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WHAT OTHERS SAY ABOUT STATES AT WORK
This is a major breakthrough in scholarly understandings of the African state.  Mas-
terly analytic chapters by the two editors unravel the complex interactions of norms 
and institutions that shape how the bureaucracies that constitute states in Africa in 
fact deliver (or don’t) goods and services. They thus manage simultaneously to trace 
out some specifically African patters of state functioning, while demystifying and 
brilliantly undercutting essentialist arguments about African “culture” or “tradition.” 
The whole is enriched with a number of specific case studies, drawing broadly across 
countries and public services. The strong case made by the editors, and illustrated by 
the case studies, of the importance of empirical ethnographic approaches to under-
standing the state in its complex realities is a methodological lesson that should be 
taught in graduate programs not only in anthropology, but in political science and 
related disciplines.
Leonardo A. Villalón, Professor of Political science and African Studies, Univer-
sity of Florida
This is an exemplary collection in the best tradition of ethnographic inquiry: theoreti-
cally astute, empirically rich, and capable of challenging pre-conceptions. It makes 
outstanding use of the comparative method to de-exoticize African bureaucrats and 
bureaucracies, while tracing the elements that have formed them. Recommended for 
readers interested in understanding states-in-practice in any corner of the globe, and 
especially important for experts bearing blueprints for state reform.
Tania Murray Li, Professor of  Anthropology, University of Toronto
While African states have attracted all kinds of labels over the last fifteen years, little schol-
arly attention has been paid to the actual working of African state agencies. This fresh and 
theoretically informed contribution, based on close empirical inspection, is a landmark 
behind which the discourse on the state in Africa should not fall back again.
Klaus Schlichte, Professor of Political Science at the University of Bremen 
This book constitutes a landmark in its efforts to rescue African states and public 
bureaucracies from a tendency to homogenize, pathologize and, above all, generalize 
on the basis of limited evidence. It squarely addresses larger theoretical questions 
about bureaucracies in general, as well as the contribution anthropology can make 
to our understanding of actual states in Africa.  The critique of some current aca-
demic fashions is provocative and will spark a debate. The plea for more empirically-
grounded reflections about how officials negotiate formal rules, and how bureaucracies 
are affected by donor-driven civil service reform, is taken up in the main body of the 
book. It represents a weighty contribution to a strangely neglected topic.
Paul Nugent, Professor of Comparative African History, Director of the Centre of 
African Studies, University of Edinburgh
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PART ONE
AFRICAN BUREAUCRACIES IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE
STUDYING THE DYNAMICS OF AFRICAN BUREAUCRACIES. 
AN INTRODUCTION TO STATES AT WORK
Thomas Bierschenk and Jean-Pierre Olivier de Sardan
State Theories and Empirical Research on Statehood1
This book aims to contribute to the academic debates on processes of 
state-building in Africa and, among development practitioners, on the 
role of the state in development, by underpinning these debates with a 
much firmer empirical grounding than is often the case in the existing 
literature. It analyses the ‘real’ workings of states and public bureaucracies 
in different African countries. A second, related objective is to define the 
public services of the Global South, and in particular Africa, as a legiti-
mate and productive object of anthropological enquiry. We argue that an 
anthropological contribution to the study of the state needs to be based on 
the discipline’s defining strength, i.e. ethnography, on a recognition that 
African states, like other states, are made up of bureaucracies and public 
employees, and that their basic, banal, routinized day-to-day functioning, 
practices and strategies warrant the interest of anthropologists as much 
as warlords, smugglers and witchdoctors. A third objective is to develop a 
more intensive dialogue in the context of the study of the state between 
anthropology and other disciplines, and show that anthropologists, in 
particular, need to engage the sociology of organization and bureaucracy 
in the North, while the latter would profit from taking the results of the 
ethnographies of states in the Global South into account.
1 We would like to thank all members of the States at Work project (see below) and 
the participants of the various panels organized by the project in Leiden in 2007, Leipzig 
in 2009, Niamey in 2009 and Uppsala in 2011 for many fruitful discussions. We also thank 
the authors of this book, and, in particular, Gerhard Anders, Isaline Bergamaschi, Hélène 
Charton, Carola Lentz, Ole Therkildsen and Chris Willott for their many comments on 
previous version of this introduction and the second chapter. The same thanks go to Jan 
Beek, Nora Brandecker, Gregor Dobler, Julia Eckert, Amanda Hammar, Mirco Göpfert, 
Nikolaus Schareika and Klaus Schlichte. It goes without saying that we are responsible for 
the remaining deficiencies of these two texts.
© Thomas Bierschenk Et al., 2014 | doi: 10.1163/9789004264960_002
This is an open access chapter distributed under the terms of the CC BY-NC 4.0 license.
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Despite the abundant academic literature on African states, little 
empirical attention has been devoted to actual ‘state apparatuses’ (in the 
sense of Althusser 1970/1976).2 Recent anthropological investigations of 
the state describe how the ‘idea’ of the state spreads in the social fabric or 
explore the state’s margins or interstices. As for political science, it is rich 
in studies that highlight the dysfunctions of African public services, but 
mainly emphasizes deviations from the official norms inspired by Western 
bureaucratic models. These deviations are frequently explained in terms 
of concepts such as clientelism and neopatrimonialism, and often with a 
culturalist bent (this is further developed in the next chapter).3
Breaking with these approaches, this book focuses on the daily func-
tioning of state services: how public servants spend their time, how teach-
ers are being trained and socialized into their jobs, how judges, policemen 
and teachers define their role in society, how they see their future and 
how they negotiate all of the conflicting demands made of them, by their 
clients, their relatives and superiors and the outside agencies that have 
increasingly defined a role for themselves in disciplining African public 
servants according to their own norms. Our book shares this focus with a 
number of studies that have been published over the past decade. Indeed, 
although African states and bureaucracies were a long-neglected field of 
research, despite some programmatic calls for more research, various 
empirical studies have been undertaken on this subject in recent years, 
many of which adopt the same perspective as the authors of this book 
(see Bierschenk and Olivier de Sardan, chapter Research paradigm, in this 
volume).
In this book, we explore the mundane practices of state-making from 
three key, inter-related points of entry: first, the ethnography of public 
servants (bureaucratic cultures and practical norms, operational routines 
in offices, career patterns and modes of appointment etc.); second, the 
delivery of public services and goods (how bureaucrats themselves per-
ceive and deliver the goods and services for which their departments 
have responsibility and how they construct their everyday relationships 
with service users); and third, the accumulation of public administration 
2 Althusser, however, was only interested in these apparatuses in terms of their domi-
nation and legitimation functions, and did not adopt an empirical and ethnographic 
perspective. 
3 This and the following paragraph are inspired by the call for papers for a thematic 
workshop at the European Conference for African Studies at Uppsala in 2011 which was 
organized by the two authors and Giorgio Blundo.
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reforms (how the different bureaucratic corps react to the ‘good gover-
nance’ discourse and new public management policies; the consequences 
of these reforms for the daily working of state bureaucracies and for the 
civil servants’ identities and modes of accountability; the space that exists 
for bottom-up micro-reforms that build on local innovations or informal 
arrangements).
Throughout the book, we adopt a broad definition of public service that 
covers the totality of public sector employment, e.g. persons employed 
by state administrations or state agencies to provide a public service. In 
our definition, the public service not only includes the civil service in the 
narrower sense of the term (e.g. employees of central administrations) 
but also public services like teaching, the police, healthcare profession-
als etc., and, moreover, independently of the institutional arrangements 
under which they are employed (e.g. tenure vs. contract).4
States at Work: Two Meanings of a Metaphor
This book addresses the question of what states do when they are working. 
The use of the metaphor ‘work’ has two dimensions that require expla-
nation. In using this term, we originally wanted to highlight the always 
incomplete nature of state formation processes and the ‘cobbled together’ 
(bricolé or gebastelt) nature of ‘state’, that is its heterogeneity. This idea 
translates metaphorically into English as ‘states at work’, through a play 
on the familiar ‘men at work’ signs used on roads in many Anglophone 
countries.
The metaphor refers to a building site, but a particular type, one that is 
more often found in Africa than, say, in Germany or France. Any observer 
will know that in many places in Africa, construction sites in particular 
for private homes may exist for many years. To the untrained eye, they 
may even look like abandoned sites. However, closer inspection usually 
reveals that there are, in fact, people on the site. The initial temptation is 
to assume that they are squatters, however, in most cases, they are the 
owners. And suddenly, out of the blue, a truck arrives with sand and cement, 
a room is added to the half-finished building, a wall goes up, or make-shift 
4 The ‘public service’ vs. ‘civil service’ definition problem is discussed in Evans (2008: 
33f.). Public services in the modern sense were established in Prussia and France in the 
18th century, and in France they were the basis for Napoleonic reforms that transformed 
the royal service into the civil service. The term ‘civil service’ itself was first used in British-
India (Osborne 1994). The United States’ law on civil service examinations was passed in 
1883, however, it did not cover 90 per cent of all federal public servants until 1990 (Raad-
schelders and Rutgers 1996).
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windows are replaced with glass ones. Of course, these particular trajec-
tories of African building sites have to do with two hard economic facts 
of many African economies: there are very few investment opportunities 
outside construction, and the banking and credit sector works very badly. 
So people have to wait until they get their hands on some money before 
they start building, and then they have to wait again until they can set a 
little money aside before they continue construction. And while the years 
go by, the family grows, relatives move in, some parts of the building have 
to be rented out and the original plan for the building does not make sense 
any more. Hence, a room is added here, a toilet there; what was planned 
as a guest room is turned into a dressmaker’s shop; many rooms are left 
unpainted for the time being; and what was once planned as a bungalow 
becomes a three-storey house. And, again, more often than not, the first 
floor might be already inhabited while the second awaits finishing and the 
third barely has half of its walls. So the house is very different to the way it 
was originally conceived and looks like an unfinished, apparently perpetual 
building site where construction, repair, abandonment and re-purposing 
proceed simultaneously, with the inhabitants not always agreeing on what 
to use the building for, the different parts of the site apparently having had 
completely different architects, some from the inhabitants of the site, some 
from outside the site; and these different architects often disagree both with 
each other and with (some of ) the inhabitants about what the buildings 
should be used for and how it should be used.
This metaphor helps us to think the state as a site of contention, not 
only between competing actors and competing organizations, but also 
between competing normative ideas. Max Weber’s ideal type of bureau-
cracy (see below) functions as one, but only one of these blueprints; 
another one was recently proposed by the New Public Management 
school (see below). These masterplans come in different variants and 
forms; they not only compete with, but also inform each other. The meta-
phor has the advantage that it helps us to see that there are not just actors, 
practices, processes and negotiation, but there are also structures, insti-
tutions and materiality. Once a part of the building has been erected, it 
stands there; it can, of course, be put to a different use to that intended 
by the builder, however its particular shape favours certain uses and 
creates  disadvantages—costs—for others. And if it is decided to tear it 
down because the owner’s plans have changed, that requires efforts and 
resources—all of which promotes routines, compromises, make-shift 
solutions and bricolage.
Thus, the metaphor of states and public services as the construction sites 
of overlapping projects led by different actors refers to both the incom-
pleteness of state-building processes and the heterogeneity and (always) 
improvised nature of statehood. We proceed from the premise that the 
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processes of state formation in Africa were not completed once and for 
all with the establishment of the colonial states, with the achievement 
of the independence of these countries, or with the recent emergence of 
democratic regimes. If one considers, from a Weberian perspective, the 
institutionalization of (a monopoly of ) violence, the local anchoring of 
central power and the self-limitation of the rulers qua codification of the 
law as the core of the development of the modern Western-type state, 
state-building processes are never-ending. However, this characteristic 
does not set contemporary African states apart from others: incomple-
tion, fragility and reversibility are universal features of state- building pro-
cesses. Statehood in Europe has in fact been described as a building site 
(Tzermias 2011).5 Hence, we only wish to point out a relative difference 
of stateness between Africa and Europe, inasmuch as the building-site 
character of the state in many African examples is particularly striking. 
The state is a vanishing point of macro-historical processes everywhere—
a vanishing point that by its very nature is never attained and processes 
that can always be deflected and (at least partly) reversed.
There is also a second dimension to the work metaphor, which is 
inspired by the 19th century German sociologist and social historian 
Lorenz von Stein. To explain this, a short review of the history of Euro-
pean thinking on the state is in order. In contemporary debates on states 
in Africa, it is frequently forgotten that even the most general theories 
of the state arose in specific local and historical contexts.6 These general 
theories, which emerge from particular historical conditions, have created 
different traditions of thinking about the state which, in turn, colour the 
general attitudes and empirical approaches of present-day social scien-
tists to states and statehood. For even when doing purely empirical work 
on the state, researchers write from a particular philosophical position. 
In this sense, their writing is localized. In fact, to extend an idea pre-
sented in Fardon (1990), their writing is doubly localized: by the position 
from which they write, and by the empirical data on which they write. 
We argue that the current debates on statehood in Africa also need to be 
5 The metaphor of a ‘building site’ has been variously used for describing a political, 
social, cultural or intellectual project and its often incomplete and incoherent implemen-
tation. In contemporary African studies, it has been deployed by Leimdorfer and Marie 
(2003) to refer to urban civil societies ‘in the making’.
6 Forgotten, for example by Sharma and Gupta (2006). Their chapter on ‘theoretical 
genealogies’ contains texts by Weber, Foucault, Gramsci and others which are entirely 
stripped of historical references and information about the production conditions of the 
texts presented and the specific analytical interests of their authors. Cf. Bierschenk (2009).
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read against the background of these very different philosophical posi-
tions from which authors write, and that it is better to make one’s position 
clear. Our own perspective is localized in an empirical tradition (à la von 
Stein) and focuses on actors’ practices, it is informed by a typological per-
spective (à la Weber), and it assumes a non-normative position towards 
the state as an institution with potentialities for development, the defense 
of civil freedoms and the weak against the poor, social promotion and 
service delivery, as well as for repression, clientelism and bureaucratic 
mismanagement.
The Historical Contexts of Theories of the State
Modern Western political theory was built on the concept of the state: 
the state was viewed by European political philosophers as a necessary 
solution for creating order in modern societies (Bartelson 2001). How-
ever, Western state philosophy is not a unified and homogeneous body of 
thinking. Two major traditions may be distinguished (Waldmann 2005): 
marked by the experience of the English Civil War, philosophers like 
Hobbes and Locke saw the state as an institution that was necessary to 
protect the citizens against internal discord and armed conflict. In this 
function, it was no more than an unavoidable phenomenon, a necessary 
evil. This corresponds to a particular ‘genetic constellation’ of state, civil 
society and the rule of law, by which the state faces barriers to its actions 
that are erected by the citizens and that it cannot ignore at will. Wolfgang 
Reinhard (2005) has termed this as “states-before-the-law” (Staaten vor 
dem Recht). Through the American Revolution, this tradition of consen-
sus and voluntary association against the state gained global importance. 
In recent debates on the state in Africa, both the mistrust of the interna-
tional finance institutions towards the state as expressed in the so-called 
Washington Consensus as well as James Scott’s (1998) fundamental cri-
tique of the state need to be read as a reflection of this particular, Ameri-
can, philosophical tradition. In fact, it is in the fundamental mistrust of 
the state that very opposed ideological positions like neo-liberalism and 
erudite anarchism à la Scott find common ground. These approaches 
generalize a specific US-American historical experience of a weak state, 
which often fails at the imposition of justice: in the American experience, 
justice is, more often than not, created by private actors in the absence of 
a state (Gumpert 2010: 162–173).
The historical experience of the continental powers of France, Prussia/
Germany and Spain was different: strong absolutist regimes developed 
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here that ruled through authoritarian laws. Only at a later moment in his-
tory, when states had firmly established the monopolies of violence and 
taxation, did they concede rights to civil society, which they controlled 
and disciplined. This gradually led to a self-binding of the state by the 
rule of law, including, in particular, the banning of state arbitrariness. This 
may be termed “states-in-law” (Staaten im Recht).
Consequently, continental European philosophers had a much more 
positive image of the state than their Anglo-Saxon counterparts. This is 
most striking in the case of Hegel (1821/1972) who saw in the state, and 
especially in its Prussian variant, the contradictions of modern societies 
harmoniously resolved (aufgehoben). For him, the state—as ‘concrete 
 reality’—is reasonable (vernünftig) per se. Against the historical back-
ground of the Prussian bureaucracy, Hegel also recognized the importance 
of loyal civil servants for the state. However, in line with his anthropo-
morphisizing view of history—the state was for him conceivable only as 
embodied in one person—, he was more interested in public servants and 
their value orientations as members of the ‘general estate’ (allgemeiner 
Stand, which for him also included teachers, doctors and lawyers) than in 
the organization of public services as such. The latter were of no particu-
lar philosophical interest to him.7
In other words, the representations of the state proposed by philoso-
phers and social scientists are always rooted to a greater or lesser extent in 
a particular context that constitutes a kind of latent reference point. This 
reference point may be constructed on the basis of second-order analysis 
of empirical studies, but it is also not infrequently based on implicit expe-
rience, common-sense knowledge and largely shared stereotypes which 
are characteristic of a specific space-time and act as an ‘infrastructure’ 
for the theories of state (for an example, see Hegel’s [1840/1986: 152–163] 
highly stereotyped and negative image of Africa).
The Hegelian state-fixated and totalizing idealism, however, did not 
remain unchallenged, not even in Germany. It was Lorenz von Stein 
7 Hegel’s appreciation of the Prussian bureaucracy should not be misinterpreted as con-
doning the absolutist tendencies of the Prussian state of his time, of which he was quite 
critical. Cf. Avineri (1972). While Hegel could be seen as the theoretician of the continental 
European, and more particularly Prussian, pathway to modern statehood, it should not be 
overlooked that some parts of continental Europa were sites of alternative trajectories, 
which resembled the Anglo-Saxon model more, e.g. Switzerland and, to a certain extent, 
the Netherlands (Kappel, Tobler and Waldmann 2005).
10 thomas bierschenk and jean-pierre olivier de sardan
(1943)8 who observed that Hegel’s notion of the state was limited to sym-
bolic acts—like a coronation ceremony—in which state actors expressed 
an authoritative idea of the state, or to government decrees in which (to 
adopt modern terminology) a policy was formulated. However, these state 
acts (von Stein calls them “deeds”) only become effective if they are imple-
mented, for which von Stein used the term “work”. This work of the state 
is done by the public service (in von Stein’s terminology: the administra-
tion). In other words, in contradiction of Hegel’s idealistic theory of state, 
von Stein pleaded for an empirical study of the public service, as it is the 
public service—the state “at work” (der arbeitende Staat)—in its empiri-
cally existing form that is the real power centre of the state.9
Max Weber and the Ideal-Type of Bureaucracy
Von Stein’s focus on the real state is not only a critique of Hegel, but also 
an anticipated, and very necessary, complement to the ideal type of the 
bureaucracy which Max Weber (1921/1972, cf. Treiber 2007) presented 
decades later. In a way, Weber rather shared Hegel’s admiration for the 
technical efficiency of ‘bureaucratic rule’. In his ideal type—which was 
also inspired by Prussia where this ideal type form appeared for him in 
the ‘purest’ form—the bureaucracy presents as a well-functioning, effec-
tive machinery of domination.
For Weber, bureaucratic rule appeared in its purest form in Western Europe 
and in particular in Prussia, and in the guise of public bureaucracies. How-
ever, bureaucracies are also found outside administration in the narrow 
sense of the term, for example in the military and universities. They also 
exist outside the state in large-scale capitalist enterprises, the churches and 
in political parties. Measured against the ideal type, historical and contem-
porary ‘real’ types can be identified. Historically, proto-forms of bureaucracy 
existed, for example, in Egypt (where the New Kingdom is “the historical 
model of all later bureaucracies”, p. 54), the Roman Principate of the Roman 
Catholic Church, and Classical China. These proto-forms were always threat-
ened by mediating tendencies, e.g. the tendency for officials to either have 
direct recourse to tributaries or for the ruler to transfer the power to tax 
8 This short work is a collection of von Stein’s central arguments which were first pub-
lished in his eight volumes of ‘Verwaltungslehre’ (first edition 1865) and then condensed 
from 1870 in his three-volume ‘Handbook of Public Administration’.
9 Although his writings were more programmatic than empirical, von Stein is consid-
ered today as one of the founders of empirical policy studies (Staats- und Verwaltungswis-
senschaften). He did not really undertake empirical research on the state in the proper 
sense himself (Seibel 2008; cf. also Derlien 2008).
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to individuals with the resulting phenomenon of the purchase of office. A 
developed bureaucracy can always regress to these forms of prebendal and 
feudal administration (p. 54f.).
Weber was particularly interested in the comparison of these proto-
bureaucracies (of the “traditional” or “patrimonial” type) with modern 
bureaucracy. Much of his reflection on the forms of domination or legiti-
macy concerned not so much the relationship between political authorities 
(kings, lords, despots, democratic governments) with their populations but 
rather the relationship of the former with their administrative bodies. Of 
particular interest to him were those factors which, in different historical 
contexts, might explain the obedience of these administrative bodies to the 
political authorities (cf. Bruhns 2011).
But he was also interested in contemporary variants of bureaucratic 
rules which diverge from the ideal type, like those constituted by the US-
American principle of the election of public officials. In other words, ‘real’ 
bureaucracy, according to Weber, can develop along specific trajectories 
which cannot be predicted from the ideal-type.
Furthermore, the ‘chance for the existence’ of bureaucracies is predicated 
on a series of social conditions. In the case of modern bureaucracy (Weber 
1921/1972: 54ff.), these are a money economy, the availability of continuous 
revenue via a stable system of taxation, and, in its more highly developed 
form, the existence of a capitalist market economy and the “conceptual 
separation of the ‘state’, as an abstract bearer of sovereign prerogatives and 
the creator of legal norms, from all personal authority of individuals” (p. 66). 
Bureaucratization and state formation are mutually linked: “it was left to the 
complete depersonalization of administrative management by bureaucracy 
and the rational systematization of law to realize the separation of the pub-
lic and the private sphere fully and in principle” (p. 67). At a later historical 
stage, social welfare policies and, to an extent, mass democracy were strong 
accelerators of bureaucratization.
However, Weber did not share Hegel’s optimism about progress which 
the latter had projected on the state: in the face of the alienation that is 
produced by the bureaucracy as an extreme form of Western rationalism, 
his work is pervaded by a deep melancholy.
Weber was fascinated by the pervasive tendency of bureaucracy in 
modern societies and the “ever-increasing importance of experts and spe-
cialized knowledge” (p. 69).10 Bureaucracy, as he saw it, is the typical form 
of domination in modern societies (their “fate”, p. 63); as a consequence, 
the bureaucratic state is the most accomplished form of state. The success 
of bureaucratic domination stems from its “technical superiority” (pp. 56 
et al.): “precision, speed, unambiguity, knowledge of the files, continuity, 
10 Translations from Weber are by Thomas Bierschenk.
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discretion, unity, strict subordination, reduction of friction and of mate-
rial and personal costs—these are elevated to the optimum point in the 
strictly bureaucratic administration” (p. 62). Once bureaucratic rule is 
established, it stays in place and cannot be challenged, neither by the ruler, 
nor the ruled, nor the bureaucrats themselves: The “objective indispens-
ability of the once-existing apparatus . . . makes ‘revolution’, in the sense 
of the forceful creation of entirely new formations of authority, more and 
more impossible” (p. 63).
Weber established a set of defining characteristics of bureaucratic rule 
(pp. 49ff.):11 the delineation of an official jurisdictional area by a bureau-
cratic agency; rule-based office management and execution of tasks, in 
particular the application of coercive means, “without regard for persons” 
(p. 58) (in fact, “the more it is ‘dehumanized’, the more completely it suc-
ceeds in eliminating love, hatred and all purely personal, irrational and 
emotional elements that evade calculation, the more perfectly bureau-
cracy develops”, p. 58); office hierarchy, monocratic rule and channels of 
appeal based on written documentation (Schriftförmigkeit); separation of 
the bureau from the private domicile of the official, of public from private 
monies and equipment; recruitment and promotion based on general rules 
concerning specialized training (expert knowledge); a fixed monetary sal-
ary and old-age pension; promotion according to fixed career lines, based 
on seniority and/or examinations; full-time activity, life tenure (at least 
in public bureaucracies) secured against arbitrary dismissal (which is the 
material base for the “independence” of the bureaucrat); office holding as 
an abstract vocation (Beruf ) as distinct from loyalty to a particular ruler.
Bureaucracy as a particular social form also requires a particular type 
of social actor, the official (Beamter) (pp. 53ff.) The particular “person-
ality type of the professional expert” differs from that of the “cultivated 
man” of earlier epochs (pp. 67ff.). The Beamten owe their position to hav-
ing successfully passed a technical exam, and they consider their profes-
sional activity not as a social position (or a job) but as a vocation. They 
form a specific status group striving for social esteem who tend to iden-
tify their interests with those of the public. This makes the bureaucracy 
into “an ethical class, one that embodies and exemplifies a model of ethi-
cal conduct based on the spirit of public service” (Osborne 1994: 302). 
Bureaucratic vocation creates a particular bureaucratic persona, for it 
11 However, these characteristics fit the middle and lower ranks of bureaucracies better 
than the higher ones (Weber 1921/1972: 53).
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“presupposes an ethical formation . . . on the part of the bureaucrat . . . as 
opposed to a more or less blind obedience to rules and orders” (ibid.: 309). 
Only on this ethical basis can the bureaucrat exercise discretion, a neces-
sary complement to the application of his expertise. Therefore, working 
in a government office is not just a job but the participation in an “order 
of life” (Lebensordnung). At the same time, job security and social esteem 
allow relatively low wages.
What Weber does here is to define “structural principles” that are dif-
ferent from “all of the types existing in the real world” (Weber 1921/1972: 
69ff.), where these organizational principles are, in fact, fluid and overlap. 
“Their ‘pure types’, after all, shall be considered as border cases which are 
of special and indispensable analytical value, and bracket historical real-
ity which almost always appears in mixed forms” (ibid.). In other words, 
bureaucracy as a social form as defined by Weber is an ideal type, an ana-
lytical category, not something to be found in reality as such. If it refers 
to empirical phenomena, it mainly refers to the world-view of (Prussian) 
bureaucrats themselves (Hilbert 1987). In any case, it is not the direct 
result of empirical research on actual practices of state actors as called 
for by Lorenz von Stein. For although the ‘interpretive’ (sinnverstehend) 
process advocated by Weber provides a label for the defence of qualita-
tive approaches and the need to take the ‘point of view of the actor’ into 
account, it was always hypothetical for Weber and he never applied it 
himself on the basis of empirical studies (cf. Olivier de Sardan 2008: chap-
ter ‘emique’).
It is important to underline this point, for a widespread misunderstand-
ing of Weber’s methodology exists: his concepts are ideal types, e.g. they 
are analytical categories which in his understanding are clearly not real 
objects, but yard-sticks with which to ‘profile’ real objects. Weber himself 
speaks of a “chance of a specific type of behaviour” which his ideal-types 
indicate: in other words, the ideal-type of bureaucracy only connotes the 
“chance of its own existence”. The empirical punch-line is that there are 
different gradients of the existence of bureaucracies and states, rang-
ing from the hypothetical extremes of complete non-existence to com-
plete existence. Hence, to claim that a given bureaucracy, say an African 
bureaucracy, does not conform to Weber’s ideal type of bureaucracy, is 
a sociological banality, and would certainly not come as a surprise to 
Weber himself. The particular, empirical, features of a given bureaucracy 
cannot be used to ‘disprove’ the Weberian model—a model can only be 
critiqued with another model. As Weber says: “It does not provide any 
difficulty for sociology to acknowledge the parallel validity of different, 
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mutually contradicting orders within the same circle of people. For even 
the individual can direct his actions according to contradictory princi-
ples. For sociology, there is no absolute alternative between the validity 
(Geltung) and the non-validity (Nicht-Geltung) of a particular order. 
Instead, fluid transitions exist between both cases, and, as noted, con-
tradictory orders can exist in parallel to each other, each . . . to the degree 
that action (das Handeln) is indeed oriented to them.” (Weber 1921/1972: 
16f.). In other words, the ‘existence‘ of a state is predicated on the exis-
tence of certain types of social behaviour—when these practices cease to 
exist, the ‘state’ likewise ceases to exist (ibid.: 13).
A Post-Weberian Perspective on the State
To sum up, even a cursory glance at the history of political thinking in 
the ‘West’ reveals a wide range of positions: from state scepticism to state 
idealism to approaches that are more interested in the empirical reality of 
states. Inspired by Abrams’s (1977/1988) critique of neo-Marxist theories 
of the state, these distinctions have recently been reformulated by Migdal 
and Schlichte (2005) as the difference between state-idea and state- 
practices, that is between the “image of the state” and the “practices of 
the state” (pp. 14–15) and between “seeing the state” and “doing the state”. 
“The state”, they write, “is a field of power marked by the use and threat of 
violence and shaped by 1) the image of a coherent, controlling organiza-
tion in a territory, which is a representation of the people bounded by that 
territory, and 2) the actual practices involving those staffing its multiple 
parts and those they engage in their roles as state officials” (p. 15).
On the one hand, a global image exists today of the modern state “as 
singular, supreme rule-maker, as separate or bounded, and as a represen-
tation . . . as the dominant and single centre of authority” (p. 16). But the 
idea of the state does not need to match actual current state practices. On 
the contrary, the image of a coherent and autonomous state can certainly 
coexist with practices which leave much space to various social groups in 
fields that are ‘properly’ attributed to the state (e.g. ranging from security 
services to education). In addition, “while some state actors themselves 
may employ practices that strengthen the image of the state, others may 
employ those that weaken the image” (p. 19).
Therefore, within what is commonly referred to as ‘the state’, there 
exists a tension between the homogenising idea of the state—which may 
be shared by opposite normative perspectives, statist and anti-statist—
and heterogeneous state practices. From the perspective of this book, 
the ‘state’ should be seen not as an entity but as a bundle of practices 
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and processes in a field of complex powers (for a similar perspective, see 
Schuppert 2010). And such processes can run in different directions with 
diverse effects. For example, they can move in the direction of strengthen-
ing the image of the state, or in the direction of weakening the state image. 
In other words, they can manifest as processes (and practices) of ‘étatisa-
tion’ or of ‘dé-étatisation’. From this perspective, ‘the state’ is the result of 
social closure and compromise in the battle of conflicting interests.
The methodological conclusion—which informs the contributions to 
this book—is to aim to produce ethnographies of the state and thereby 
concentrate on ‘doing the state’ or on state-making (and un-making) 
practices. The focus is not on a bounded research object—‘the state’ as a 
clearly definable unit of analysis—but on ethnographic investigations of 
the properties of the phenomena, processes and practices connected to 
state institutions, state authority and the state provision of services and 
goods, that is their ‘stateness’ or state quality.
This is not to suggest that the object of the ‘state’ is so continually fluid 
in its endlessly reshaping composition that it cannot be empirically inves-
tigated. The question of what constitutes the state can instead be refor-
mulated as the question about the conditions, under which—historically 
and geographically specific—temporary condensations of these practices 
and the stabilization of certain patterns and meanings take place.
Many authors have highlighted the fact that the role of the state has 
undergone considerable changes in the last 40 years. In reference to the 
Global North, some authors speak of a ‘golden age’ of the national demo-
cratic capitalist welfare state—roughly during the period between the end 
of the Second World War and the 1970s—which has unravelled since. It 
is less obvious whether there is an overarching tendency in this unravel-
ling. Some authors claim an increasing hegemony of a “neoliberal project” 
(Comaroff and Comaroff 2001, Chalfin 2010).12 However, empirical research 
on the transformation of the state in Europe (Zürn and Leibfried 2005; 
Derlien and Peters 2008, 2009) points instead to ‘asymmetrical change’, 
e.g. transformations which go in very different directions, depending on 
which dimension of statehood is being envisaged. While nation-states 
continue to cling to tax revenues and the monopoly of the use of force, 
12 The interest in the ‘neoliberal project’ can become an obsession among some anthro-
pologists, e.g. when the journal Cultural Anthropology decides to devote one issue per year 
(out of four) exclusively to this topic (http://www.culanth.org/?q=node/2 [11.2.2013]). For a 
nuanced and empirically grounded approach see the discussion between Wacquant, Hilgers, 
and others in Social Anthropology 20 and 21 (2012 and 2013). See also Olivier de Sardan 
(2011a) and the other contributions in Politique Africaine no. 123 on Chalfin’s (2010) book.
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the rule of law appears to be moving, at least partly and depending on 
the sector of law in question, into the international arena. The welfare 
dimension of the state, by contrast, is headed in every direction, includ-
ing privatization, internationalization, supra-nationalization, and defence 
of the national status quo, again depending on the sector and country in 
question. As for the democratic legitimacy of political processes, how it 
will be ensured in such an incoherent situation remains unclear.
Nevertheless, many authors agree that the state is no longer the only 
carrier of effective government (if it ever was), and that it is increasingly 
confronted with other actors, with which it is in overlapping and complex 
relations of conflict, negotiation, alliance, compromise, avoidance, etc. 
(Hagmann and Péclard 2010, Eckert, Behrends and Dafinger 2012). Vari-
ous key terms have been proposed in order to account for these changes, 
for example the ‘pluralization of governance’ and ‘fragmentation’ (or 
‘overlapping’) of sovereignty (Randeria 2007, Benda-Beckmann, Benda-
Beckmann and Eckert 2009). With regard to Africa, most authors writing 
today on politics and the state assume, in one form or another and using 
various terminologies, a plurality of power centres within and adjacent 
to, and partially intertwined with the state. In the Africanist debate, the 
concepts used range from ‘polycephaly’ (Bierschenk and Olivier de Sardan 
2003, orig. in French 1997) and ‘para-sovereignty’ (Parastaatlichkeit) 
(Trotha and Rösel 1999) to ‘twilight institutions’ (Lund 2007), ‘heterarchy’ 
(Bellagamba and Klute 2008) and different ‘modes of governance’ (Olivier 
de Sardan 2011b). Other authors have described the delegation of state 
functions to private actors (Hibou 2004). Therefore, in many cases several 
actors are quite frequently involved in the delivery of public services in 
Africa today: state administrations, international actors such as NGOs and 
international donor organizations, community-based organizations, and 
private companies (Blundo and Le Meur 2009; for a similar perspective 
beyond Africa, see Tendler 1997).
While these observations—which are confirmed by the contributions to 
this book—relativize the role of the state in regulation and public service 
delivery, they also confirm that state agencies remain strong, although not 
exclusive, actors in these fields.
Anthropology and the Modern State in Africa
The primary objective of this book is to provide new knowledge on state 
apparatuses and their actors in Africa. However, the ethnographic scrutiny 
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of state phenomena, which we advocate in this book, also claims to make 
an original contribution to research on the state in general as well as to 
the discipline of anthropology.
A Contribution to Studies of the State
Studies on modern forms of the state are the preserve of political science, 
the sociology of organizations and administrative science. It is through its 
method that anthropology can contribute added value. Admittedly, this 
discipline no longer has a monopoly on fieldwork carried out in its natural 
setting; qualitative methods are increasingly employed by sociologists and 
political scientists, even if only by a very small minority. However, these 
methods owe their existence largely to anthropology, even if it could be 
argued that participant observation was a parallel invention by anthro-
pology and qualitative sociology, e.g. the Chicago school (itself largely 
influenced by anthropological inquiry). The approach used by most con-
tributors to this book has been to apply the fieldwork practices routinely 
used by anthropologists to topics that originate in the political sciences 
and the sociology of organizations, and to do this in an African context, 
which is rarely the focus of such perspectives. Such an approach has yet 
to become established, despite the fact that it opens up new lines of ques-
tioning and new forms of knowledge, especially when it systematically 
takes actors’ viewpoints into account, observes their actual practices and 
undertakes in-depth case studies or analyses of interactions in situ.
We also argue that the studies we have conducted in an African context 
can make a positive contribution to studies undertaken in other contexts 
and on other continents. To put it a little differently, the findings pre-
sented in the following chapters can, to a certain extent and in certain 
respects, be ‘exported’ elsewhere from Africa, or ‘translated’ into other 
contexts and initiate a dialogue with research on the state in the coun-
tries of the North.
Why is this so? Fundamentally and paradoxically because African states 
are both similar to European states and, at the same time, different.
One of the premises of the studies assembled in this book is precisely 
that practices in Africa and in Europe do not differ in nature. Many Africa 
specialists think the opposite, and claim incompatibility between the state 
of western origin and ‘African culture’ (for a critique of such claims, see 
Olivier de Sardan 2010). Whatever the argumentations of these believers 
in the irreducible specificity of Africa, they are all based on the same—
and admittedly well-founded—observation, namely, the existence of 
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significant divergences between the ‘imported’ state (Badie 1992), suppos-
edly of the Weberian kind, on the one hand, and the real African state, in 
which the practices of public employees are far removed from the public 
norms, on the other.
However, irrespective of their location, all practices in all modern states 
display both permanent and multi-faceted disparities between the official 
model, which state actors are supposed to follow, and actual behaviour. 
This is a common feature of all organizations, be they public or private. 
In Africa as in Europe, all public bureaucracies are permeated by ten-
sions between prescribed and real conduct, between official and practi-
cal norms, between organizational charts and professional cultures, and 
between public policies and their implementation. Bureaucracies are, 
without exception, subject to a host of contradictory directives. Compet-
ing rationales, overlapping power structures, shifting alliances and differ-
ent conflicts clash endlessly.
This does not mean, of course, that the substance, scale, style and 
nature of these tensions, directives, rationales, alliances and conflicts are 
identical in Africa and Europe. Quite the reverse: the contexts in which 
they occur are different, as are the issues and strategies. The codes, 
points of reference, forms of non-verbal communication and social norms 
diverge.
However, the investigation of African and non-African forms of state-
hood using the same analytical concepts and the same methods enables 
interesting comparisons. Certain forms of behaviour in the context of the 
state that are less pronounced in Europe, and hence barely discernible, 
assume such proportions in Africa that they could not, as it were, escape 
the attention of either citizens or researchers. The many kinds of corrupt 
transactions are a significant case in point, another being the role of per-
sonal connections within the working environment (Blundo and Olivier 
de Sardan, with Bako-Arifari and Tidjani Alou 2006). These practices 
are universal in African states, and are not difficult to spot for those 
who look closely enough. Hence it is relatively easier for a researcher 
to access them in Africa. They are also present in Europe, of course, but 
much better hidden or disguised. Therefore, it is clearly in the interests 
of researchers working on European bureaucracies to familiarize them-
selves with the findings of anthropologists studying African bureaucracies. 
The specificity of the practices engaged in by public employees in Africa 
highlights forms of behaviour that are more difficult to detect in Europe, 
either because they occur on a smaller scale or because they take a dif-
ferent form.
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The informality of practices is another example. This is omnipresent in 
Africa in the area of the economy and is a favourite object of anthropo-
logical investigation; it is difficult to conduct investigations on informal 
practices other than by ethnographic surveys. However, informality does 
not only exist outside the state, it is also firmly entrenched in state mecha-
nisms themselves (cf. Olivier de Sardan, Bierschenk, this volume) and can 
be enlisted (as in the contributions to this book) in the analysis of the 
informal processes internal to the public services in all their diversity. This 
approach is in stark contrast to the culturalist analyses of those African 
specialists who interpret every informal practice as the outcome of an 
‘African world view’. The approach can no doubt be used to advantage in 
Northern countries, too, and enables interesting comparisons to be made 
between North and South, as well as East and West. The close resem-
blance between post-colonial and post-communist countries is striking in 
this respect, in this area as in others (Bayart 1996, 2004, Hibou 2011).
The entanglement of multiple rationales in heterogeneous public 
arenas provides a final example for the comparative study of African 
and non-African statehood, and one that is highlighted in the studies 
featured in this volume. Public action brings together not only public 
servants and service users, all with their own rationales, objectives and 
strategies, but also chiefs, patrons, development projects, priests, min-
isters and imams, development agents, NGOs, experts and consultants, 
bilateral cooperative ventures, international organizations, etc. Here, too, 
our perspective is different from those of the culturalist Africanists, who 
promote a single rationale (more often than not, of the neo-patrimonial 
kind). In this respect, also, our approach can bear fruit in non-African 
contexts, by underlining the multiplicity of ‘strategic groups’ (Evers and 
Schiel 1988; Bierschenk and Olivier de Sardan 1997) that intervene not 
only in the bureaucracies themselves but also in the environments with 
which they interact, the diversity of modes of governance delivering or 
co-delivering services (Olivier de Sardan, this volume) and the multiplic-
ity of logics and strategies that individual public agents follow, in both the 
Global North and the Global South.
A Contribution to Anthropology
However, this comparative venture concerning the modern state, to which 
we are seeking to contribute, also entails a plea for a new relationship 
between anthropology and the other social sciences, as well as for innova-
tions within anthropology itself.
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For reasons that are both historical and institutional, anthropology 
is inclined to be self-referential and inward-looking. In celebrating the 
uniqueness of its method, its approach and objects, especially when 
the latter are perceived—by Europeans—as ‘exotic’, and in adopting a 
culturalist stance, it all too often forgets that other social sciences have 
dealt with the same objects or conducted the same kind of research in 
different areas.
In this book, we have attempted to correct this trajectory, as far as pos-
sible, by engaging in a wide-ranging dialogue with history, sociology and 
political science, not only when they deal with the state, its machinery and 
its practices in an African context (which, sadly, is all too infrequently), 
but also when they deal with these objects in a European or American 
context (which is the norm) (Bierschenk and Olivier de Sardan, Research 
Paradigm, this volume).
Oddly, and one need only glance through the bibliographies of the 
anthropological works currently in favour to conclude that, when it comes 
to other disciplines, anthropology is more inclined to align itself with phi-
losophy, especially political philosophy, than with its closest disciplinary 
(and empirically-oriented) neighbours. It is as though many anthropolo-
gists preferred the ethereal realms of highly generalized, speculative forms 
of interpretation to empirically grounded and methodically controlled 
forms of comparativism applied to specific historical configurations. One 
sometimes gets the feeling that as anthropology has increasingly shied 
away from the essentialization of its traditional objects of study (e.g. 
‘primitive cultures’), it has become prone to essentializing certain general 
concepts—like ‘neopatrimonialism’ or ‘neoliberalism’—which are consid-
ered not as emerging from actors’ practices, but as having a reality of their 
own (Carrier 1992).
There is obviously no question of banning all dialogue with philosophy 
but instead of promoting, as a matter of priority, a different kind of dia-
logue, a dialogue with the empirical social sciences which investigate the 
same objects in the Northern hemisphere as contemporary anthropology 
in the South. This would involve a triple dialogue: anthropology’s dialogue 
with history, sociology and political science; dialogue between Africanist 
and non-Africanist researchers; and dialogue between researchers from 
the North and the South. It would also mean the delineation of an agenda 
for anthropology generally (and not only the anthropology of the state): in 
the vast majority of cases, anthropology now studies social processes and 
empirical objects that are typical of the contemporary world, everywhere, 
and it should draw the methodological consequences from this.
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The anthropology of the contemporary world—of which the anthro-
pology of the state is a part—is increasingly faced with the challenge of 
analysing ‘transversal objects’. By this term, which we borrow from the 
historian Espagne (2012), we understand relatively bounded empirical 
phenomena which are a result of transfer processes that took place in 
the past in the context of European imperialism and colonization. Mod-
ern state bureaucracies, which are under investigation in this book, are a 
prime example of transversal objects. In the classical phase of ethnograph-
ically-based anthropology, when Malinowski analysed the social functions 
of an exotic institution like the Kula ring, or Evans-Pritchard the social 
embedding of Azande witchcraft beliefs, researchers, all of them west-
ern ethnographers, were faced with empirical phenomena which were, a 
priori, unknown to them, and of which they had to make sense. Today, in 
the presence of transversal objects, the boundaries between the known 
and the unknown are drawn differently, and ethnographers are no longer 
exclusively Westerners. In fact, they belong to a globalized body of experts 
who are confronted with a set of institutions and organizations that are 
spread throughout the world, and who are (or should be) in constant dia-
logue with other experts from other disciplines and professions.
While the temptation in some academic circles in the political or 
administrative sciences is to view these institutions in the South from the 
confines of a (ethnocentric) Northern conceptual framework and from a 
universalistic perspective (similar to the way in which, for example, many 
comparative political studies rely on quantitative data), in contrast, the 
temptation for many anthropologists working in Southern countries, is to 
exoticize or essentialize these objects from a particularistic perspective. 
We argue that the study of transversal objects requires systematic “recip-
rocal comparison” (Austen 2007: 10 and passim). What is needed, there-
fore, is the development of a ‘symmetrical’ social science that consigns the 
both epistemic and methodological ‘great divide’ (Latour 1983) between 
‘Them’ and ‘Us’, South and North, Africa and Europe to history, and at the 
same time allows for the relativity of particular ‘Northern’ perspectives.
At the same time, however, this implies the adoption of a different 
approach to the making of comparisons. Traditional anthropological com-
parativism was concerned with closed systems (cultures and societies)—
which should be considered as passé. Contemporary anthropological 
comparativism, more often than not, is quick at establishing direct if frag-
ile connections between anecdotal local observations and theories of the 
global. We are advocating a third type of comparativism, which spreads 
progressively outwards from a solid empirical base: (a) an intensive, 
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multi-site comparativism pursued in the field (for an appropriate meth-
odology, see Bierschenk and Olivier de Sardan 1997); (b) a comparativism 
based on regional and thematic affinities, comparing similar institutions 
in historically related local and national contexts (such as bureaucracies 
in Africa, to take the present volume as an example); (c) a wider level of 
comparison involving similar processes in very different historical or spa-
tial contexts (such as the police in Benin and in Germany).
An important methodological consequence needs to be stressed here. 
As soon as anthropology begins to take an interest in modern societies 
or the modernity of societies, in Africa as elsewhere, it is to its advantage 
to develop teamwork in research, thereby enabling the optimum imple-
mentation of these three levels of comparativism. This, of course, means 
breaking the strongly individual mould of the discipline.
The studies collected in this book are a step in this direction.
Presentation of the Book
This book grew out of an international comparative research project enti-
tled “States at Work: Public Services and Civil Servants in West Africa: 
Education and Justice in Benin, Ghana, Mali and Niger”, which was 
funded through a programme of the Volkswagen Foundation (see above, 
acknowledgments). This programme investigated two key sectors, educa-
tion and justice, in four West African countries: Benin, Ghana, Mali and 
Niger. The focus was on ethnographic enquiry within an interdisciplin-
ary approach combining social anthropology, sociology, political science 
and law.13
13 On a research policy level, and against the background of existing research net-
works, the objectives of the project were to: promote young (mainly African) research-
ers at PhD level; contribute to the development of West African centres of excellence; 
develop interdisciplinary cooperation between West African scholars of different coun-
tries, in particular between Anglophone and Francophone countries, on the basis of joint 
empirical research; and strengthen existing cooperative relations between German and 
African researchers at different levels (senior staff, PhD and MA students). The project 
was co-ordinated by a German-African tandem (Bierschenk/Mainz and Tidjani Alou/ 
Niamey). Institutionally, the project operated as a network of the Laboratoire d’études et 
de recherches sur les dynamiques sociales et le développement local (LASDEL; www.lasdel 
.net/) in Niger and Benin, the Department of Anthropology and African Studies of the 
Johannes Gutenberg University of Mainz, the Department of Sociology of the University of 
Legon (Accra, Ghana) and the University of Mali, Bamako. On the staff level, and includ-
ing the coordinators, it comprised nine senior researchers from Benin, Ghana, Germany, 
Mali and Niger (six anthropologists, one jurist, one political scientist, one sociologist), one 
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While this book includes contributors from outside the project team 
(see below), it should be acknowledged that our view on public services 
and state practices has been heavily influenced by the empirical research 
carried out, or supervised, in the context of this project. Therefore, a short 
reflection on the particular location of our own empirical work is in order. 
For academics who express views on Africa always do so on the basis 
of limited empirical experience. They generalize according to the small 
corner of Africa with which they are familiar to a greater or lesser extent. 
In fact, nowhere does the temptation to succumb to such continent-wide 
generalizations appear to be as strong as it is for Africa (Keller 1991).14
Therefore, we consider it important to refer explicitly to the empirical 
basis of our statements. Like any empirical sample, ours was limited—in 
three important respects: first, it incorporated four relatively small, poor 
states all located in West Africa which, however, also function relatively 
well in the context of Africa. At the time of our research, none of them 
could be described as a ‘failed’ state—in fact, in international donor dis-
course, Ghana, Benin and Niger are, and Mali until recently was, viewed as 
quite respectable African democracies. Second, we were primarily inter-
ested in the interface bureaucrats, that is the officials who have direct 
contact with the citizens, mainly on a local level, and the organizations in 
which they work. (Lentz’s contribution is an exception here.) Third and, 
finally, we only focused on two selected state sectors, e.g. the justice sys-
tem (understood here in a wider sociological sense that includes, along 
with the judiciary, the police and gendarmerie) and primary education.
The reasons for the selection of these two state sectors were partly prac-
tical: other sectors like health, customs and public service delivery at local 
level had already been studied by some members of our team (Jaffré and 
Olivier de Sardan 2003; Blundo and Olivier de Sardan, with Bako-Arifari 
and Tidjani Alou 2006; Blundo and Le Meur 2009; see also Bierschenk 
and Olivier de Sardan, Research Paradigm, this volume). However, there 
post-doctoral researcher (anthropologist, Benin), four PhD students (one anthropologist 
two sociologists, one jurist) from the same four countries, five associated PhD students 
with fourth-party funding from Germany (3) and Benin (2) (all anthropologists), and about 
30 MA students from all five countries.
14 In fact, “one has to ask, what is Africa? Is it Botswana or Guinea-Bissau? Is it Swa-
ziland or the Democratic Republic of Congo? Of course it is all of them. But they won’t 
develop in remotely similar ways. In fact, there should actually be a moratorium on the use 
of the word Africa in book titles related to development. Just that one modification would 
force well-intentioned thinkers . . . to investigate more deeply and see what might actually 
work in a particular case, rather than what ought to work for everyone” (Keating 2009).
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were also systematic reasons for our selection. While the reputation and 
the image of the state are staged through daily practices in both sectors, 
primary school education and the justice/police system represent two 
very different fields of state action. In most African countries, the primary 
school sector is probably the biggest single apparatus of the state—up to 
50 % of all public sector employees are primary school teachers, and if an 
African citizen in a rural area comes into contact with the state, statisti-
cally speaking, this is most likely to happen in the school environment. 
Since the late colonial era, the educational system has been a top priority 
of African governments, and it was and continues to be assigned a central 
role in the building of state and nation, and in the economic development 
process. At the same time, the teaching profession is, at present, a particu-
larly hotly contested site for establishing the boundary between the public 
and the private, the state and civil society (Bierschenk 2007).
The justice sector, on the other hand, involves a far smaller group of 
apparatuses, in which the development function of state action assumes 
a less prominent role than the claims for sovereignty and the monopoly 
of violence.
Hence, it was our intention to study two different areas of state action. 
When we embarked on the research we were not aware of just how dif-
ferent these areas actually were and, at the same time, of how similar 
some of the actors’ practices would nonetheless prove to be. However, 
the broader theme of the construction of the state and the theoretical 
and empirical perspectives adopted here exceed the sectoral (education 
and justice/police) and geographical (Benin, Ghana, Mali, Niger) limits of 
the States at Work programme. Hence, we decided to extend this book to 
include other researchers who were working from a similar perspective on 
other state sectors and other African countries. In other words, this books 
presents contributions from the States at Work project (Bierschenk, Chabi 
Imorou, Hamani, Lentz, Olivier de Sardan) and other researchers, most of 
whom (with the exception of Roll and Therkildsen) participated in one of 
the panels organised by the project between 2007 and 2011.
The authors of this book originate from different European (Denmark, 
France, Germany, Italy, United Kingdom) and African (Benin, Niger) 
countries, wrote the original versions of their paper in different languages 
and work at the confluences of several social sciences (anthropology, his-
tory, political sciences, management sciences). A majority, however, are 
anthropologists, which undoubtedly explains the general prevalence of a 
qualitative approach (with the exception of Therkildsen whose research 
is of the survey type). The conditions in which the empirical studies were 
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carried out also differ considerably: in some cases, teamwork was involved 
(Roll), in others, individual studies were carried out in the context of 
larger research programmes (Blundo, Chabi Imorou, Hamani, Lentz), 
while other contributions issued from individual doctoral or postdoctoral 
projects (Anders, Bergamaschi, Charton, Muñoz, Willott).
The first part of this book includes this introduction and an overview 
of the relevant literature, in which the editors describe the emergence of 
a research paradigm for the ethnographic study of states, bureaucracies 
and bureaucrats at work, in Africa and beyond.
The second and third part of the book take up the theoretical perspec-
tives of the two introductory papers and develop them further based on 
empirical examples. The African states under consideration in these sec-
tions are not ‘failed states’ (like Somalia or the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo), a category frequently and erroneously interpreted as the arche-
type of the African state (Englebert 2009; for a critique, see Bierschenk 
2010). They do not concern areas of “limited statehood” (in the sense of 
Risse 2011). Neither are they ‘success stories’ like Botswana, Rwanda and 
South Africa. They more closely resemble the modal type of African states, 
and this undoubtedly lends greater validity to the comparative lessons 
drawn from their study. The different chapters deal with both French-
speaking (Benin, Cameroon, Mali, Niger, Senegal) and English-speaking 
(Ghana, Malawi, Nigeria, Tanzania, Uganda) countries. With the excep-
tion of Cameroon in Central Africa and Tanzania and Uganda in East 
Africa, the book focuses for the most part on West Africa. The particular 
state sectors examined in the book are varied: primary (Charton, Chabi 
Imorou) and university (Willott) education, the administration of live-
stock breeding (Muñoz) and natural resources (Blundo), and the judiciary 
(Hamani). Not all chapters focus on particular sectors of state activity; 
some adopt a more cross-sectional perspective, for example Bergamaschi 
on the role of external actors, Lentz on the particular outlook of higher 
civil servants, Roll on ‘pockets of effectiveness’ in the Nigerian public ser-
vice and Therkildsen on public sector hiring and promotion. Several of 
the authors (Anders, Blundo, Chabi Imorou, Charton, Muñoz) chose the 
issue of reform as their main subject, or as their point of entry into wider 
analyses of bureaucratic practices.
While all contributions analyse bureaucratic practices, we have grouped 
them into two sections, the first taking bureaucrats as an entry point, the 
second bureaucracies. The first section is introduced by a contribution 
by Giorgio Blundo on the professional practices of Senegalese foresters, 
which develops several themes taken up later on by other authors of this 
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book. Beyond their formal structures, the forestry service in Senegal—like 
higher education (Willott) and the judiciary (Hamani)—is marked by a 
strong degree of ‘informal privatization’, but also new hybridized ways of 
‘doing’ the administrative service and managing the relations of foresters 
with the public. Like other bureaucratic services of the postcolonial state 
(see, in particular, Charton on education in Cameroon, Anders on the civil 
service in Malawi, Muñoz on tax authorities in Cameroon), the Senega-
lese forestry service has been reshaped by major reforms, partly initiated 
by international donors. This has created ‘two-speed’ bureaucracies, by 
which a ‘traditional’ service, relying solely on the state budget, under-
funded and therefore condemned to inactivity and/or petty corruption, 
co-exists with ‘projects’, which offer their employees much better working 
conditions and income (see Roll, this volume, on ‘pockets of effectiveness’). 
At the same time, the different reforms reinforce the dilemma that the 
foresters must navigate between protecting the environment, for which 
they have recourse to repression and sanctions, and new ‘participatory’ 
and developmental professional roles in line with recent international 
aid fashions.
Willott is interested in factionalism and patronage as strategies for 
manipulating promotions in Nigerian higher education. Faction politics 
are played out there in a complex interplay of formal and informal rules. 
However, official regulations still play an important role, as unofficial 
practices can only be used to a certain degree before the official rules 
act to rein them in. Understanding staff success and failure is, therefore, 
dependent on an understanding of both formal and informal processes, 
and particularly the way these processes intersect.
Therkildsen, likewise, focuses on hiring, firing, transfer, demotion 
and promotion practices, this time in the public sector in Tanzania and 
Uganda and using a survey type of approach. He is interested in how such 
practices influence organizational performance and staff motivation. Very 
much in line with the results of Willott’s study, he concludes that the neo-
patrimonalism paradigm, which is widely adapted to characterize African 
public services, does not provide an adequate analytical basis for under-
standing politics and administration, as it tends to overlook the often 
significant variation in organizational capacity within public sectors, the 
uncertainty that characterizes relations in neopatrimonial settings, and 
the particular types of hypocrisy that this generates.
These results are corroborated by Hamani’s study of the Niger judi-
ciary. His point of departure is the startling fact that while African public 
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services show many obvious deficiencies, they do seem to meet (some 
of ) the needs of citizens. This raises the question as to how these services 
‘really’ function—largely, as he shows, through the practical inventiveness 
(débrouillardise) of public services which generate numerous informal 
reforms on the local level. In other words, far from expressing adminis-
trative inefficiency, the practical norms of public servants contribute, at 
least in some cases, to making service delivery workable, and making the 
state work (a theme developed further by Olivier de Sardan).
Lentz deals with the persistence of a surprisingly high commitment to 
public service among contemporary Ghanaian higher civil servants. Her 
chapter investigates the images of a worthy public servant and a well-
functioning bureaucracy developed by senior Ghanaian bureaucrats. 
Analysing her informants’ views on changing professional trajectories, 
the role of merit, seniority and patronage in public service careers, and 
on professional ethics, she highlights the role that a rigorous Catholic 
education, certain ethnic stereotypes of ‘hard work’ and ‘honesty’, and 
membership in close-knit, regional-ethnic elite peer groups play in the 
professional commitment of higher public servants.
Eckert’s paper looks at the historical roots of this moral commitment. 
He shows that the work of civil servants in early independent Tanzania 
was very much defined as ‘work for the nation’, and that this self-image 
went along with notions of discipline and a strong sense of the connec-
tions between political issues and administrative duties. However, this 
development orientation was coupled with a view that because these 
objectives were considered to be so important and humane and because 
there appeared to be so little time to implement them, they had to be 
imposed from above, if necessary. This fostered a form of arrogant and 
authoritarian paternalism vis-à-vis fellow citizens on the part of a bureau-
cratic power elite that saw itself as the avant-garde of state and nation 
building.
This section on bureaucrats is concluded by a more general chapter by 
Bierschenk which shows that, by a process that may be called sedimenta-
tion, historical trajectories—colonial and post-colonial—have resulted in 
heterogeneous and fragmented bureaucracies which, for the public ser-
vants working in them, are complex normative universes shot through 
with numerous double binds. The chapter concludes that the ‘ordered 
informality’ of bureaucratic processes is at least as much produced inside 
the state apparatuses themselves as it is an expression of cultural logics 
of an African environment, and that the search for the uniform logics of 
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‘the’ African states is a futile one. The chapter ends with a reflection on 
how to theorize macro-change and difference as the accumulated product 
of numerous micro-processes.
The second section on bureaucracies is introduced by a chapter by 
Charton which examines the dynamics generated by the implementa-
tion of the so-called competency-based approach within the Cameroo-
nian educational system, and shows how a development aid technology 
is challenged by internal bureaucratic dynamics. Far from producing the 
expected change, the reform was turned into a very normative, hierarchi-
cal and administrative exercise by the bureaucratic agents. Consequently, 
the main effect of the reform has been to strengthen bureaucratic dynam-
ics through the distribution of new symbolic and material resources.
Bergamaschi examines the ability of international organizations to 
shape and reform African administrations. Based on a detailed study of 
the technical unit installed to implement the Poverty Reduction Strategy 
in Mali, she argues that such targeted capacity-building initiatives have 
limited impact as they have to deal with pre-existing institutional fea-
tures, social relations and competing interests which are created by the 
unit itself. However, international support has made unexpected contri-
butions to the process of state formation in Africa as it contributes to the 
extension of bureaucratic power.
Muñoz, in turn, explores the contours of two decades of administrative 
reform in Cameroon by taking a close look at a governmental programme 
which, informed by objectives such as the introduction of performance-
based management and the fight against corruption, has since 2000 
attempted to improve the ‘reliability’ of the cattle sector as a source of 
state revenue. The cooperation between two administrative agencies in 
Adamaoua Province meant a realignment of their respective professional 
cultures and spheres of influence, which was only achieved gradually 
through a pragmatic reformulation of the programme’s goals. This chapter 
serves as a reminder of the patchiness of public authority in regions and 
domains of activity where uncoordinated state action is pervasive.
Anders, like Blundo, uses the issue of reform as a point of entry into 
the study of civil servants in Malawi. While these reforms are seen by 
their promoters as key to transforming African state bureaucracies into 
efficient, transparent and accountable service providers, ethnographic 
evidence points instead to a widening of existing fissures in the civil ser-
vice as an unintended consequence of reform. Due to the establishment 
of new agencies, which were supposed to function as motors of reform, 
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two types of institutions competed, i.e. the ‘enclaves’, which were mainly 
staffed by a younger generation of technocrats (see also Blundo and Roll), 
and the line ministries led by old-school bureaucrats. The reform mea-
sures also fuelled a latent conflict between the bureaucratic elite and the 
rank and file of junior civil servants, which was often expressed in the 
idiom of ethnic and regional difference.
Trade union activity is often decried in the donor literature as a main 
impediment to reform. However, as demonstrated in Chabi Imorou’s 
chapter, it may also serve as a filter of reform proposals. As the numer-
ous reforms initiated by outside actors often lack synergy and present sig-
nificant internal contradictions, it comes as no surprise that the sectors 
affected (in his case, primary education in Benin) experience few of the 
intended changes, or even witness the completion of any action that is 
undertaken. If these reforms do work, to a certain extent, it is because 
they are selectively appropriated by public actors, including trade unions, 
to make them more workable (see also the contribution by Hamani to 
this volume).
Striking a more positive note and inverting the frequently found defi-
ciency-focused perspective on African public services, Roll explores the 
often overlooked phenomenon of ‘pockets of effectiveness’ in a weak 
governance state like Nigeria. These pockets emerge as a result of the 
interactions of political interests, the functions of a public organization 
and specific leadership and management styles. He concludes that, under 
certain conditions, factors that are normally seen as detrimental to state 
effectiveness, such as the personalization of the bureaucracy and political 
interference, can even contribute to building pockets of effectiveness.
This section, and the book, concludes with a chapter by Olivier de 
Sardan which (like Bierschenk’s chapter) is based on both the contribu-
tions to this book and other topical studies in which the author has been 
involved for the last 20 years, including the States at Work programme. 
The chapter takes a special interest in the function of the delivery of pub-
lic or collective goods and services by the state through the bureaucracy, 
the implementation of policies and the functioning of the ‘local state’. The 
author uses the concept of practical norms to empirically investigate 
the informal, tacit and latent regulations that underpin the actions of 
public actors and do not conform to the bureaucratic, professional and 
formal norms. Far from going back to a ‘traditional African culture’, they 
are integrated into modern professional cultures, which are partly com-
mon to all officials, on the one hand, but also partly specific to each 
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professional body, on the other, and are integrated into a bureaucratic 
mode of governance, prompted to mix or collaborate with other modes 
of local governance.
All of the contributions call for a new perspective on the ‘real’ state in 
developing countries which is based on detailed empirical analysis and 
grounded theory rather than stereotypical assumptions and hasty gener-
alizations. States in Africa, as everywhere, are complex, dynamic, ambiva-
lent institutions composed of varied professional mechanisms and bodies 
that deliver services while also exerting authority or domination. Their 
fabrics are interwoven and layered with heterogeneous practices and rep-
resentations, with actors ‘doing the state’ and ‘seeing the state’.
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ETHNOGRAPHIES OF PUBLIC SERVICES IN AFRICA: 
AN EMERGING RESEARCH PARADIGM
Thomas Bierschenk and Jean-Pierre Olivier de Sardan
The Study оf Public Services in Africa: An Invisible College?
This book is at the heart of a new and rapidly growing field, in which con-
ventional anthropological methods (qualitative approaches, fieldwork, 
participant observation, interviews, etc.) are used to investigate topics 
usually taken up by political science, the administrative sciences or man-
agement studies.
Empirical studies of public services and ‘the state at work’ (von Stein, 
see Bierschenk and Olivier de Sardan, introduction) have, of course, been 
carried out for a long time. They mainly concern the Global North, where 
they are a focus of the political and administrative sciences and sociology 
rather than social anthropology. The situation with respect to the Global 
South, and especially Africa, is different: a comparably rich research tra-
dition does not exist there. At the same time, however, in recent years, 
anthropological and ethnographic approaches have gained a special 
importance in the study of public services in Africa.
This chapter is about what we have learned from the literature, and 
how it has influenced our perspectives. We do not aim to provide a com-
prehensive literature review; instead, we describe the emergence of a par-
ticular research paradigm in which this book participates. The process 
involved could also be referred to as the formation of an invisible college 
of researchers who share important theoretical references and empirical 
perspectives on public services in Africa.
Studies of Public Services, Public Policies and Public Servants  
in the Global North
Public services, public policies and public servants have been extensively 
studied in countries of the Global North.
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The Sociology of Organization and Bureaucracy, Administrative Sciences, 
Public Policy Studies
In fact, specialized academic disciplines like the sociology of organization 
and bureaucracy, the administrative sciences, and public policy studies, 
developed for that very purpose since the second half of the 20th century. 
Here, we would like to draw attention to three works that have had a par-
ticular influence on us, directly or indirectly. Inspired by an already very 
productive American sociology of organizations (Simon 1957, 1978, March 
and Simon 1958, Cohen, March and Olsen 1972, see also March and Olsen 
1984, 1989), Crozier (Crozier 1963, Crozier and Friedberg 1977) was one of 
the driving forces behind the introduction of an actor-centred approach 
into the study of bureaucracy in France. He showed that a formal orga-
nizational structure never completely limits actors who retain room for 
manoeuvre and strategic games in line with their own interests and situ-
ational definitions. Hence, the so-called ‘dysfunctions’ of a bureaucracy 
must be interpreted as the result of these strategies and games. In the 
absence of progressive reforms, these dysfunctions become an essential 
element of the system’s equilibrium, resulting in deep, recurrent crises.
Second, Lipsky (1980) focused on ‘street-level bureaucrats’, e.g. those 
public servants who deal directly with the public. As the demand for their 
services is not fixed but tends to increase with supply, street-level bureau-
crats face a chronic lack of resources, one of the reasons for the high level 
of employee dissatisfaction and frequent burn-out among them. Their 
relation to their superiors is marked by ambiguity and contradictory goals, 
the difficulty in measuring performance and, therefore, low accountabil-
ity. As for their clients, these are mostly involuntary and consequently 
do not serve as primary reference groups. Against this background, the 
work of street-level bureaucrats is characterized by broad discretionary 
scope and huge autonomy from and resources for resisting organiza-
tional control. In particular, street-level bureaucrats develop strategies for 
rationing services, e.g. through favouritism and/or stereotyping, strategies 
which invariably lead to discrimination. The important conclusion drawn 
by Lipsky was that street level bureaucrats are not simply policy imple-
menters but policy makers. Policy is not what is written in policy papers 
and organizational regulations but what street-level bureaucrats do: 
they, and not the administrators and politicians, make the everyday deci-
sions about what really constitutes policy in the field. Bureaucrats have 
greater margins for manoeuvre than officially prescribed by the rules and 
they make extensive use of them.
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Third, in a study aptly sub-titled “How great expectations in Washington 
are dashed in Oakland; or why it is amazing that federal programs work 
at all”, Pressman and Wildavsky (1973) argued that full implementation 
of a policy is extremely unlikely. The chances of implementation decrease 
with the rise in the number of actors involved and in the decision points 
that have to be successfully navigated. Therefore, the most likely outcome 
of a complex policy is partial or selective implementation, the unpacking of 
policy packages, re-purposing and other actor strategies which convert 
the end result into something very different to what the policy-makers 
had in mind.1 In other words, any empirical study of the translation of a 
policy into practice is likely to discover what has been described as the 
“implementation gap” (Lane 2009: 47 et seq.) in recent policy studies.2
Among other works that have influenced us, especially in relation to the 
areas of justice and education which were at the core of our research, we 
need to mention the highly ethnographic—and historically informed—
research carried out in France and Germany on the police3, teachers4 
and justice. For example, the empirical sociology of justice has devel-
oped important ideas like the difference between the ‘formal’ and ‘infor-
mal programme’ of judges when they take decisions (Lautmann 1972), 
 Blankenburg’s (1995) observation that law and the apparatus of justice 
are not just ‘there’, working according to their formal programme, but are 
resources which actors first have to mobilize (for which not all social actors 
are equally well equipped), and the ‘funnel model’ as a mechanism 
for keeping the justice system working despite constant overload (cf. 
Rehbinder 2000).
‘Northern’ Anthropology of Organizations, Bureaucracy and Public Policy
While the aforementioned studies essentially originate from the fields 
of political science, the sociology of organizations and policy analysis, 
it should not be forgotten that an—admittedly minority—field within 
anthropology has also shown an interest in bureaucracy for a long time.
1  This idea was applied by Bierschenk (1988) and Olivier de Sardan (1988) to develop-
ment projects in Africa and has recently been adopted and refined by Mosse (2004).
2 For the present state of implementation research, cf. Saetren (2005), Robichau and 
Lynn Jr. (2009).
3 Feest and Blankenburg (1972), Monjardet (1987, 1994, 1996), Chesshyre (1989), Young 
(1991), Reichertz and Schröer (1992), Soeffner (1992), Behr (1999), Bouillon (2008), Elgueza-
bal (2008).
4 Neboisa (1960), Ozouf (1967), Schefer (1969), Gauthier, Guignon and Guillot (1986), 
Prinz von Hohenzollern and Liedtke (1989), Ozouf and Ozouf (1992), Terhart (1993).
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In fact, from as early as the late 1920s, certain anthropologists turned 
their backs on ‘primitive societies’ to carry out research on organiza-
tions in ‘developed’ countries, in particular in the USA (Schwartzman 
1993). William L. Warner (1941) and Eliot Chapple (1953) were pioneers 
in this field; Chapple was also the founding president of the Society for 
Applied Anthropology (later presided over by Margaret Mead), which 
published the journal ‘Human Organization’, originally called ‘Applied 
Anthropology’. The famous (and controversial) ‘Hawthorne studies’ trig-
gered the implementation of various ethnographic studies in industrial 
and bureaucratic work environments prior to the Second World War. 
Chapple (1943) also developed the concept of ‘anthropological engineer-
ing’ as a variant of social engineering (Bennett 1996). In the 1950s, these 
approaches were radicalized by the ‘action anthropology’ of Sol Tax (1975). 
In the UK, from the late 1950s, the American Hawthorne Studies inspired 
ethnographic research in English factories, which has become known as 
the “Manchester shop floor studies” (Emmert and Morgan 1987). How-
ever, mainstream anthropological circles considered these studies as too 
close to the theories of management and concerned with human relations 
within companies.
Hence, the world of work in the countries of the North only received 
“sporadic attention” (Schwartzman 1993: 27) up to around the 1980s when 
it began to attract the interest of American anthropologists with the devel-
opment of research on organizations, public services, offices, hospitals, 
schools, companies, etc. (cf. for example, Van Maanen 1973, 1979). How-
ever, as noted by Bate (1997: 1150), this anthropology of organizations was 
often marked by a predilection for colourful and marginal topics: “ ‘Orga-
nizational’ often turns out to be yet another marginal group: football hoo-
ligans, Greenham Common protestors, divorce court personnel, cocktail 
waitresses, Olympic organizing committees, funeral directors, girls scouts, 
dance companies, or LA punks. I mean where are the ethnographies of the 
health services or modern ethnographies of the shop floor?”.
Nonetheless, numerous ethnographies of the ‘shop floor’ or the health 
services and other state agencies have been produced since then (and 
some before, for example Van Maanen 1973 on the police), and the public 
services in the North are now the subject of numerous publications of an 
anthropological (or qualitative sociological) nature. Of greatest appeal for 
our approach are those that develop emic perspectives and accord a cen-
tral focus to the representations and practices of actors (Van Maanen 1973, 
1979, Richman 1983), and those that focus on the informal face of organiza-
tions and the dialectic between formal rules and practical organizational 
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cultures (Britan and Cohen 1980: 14–21). While some of these studies are 
neo-Marxist in orientation (Burawoy 1979, Nash 1981), others focus on the 
mechanisms of power (Heyman 1995, 2004). Others are inspired by 
the cognitive sciences (Spradley and Mann 1975) and others, again, origi-
nate from ethno-methodology (Haines 1990, Cicourel 1968). Finally, others 
take their inspiration from actor networks and the sociology of translation 
as promoted by Callon and Latour (Riles 2006, Rottenburg 2009).5
Nevertheless, due to their enormous conceptual and empirical hetero-
geneity, these studies did not prompt the emergence of a specific scien-
tific field. In any event, as attested by various comparative collections (in 
addition to the pioneering work of Britan and Cohen 1980, see Gellner 
and Hirsch 2001), the vast majority of these studies concerned the Global 
North. Until recently, organizations in Africa remained marginal to anthro-
pological research and received little interest. 6
How and by Whom Research was Done on Public Services 
in Africa, and How Anthropology Became Involved
A huge number of publications have been produced about the state in 
Africa from the 1970s to the present day. Most of them originate from 
the political sciences and try to characterize the specificity of ‘the Afri-
can state’ and African politics7 in one way or another. Nevertheless, the 
pungent question asked by Copans in 2001 remains fully relevant, that is 
whether African states are “states without civil servants?”. Empirical stud-
ies about administrations, state professions, service delivery, public policy 
implementation, and street level bureaucrats are spectacularly lacking for 
Africa. Africa obviously does not have the rich tradition that Europe has 
in research on bureaucracy and organization, to which we referred above. 
Instead, in the case of Africa, we find a small and heterogeneous body of 
studies by various disciplines on the history of the public services, the 
5 The frequently quoted study by Herzfeld (1992), the title of which highlights one of 
the ideal-type properties of bureaucracy (“the social production of indifference”), presents 
very few ethnographic data on Greek bureaucracy. 
6 However, some interesting recent work in the anthropology of Southern organiza-
tions and bureaucracies exists, e.g. Fuller and Bénéï (2000), Fuller and Harriss (2000), Hull 
(2003), Nuijten (2003), Eckert (2004, 2011); for an older study, see Conkling (1984).
7 Cf. Lonsdale (1981), Médard (1982, 1991), Rothchild and Chazan (1988), Darbon (1990), 
Badie (1992), Fatton (1992), Hydén and Bratton (1992), Bayart (1993), Bayart, Ellis and 
Hibou (1998), Reno (1998), Boone (2003), Hydén (2006), Jourde (2009), Nugent (2010). 
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administrations of development and underdevelopment, the elites, and 
public service reforms.
Historical Studies on African Public Services
Of particular importance to the authors of this book are the existing his-
torical studies of African colonial administrations as this is where we 
locate the genesis of the specific operating modes of contemporary Afri-
can state administrations and their articulation of formal and practical 
norms (Bierschenk, Olivier de Sardan, this volume). Notwithstanding the 
punctual existence of patrimonial bureaucracy in pre-colonial states like 
Danxome and Buganda, the modern bureaucratic state was introduced 
during the colonial period in sub-Saharan Africa. This modern colonial 
state was not simply a copy of the European bureaucratic state. Rather, it 
combined bureaucratic modes of operation with despotic and intermedi-
ate ones (Spittler 1981, Olivier de Sardan 1984, Trotha 1994, Young 1994).8 
At the same time it largely lacked the elements of citizenship and the 
legal form (Rechtsförmigkeit) of administration that had marked authori-
tarian modes of government such as Napoleonic France and Prussia, even 
in the 19th century. Naturally the colonial state also delivered—albeit 
limited and selective—public goods and services: mainly infrastructure, 
but also education and vocational training, health services, animal health, 
etc. However, due to the special conditions of colonial domination, these 
public goods were delivered in a special form, wrapped, so to speak, in 
practices of patronage, privilegism, corruption, contempt of anonymous 
customers—practices that differed significantly from the Weberian ideal-
type of bureaucracy (see Bierschenk and Olivier de Sardan, introduction, 
this volume) and established lifestyle routines of officials that remain 
virulent to the present day (Olivier de Sardan 2009). The possibilities 
for the uncontrolled exercise of power by colonial officials, who notably 
combined executive and judicative functions, were far greater than those 
enjoyed by their colleagues in European administrations, their privileges 
(official residence, cars, servants, etc.) were comprehensive and largely 
out of proportion to their often limited education. These privileges were 
scarcely merit-based, but primarily markers of social distinction. The 
8 Spittler’s (1981) epochal analysis of colonial administration in the French colonies of 
West Africa in the interwar period still awaits translation. For part of the argument, see 
 Spittler (1984, 2004). Some categories of colonial public servants have been rather  thoroughly 
studied, in particular teachers (Sabatier 1977a, 1977b, Jézéquel 2002, 2003, 2005).
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actual ‘under-administration’ of the colonies weakened both the pos-
sibilities of internal control of the subaltern African staff, and made it 
necessary to outsource many governance functions to informal—and 
unpaid—subcontractors, auxiliaries of the administration. Both the weak 
internal control and outsourcing of governance functions created a hot-
bed of small everyday corruption of officials (Cohen 1971, Lackner 1973, 
Lawrance, Osborn and Roberts 2006).
The central gateway of patrimonialism into the bureaucratic mode 
of government, however, was the institution of the chieftaincy. Chiefs 
were the street-level agents of colonial rule. Because of the under- 
administration already referred to, they were a necessary part of the 
colonial administration, which would not have been able to function 
without them. At the same time, however, they were held officially, as 
it were, to following a patrimonial logic. The practices instituted in this 
way still characterize African chieftaincies today and have infiltrated the 
public services (Blundo and Olivier de Sardan, with N. Bako-Arifari and 
M. Tidjani Alou 2006, Bayart 1993).
Studies on African Elites
There is very little information on the professional practices of African 
colonial bureaucrats in the period immediately leading up to indepen-
dence and in the post-colonial period.9 The African officials of the post-
independence period have been mainly studied under the label of ‘African 
elites’ (Behrends and Pauli 2012). These studies were particularly popular in 
the 1960s and 1970s; however the topic has also remained of interest to the 
present day (although the concept of ‘elite’ is increasingly replaced by that 
of ‘middle class’). Due to the political-economic structure of many Afri-
can countries, the social groups referred to as elites were overwhelmingly 
products of modern, Western-style education, and, in the French colonies, 
consisted almost exclusively of (higher) officials, whereas in the British 
colonies they also included members of the free professions, in particular 
lawyers as well as teachers and nurses employed by the missions. Up to 
the 1980s, the vast majority of secondary and university graduates went 
into government service. However, the studies on the African-educated 
elites pursued a different interest from that on which this book is based, 
and must therefore be regarded as a largely separated research tradition. 
9 Some information can be found in Cooper (1996). For Ghana, see Lentz in this 
volume, for East Africa, Eckert.
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These studies were less concerned with the working conditions and pro-
fessional practices of officials than with their social and political role in 
the modernization process. The main interest was in the question as to 
whether the Western-style educated elites would play a central role in the 
modernization of the newly independent states. Their lifestyles and val-
ues were seen as modern and as representative of the newly independent 
Africa. Issues of class formation came into focus at a later stage (do we 
observe increasing self-recruitment and class closure or continued high 
social mobility?) along with topics like urban-rural relations, clientelism, 
neo-patrimonialism and ethnic mobilization.
The moral connotations of the elite literature are striking; both extreme 
idealizations and condemnations of African elites can be found (Cohen 
1981; for a more balanced view, see Werbner 2004). In the 1980s the 
optimistic view of the role of elites was reversed, and political science 
authors, in particular, highlighted the problematic role of elites and ‘big 
men’ in ‘neo-patrimonial’ political systems (Médard 1992) and the “recip-
rocal assimilation” of different categories of elites (Bayart 1993). The criti-
cism was directed against corrupt political elites, tyrannical dictatorships 
and the economic self-interest of those in power, which were deemed 
as threatening the development of independent African states. How-
ever, the elites were not investigated ‘at work’, nor in their relations with 
administrative bodies. Leonard (1987, see below) is a rare and early excep-
tion of an author who attempted to integrate an organizational perspec-
tive with insights from these elite studies. In this book, Lentz’s chapter 
and, to a certain extent, Eckert’s show how a perspective on elites can be 
fruitfully interlinked with a perspective on public bureaucracies (see also 
Budniok 2012).
Early Administration Studies in Africa: 
The Bureaucracy of Underdevelopment and Development
In the 1960s and early 1970s, we also witnessed the beginnings of an 
African administrative science, mainly in the Anglophone regions of the 
continent. However, it remained embryonic, and had difficulties in shed-
ding its normative orientations. In fact, a large part of the literature con-
sisted of textbooks for use in the classroom at African universities and 
intended for the transmission of basic concepts from the administrative 
sciences to African administrators (cf. Adu 1964, Harris 1965, Blunt 1983, 
Koehn 1990). If African bureaucracies were studied empirically, more 
often than not it was from a deficiency perspective: the focus was on what 
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African bureaucracies were not as compared with an idealized notion of 
Western bureaucracy (e.g. Oyugi 1985).10
However, a limited number of more empirically grounded works on the 
‘bureaucracy of underdevelopment’ also existed which followed the lead 
given by Riggs (1964) and Kasfir (1969) in comparative administration stud-
ies. In terms of their orientation, these works fall into two camps (Leonard 
1987: 905): on the one hand were the ‘universalists’ who held that the basic 
principles of organizational behaviour were the same everywhere, and, on 
the other hand, there were the ‘environmentalists’ who held that African 
administrative systems could only be understood through reference to 
their cultural and political environment (e.g. Price 1975, Hydén 1984). At 
their most extreme, the universalists would plead for the turn-key import 
of Western-style management techniques into African bureaucracies. The 
more extreme environmentalists, on the other hand, saw African public 
services as essentially unreformable. This led some of them (Bates 1981) 
to conclude that the only way forward was to reduce state activities to a 
minimum: public services were not the pre-condition for, but the main 
barrier to development and had to be replaced, wherever possible, with 
market mechanisms. This position—later labelled the Washington con-
sensus—was gradually espoused by the World Bank in the 1980s following 
the so-called Berg report (World Bank 1981).
Adopting a more nuanced position, which integrated ‘universalist’ 
and ‘environmentalist’ perspectives, and which is compatible with the 
approaches favoured in this book in many respects, Leonard (1987) pleaded 
for taking the realities of African public services as well as their social envi-
ronment into account when proposing reforms from the outside rather than 
the wholesale import of Western-style management systems. The improve-
ment of existing systems, he argued, was a more promising approach than 
wholesale replacement.11 In this, he argued against the structural amnesia 
10 The irony here is that this is a contribution to a book which is very critical of over-
efficient and over-powering bureaucracy in the West and tends to blame it for all the 
evils of the modern world, including the impending nuclear holocaust. Oyugi argues the 
opposite case, however: i.e. that an inefficient and powerless bureaucracy is not a good 
thing either.
11  The dominant form of development intervention is ‘starting from a clean slate’, 
whereas Leonard argues that it might be more productive “to swim with the current 
of indigenous morality” (p. 904), a position recently labelled as “going with the grain 
in African development” (for a similar argument, see already Bierschenk and Elwert 
1988). Obviously, the problem is what exactly is meant by “the grain” (or “the current”): 
traditionalist-culturalist visions (Kelsall 2008) can coexist with much more complex and 
nuanced ones (Booth 2013).
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of the development discourse and for the use of the chequered history 
of European administrations as an inspiration. A direct influence can be 
traced from this approach to the focus on ‘pockets of effectiveness’ as dis-
cussed by Roll (this volume; see also Roll [forthcoming]).
These early empirically-oriented administration studies are not only 
interesting because the structuring of the debate does not appear to 
have changed that much since the 1970s and 1980s. They also gave some 
interesting methodological leads: at best, we have quantitative studies in 
which, for example, the Nigerian ombudsman system was compared, in 
its personnel inputs and its outputs, i.e. in terms of complaints settled, 
with other such systems in the world (Ayeni 1987).
In any case, this small tradition of organizational studies largely dried 
up in the late 1970s and early 1980s. It is possible to cite three reasons 
for this: the Marxist paradigm, which became increasingly hegemonic in 
development sociology, generated more interest in theories of the state 
than in their empirical analysis;12 the nationalist one-party systems which 
dominated Africa at the time rendered access difficult for researchers; and 
the increasingly severe economic crises that hit the continent made the 
undertaking of research at many African universities an increasingly unre-
alistic ambition.
Recent Studies Carried Out in the Context of Civil Service Reforms
In the 1990s, the anti-statist Washington Consensus was nuanced by an 
emphasis on ‘good governance’. Consequently, various attempts were 
made at implementing public sector reforms in practically all African 
countries, all of which were essentially donor-driven. The first round of 
reforms, which was still inspired by the structural adjustment policies 
imposed on almost all African countries by the IMF since the 1980s, had 
led to a considerable downsizing of a supposedly overgrown civil service. 
With the new emphasis on good governance, attempts were made to 
reform supposedly ‘Weberian’, if imperfect, bureaucracies in accordance 
with the norms of New Public Management. The principles of tenure and 
career appointments, promotions based on qualifications, knowledge 
and seniority as well as that of a unified national civil service were to be 
12 For an example, see the book by Godin (1986) on the “logic of the African state” which 
is entirely based on Beninese official government pronouncements (e.g., the idea which the 
Marxist-Leninist regime had of itself ) rather than on an empirical investigation of how 
the Beninese state functioned.
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replaced with performance-based pay linked to specific results specified 
in agreement or quasi-contracts, fixed-term contracts, in particular for 
top officials, flexible procedures for recruitment and remuneration, the 
decentralization of management functions, and the unification of private 
and public labour regimes.
Today, even their promoters generally acknowledge that these reforms 
have failed (Evans 2008, World Bank 2008). However, this has not stopped 
the international promotion of the New Public Management package 
(McCourt and Minogue 2001). Although New Public Management claims 
to be inspired by a coherent ‘neo-liberal’ ideology, the techniques devel-
oped are a stack of disparate prescriptions and axioms arising from the 
world of Western private enterprise, American economics departments 
and circles of international experts (Bezes 2008). It is equally surprising 
how little the reformers know about the public services that they wish to 
reform, starting from the basic question as to whether these bureaucracies 
may be called ‘Weberian’ at all—which is, after all, the point of departure 
of all New Public Management reforms. Most contributions written about 
public service reforms in Africa over the last 20 years as reports or publica-
tions in academic journals have adopted a normative point of view, or rely 
on non-reliable empirical material like surveys. In many cases, even the 
statistics are dubious. More often than not, they are also based on poor 
conceptual approaches, stereotypes about culture, or very aggregate and 
highly disputable categories.
In other words, the reformers are at a loss to understand the organiza-
tional processes concealed behind the perceived deficiencies in the African 
public service. Bad reform policy is rarely acknowledged and the admis-
sion of “weak diagnostic work on the civil service” is even rarer (World 
Bank 200: xvi). Civil service reform turns out to be a highly ideological 
enterprise with only a slim empirical basis. It is not at all an example 
of evidence-based policy, in which the exact identification of problems 
leads to tailor-made proposals for reform. Instead, it is an attempt at the 
full-scale transposition of organizational models. These models had been 
developed elsewhere as a solution to specific problems found elsewhere. 
Leaving aside the open question as to just how successful New Public 
Management reforms have been in other parts of the world, it can be 
argued for the African context that the reforms are a case of solutions 
looking for problems (Naudet 1999). Bezes (2008: 20) rightly concludes 
that “New Public Management is often ill-suited to the institutional con-
texts it is supposed to reform and generates considerable adverse effects 
in the course of its implementation”. Moreover, with regard to Africa in 
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particular, it fosters “the development of bureaucratic enclaves in symbio-
sis with the international consultants but who leave the remainder of the 
administrative system intact” (ibid.).
This unsatisfactory situation has recently led to calls by political and 
administrative scientists for a more empirically grounded and more theo-
retically relevant study of African bureaucracies (Darbon 1985, Copans 
2001). While only a few political and administrative scientists (Rzafind-
rakoto and Roubaud 2001) have responded to this challenge, it is taken 
up by the authors of this book, most of them anthropologists. The par-
adoxes of reform in particular are dealt with by several of the authors 
(Anders, Bierschenk, Chabi Imorou, Charton, Hamani, Muñoz), while 
Bergamaschi examines the ambiguous role of outside intervention in the 
reform process.
Anthropology and African Public Services
Within anthropology, up to the early 1990s, the few studies dealing 
directly and, more often, indirectly with African administrations or, more 
generally, the administrations in countries of the South, focused on the 
colonial state and its post-colonial extension in the early years of indepen-
dence. It was only from the 1980s, and particularly from the 1990s, that a 
larger number of studies emerged, very often from the new anthropology 
of development, that approached various aspects of the state and public 
services from an empirical perspective and along the same lines as the 
work undertaken for this book.
In post-evolutionist anthropology, starting with Malinowski and Boas, 
the state was not initially an explicit topic. The great merit of this anthro-
pology was to have shown, instead, that—contrary to what the European 
state theorists believed—political order is possible without the state. 
This anthropological discovery was made by Evans-Pritchard in southern 
Sudan (Evans-Pritchard 1940, see also Fortes and Evans-Pritchard 1940) 
and Edmond Leach (1954) in the highlands of Burma (see also Middle-
ton and Tait 1958). Therefore, while not an explicit object of research, the 
state was always present as a major philosophical issue in the background 
of this early political-anthropological research. In this philosophical and 
indirect sense it may be said, therefore, that the state was the midwife of 
modern political anthropology. However, in line with the original—19th 
century—division of work between sociology and anthropology (see the 
introduction to Wolf 1982), most anthropologists, in continental Europe at 
least, remained much more interested in ‘traditional’ forms of politics. As 
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George Balandier (1951) expressed it in his thundering critique, they were 
“fleeing the present”.
Since the 1930s, however, British anthropology had extended its range 
of interest from ‘traditional societies’ to more contemporary topics based 
on a mixture of practical concerns (of colonial rule) and academic inter-
ests (Asad 1973, Parkin 1990). (As we have already pointed out, a similar 
shift towards the modern world took place in North American anthropol-
ogy, albeit directed towards US society.) This growing concern with social 
change in the colonies was accompanied by a shift of attention from the 
Pacific to Africa, and from economic to political anthropology. The shift 
was indicated by the establishment of the International Institute of Afri-
can Languages and Cultures (now known as the International Africa Insti-
tute) in 1926, and by Malinowski’s growing interest, in his post-Trobriand 
phase, in issues like “practical anthropology” (Malinowski 1929), “culture 
contact” and “culture change” (Malinowski 1938, 1945). In the wake of this 
movement, and with the object of scientifically accompanying the mod-
ernization of colonial rule, the Rhodes Livingstone Institute was founded 
in Northern Rhodesia (today’s Zambia) in 1938 for the purpose of studying 
social change in the colony. This was followed by the foundation of the 
East African Institute for Social Research (EAISR) in Kampala in 1950. In 
other words, anthropologists in both the RLI and the EAISR tried to work 
out a scientific base for public policies.
However, these ‘modernist’ British anthropologists were not interested 
in the (modern) state as such, but studied around the state, at its margins.13 
When they were interested in modern forms of politics—as was the case 
with the Manchester school, whose shop floor studies have already been 
referred to above—, it was mainly on the local level and with a focus on 
the articulation between traditional and modern forms of politics (Evens 
and Handelman 2006). The transformation of the chieftaincy and its con-
flictive relationship with modern government structures was a favoured 
subject (Mair 1936, Gluckman 1948, Fallers 1955, 1956, Southwold 1960). 
This is also true of French Africanist research, in any case the studies 
developed under the influence of George Balandier (1951), who drew a 
13 The question of the origin of the state remained a topic tackled by evolutionist 
anthropologists like Elman Service (1962), Robert L. Carneiro (1967) and Lawrence Krader 
(1968). For an overview of this field, see Wright (1977). There were also anthropologists like 
Nadel (1942), Goody (1971), Terray (1974, 1988) and Southall (1988) who were interested in 
pre-modern states. This sometimes led to a search for the ‘survival’ of certain of their traits 
in modern times and their colonial or pre-colonial origins. 
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large part of his inspiration from the Manchester School. In the course of 
this research, political anthropology developed important concepts like 
clientelism, networks, political arenas, etc., which were later adopted by 
sociology and political science. Anthropology also developed particular 
competence in the study of the informal side of politics (Olivier de Sardan, 
this volume).
Ethnographic accounts of African public services, on the other hand, 
were rare. One exception is Eames’s (1986) highly personal, ethnographic 
account of encounters in the Nigerian bureaucracy, in which she devel-
oped a notion of neo-patrimonialism, independent of Médard’s (1982) 
famous conceptualization which the latter had adopted from Eisenstadt 
(1973) (see also Therkildsen, Willott, in this volume). Another early exam-
ple of an ethnographic approach to African public services is found in the 
work of Cohen (1980), who identified the different ‘patterns’ characteristic 
of the Nigerian bureaucracy and demonstrated their links with the former 
colonial state.
Indirectly influenced by the Manchester School, the anthropology of 
development constituted another door to the empirical study of the state 
and public services in Africa. Anxious to break away from the culturalist-
traditionalist tropism of main-stream continental anthropology, some 
researchers took the interventions associated with development as their 
main points of access to the study of African modernity. They were thus 
reacting to the omnipresence of development discourses among public 
actors, the controlling of the rural population by development projects 
and a growing demand for expertise in the social sciences by the develop-
ment institutions. Hence, a new research paradigm emerged, in particular 
in African studies, that considered the development projects as arenas, in 
which different strategic groups confronted each other (Bierschenk and 
Elwert 1988), analysed the interfaces between two worlds which mobilized 
very different types of knowledge (Long 1989, Long and Long 1992), and 
applied a deliberately non-normative, non-culturalist and empirical per-
spective (Olivier de Sardan 2005a). While the old anthropology of devel-
opment was centred on ‘culture contact’ (Malinowski 1945, Herskovits 
1958, Bastide 1973), this new anthropology of development was character-
ized by an approach centred on the ‘entanglement of social logics’, which 
included both the development institutions and the target populations as 
objects of study. It differed markedly from other types of anthropology of 
development that were emerging at the same time and were based either 
on a ‘deconstructionist’ or normative approach (Bierschenk 2008a).
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The new anthropology of development, which mostly concerned Afri-
can contexts and initially focused on development projects as the arche-
typal form of development mechanism in the period 1970–80, gradually 
expanded to encompass the entire palette of development interventions, 
from the ‘brokers’ to the agents of development and development bureau-
cracies, and from NGOs and decentralized cooperation to decentraliza-
tion and public policies.14
However, in the face of the continued tendency of aid flows (particularly 
since the Paris Declaration in 2005) to pass through the states and their 
machinery, the overlaps between development interventions and state 
interventions, the growing adoption of a policy approach by donors, and 
the entanglement of state and development bureaucracies, the anthropol-
ogy of development in Africa expanded quite naturally and has gradu-
ally transformed into an anthropology of public spaces and public action, 
which adopts both public policy interventions and the interventions by 
development institutions as the same object of study (Olivier de Sardan 
2005b). After all, development policies are merely a particular form of 
public policy that are designed, managed and financed from outside a 
country but implemented within it with the direct or indirect support 
and instrumental use (and sometimes resistance) of national public actors 
(Bergamaschi, this volume).
From the 1990s, an increasing number of empirical studies emerg-
ing from the anthropology of development were carried out on African 
administrations. In other words, the classical methods of anthropology 
(qualitative approaches, fieldwork, participant observation, interviews, 
etc.), which were used in the context of development studies, are now 
used to investigate topics that are usually the concern of political sci-
ence, the administrative sciences and management sciences. Some of this 
14 On brokers, see Bierschenk, Chauveau and Olivier de Sardan (2000), Lewis and Mosse 
(2006); on development agents, see Long (1989), Olivier de Sardan and Paquot (1989), Arce 
(1993), Mongbo (1995); on development bureaucracies, see Quarles van Ufford, Kruyt and 
Downing (1988), Harrison (2003), Rottenburg (2009); on NGOs and decentralized coopera-
tion, see Jacob and Lavigne Delville (1994), Marie (2005); on decentralization and public 
policies, see Laurent (1995), Blundo (1998), Mosse (2004, 2005), Fay, Koné and Quiminal 
(2006). This progressive expansion is mirrored by the content of the APAD Bulletin (Euro-
African Association for the Anthropology of Change and Development, Ed. Lit, Münster), 
which is representative of a considerable proportion of this new anthropology of develop-
ment in various respects. While the history of APAD is relatively well documented, the 
parallel and partly overlapping history of the EIDOS network in development anthropol-
ogy still needs to be recorded in writing.
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recent anthropological research has focused on specific areas of public 
action and the state like health, education, the judiciary, the police and 
others.15 Other studies also based on ethnographic fieldwork present, 
instead, cross-sectional analyses of the ‘everyday’ life of African adminis-
trations and states.16 This book is a direct extension of these recent stud-
ies and benefits from their findings.
This emerging anthropology of public policies and state bureaucracies 
is based on theoretical and methodological perspectives which are similar 
to those that marked the ‘entanglement of social logics’ paradigm in the 
anthropology of development: i.e. the focus on the diversity of actors’ ratio-
nales, the non-normative perspective, the primacy accorded to empirical 
investigation, the use of multi-site team-based research.
There is another advance that is also worth highlighting. Following 
some of its precursors, the European anthropology of development had 
become interested in, among other things, the gap between a develop-
ment project on paper, i.e. the way in which it presented itself in its docu-
mentation, its planning and methods, on the one hand, and the actual 
development project as it unfolded ‘for real’ and on the ground, on the 
other. In other words, it demonstrated the divergences between the objec-
tives of a development project and its actual implementation. One of the 
most interesting mechanisms it discovered in this context was the ‘hijack-
ing’ of development projects under the impact of different logics and 
multiple actor strategies (Bierschenk 1988, Olivier de Sardan 1988, Smith 
2003). The emerging anthropology of public action has likewise taken the 
policy-implementation gap as one of its main topics of interest.
15 Apart from the chapters of this book, on health, see, for example, Gobatto (1999), 
Jaffré and Olivier de Sardan (2003), Jaffré, with Diallo, Vasseur et al. (2009), Koerling (2011), 
Kroeker 2012; on education, see Bierschenk (2007), Chabi Imorou (2010a, 2010b), Fichtner 
(2010, 2012), Tama (2011), Willott (2011), see also recent works on the special role of teach-
ers in producing and disseminating the state idea, e.g. Bénéï (2000), Wilson (2001); on 
the judiciary, see Tidjani Alou (2001, 2006), Bierschenk (2008b), Hamani (2011), Tchantipo 
(2012), Budniok (2012); on the police, see Beek and Göpfert (2011, 2013), Beek (2012), Göp-
fert (2012, 2013), Badou (2013), Bierschenk (2013); on the customs authorities, see Bako-
Arifari (2001, 2006), Chalfin (2010); on the water and forest authorities: Blundo (2011); on 
collective infrastructure, see Jaglin (2005), Tidjani Alou (2009), Baron and Peyroux (2011), 
Beckedorf (2012); on local public tenders, see Blundo (2001, 2006); on the local state and 
decentralization, see Olivier de Sardan and Tidjani Alou (2009), Hahonou (2010), Olivier 
de Sardan (2011), Hilgers (2012).
16 Cf. for example: Oppen and Rottenburg (1995), Blundo and Olivier de Sardan et al. 
(2006), Smith (2006), Blundo and Le Meur (2009), Anders (2010), Hagmann and Péclard 
(2010).
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The importance of the divergences between the official norms and the 
behaviour of public actors is, in effect, a frequently highlighted charac-
teristic of African bureaucracies and is particularly evident in the case 
of the ‘interface’ or ‘street-level’ bureaucracies. However, this is nothing 
more than a particular instance of the universal divergences that can be 
observed between all kinds of social prescriptions and actor behaviours 
(Olivier de Sardan, this volume).
Concerning Africa, the social sciences, in general, and anthropology, in 
particular, remained particularly reticent when it came to investigating 
the unexpected effects of state intervention. It is true that the creative 
or adaptive practices of actors developed in response to the constraints 
imposed on them, their tactics and strategies, their ruses and disputes, 
and their non-conformist, deviant, or marginal behaviours, have been 
studied nonetheless by anthropologists, but such a perspective was largely 
restricted to the domain of informality (Meagher 2010), in other words 
outside bureaucracies or formal organizations. The emerging research 
paradigm advocated in this book involves studying informality inside the 
state as well as the gaps between public policies and their implementa-
tion or between official norms and actual behaviour.
Anthropology of Public Bureaucracies or Anthropology 
of the State?
While anthropologists have been working on state-phenomena one way 
or another for a long time without calling it an ‘anthropology of the state’ 
(apart from the evolutionist anthropologists, see footnote 13),17 articles and 
17 There are two books that used the term ‘anthropology of the state’ in their titles 
at a relatively early stage, however they both use this term differently to the way it is 
used here. Fallers (1974) is an attempt to show what anthropology can contribute to the 
comparative perspective on nation-building, which had become the interest of the new 
discipline of comparative politics, indicated by names like Shils, Almond, Verba and (the 
early) Geertz. The interest of this book for the perspective pursued here lies less on a 
thematic than on a methodological level: First, in his definition of anthropology as “sci-
ence of the everyday, the ordinary” (p. 10) by which the anthropology “take(s) note of 
matters . . . that to other social scientists may seem trivial” (p. 11), second, in his refutation 
of the common assumption that anthropological methods are particular suited to “tradi-
tional” (in the sense of “custom-bound”) societies while those of the political scientist and 
the sociologist are more appropriate to “modern” societies” (p. 17), and, finally, in his plea 
for the interdisciplinary cooperation of anthropologists with what he calls “comparative 
macro-sociology” (in his case largely inspired by Weber) (p. 15ff.): “One cannot”, he writes, 
“study an elephant armed only with a microscope” (p. 20). Abélès’s (1990) book likewise is 
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books in which the terms ‘anthropology’ or ‘ethnography’ are combined 
with that of ‘state’ have become somewhat more common since shortly 
before the turn of the millennium; these started with articles (Gupta 1995, 
Masquelier 2001, Trouillot 2001, Ferguson and Gupta 2002) and were fol-
lowed by several edited volumes (Hansen and Stepputat 2001, Das and 
Poole 2004, Krohn-Hansen and Nustadt 2005) and a topical reader (Sharma 
and Gupta 2006). We share an interest in establishing and defining a new 
field for anthropology with these authors. However, the research stream 
of which this book is an expression differs from the theoretical orienta-
tions and methodological approaches adopted in many of these texts. In 
particular, these studies do not all share our empirical focus. While we are 
interested in state apparatuses and their actors, their practices and their 
emic point of view, most of the recent literature on the ‘anthropology 
of the state’ prefers to stay in the ‘margins’ of, or ‘beside’, the state (Das 
and Poole 2004, Bellagamba and Klute 2008). Thus, it follows a classical 
reflex of anthropology which has always favoured the periphery. This has 
resulted in interesting work which draws attention to the governmental 
and non-governmental continuum as well as formal and informal political 
structures. The state (with a varying presence and reach) exists within this 
continuum as one of several actors, in addition to and/or in interaction 
or confrontation with a range of other political actors (Bierschenk and 
Olivier de Sardan 1997, 2003). However, to subsume all these actors under 
the heading of ‘state’ renders the notion of the state co-existent with all 
political forces, if not society itself.
In other words, starting from the valuable insight that the borders of 
the state are contested, some authors appear to conclude that there are 
no borders at all, and that an anthropology of the state in a stricter sense 
(as attempted in this book) might as well be replaced by an anthropology 
of governing processes in general. We argue that in such an approach the 
notion of the state becomes a totalizing concept by which, in the final 
analysis, it is impossible to think the ‘outside’ of the state, or the ‘non-
state’. Used in this broad and overextended fashion, the concept of the 
state is not a tool for empirical analysis, as the authors in this book try 
to employ it, but, to paraphrase Martin (2002) and his search for OPNI, 
‘objets politiques non identifiés’, it becomes instead a UTO, i.e. an ‘unidenti-
fied theoretical object’.
not on the state, but is an introduction to (and plea for) political anthropology ‘at home’ 
(in this case, France), with examples drawn from the author’s own research interests, e.g. 
elections, local politics, rituals and political language.
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The theoretical referents for these totalizing approaches are, of course, 
mainly Foucault (2007) and his concepts of bio-power and governmen-
tality, and sometimes also Gramsci (1971) with his notions of hegemony 
and the integral state. These were authors who were less interested in the 
state as an ensemble of concrete actors, institutions and practices, how-
ever loosely articulated, but instead in broad macro-historical processes 
with a clear focus on Europe. Foucault’s totalizing concept of power is 
particularly resistant to operationalization for empirical research. One of 
the effects of the predominant reference to Foucault found in some of the 
recent ‘anthropology of the state’ literature has also been to reduce the 
notion of the state to its political, regulatory and disciplinary practices as 
opposed to other functions like service delivery. This gives the impression 
that, in some works, the excessive referencing of Foucault and other mas-
ter-thinkers, taken out of time and place, does not connote a critical and 
productive use of theoretical categories for empirical analysis (Bierschenk 
2009). Instead, it serves the function of labelling as a strategy of academic 
identity politics. This becomes particularly obvious when the reference to 
Foucault is paralleled by an occasionally obsessive attempt to ‘disprove’ 
Weber, within a frame of reference in which Weber is presented as an 
‘affirmative’, Foucault as a ‘critical’ thinker. This strategy is often based 
on an ignorance of Weber’s original texts, and can only be explained by 
the very selective and biased reception of Weber in the US where his oeu-
vre is often reduced to Parsonian functional sociology (Cohen, Hazelrigg 
and Pope 1975; on Weber, see Bierschenk and Olivier de Sardan, Introduc-
tion, this volume). The differences between Foucault and Weber are also 
more often than not overstated in this form of academic identity politics, 
whereas in fact they share many perspectives.18
As far back as 1952, Kroeber and Kluckhohn (p. 146f.) criticized an 
overly philosophical, essentializing tradition in (US) anthropology and 
18 For both, the empirical referents are late capitalism and the advanced liberal societ-
ies of Europe (not of the Global South); for both, state power is part of a wider regime 
of power; for both the macro-historical process of state-formation is perceived as being 
embedded in larger processes of disciplining and social control; for both, regimes of rules 
are largely actor-less; for both, consent (Weber: legitimation, Foucault: fashioning of sub-
jectivities) is a central problem of domination; and both see the rule of the expert as a sig-
nature of modernity. As we have already pointed out (Introduction, this volume), Weber 
was very critical of modern bureaucratized capitalism (an “iron cage”) but, unlike Marx, he 
saw its dominance as inevitable (thus again resembling Foucault). It could also be argued 
that, without more precise operationalization, Foucault’s concept of governmentality is 
of limited use for empirical analysis as it conflates three pre-existing concepts which had 
been well established in sociology or psychology (‘domination’, ‘social control’ and the 
‘super-ego’ of Freud) in one rather diffuse complex.
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argued for the study of social behaviour (‘customs’) which were seen as 
“variable, particular, plural, and empirical”. It is remarkable how much 
an important strand of contemporary anthropology continues to shy 
away from empirical engagements but instead aims to produce an often 
second-hand philosophy. In any case, among the social sciences today, 
anthropology is probably the one that refers the most to the philosophical 
fashions of the moment: Agamben and Butler today, Foucault, Deleuze, 
Gramsci yesterday or the day before yesterday, and Wittgenstein the day 
before that. We interpret this as a strategy for defending the discursive 
authority of a discipline which, in the aftermath of decolonization, has 
lost its ‘natural’ object and a unifying theory (Asad 1973). In the case of 
the anthropology of the state, this dissolution of anthropology into a more 
or less speculative social theory is all the more remarkable as it shows no 
interest in, or is simply unaware of, major achievements in the empirical 
sociology of organization and bureaucracy in the Global North (to which 
we referred above). This ignorance appears to us to be largely the effect 
of a peculiar, North American disciplinary constellation. It has, however, 
the unfortunate effect of creating within some of ‘the anthropology of the 
state’ literature a tendency to re-invent the wheel and to present certain 
truisms of organizational sociology as more innovative findings than they 
really are: i.e. that organizations are not regulated exclusively on the basis 
of their formal rules, but that informal state actions are always based on 
a combination of formal and informal practices; that there is a difference 
between policy formulation and implantation, or between the formula-
tion of law and the application of law; that state agents interpret new 
rules in the light of their professional experiences and corporate interests; 
etc. In our view, this ignorance of empirical organizational and profes-
sional sociology leads to a tendency to exoticize states of the South by 
comparing actual practices in the South with an idealized notion of how 
things work in the North.
Conclusions: Towards an Ethnography of Modern States 
in Africa
Over the last two decades, an interest has progressively emerged in more 
empirically grounded analyses of statehood in Africa, in ethnographic stud-
ies of state actors, state institutions, state professions and state-making 
and unmaking processes, and in investigations of the many logics under-
lying these practices and interactions. Both the growing attendance at 
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panels we organized on such topics at international conferences between 
2007 and 2011 and the increasing number of doctoral theses compiled and 
defended by African and European scholars on these themes testify to this 
emerging research paradigm.
This chapter has attempted to localize this emerging paradigm within 
academic debates and the achievements of social science. The objective 
of this book is to respond to the call made by Lorenz von Stein to empiri-
cally study the state at work, from a neo-Weberian perspective and using 
ethnographic methods (Bierschenk and Olivier de Sardan, Introduction, 
this volume). Irrespective of the undeniably changing configurations of 
governance, law and the state, we believe—to paraphrase Karl Marx—
that people have spent too much time essentializing or deconstructing 
the state in Africa and beyond in search for an evanescent entity, and 
that it is time to study it empirically. What we are interested in are the 
apparatuses of states, the practices of public bureaucrats and their emic 
perceptions, and the implementation of public policies. We are not inter-
ested in finding out ‘how the state sees’ (à la Scott 1998), but how public 
bureaucrats see their world, how they are perceived by the citizens to 
which they deliver services (Blundo, this volume), and how they deal on 
a routine basis with their hierarchy, their colleagues, other non-state insti-
tutions, and the users of public services.
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SEEING LIKE A STATE AGENT: 
THE ETHNOGRAPHY OF REFORM IN SENEGAL’S FORESTRY SERVICES
Giorgio Blundo
13 April 2005, Ngor Diarama Hotel, Dakar, Validation Forum of the Forest 
Action Plan: The director of Senegalese Forestry Department takes the floor 
welcoming a new stage in environmental policy in Senegal: from now on, 
the rural population and the municipalities will be given new responsibili-
ties in the area of forest management and the forestry service must sup-
port them. ‘Participation’ and ‘local management’ are the buzzwords of the 
several workshops that take place in the afternoon. However, during the 
breaks, another issue is the object of a considerable behind-the-scenes gos-
sip among the foresters: after endless negotiations, the Senegalese govern-
ment has finally enacted a law reforming their status. They are now a full 
paramilitary body and, as a result, they lose their voting rights but double 
their salaries. At lunch, tempers flare. A Senegalese forestry expert working 
for a German project is against this reform, which he considers to be in 
contradiction with the new participative credo popularized by the decen-
tralization reform. A regional inspector retorts that those who do not agree 
with ‘militarization’ need only resign from office. Moreover, who would be 
so foolish as to refuse a salary increase? To hell with the civil rights we are 
going to lose! At least the other military bodies will finally respect us!
The first day, most of foresters were in uniform. The second day, the 
majority wore civilian clothes.
This account sets the scene for this chapter, which focuses on the recent 
evolution and daily functioning of the forestry services in Senegal. This 
extract from my field notes refers to the internal debates that inflamed 
passions among the foresters, who had been confronted with two recent 
and apparently contradictory reforms: decentralization and militariza-
tion. These reforms appeared to aggravate the dilemma between a role 
involving the protection of environmental resources using repression and 
penalties (echoing the colonial forestry policy) and a new ‘participative’ 
role, which would transform the forestry agents into technical advisers 
of the producers and the local elected representatives. In my view, these 
two reforms, one of which has been imposed on the forestry services and 
the other desired by them for a long time, provide a good starting point 
for analysing how the state is ‘seen’ and ‘done’ by a specific segment of its 
bureaucracies (Migdal and Schlichte 2005).
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It is indeed timely to reverse the perspective presented by James Scott 
in Seeing like a State (1998): instead of considering the state as a unified 
source of intentions, policies and coherent plans that is capable of mak-
ing a shifting and complex social world ‘legible’, I seek, first, to render 
the state itself legible by observing it through the concrete practices of its 
officials. Second, I enquire whether civil servants ‘see’ in the same way as 
the state.
The question here is not merely one of filling an empirical gap. A com-
prehensive anthropology of the state cannot confine itself to describing 
the ways in which the idea of the state is embedded in local societies and 
the expectations, representations and fantasies associated with it (Gupta 
1995, Hansen and Stepputat 2001, Masquelier 2001), or exploring the state’s 
margins or interstices (Das and Poole 2004)—both of which are among 
the favourite themes of contemporary political anthropology. The inquiry 
‘around the state’ must be complemented by an inquiry into the ‘core of 
the state’ that focuses on the daily functioning of state apparatuses and 
describes the mundane practices of state-making.
The Ethnography οf τhe ‘Bureaucrats ιn Uniform’
Against this background, in 2005 I embarked on a comparative study of 
the forestry departments in my two principal research areas, i.e. Niger and 
Senegal.1 The forestry service offers a fruitful point of access for an ethno-
graphic exploration of the everyday functioning of the state in Africa.
To begin with, the institution has a rich historical past. Founded in the 
1930s, it was among the first colonial bodies and, for a long time, repre-
sented one of the rare manifestations of the state’s presence in the coun-
tryside. For this reason, it is also one of the strongest sources of people’s 
representations of the state.
Second, like customs officers, policemen and gendarmes, forestry agents 
belong to the huge proportion of African state employees whose main 
characteristic is that they are ‘bureaucrats in uniform’, i.e. “administrative 
1 To date I have conducted ten research trips, initially in the framework of a research 
project financed by CIRAD, then on a study of the “local State” in collaboration with LAS-
DEL (Niamey) and, ultimately, as head of the State Bureaucracies research stream of the 
Africa Power and Politics programme led by a consortium of research institutions headed 
by the Overseas Development Institute and funded by the UK Department for Interna-
tional Development (DFID) and Irish Aid. The ideas expressed here do not necessarily 
reflect the views of DFID, ODI or Irish Aid.
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agents who have the task of enforcing the law through the legal use of 
violence” (Blundo and Glasman, forthcoming). However, its work places 
the forestry department at the heart of the production of essential pub-
lic goods and services in the environmental sector (reforestation, soil 
regeneration, combating desertification, the protection of forest reserves 
and national parks, the rational exploitation of forest resources to sup-
ply timber and charcoal for urban areas, etc.). Being caught in a dilemma 
between protecting environmental resources using suppression, law 
enforcement and sanctions and their new ‘participative’ role, which has 
been strengthened by recent decentralization reforms, forestry services 
represent simultaneously a suppressive state and a state as provider of 
services. “For this reason, they should not be studied only as violence spe-
cialists, but also as state agents. They represent some specific segments of 
the state and need to be analysed with the same perspectives and meth-
ods we adopt when studying the ‘civilian’ bureaucracies” (Blundo and 
Glasman, forthcoming).
Third, forestry services are a ‘two speed’ bureaucracy (Blundo 2011a): a 
‘traditional administration’ financed by the single state budget and often 
condemned to inactivity coexists with an administration sustained by 
development aid that offers its agents both better working conditions and 
an additional income. This constitutes a crucial element of statutory dif-
ference within the service. Observing these dynamics provides insightful 
examples about the impact of international aid policies on state-building 
in Africa.
Finally, forestry services crystallize some of the tensions and contra-
dictions that characterize contemporary African public administrations. 
Although they establish their legitimacy through a mastery of technical 
and scientific knowledge, this legitimacy is strongly contested by partisan, 
patronage and economic networks and lobbies. Moreover, they illustrate 
the informal privatization of public administrations. Forestry services 
are an important site of the production and reproduction of informality: 
in fact, the inadequacy of official norms as a guide for the behaviour of 
officials leads to the production of informal, practical norms to ensure 
the functioning of a service (Blundo 2012; see also Olivier de Sardan, this 
volume).
Although forestry agents are present across the national territories, they 
constitute a relatively manageable group for the researcher—totalling 
around 500 in Senegal and 770 in Niger. Due to the freezing of public 
appointments between 1990 and 2006, they are an ageing group and, in 
some significant respects, a bureaucratic example of ‘face-to-face societies’ 
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as studied by classical works of anthropology. They were trained in the 
same establishments. Frequent transfers gave rise to recurrent interac-
tions and exchanges; practically everyone knows everyone else. Hence, it 
is not very difficult to ascertain facts about delicate matters such as politi-
cal appointments, internal conflicts and cases of corruption.
Instead of concentrating on a single site of observation, I opted to carry 
out a multi-site inquiry. The study of a state administration, which is, fur-
thermore, a paramilitary corps, raises specific problems such as, obviously, 
those associated with obtaining official authorizations, but also problems 
regarding gaining access to the discourse of subordinates. The traditional 
obligation of confidentiality common to every administrative agent is 
strengthened here by the burden of the military hierarchy. In order to win 
the confidence of high-level officials, I began at the top by “studying up” 
(Nader 1974) the ‘big family of foresters’. I then progressively observed work 
in offices and at checkpoints, studying the interactions with the admin-
istered from below. Finally, I “studied through” (Wedel, Shore, Feldman 
and Lathrop 2005) the processes of implementation, negotiation and 
entanglement of two reforms. The first, the militarization of the forestry 
department, was internal; the second, which was motivated by interna-
tional donors, was national and involved the decentralization of natural 
resource management.
Doing the ethnography of a state administration also involves the 
attempt to understand its jargon, its working tools (legislative texts, admin-
istrative procedures, technical terminology), and its modes of acknowl-
edgement and internal distinctions. For someone who had no training in 
the natural sciences and who had not done military service, the task was 
particularly laborious and the blunders frequent.
In this chapter, I will consider military reform as the main theme so as 
to shed light on some of the provisional results of my ethnographic work 
on the forestry department. This case study is limited to Senegal.
In Search of a Lost esprit de corps
The coherence and unity of the state are merely an “ideological artefact” 
(Abrams 1988: 81). State institutions are profoundly fragmented, continu-
ously reconfigured and often in conflict with one another. Many forest-
ers hoped that militarization reform would reinforce a feeling of unity 
that had become weakened since independence. In fact, despite official 
discourses exalting the unity of the ‘big family of foresters’, collective ritu-
als that marked this so-called solidarity and reaffirmed the department’s 
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values and common goals disappeared progressively in parallel to the rise 
of some internal distinctions.
The first—rather obvious—distinction is made between the heads of 
the services, the high-level officials (Ingénieurs des Eaux et Forêts [IEF] 
and Ingénieurs des travaux des Eaux et Forêts [ITEF]), the low-ranking 
officials (Agents techniques des Eaux et Forêts [ATEF]) and the local-level 
agents. The service heads have the power to sanction subordinates and, 
perhaps more significantly, redistribute financial and material resources 
and rewards. Moreover, an imbalance in favour of senior executives can 
be observed (170). Local-level agents are few in number (fewer than 300), 
sometimes poorly trained and lack material means for carrying out daily 
activities.
A second division concerns senior officers. There is an ‘emic’ differ-
ence in status between foresters educated in Western universities and 
those with degrees from Third World or socialist countries. Another dif-
ference currently in force is that between the IEF who entered the for-
estry administration directly thanks to holding a university degree and 
those who entered the administration as junior officers and were then 
promoted through civil service examinations. In the forest rangers’ jargon, 
the former are referred to as ‘direct foresters’ and the latter as ‘backpack 
foresters’.
A final distinction can be made between foresters who pursued their 
career within development projects and those who dedicated themselves 
to the traditional tasks of control and repression.
Thus, beyond the official picture of concord, the forestry services are 
permeated by internal conflicts, resentments and widespread frustration. 
Two factors appear to have undermined the unity between foresters deci-
sively: internal struggles for the monopolization of ‘profitable’ jobs (or, in 
emic terms, ‘juicy jobs’) and what agents perceive as the opaque, arbitrary 
and unpredictable management of human resources and careers.
An Informal Topography of Administrative Posts
In accordance with the model of other paramilitary bureaucracies (cus-
toms, police, gendarmerie), the posts most sought after by foresters are 
posts that “provide access to a high level of transactions, whereby the 
holder has direct contact with users—that is, posts in the field as opposed 
to strictly administrative posts” (Blundo and Olivier de Sardan 2006: 89).
The appeal of a job is determined by its capacity to simultaneously 
engender three types of financial resources (Cantens 2009): public money 
(tax revenues and fines); private money, both legal (corresponding to 30% 
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of the total of fines attributed to indicators and booking agents) and ille-
gal (corresponding to the results of informal arrangements with users); 
and collective money (collected in each service in kitties or black boxes 
and redistributed according to different criteria). In Senegal, every for-
ester knows the places where these three resources are most easily mobi-
lized: i.e. mainly in the Kolda and Tambacounda regions, which are open 
for charcoal production, or at the checkpoints located at the crossroads of 
the busiest roads (Kaffrine, Gouloumbou, Bargny, etc.).
However, from the mid-1970s, a new category of ‘profitable’ posts 
opened up for foresters, adding good working conditions and opportuni-
ties for promotion to the economic interests associated with the devel-
opment projects financed by international cooperation. The emergence 
of these ‘functional bureaucratic enclaves’ connected to the system of 
aid constitutes an important source of differentiation within the forestry 
department (for a further analysis of these dynamics, see Blundo 2011a).
Apart from the obvious pecuniary advantages, working on a project 
provides access to considerable work resources, greater autonomy, in- 
service training courses, study trips and scholarships for university train-
ing. The experience improves an employee’s curriculum vitae and opens 
the door to the consultancy market thanks to contacts made. Moreover, it 
is also the best way of building or extending a network of clients through 
the probable redistribution of project resources. Finally, it is a factor that 
can accelerate careers. All former and current directors of Senegal’s for-
estry department have participated in projects and been involved in them 
for most of their professional lives.
Control of project resources quickly became a power stake, so much 
so that, in 1985, the Senegalese Minister of Nature Protection decided to 
divide the directorate of the forestry department into two sections by cre-
ating a new head in charge of ‘reforestation and soil conservation’ and 
hence centralize de facto all of the projects in the hands of a trustworthy 
individual. Although this measure only endured for five years, the proj-
ect system generated internal conflicts around high-level appointments 
within the projects. The Minister and the head of the forestry department 
also disagreed about the control and appropriation of project resources: 
i.e. vehicles, petrol, public contracts that enable the establishment of 
arrangements with obliging suppliers.
Disagreements also arise between projects and decentralized forestry 
services. In the past, a reforestation project at the level of a Senegalese dis-
trict could receive greater logistic resources than a regional inspectorate.
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Hence, the forestry administration worked at two speeds. The gap deep-
ened between the ‘traditional’, shoddy services with no resources, which 
were reduced to forest policing and fighting forest fires, and the more val-
ued ‘projects’ departments. In this context, agents who remained outside 
the project system became discouraged and were sometimes forced to 
search for forms of parallel or illicit remuneration. Rumours and suspi-
cions grew within the service.
Human Resources Management: Between Clientelist Logics 
and the Search for Efficiency2
In a paramilitary administration in charge of law enforcement, agents are 
frequently transferred to other localities so as to prevent them from estab-
lishing collusive practices with the population. The shortage of staff and 
‘profitable’ jobs makes appointments a real challenge.
Staff transfers are very frequent: 161 national transfers took place in 
Senegal in the decade 1995–2005. On an average, 68 transfers took place 
each year, however, with ministerial reshuffles or changes in direction, 
this figure could sometimes affect more than 100 agents, which is one fifth 
of the workforce.
The logics of appointments varied. Whereas the Director-General of 
the forestry department, the administrative authority, appoints the tech-
nical agents on the suggestion of regional inspectors, the Minister of the 
Environment, which is the supervisory political authority, decides on 
the appointment of leading and technical staff (engineers and technical 
engineers). The important or strategic jobs are distributed according to 
classic clientelist logics (classmates, trustworthy men, ethnicity, political 
militancy). For example, during the last decade, like the Director-General 
himself, the majority of those responsible for the national direction in 
Senegal came from the Canadian university branch.
Nevertheless, clientelism is not the only criterion that dictates appoint-
ments (on this point, see also Willott, this volume). On the one hand, a 
considerable number of agents remain excluded from patron-client net-
works and, under duress, agree to go where service calls them, even if the 
reasons for successive changes are not clear and discourage officials in 
the long term.
2 For a further analysis on this point, see Blundo 2011b.
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Let us take the example of Saliou, a technical agent who comes from 
Djibélor’s first class3 of 1967. He remained in his native city Ziguinchor, from 
1968 to 1994 where he basically looked after reforestation. In 1994 he was 
sent to Kedougou and put in charge of departmental nurseries. However, 
after seven months, he was posted back to the departmental sector of Tam-
bacounda. As an addition to the manpower, for five months, he carried out 
controls along with the head of the central brigade. He was then appointed 
head of the Missirah brigade but he only remained there for eight months, 
after which he was removed by Tambacounda’s regional IREF (Inspecteur 
régional des Eaux et Forêts). He was then sent to Kouthiary. He thinks that 
someone wanted the Missirah appointment. He spent five years in Kouthiary 
under the orders of a young sector chief from Bala. He feels that if senior-
ity were recognized in the service, he would not have had to endure this. 
However, it is simply a question of contacts, he adds. He was then appointed 
chef du contentieux (head of the litigation department) at the IREF in Tamba 
where he lasted no more than six months before being posted on to the 
Kidira brigade, 190 km away from Tambacounda: “I am like a football, as 
long as the player doesn’t touch it, I don’t move . . .”
On the other hand, appointments to jobs are also made with respect to 
agents’ skills and experience. It is common for an experienced agent to be 
sent to a reputedly difficult zone to settle a running conflict or to repair 
damage caused by a predecessor.
Therefore, the directorate tries to juggle apparently contradictory 
requirements. It tries to satisfy clientelist pressure and ensure the proper 
functioning of the service.
Transfers can also conceal sanctions. Clientelism prevents direct 
sanctions. The only possible initiative consists of removing the dishon-
est or greedy agent under the pretext that ‘he is inefficient’. Frequently, 
when several agents are transferred at the same time, two are actually 
being sanctioned while the others are ‘whipping boys’. The concealment 
of sanctions responds to two logics. First, it spares the agent a certain 
stigmatization and, second, it also protects his chief from the suspicion 
of complicity. Patrons generally protect corrupt agents since both share 
bribes on the basis of a well-oiled system that also works for the police 
and customs. If agents know how to redistribute the fruits of their illicit 
activities, they can keep their jobs for years.
Sanctions can also strike agents with a reputation for being too rigid, 
disinclined to compromise and too frequently opposed to orders issued by 
3 The École des Agents Techniques des Eaux et Forêts was created in Djibélor (Ziguin-
chor) in 1963.
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the directorate that contravene professional ethics. I met several agents 
who had been punished for wishing to remain honest.
As a general rule, the jobs with the highest turnover are found in char-
coal exploitation areas in Senegal. Agents are quickly shifted when it is 
known that they have been involved in rackets or have opposed a power-
ful charcoal producer, but also if their job is desired by another agent who 
has ‘a long arm’ (i.e. more influence).
On the other hand, some foresters remain in key posts for a long time, 
particularly the fund managers (gestionnaires des Caisses intermédiaires 
des recettes forestières). Hence, they ensure the department’s stability 
and administrative memory in an environment in which administrative 
archives are neglected or non-existent.
Finally, appointments can also take account of agents’ specific demands, 
however such cases are quite rare officially and limited to reasons mod-
estly referred to as ‘social’: i.e. disease, the approach of retirement, aged 
or ill parents, excessive distance from the family etc. In reality, these cases 
are more common than people would like to admit. According to the 
Assistant Director of the Forestry Department in Senegal, during a recent 
national transfer concerning 96 ATEF, 30 persons asked for a transfer and 
their requests were accepted. Based on these same ‘social criteria’, if they 
are government employees and even if they are too numerous, agents’ 
wives are systematically posted in the same district.
Defending Foresters’ Jurisdiction from External Pressure
Since its establishment in French West Africa in the 1930s, the Corps des 
Eaux et Forêts essentially fulfilled its function of protecting environmental 
resources through suppression and sanctions. However, from the 1970s 
onwards, the national forestry services progressively assumed tasks cor-
responding to those of a development administration and became the 
principal actor in ambitious reforestation schemes and forest and wildlife 
protection programmes. It has been the vehicle for the introduction of 
a succession of new approaches from state-supervised technocratic proj-
ects, in which the only form of participation was food-for-work, through 
projects centred on rural community development, with experiments in 
rapid rural appraisal, to the current phase in which the central focus is 
decentralization. Since the mid-1990s, rural municipalities, particularly 
in Senegal, have been placed at the centre of natural resource manage-
ment. The professional forester has since been called on to accompany 
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and stimulate rural populations in making choices regarding the use of 
their environmental resources (Boutinot 2002).
However, the transfer of natural resources management to local coun-
cils and rural populations has yet to become effective. There are several 
reasons for this. Foresters appear to have blocked the transfer in order to 
avoid relinquishing their prerogatives of authority and control, invoking 
local technical incompetence and mismanagement by elected representa-
tives as justifications (Boutinot 2005; Ribot 2008). According to these stud-
ies, foresters have formed an alliance with powerful logging interests and 
with de-concentrated state authorities (sub-Prefects, Prefects and Gover-
nors) so as to resist being reduced to mere advisory roles, which would 
also involve the loss of illicit economic rents linked to the exploitation of 
forest resources.
Despite an increasingly participative rhetoric that serves as a smoke-
screen, the feelings of the forestry department’s agents waver between 
regret for an incomplete decentralization and the conviction that environ-
mental protection should remain a competence reserved to the state.
The forestry service feels threatened by the redefinition of its skills, 
which is interpreted as a loss of authority and economic resources. Some 
agents even suspect lobbies of working toward the declassification of all 
state protected forests and fear the pure and simple disappearance of the 
forestry department in the short term. Consequently, for many, militari-
zation represents a means of “keeping our administration in its place. It 
is a safety-valve to defend our field from external threats” (interview, AN 
22/9/06). In the context of the strong politicization of the forestry depart-
ment in the last decade and increasing external interventions in its daily 
functioning, “the uniform is a security for agents today”.
Interventionism and Registers of Accountability
Indeed, the discretionary powers of agents in relation to the application of 
the Forest Code are strongly influenced by interventions from a variety 
of formal and informal institutions and actors. This modifies the logics of 
accountability to which they are subjected and leads to public action 
characterized by the hybridization of norms and informal administrative 
procedures (on the multiple accountabilities of the postcolonial African 
state, see Blundo 2012).
These interventions cancel or transform an administrative decision or 
a penalty applied in respect of the law. The authors of interventions can 
be religious or customary authorities, state or political authorities like 
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prefects and governors, deputies, high-ranking officials or even forester 
colleagues.
In Senegal, the intervention of religious leaders appears to be more 
willingly tolerated or legitimized by agents who are themselves very often 
the disciples of marabouts. Authorities at the top of the brotherhood’s 
hierarchy are sometimes invited to convince foresters to relax a penalty 
or annul it. The discourse of agents who share their co-citizens’ religious 
experience presents the marabouts’ mediation as legitimate in the frame-
work of the patron-client relationships that link them to their disciples. 
Hence, they shift responsibility to the latter, who would take advantage of 
the religious leaders’ honesty to engage in illicit activities.
The head of the K regional inspectorate showed me a letter dated 22 June 
2008 with the letterhead of the general Caliph of Mourides and his signa-
ture, asking him very politely to be lenient with the drivers of two trucks 
fraudulently loaded with 60 bags of charcoal. Their only mistake, according 
to the Caliph, would have been their failure to declare that the goods were 
destined for the preparation of collective meals in a religious festival.
In reality, the pressure of marabouts can be very important and some-
times leads to physical threats:
One day, a marabout of the Mbacké family accompanied by 20 of his disci-
ples came to hunt in a forest classified as a reserved zone. When questioned 
by the Assistant Regional Inspector of the Forestry Service, the marabout 
told him: ‘You are very undisciplined. What gives you the right to come and 
disturb me in my work and tell me that I must not hunt here?’ In the mean-
time, the disciples roughed up the Assistant Inspector and pelted him with 
blows. They also asked their marabout for permission to kill him. Conse-
quently, the marabout added: ‘Go tell your inspector to come prohibit me 
from hunting here. If he doesn’t dare come, go tell his Director-General to 
come and do it, if he doesn’t dare, go tell the minister to come, and if he 
doesn’t dare come, go tell the President of the Republic to come. And you’ll 
see that he too will not dare come. So I don’t see how a subaltern like you 
can prevent me from hunting here. Besides, I was hunting for good game but 
there isn’t enough here. I’m going to change my hunting ground’. After that, 
he got into his 4X4 vehicle, which got stuck in the sand. Instead of asking 
his disciples to get the vehicle out of the sand, he got down from the vehicle 
and asked the Assistant Inspector and his two agents to do it. The agents 
wanted to resist but when they looked at the disciples they understood that 
it was better to accept. So they did what was necessary to get the vehicle out 
of the sand (head of a forestry brigade in Northern Senegal).
More generally, there are no-go areas for foresters and other official law 
enforcers where the state has deliberately chosen not to interfere. A 
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regional head of Diourbel told me that “to avoid problems” forestry service 
agents do not go into Touba, the holy city of Mouridism. The last admin-
istrative post is located in Mbacké and the person in charge is a fervent 
mourid whose only role, according to the higher officials of the service, is 
to accompany the Minister and the Director-General when they pay a visit 
to religious leaders.
These forms of interventionism share some common characteristics. 
First, interventions are not forcibly linked to the status of the offender 
but to the nature of his links with the author of the intervention: thus, 
a simple peasant or trader can win his case if he is the disciple of an 
influential marabout, or claims to be one, or if he is close to a member of 
parliament etc. Second, they highlight the disconcerting ease with which 
it is possible to enter into contact with the highest state representatives. 
The summit of the state is closer than one would imagine.
As demonstrated by my observations at the control station in Pont 
Noirot in August 2009, thanks to the use of mobile telephones, inter-
ventions have become increasingly rapid and practically instantaneous: 
having stopped a truck transporting precious wood without authoriza-
tion, two forest agents negotiated the release of the driver along with his 
load directly on their cell phone with a person whose identity they were 
unwilling to reveal.
The final administrative decision after intervention, is the result of 
the mobilization of different forms of accountability (Lindberg 2009): 
upward accountability related to a patron-client relationship when a dis-
ciple invites the administrative mediation of a marabout or a governor 
is questioned as a son of the soil; downward accountability typical of a 
relationship of patronage when a marabout contacts the Minister or the 
Director-General; downward bureaucratic accountability when the minis-
ter exerts pressure on the administrative hierarchy.
However, if it cannot be ruled out that these interventions are moti-
vated by the denunciation or correction of an offence by the forestry 
administration, it would appear to me that, instead, a large number tend 
to redress the effects of the normal application of the law, in other words 
to attenuate the effects of formal legality.
Finally, interventionism contributes to forging a professional culture 
amongst foresters that condemns rigor and values the capacities of nego-
tiation and the notion of maslaa that is central in Wolof and other Sahe-
lian societies: the constant search for a consensual solution aimed at 
establishing social peace.
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Improving the Efficiency of Forestry Services
The reform of militarization also aimed at “strengthening discipline, 
order and efficiency in the application of police forestry tasks, hunting, 
controlling poaching, fighting bush fires and participating in defence 
committees”.4 With militarization, the loss of civil rights was compen-
sated by a considerable increase in the purchasing power of civil servants 
who saw their salaries practically double thanks to various allowances. 
This was supposed to motivate them further and thereby attain the goal 
of greater rigor in their operations.
Informal Privatization of Forestry Services
In practice, however, the allocation of resources continues to be highly 
skewed. Financial and material resources destined for the functioning of 
local forestry services are managed at the central level. They are unequally 
distributed over the national territory: the directorate prioritizes regions 
and sectors likely to produce significant financial resources and neglects 
regions that are ‘dry’ from the perspective of rent extraction, despite the 
fact that they suffer from serious environmental challenges. The most 
deprived services correspond to the decentralized level of the depart-
ment (secteur), the district (brigade), the rural community (triage) and 
checkpoints. Field agents have no means of transport, little petrol and no 
money for maintenance and repairs. They buy their own uniforms from 
other military services and sometimes make their own stripes. Offices are 
neither equipped nor functional and checkpoints are mere shanties.
In this context of structural shortage, decentralized services resemble 
an archipelago of islands functioning in isolation (Copans 2001: 14); they 
have little formal contact with regional directorates and practically no 
relationship with the national directorate.
Under conditions of such structural penury, field officials acquire 
almost complete autonomy and their operations are effectively privatized. 
Members of local teams organize to equip themselves individually and 
collectively to ensure the minimal functioning of the service.
Agents like to evoke Wolof proverbs to describe their situation: “Yalla 
du tej buntu tej feneetr” (“God never closes a door and a window in a room 
at the same time”, i.e. when the formal resources financed by the state are 
4 According to the preamble to the Senegalese Forest Code, law n° 2005–10, 3 August 
2005, Republic of Senegal.
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lacking, the forestry agent always has the possibility of ‘surviving’ by other 
channels that could present themselves from elsewhere). Procedures dif-
fer, because “to each his manner of using his rat’s head” (“ku nek yaa xam 
ni ngay tojee sa bopu kaña”).
Thanks to the activities of the forestry police, agents can individually 
invest a part of the illicit gains obtained to buy themselves a motorcycle, 
a new uniform or office supplies. This informal privatization is not syn-
onymous with predation and is not incompatible with providing a public 
service (cf. the case described by Bierschenk, this volume). In some cases 
corruption can ensure the survival of the public service. Other agents 
engage in activities that generate revenue in order to finance the brigade’s 
activities (sale of decorative plants and fruit trees, chicken breeding).
Collectively, they can have recourse to local patrons (private operators, 
private firms, development projects) or dip into a ‘kitty’, a common fund 
financed by the legal proceeds of fines.
Irrespective of the source of financial resources, this situation prompts 
the agents to consider service equipment as private goods: a district head, 
whom I encountered in an office that had been freshly repainted and 
well-equipped told me proudly: “Everything here, even the forestry ser-
vice stamps, belongs to me. I bought it all and I’ll take it with me when 
I leave”.
The de facto independence enjoyed by subaltern agents is important. 
One agent told me: “Here, I am the one who cuts the head, chops it, cooks 
it but also the one who eats it” (“Fii may dag bop, may fees, may tog te 
may lekk”). This autonomy increases their already significant discretion-
ary powers. Combined with the informal privatization of the logistical 
resources of services, they determine a specific regime of activities on the 
field.
Forestry brigades, which often consist of a single agent, spread their 
activities across reforestation, forestry police, battling bush fires and the 
training and supervision of peasants. Although militarization did not lead 
to a significant increase in forestry police activities, it did not necessarily 
involve the conversion of forestry agents to a participative credo. Due to 
the lack of resources or petrol, agents tend not to go into the field unless 
they are sure that the ‘hunt will be good’ or if the cost of their trip is cov-
ered by a development project.
Sorties by the brigades most often result from denunciations made by 
a small network of local informants or they are limited to unannounced 
controls in places considered strategic, or, again, carried out at certain 
strategic periods corresponding to religious festivals like tabaski and 
korité, periods when clandestine users tend to be very active.
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In reality, the control and supervision operations are very sporadic, 
both on the level of protected natural spaces and at charcoal production 
sites. In this context, suppression takes precedence over prevention. Most 
agents prefer to hide in the bush and wait for offences to take place before 
intervening.
Informal Arrangements, Simplification of Administrative Procedures  
and Practical Professional Norms
A paramilitary body that can legitimately exercise control and suppres-
sion activities armed with important discretionary powers (evaluation of 
the offence and the penalty to be applied, a large range of fines etc.) gov-
erning economically and politically crucial resources, subjected to con-
tradictory pressures but lacking the necessary means to act: all of these 
factors combined constitute an ideal ground for the growth of corruptible 
behaviours.
Several studies describe the corruption of the forest control system (Fall 
2006, Djigo 2006). However, I would tend to qualify these conclusions. My 
research suggests the need to try to go beyond the classical reading of the 
dysfunctionality of African public administrations in terms of neopatri-
monialism (see Therkildsen, this volume), clientelism and the ‘capture’ of 
bureaucracies by economic and/or political elites.
This does not involve the denial that there is an—often marked—
hiatus between the formal mission of the Eaux et Forêts service and the 
reality of its practices (in fact, the same disjunction applies to the majority 
of the public services of the same countries). The problem is that most of 
the cited works take a normative and externalist approach to the analysis 
of the malfunctioning of the service. This approach is normative to the 
extent that it focuses on the ways in which practices deviate from formal 
norms and leans on a non-critical faith in a vigorous civil society acting as 
a counter-power; it is externalist in that it takes no account of the inter-
nal logics governing the functioning of the service but instead adopts the 
point of view of external actors, whether donors or service users.
In contrast, I have attempted to approach this question by adopting the 
point of view of forestry service agents who are not reticent in providing 
examples of their own practices and, contrary to all expectations, do not 
solely adopt a stance that tends to justify or minimize the scale of these 
practices.
The forestry administration manages spaces and resources that involve 
significant economic stakes: hunting and the allocation of licenses, the 
timber trade, the collection of fruit and wild species. Charcoal production 
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alone, “represents an annual turnover of 20 billion FCFA for the state” 
(Boutinot 2002). Even an agent at the bottom of the hierarchical ladder 
can achieve a living standard incommensurable with his basic salary if 
he knows how to manage his career smartly. For example, a former head 
of a district sector could finance a pilgrimage to Mecca, build one house 
in Saint-Louis and another in Touba, and send his children to Europe to 
study.
Indeed, the opportunities for enrichment, particularly in charcoal 
zones, are numerous. This is not the place to describe them in detail. It 
may be noted, however, that they are located in a continuity of practices 
characterized by blurred boundaries, ranging from ‘tolls’ required at each 
of Senegal’s 13 official checkpoints for the control of transport licences to 
‘commissions’ in cash or kind arising from mutually agreed arrangements 
between forestry agents and producers for evading the requirements of 
the Forest Code. Although it is by definition impossible to evaluate the 
scale of the illicit transactions, according to a senior official at the head 
of the forestry services, the number of transactions settled on a ‘friendly’ 
basis can be estimated at 80%. According to a recent study, two fifths 
of the charcoal loads that arrive in Dakar are fraudulent in origin (Djigo 
2006: 34). Thus, foresters trade in free transport licences, which, in prin-
ciple, are limited in number and reserved for domestic use. It is also com-
mon knowledge that in case of the seizure of illegally produced charcoal, 
the latter is resold ‘in auctions’ to the same producer, in the name of 
another member of a forestry cooperative. Exceeding the tonnage has also 
become the rule: trucks are generally loaded with 450 bags instead of the 
regulatory 300; moreover, hauliers use bags containing up to 80 kg instead 
of the standard 50 kg. Money is distributed at each checkpoint to ensure 
that agents turn a blind eye.
Several factors contribute to the corruptibility of forestry agents. To 
begin, when a forester decides to book an offender, he already knows that 
he risks being disowned by a superior as a result of a political, administra-
tive or religious intervention and, moreover, the delegitimization of his 
action in the eyes of the population.
The cancellation of a statutory settlement also deprives the booking 
agent and the informer of the shares of the fines due to them by law,5 
5 Article R.64 of law N° 98/03, 8 January 1998 stipulates: “Three tenths of the income 
from fines, confiscations, repayments, damages-interests and constraints are attributed 
to forestry agents, to agents commissioned by the Forestry Service and, if necessary, to 
authorized agents of other services. The division is made on the basis of two tenths for 
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which are paid as an incentive to honest behaviour. However, even if the 
fine is normally paid, the forestry agent knows that the probability that 
he will receive the entire share due to him is very low. At best, the service 
‘will have a kitty’: the money contained in this common fund will be dis-
tributed among the brigade’s agents so as to motivate agents who rarely 
‘go out’. This will reward the auxiliary staff, but also serve to finance work-
ing costs or social expenses. At worst, the shares will end up in a black box 
managed by the head of the service in the greatest secrecy.
Sporadic and irregular relations with hierarchical superiors also dictate 
the tone of actions of the field. In July 2009, the head of a sector in the 
Senegalese groundnut basin admitted: “Temptation is great. No one con-
trols me”, and then asked: “How can you explain that since my installation 
six months ago, no one, not even the IREF, has come to see me?”.
Moreover, agents shelter behind the well-established justification that 
the bad example comes from above. According to a rumour going around 
the service in 2009, the outgoing Director of the Forestry Service granted 
special authorizations to his entourage to produce up to 85,000 hundred-
weight of charcoal and gave government contracts to ‘relatives’ for sup-
plying very bad quality equipment to tree nurseries.
The problems that beset the charcoal sector and the entire manage-
ment of forestry resources are systemic. Subaltern agents are only the last 
link in a chain of fraudulent transactions and irregularities that extends 
up to the supervisory authority. Furthermore, even programmes financed 
from outside and considered as ‘success stories’ are not immune from this 
system. The example of the Sustainable and Participative Energy Manage-
ment programme (PROGEDE) financed by the World Bank is a case in 
point.
In short, much of the administrative action in the forestry sector 
follows informal arrangements with users. It is even possible to affirm 
that the forestry administration is an important site of the production 
and reproduction of informality as public action is instigated by actors 
immersed in a pluralism of norms: official norms (for example, the Forest 
Code and statutes dealing with the internal organization of the forestry 
service), social norms (general principles of conduct and behaviour in 
the social sphere which are codified to varying degrees), and ‘practical’ 
the informer agent and one-tenth for the booking agent. Seven tenths are paid to the local 
group administering the forest, in which the offence was reported or to the state if the law 
has been breached in the state forest reserve.”
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professional norms, which the official learns in the course of his profes-
sional socialization (for example, knowing how to spot a fraudulent load, 
knowing how to negotiate the sum of a fine, learning to handle traditional 
authorities etc.).
Different mixtures of these varieties of norms constitute the so-called 
“professional culture” (Olivier de Sardan 2001) of foresters. I would avoid 
treating this in a deterministic manner. The professional culture is not 
fixed and does not extend to the entire service. It is not fixed because it 
evolves with changes in environment policy, new approaches to develop-
ment and the appointment of new staff. Moreover, rather than conceiving 
professional culture as a set of common traits that shapes the behaviour of 
every forestry administrative agent, it can be seen as a repertory of norms, 
values and registers of action for foresters to draw on in their daily actions 
and as responses to new situations created by reforms in their sector 
(reforms involving decentralization, militarization, development actions, 
the technical framework etc.). An integral part of foresters’ culture con-
sists in learning how to handle different types of authority, bargaining the 
sum of a legal penalty, respecting local codes of propriety, undoing and 
preventing sorcery and relying on intermediaries (political leaders, infor-
mants, religious authorities) for contact with the population.
Conclusions: The Limited Impact of Reform
It is clear that as implementers of the Forest Code, forestry agents exert 
their discretionary powers under the influence of multiple pressures flow-
ing from a variety of formal and informal interests and actors. This com-
plicates the logics of accountability to which they are subject and results 
in forms of public goods provision being governed by hybridized norms 
and informal administrative procedures. Under these circumstances, the 
capacity of top-down reforms to deliver significant benefits would appear 
doubtful (see also Anders, Charton, Muñoz, this volume).
Restoring the prestige of the service, rediscovering the ‘big forestry fam-
ily’, protecting the service from external pressures, strengthening order 
and discipline, ending abuses in the attribution of stripes, increasing the 
salaries of government employees: of all these—official or unofficial—
goals, only the latter appears to have been successful to the extent that 
most of the agents encountered voluntarily spoke of a “militarization car-
ried out merely to earn a living”. And yet, the service needs something 
other than new recruits. In order to fully assume its role of protecting and 
regenerating natural resources, it requires a series of reforms.
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If top-down reforms have partially failed, the emergence of bottom-up 
micro-reforms can be observed occasionally (for the observation of a simi-
lar phenomenon in the Niger judiciary, see Hamani, this volume). There 
appears to be significant scope for local innovations, which, in fact, for-
malize some of the more constructive features of the informal habitus, or 
the way things work in reality. The leadership styles of heads of services 
(e.g. the regional inspector, sector head) play a preponderant role here. In 
the eyes of foresters, a good chief must know how to share technical and 
financial resources with his subalterns and be capable of ‘communicating’ 
and making them more responsible. He must know how to defend and 
protect the interests of subordinates and the service in general, take inter-
est in their working conditions and listen to their demands, know how to 
resist a minister, and not be too politicized. In short, he must behave as 
a boss vis-à vis subalterns without himself being a client of hierarchical 
superiors.
Clearly, a hierarchical administration based on patron-client relation-
ships is often better managed than a service, in which the chief intends to 
apply the criteria of ‘good governance’ literally. In the former case, agents 
are more motivated, the team more united and even ready to provide 
quality service. Internal relations in the services remain informal. In the 
Tambacounda regional inspectorate, for example, the chief took the ini-
tiative of formalizing the use of the legal or illicit shares collected by the 
agents when they booked offences. The agents decided to create a fund 
managed by the accountant. Part of the sum collected was redistributed 
on the basis of a unanimously accepted allocation system and the rest was 
used to finance urgent repairs, petrol consumption and unexpected social 
expenses. This is an example in which the formalization of an informal 
practice appears to have improved the functioning of the service, antici-
pated predatory behaviours and fostered internal solidarity.
In other regions situated outside the charcoal zone, I met young sector 
heads, who, even while privatizing their services entirely, simultaneously 
rejected the classical forestry professional culture and, above all, its form 
of internal patronage, corruption and repression of rural people. They 
undertook small reforms towards formalization of and tighter control on 
the informal arrangements with the population instituted by their pre-
decessors. If, as foresters like to recall, “charcoal is black and hands get 
dirty”, then the motor of the internal transformation of the forestry service 
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FACTIONALISM AND STAFF SUCCESS IN A NIGERIAN UNIVERSITY:  
A DEPARTMENTAL CASE STUDY
Chris Willott
Introduction
In recent years a narrow group of approaches and themes has come to 
dominate analysis of the African state.1 From a methodological perspec-
tive, broad brush approaches that provide a homogenous vision of the 
African state shorn of empirical content have gained pre-eminence. These 
approaches tend to use the methodologies of the discipline of political 
science, and are often normative, in that they examine African states 
through the prism of Weberian logic and conclude that, because states 
do not conform to a rational-legal ideal, they must therefore be deficient. 
Thematically, corruption, patronage and informality dominate, and are 
held to be the characteristics that define all African public service bureau-
cracies. Taken together, these approaches and themes can be termed the 
neopatrimonial approach to the African state.
A key question arising from this dominance is, when one undertakes 
long-term, ethnographic analysis of African public institutions, to what 
extent are these themes actually apparent? To what extent do corruption 
and patronage, compared to the official rules, structure access to rewards? 
How do patron-client systems actually operate for those who are embed-
ded in them? This chapter seeks to analyse these processes in the context 
of an institution in Nigeria’s elite Federal university sector. In particular, 
I analyse the pervasiveness of one aspect of patron-client relationships, 
but one that has been relatively excluded from the dominant neopatrimo-
nial approach: factionalism, defined as competition for resources between 
structurally and functionally similar groups of individuals.
This chapter argues that factionalism exerts a significant influence over 
the careers of academics in a Nigerian university. This conclusion sup-
ports the general neopatrimonial thesis: that it is personal connections 
1 I gratefully acknowledge the financial support of the ESRC for funding my research 
in Nigeria. I also thank Dibyesh Anand and Joe Devine for their helpful comments on an 
earlier draft of this chapter.
© Chris Willott, 2014 | doi: 10.1163/9789004264960_005
This is an open access chapter distributed under the terms of the CC BY-NC 4.0 license.
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rather than formal competence that exert a greater influence over access 
to rewards. Despite this, however, the influence of factionalism and other 
non-merit considerations are not absolute: merit still exerts an influence 
on both staff entry and promotion. Prospective academic staff who do 
not have the required qualification will not gain employment regardless 
of their personal or factional connections, and decisions about promo-
tions that are not based on merit—either the promotion of unworthy 
candidates or the ‘frustration’ of meritorious ones—can only reach a cer-
tain level before the official rules act to rein them in. The neopatrimonial 
characterisation of Nigerian state institutions as operating wholly for the 
benefit of those working for them and their client groups (see for instance 
Chabal and Daloz, 2006; Joseph, 1987) has clear limits and must be tem-
pered by an understanding of the micro-dynamics of individual institu-
tions. Entry to and promotions within Nigerian higher education are not a 
power-politics-led free-for-all; they operate on the basis of clearly defined 
logics that combine emphasis on personal connections with merit. That 
the former often take precedence does not mean that the latter are non-
existent.
Setting and Methods
This chapter is based on nine months of ethnographic fieldwork carried 
out in a university in the Igbo-speaking region of south eastern Nigeria in 
2007. In this chapter I will refer to the university where I carried out field-
work as the University of South Eastern Nigeria (USEN).2 During the data 
collection process I became close to one of the two factions I describe, the 
anti-select club (ASC), which was generally made up of people who were 
sympathetic to my research and were happy to discuss their experiences, 
even those concerning relatively sensitive topics. By contrast, the mem-
bers of the other faction, the select club, were much less open and I found 
it difficult to gain an ‘insider’ understanding of their views. It could be 
argued that, in becoming closely associated with the ASC, I suffered from 
what Olivier de Sardan (2003) terms encliquage—literally, becoming fac-
tionalised. Olivier de Sardan notes two particular difficulties engendered 
2 Throughout this paper the name of the university, the department where I worked 
and all individuals are pseudonyms. In addition I have changed some details about indi-
vidual members of staff in order to protect their identities.
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by this process—the tendency for the researcher to “become the echo 
of his adoptive clique and to adopt their points of view” and the way in 
which it can close off other cliques to him or her (ibid.: 49). In my case, 
the first of these problems may well have occurred, though it is difficult 
to say for certain. I have endeavoured to be as neutral as possible in my 
analysis of the factional struggle, though my closeness to the ASC means 
that I may have unwittingly given greater credence to their views than 
those of others. I acknowledge that there is therefore a potential bias in 
this work. In an effort to combat this during fieldwork, I also carried out 
research with staff outside my department and those who were not mem-
bers of either faction.
During my time at USEN I also tried to get close to members of the 
select club, though this group were much less welcoming to me and, later 
in my fieldwork I became aware that some members were unhappy with 
my presence on campus as they believed I was ‘asking too many ques-
tions’. This is because I was researching aspects of extra-legal practice in 
which they were involved. For this reason, I do not believe that the second 
problem of encliquage—closing off access to other groups—occurred in 
my research, because, regardless of my relationship with the ASC, I would 
have been denied access to the select club in any case. My isolation from 
this group was due to the sensitive nature of my research and the fear 
amongst select club members that I might discover their participation in 
extra-legal practice, rather than my closeness to the ASC.
Factionalism
Factionalism refers to competition for power and prestige between “struc-
turally and functionally similar groups” (Brumfiel, 1994: 4). It takes place 
in many different arenas—particularly political parties but also bureau-
cracies, chiefdoms, trades unions, employers’ organizations and religious 
groups (Bayart, 1991)—of African social and political life. Nicholas’s (1977: 
57–58) classic definition incorporates five characteristics of factions: they 
engage in conflict; are political; are not corporate groups, meaning that 
they are “basically impermanent” (ibid.: 58); their members are recruited 
by a leader; and members are recruited on diverse principles. I will use a 
combination of the definitions provided by Brumfiel and Nicholas in this 
chapter.
Few scholars of African politics and society examine factions in detail. 
Only one author of the broad neopatrimonial school, Jean-François 
94 chris willott
Bayart,3 studies the primacy of factions in Africa, noting that they are “the 
very stuff of political life” (2009: 211). Within micro-empirical accounts of 
public service bureaucracies in Nigeria and elsewhere in West Africa, 
analysis of factions, their operation, impact and historical antecedents, 
is conspicuously absent. Smith (2001, 2005, 2006), who spent a number of 
years working in Nigerian universities, does not mention their existence 
in his numerous writings on patronage and corruption in Nigeria, while 
Olivier de Sardan (2009) touches on the subject very briefly, viewing fac-
tionalism as part of broader patterns of clientelism. Understanding of Afri-
can states, and particularly interface bureaucracies—those arenas such 
as schools, hospitals, police stations, courts and, in my research, universi-
ties, where the individual ‘meets’ the state—would benefit greatly from 
further empirical research on factions and their functions. However, as 
Sandbrook (1972) argues, conducting research on factions can be a dan-
gerous activity, which is a possible reason why so little empirical work on 
the phenomenon has been produced.
Factionalism at the University of South Eastern Nigeria
In USEN’s social policy department, the department where I carried out 
my research, there are two broad groupings, and every member of aca-
demic staff bar one is closely allied to one of the two groups.4 One of 
the groups is semi-official and staff can become members. This group has 
a title, though in this chapter I use the pseudonym the select club. The 
opposing faction is unofficial, in that staff cannot officially join. It does 
not have a title, though for the purposes of clarity I term this group the 
anti-select club (ASC). The split exerts a large influence on departmen-
tal activity, and was acknowledged as existing by every staff member I 
spoke to. One senior member of staff described the departmental split as 
“a huge chasm”, “bitter” and “fascistic” (interview, 3 September 2007). Fac-
tion membership is very much a zero-sum game: by being closely allied 
to one faction individuals will find it extremely difficult to become close 
3 Jean-François Bayart’s contribution to the study of African politics and society is broad 
and diverse and to label this work neopatrimonial is something of an oversimplification. 
Nonetheless some of his writing contains some strongly neopatrimonial arguments.
4 The social policy department was viewed by many other academics as the most ‘cor-
rupt’ department in the university. The patterns of behaviour outlined here may therefore 
not be repeated across the university, though anecdotal evidence suggests that similar 
situations may be found in other departments, albeit to a lesser extent.
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to, or even have civil personal relationships with, members of the other 
camp.
The factionalism in the social policy department began in the 1960s 
and 1970s when the department was largely split along ideological lines, 
in that there was a ‘liberal’ group and a ‘Marxist’ group, each led by a 
charismatic member of senior staff. At the time all USEN social science 
departments were split along Cold War lines. During this period ideologi-
cal differences did not prevent staff from enjoying each other’s company 
socially: differences were to do with academic debate rather than per-
sonal animosity. However, the mid-1980s were a time of great upheaval in 
Nigerian universities (Anugwom, 2002), as in the country as a whole, as 
structural adjustment and the devaluation of the Naira brought increasing 
scarcity following the plentiful years of the late-1970s oil boom. Condi-
tions for staff, including salaries, worsened considerably (ibid.) and some 
staff used this as a justification for participating in extra-legal practices 
in order to augment their wages. Departmental splits took on a different 
character around this time, the new cleavages being based more around 
beliefs on the acceptance of extra-legal practices and less on political ide-
ology or national politics, though personnel remained broadly the same: 
those who had been in the liberal camp were those who were most likely 
to participate in extra-legal practice and those in the Marxist camp the 
least, though this was by no means absolute. It is not clear why members 
of the Marxist group were less likely to participate in extra-legal prac-
tice, though strength of ideology—which would be likely to be stron-
ger amongst Marxists, a doctrine that tends to attract highly committed 
followers—over self-interest is a plausible explanation. Indeed, Nicholas 
(1977: 57) argues that political ideology forms a greater part of factional 
conflict for socialists than for conservatives. The division over the issue 
of ‘moral standards’ at USEN persisted while the political divide did not. 
Many of those who had formerly been in the Marxist camp retained their 
belief in socialist ideology but it no longer formed the basis of factional 
conflict.
The issue of morality in working practices remains a driving force 
behind the factional split, though the related issue of attitudes towards 
student success—the ex-Marxist faction (broadly) favouring advance-
ment on the basis of merit and the ex-liberal faction being more heav-
ily involved in ‘sorting’—also plays a part. ‘Sorting’ is a Nigerian English 
term referring to the sale of grades for money. There are a number of 
other practices that academic staff who seek personal enrichment involve 
themselves in. ‘Lobbying’ refers to the sale of university places for money, 
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while academic staff may also demand that students purchase handouts 
in order to pass courses and engage in exam malpractice in exchange for 
financial reward.5 As one lecturer put it, there are those who are “here 
to trade” and those who “want to contribute to the university realising 
its [official] objectives” (interview, 2 October 2007). In this environment 
academics inevitably gravitate towards others who share their views. One 
faction member said that he seeks to establish relationships with people 
with the same “value system relationship” as him, meaning a belief in hard 
work and upholding the stated values of the university. Often academics 
are ‘brought in’ to the university on the basis of their views on morality 
in working practices, depending on which faction is in control of each 
department at that point. Factional groups seek to ‘replicate themselves’ 
in the appointments they make, in order to increase their numerical 
strength and reinforce their power in the department.
In the next section I outline the histories, personnel and characteristics 
of the two main factions.
Anti-Select Club
The anti-select club can be viewed as the modern incarnation of the Marx-
ist faction that began in the 1960s though, as noted above, it has under-
gone significant change since then. The inception of the current group in 
the social policy department occurred soon after the inauguration of the 
incumbent Vice Chancellor (VC) in 2005 when the select club went “over 
the heads of the department” to appoint a Head of Department (HoD) 
who would “give them leeway” to participate in extra-legal practice (inter-
view, 3 October 2007). As a result of this, all lecturers who had not been 
involved in this endeavour—with the exception of the one non-affiliated 
member of staff in the department—were called for a meeting by the VC, 
and these staff members became a group. The ASC therefore owe their 
existence to a successful attempt by the select club to install their pre-
ferred candidate to the position of HoD.
The ASC is an informal group of academics, mainly in social policy 
but also in other departments in the social sciences faculty. During my 
research at USEN the ASC, like the select club, had a clear leader, though 
5 These practices are by no means ubiquitous, and many academic staff do not partici-
pate in them. Additionally, there is usually an element of merit to these transactions. For 
instance, a student with a very low score on their entrance exams would not be offered 
a place to study, whatever their ability to pay. For more detail on these processes see 
Willott 2011.
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other very senior staff were also closely allied to the group. These aca-
demics, however, did not have an active role in the ASC at the time. The 
de facto leader of the ASC during my time at USEN was a charismatic 
Marxist scholar named Professor Arinze Omeife, who was also in a posi-
tion of authority within the faculty. He also has a PhD from a prestigious 
American university and is an internationally-renowned scholar.
The vast majority of staff members associated with this group espoused 
an ideology that can be described as socialist or Marxist; as noted above, 
though the factional conflict no longer concerned this issue, a number 
of Marxist scholars remained committed to its ideology. This was a key 
aspect of the way the group presented itself. Many of the group were 
also heavily involved with the Academic Staff Union of Universities 
(ASUU).6 However, neither of these two characteristics were prereq-
uisites for membership.7 A number of ASC members were not active 
members of ASUU, nor were they adherents to Marxist ideology. This 
situation has evolved since the origins of this group and illustrates the 
dynamic nature of the factional struggle at USEN.
In addition to a leftist ideology, many members of the ASC saw them-
selves as guardians of a long-established tradition of scholarship at USEN 
and within the social policy department. Faction members would often 
emphasise the ‘traditions’ and ‘culture’ of the department, and how those 
currently in control of the department—the select club—were moving 
the department away from its roots:
This particular department . . . has a culture rooted in hard work. So for 
you to move in from elsewhere and start academic work here . . . if you are 
not too careful in learning and understanding how we function, the ten-
dency [is] that you might bring in some of the practices that are not known 
here (interview, 25 July 2007).
This individual alludes, through the phrase “some practices that are not 
known here”, to extra-legal practices such as lobbying, sorting and sell-
ing handouts that members of the select club engage in. He suggests that 
those who favour hard work and academic culture are guardians of an old 
tradition in Nigerian higher education, while the newcomers he refers to 
are implicitly seen as part of a newer, inferior tradition based on personal 
6 ASUU is the trade union for Nigerian academics. All academic staff are automatically 
ASUU members though many actively work against the union in university politics.
7 There was no formalised way of joining the ASC. I use the word membership here to 
refer to a sense of belonging to a like-minded group and participating in their activities.
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gain. The safeguarding of old traditions was presented as one of the ASC’s 
main raisons d’être. Some non-ASC members, however, viewed this stance 
as more rhetorical than actual.
At the time of my research, the ASC were rather marginalised within 
the social policy department. They struggled to ‘replicate’ themselves by 
bringing in new members of staff who shared their views on extra-legal 
practice and scholarship. All new staff members recruited during my 
fieldwork were affiliated to the select club. ASC members also suffered in 
regularization—the process academics go through to become permanent 
members of the faculty—promotion and committee membership at the 
hands of the select club. The main function of the ASC at the time was 
therefore to forward the interests of its members, such as to ensure that 
they received regularizations and promotions on time, a function it was 
not able to fulfil particularly well. The ability of the group to influence 
the prevalence of extra-legal practice in the university and to encourage 
scholarship was also severely hampered by their lack of power within the 
department.
A second key function of the group was to link each individual with 
Prof. Omeife, a man who, as a senior academic, could have a signifi-
cant impact on their current and future careers. This corresponds to 
assertions (such as by Bujra, 1973; Nicholas, 1977) that factions are more 
about the relationship between members and the leader than within the 
faction as a group. It also highlights the way in which factionalism can 
be viewed as a concept with close links to that of patron-clientism, 
which forms a central part of the neopatrimonial characterisation of the 
African state.
The two main functions outlined here would suggest that ASC mem-
bers were rather more self-interested than their rhetorical commitment 
to socialism and scholarship might suggest, as individual success rather 
than ideological advancement was a key goal. A further piece of evidence 
pointing to the self-interest thesis is the actions of staff at a departmen-
tal board meeting I attended. A number of questions were raised at this 
meeting by ASC members and, despite the widespread existence of exam 
malpractice, poor facilities and lack of opportunities for research, all ques-
tions raised were directly linked to the factional struggle and to personal 
welfare. These included queries as to why certain members of staff (non-
select club members) were excluded from some responsibilities, partic-
ularly those that carried high remuneration, and other issues related to 
contracts and salaries. Furthermore, a key meeting place for ASC mem-
bers in the social policy department was a discussion group on African 
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politics, but this group appeared not to meet when Prof. Omeife was not 
on campus, illustrating that impressing the leader, rather than discussing 
African politics, was the real reason for the existence of the group. This 
evidence appears to point to a pattern of self-interest in the ASC, in which 
the faction could be seen as simply the best avenue through which indi-
viduals gain access to rewards in a potentially hostile environment.
Contrastingly, there is also evidence that ASC members did behave dif-
ferently to their select club counterparts. Students noted that ASC mem-
bers were less likely to award “unmerited favours” when it came to the 
allocation of marks and instead focused on the students’ academic quality. 
By contrast, the select club were viewed as non- or even anti-intellectual 
by students and staff alike. My own observations also point to a qualita-
tive difference in attitude to scholarship and meritocracy between the two 
groups, though this does not necessarily apply to all members.
There is, therefore, coherence in the way the ASC presents itself to out-
siders: it exists in order to work against the select club’s focus on material 
gain and instead emphasises hard work, meritocracy and a socialist politi-
cal ideology. Internally, however, it does not possess this coherence as the 
group combines a logic of commitment to meritocracy with that of self- 
interest. Some members were committed to both socialism and scholar-
ship but also viewed the faction as an important vehicle for self-interest, 
while others had little commitment to either of the group’s ideological rai-
sons d’etre, but instead were simple opportunists, in that they would join 
any group if it assisted their climb up the social and academic hierarchy.
Select Club
The select club is a group of academic staff at USEN that, in contrast to 
the ASC, is a semi-official group of which staff can become members. It is 
much more organised than its opposite number. The club contains mem-
bers from across the social science faculty and the university as a whole. 
The openly espoused goal of the select club is the acquisition of mate-
rial wealth, and members see themselves as ‘select’ in these terms, not in 
terms of academic or intellectual prowess. During my time at USEN the 
select club was ‘in control’ of the social policy department, meaning that 
it had significant influence over decisions on such issues as allocation of 
resources, staff promotions and committee memberships. A number of 
factors contributed to this. First, the HoD at the time was a man who, 
while not a select club member, was nonetheless sympathetic to their 
aims. Second, the select club had close links with the Vice Chancellor—a 
position of unrivalled importance in Nigerian higher education—which 
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substantially improved their ability to act independently. One non-select 
club member of staff commented that their association with the VC allowed 
them to “become liberated” from constraints on their action. Third, the 
de facto leader of the select club was a particularly powerful member of 
staff who had close ties with the VC independent of his position as leader 
of the select club. He had previously held important positions in national 
politics. As a result, the benefits accrued by members of the select club 
were likely to be derived from a combination of closeness to the faction 
and closeness to the leader. One respondent commented that one of the 
reasons certain select club members were able to secure promotions is 
because they were tied “to the apron strings” of their leader.
It was widely acknowledged that the glue holding the select club 
together was their individual and collective participation in extra-legal 
practice. One of the main functions of the club, therefore, was to protect 
members from external sanctions on their behaviour. As a result, it was 
widely believed that the select club in social policy operated on the basis 
of collective decision-making, in that decisions taken by individuals had to 
be agreed on by all members. As any extra-legal activity had been agreed 
by all members, each member therefore agreed to defend their colleagues 
against allegations of malpractice or wrongdoing. This mechanism pro-
vided a protection for all members as they knew that they would not be 
betrayed by a colleague, as betrayal would also implicate the accuser. This 
marked it out as being significantly different from the ASC, which had no 
such codes of behaviour, primarily because it was unnecessary: even if 
individual ASC members participated in extra-legal practice, there was no 
group decision to do so. Members who did do this were on their own. In 
addition, the select club members much more exclusionary than the ASC, 
specifically because of their participation in extra-legal activities.
Participation in extra-legal practice may not be the only thing hold-
ing the select club together and encouraging new members, however. The 
select club is an isusu group, a form of Igbo credit institution in which 
members make regular financial contributions and receive fixed amounts 
at periodic intervals. Isusu groups initially developed in order to provide 
young men with the resources they needed to get married (Nwabughuogu, 
1984). The select club isusu group is intended to provide members with the 
capital to make large purchases such as cars or to begin building homes 
or businesses. This aspect of the select club, which has no connection to 
their participation in extra-legal practice, provides another explanation 
for their success.
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The select club performs similar functions to its opposite number, 
though with far greater success. It was able to ‘bring in’ staff to the social 
policy department who shared its ethos, and was also successful in sup-
porting staff once they had joined the department. Its primary role was 
to act as protector of individuals and to ensure that they advanced up the 
academic ladder as quickly and efficiently as possible and gain member-
ship of important departmental and faculty committees, both of which give 
greater power to the group. During my time at USEN the select club per-
formed this function extremely effectively: of four promotions announced 
during my fieldwork, all were select club members. This is despite the 
fact that some of these promotions were to grades not yet achieved by 
other staff members who had considerably longer service at USEN. This 
is particularly noteworthy as Nigerian bureaucracies have a reputation 
for promoting people on the basis of “serving time” in an institution as 
opposed to merit (Cohen, 1980: 76), so one might therefore expect people 
with longer service to be promoted earlier. My research suggests that a 
number of those promoted were lacking in both time served and merit 
compared to some of their non-select club colleagues. Departmental com-
mittees, particularly lucrative and influential ones, were also dominated 
by the select club.
There is greater clarity to the logics that structure the existence of 
the select club. The central logic underlying their existence is that of 
individual and collective self-interest. The group does not seek to cloak 
this behind a different external portrayal; to the contrary, they are very 
open about their interest in material advancement. This logic was based 
on a belief that personal material advancement, even at the expense of 
the university, was justified and represented a legitimate goal. I would 
argue—though detailed examination of this issue is beyond the scope 
of this chapter—that this belief is a direct result of the alienation from 
the state felt by many Nigerian people, particularly in the south-eastern 
region (Tignor, 1979), a direct result of the type of rule imposed during the 
colonial era (for more detail on this issue see Ekeh, 1975; Willott, 2009).
Non-Faction Members
There was just one member of staff in the social policy department who 
was not a member of either of the two factions. Chigozie Emerenini had 
a broadly anti-colonial, though not avowedly Marxist, political stance, 
something which would have allied him more closely to the ASC, though 
he did not seem to fit in with this group’s emphasis on hard work and 
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scholarship. Chigozie had a difficult time gaining access to promotions 
or perks at USEN—it had taken him well over a year to get his position 
regularized—and appeared to be the most marginalised of all members 
of the department. However, Chigozie was fortunate that he had a strong 
patron, a senior ASC academic called Professor Isaac Okonkwor, some-
one who was able to ensure that he retained his position and eventually 
ensured his regularization.
This relationship illustrates the extent to which obligation is a key con-
cept in understanding Nigerian state and society. When I first became 
aware of the relationship between the two men I was surprised, as I had 
regarded Chigozie’s patron as a strong academic and Chigozie as much 
less so. I later learnt that Prof. Okonkwor’s reason for assisting Chigozie 
was that he had ‘inherited’ the role of patron from a patron of his own 
who he felt obliged to help. Chigozie had been ‘brought in’ to the depart-
ment on a temporary contract by a senior academic called Professor Uche 
Osoagwu. There is some debate over why Prof. Osoagwu chose to bring 
Chigozie in, with Chigozie himself remarking that Prof. Osoagwu had 
brought him in on merit and another academic commenting that Chig-
ozie was “his townsman with a higher degree, that’s all” (interview, 22 July 
2007), suggesting that their community of origin was the most important 
factor. This interpretation is consistent with Young’s work in a Zairean 
university, in which non-merit factors—in Young’s research, ethnicity, in 
this case, patronage—can only operate among formally qualified but not 
outstanding candidates. He provides an example from his research:
[E]thnic preference, conscious or unconscious, can only arise when the rela-
tive qualifications of the contenders fall into a gray zone of ambiguity. For 
example, in Zaire, it would be unimaginable for a candidate armed with 
a dubious doctorate from Spain or Czechoslovakia to win support over a 
contender whose thesis, directed by a distinguished Belgian academic, had 
won a “grande distinction” from Louvain, whatever the respective ethnicity 
of the aspirants and the voters (Young, 1981: 153).
This suggests a system in which the individual concerned first has to 
achieve the required standard—in Chigozie’s case a Master’s degree—
before they can enter the ‘gray zone of ambiguity’ in which patronage 
exerts an influence. With no Master’s degree, it would have been impos-
sible for Chigozie’s patron to accept him as a staff member in the depart-
ment. Merit and patronage are therefore both required for success, and 
operate simultaneously (see also Therkildsen, this volume).
Prof. Osoagwu had been the Masters and PhD supervisor of Prof. 
Okonkwor, so when Prof. Osoagwu retired he “handed [Chigozie] over” 
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to Prof. Okonkwor, who “has taken it upon himself to see about his 
social climbing” (interview, 3 September 2007). Prof. Okonkwor clearly 
felt an obligation to help his patron by taking responsibility for Chig-
ozie, even though Chigozie did not have the characteristics of scholar-
ship or Marxism that might otherwise have made him a good candidate 
for Prof. Okonkwor’s patronage. Obligation to his patron therefore trumped 
Prof. Okonkwor’s sense of loyalty to these more abstract concepts.
Factionalism and Entry to USEN
Academic staff recruitment at USEN is dependent on a combination of 
factors including qualifications and where they were obtained, connec-
tions, including those to factions, ethnicity, political ideology and beliefs 
about the way the university should run. Each member of staff will uti-
lise a different combination of these “currencies” (Bierschenk, 2008) in 
order to gain entry. A combination of qualification and connections is 
necessary for all but the very best candidates, such as those with higher 
qualifications from British or US institutions. If an individual has both the 
qualifications required to begin an academic career—sometimes nothing 
more than an undergraduate degree—and people of influence—whether 
individuals or a faction—supporting his or her application, they are very 
likely to succeed. For those with one but not the other, gaining a position 
will be considerably more difficult. Andreski (1979) suggests that the limits 
to purely kin-based appointments are tiny, but my research suggests that 
unqualified academics, however well-connected, will not secure employ-
ment. At the opposite end of the spectrum, a senior academic with a doc-
torate from Oxbridge or a prestigious US university would be appointed 
regardless of other considerations. Young’s (1981) concept of the ‘gray zone 
of ambiguity’ plays a part only amongst those who are formally qualified 
but not outstanding candidates.
A striking attribute of academic appointments to USEN is their infor-
mality. Very often an individual—sometimes a postgraduate or ex-student 
or non-academic member of staff—will be contacted by an academic 
because there is a vacancy in their department. If the person is quali-
fied and influential people within the department are happy for them to 
join, they will enter the university. To get around administrative proce-
dures related to advertisements and interviews, new academics will often 
receive temporary appointments initially, which are ‘regularized’ later. 
There is a general belief that recruitment is now much more based on 
connections than previously, a change that began during the financial 
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crisis and subsequent era of austerity and structural adjustment during 
the 1980s and depends largely on the attitude of those in positions of 
authority in departments, faculties and the central university administra-
tion. A number of authors (such as Anugwom, 2002; Jega, 1995; Saint et al., 
2003) support the view that staff appointments and promotions became 
more personalised and less meritocratic during this period, particularly as 
a result of military intervention in university management. As is the case 
for other aspects of the operation of USEN, there are also senior members 
of staff who work to the official rules and will only appoint others if they 
are adequately qualified.
During the Cold War period political ideology played a part in academic 
recruitment, especially in social science departments. A senior member of 
staff in the social policy department told me that in the 1980s academic 
staff would be appointed on the basis of two criteria: whether they were, 
first, a good scholar, and second, a Marxist. This was partly because the 
HoD at the time wished to guide the department along ideological lines. 
However, the importance of political ideology in recruitment has declined 
markedly since the end of the Cold War. This may, however, be influ-
enced by the fact that those in control of the social policy department— 
and, by extension, appointments of academics—are the select club, who 
are far less ideologically-minded than their ASC counterparts. Individuals 
are now much more likely to be judged on their loyalty to a particular 
faction and how they believe the university, rather than the country as a 
whole, should be run.
Recruitment of particular individuals has the potential to intensify 
departmental conflict, as the case of Wilson Nnaji reveals. Wilson was lec-
turing at a different, much less prestigious university and was registered 
for his PhD at USEN, where he had also completed his BSc and Masters. 
He was approached by the social policy department at USEN to teach 
part-time. At the time the department was headed by a member of staff 
who was known to be hostile to the select club and a close associate of 
the ASC. During the period that Wilson was teaching part-time, two mem-
bers of the select club were suspended for unethical practice. The circum-
stances of the suspension of one member of staff are unknown to me, but 
the second was suspended for asking a student for £50,000 (approximately 
£200) to approve a PhD thesis. When Wilson entered the department he 
was given the courses of one of the suspended lecturers to teach. The 
attitude of other select club members in the department was that Wilson 
had “come to replace their friend” (interview, 30 August 2007), resulting 
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in a large amount of hostility being directed towards Wilson. In addition, 
these people believed that, as Wilson had been brought into the depart-
ment by the previous, ASC regime, he must be loyal to them.
Whatever the reasons behind Wilson’s entry into USEN, he is now 
firmly associated with the ASC. This has had negative implications for 
his academic career. Wilson originally came in on a temporary contract 
and so had to go through regularization to get a formal academic post. 
However, soon after his original appointment the departmental leader-
ship changed hands with the new select club leadership being much less 
sympathetic to Wilson than the previous one. Wilson’s regularization 
was ‘sat on’ by a senior member of staff to ensure it was not completed. 
This staff member once described Wilson and a close friend of his to 
me as “insulting specimens”. Eventually his regularization was only com-
pleted with the intervention of senior academic Prof. Arinze Omeife, the 
ASC leader.
Factionalism and Promotion
At USEN, as in all higher education systems, promotion up the academic 
ladder is dependent on a variety of official criteria. At USEN promotions 
are officially subject to the rules set out in the university’s ‘green book’ 
and candidates for promotion must fill out an Academic Staff Appraisal 
Form (ASAF). Promotions are decided on the basis of length of service, 
academic qualifications, publications, teaching and professional experi-
ence and conference attendance (USEN, nd), and are on a points-based 
system. At USEN promotions are a site of extreme contestation between 
the two factions and are used by the powerful to advance the interests 
of those they favour and stifle the ambitions of those they are hostile to. 
There are clearly-set rules regarding promotions, but those in positions of 
influence nonetheless use numerous methods to either assist or thwart 
promotion efforts. During my time at USEN I came across a number of 
staff members who believed that their advance up the academic ladder 
had been ‘frustrated’, in some cases for many years. A key issue with 
regard to promotions at USEN is the huge scope for different interpreta-
tions of the criteria set out in ASAF.
The situation individuals are faced with when seeking promotion could 
be described as a classic double bind (cf. Bierschenk, this volume). Indi-
viduals find that they must meet the official criteria for promotion, but are 
also acutely aware that, without the support of a senior member of staff 
to ensure their application is not ‘sat on’ or frustrated, they are likely to 
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be denied. Official criteria are used with great rigour in some situations, 
and great laxity in others, depending on the positions and interests of 
those involved.
Publications are a particularly contested site. According to ASAF, books, 
book chapters and journal articles each receive points depending on the 
quality of the publication. Journals are assessed on their impact factor. 
However, some in the social policy department have sought to manip-
ulate this process in order to ensure that local journals owned by their 
members are categorised as high impact. In this case the journal’s owner 
would then encourage his or her friends and fellow faction members to 
submit articles to this journal, which would then be published whatever 
their quality, a practice that is well known in Nigeria (Olukoju, 2002).
The remaining criteria in form ASAF are also subject to the interpre-
tation of the reviewer, and are therefore open to decision-making on 
the basis of non-merit factors. There is considerable scope for reviewers 
to award more or fewer points in each category, and, as with publica-
tions, it is personal and factional connections that are often—though not 
always—the deciding factor.
As with most types of patronage at USEN, where there are win-
ners—such as those who have poor-quality publications accepted to 
local journals and gain promotion on that basis—there are also losers. 
A useful case study of thwarted ambition is that of Professor Emenike 
Esonwanne. Prof. Esonwanne was a highly regarded scholar who had fin-
ished top in national examinations and had a long list of publications in 
both local and international journals. However, Prof. Esonwanne was 
viewed by many at USEN as a “radical”, a perspective that was not well 
received by many, particularly those close to the locus of power. In Prof. 
Esonwanne’s case, this meant he was politically left-wing and a strong 
trade unionist, something that brought him into conflict with “established 
interest” within the university (interview, 27 June 2007). He was close to, 
and had some ideological affinity with, some ASC members, but their mar-
ginalisation meant that they were unable to assist his promotion efforts.
A number of different methods were adopted to prevent Prof. Eson-
wanne gaining a variety of promotions. In an attempt to get promoted to 
the rank of Reader, many of his publications were not sent to the external 
assessor. For a later promotion attempt the faculty did not send any papers 
at all to the external assessor. His file and forms went missing within the 
department and he was accused of trying to send the assessor an addi-
tional paper in order to improve his chances. Deans of Prof. Esonwanne’s 
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faculty refused to sign forms that would have assisted his chances of pro-
motion and assessment of his publications was manipulated.
Prof. Esonwanne was awarded enough points to be promoted to 
Reader, but not Professor, a title of great significance and one to which 
Prof. Esonwanne believed he was entitled. Eventually the university 
agreed with this and he gained his Professorship, having submitted his 
papers four times and after a wait of seventeen years from his original 
application. The final decision was made, according to Prof. Esonwanne, 
because the university was ashamed at the length of time it had taken to 
approve the Professorship. This suggestion is similar to evidence relating 
to extra-legal processes across USEN: rules may be manipulated up to a 
point—the moral boundary, beyond which it is viewed as unacceptable 
to go—but the formal written policy will, once the informality reaches a 
certain stage, act to rein it in.8
This situation reflects the double bind at the heart of Nigerian higher 
education. Many people within the university wish to use it—in an arche-
typal prebendal manner (cf. Joseph, 1987)—to benefit themselves and 
their clients. However, these people are also aware of the necessity for the 
university to retain the image of an institution embodying the principles 
of higher education: scholarship, meritocracy, hard work. For this reason, 
and particularly because the university is in the Federal sector—where 
the country’s educational elite come to study—unofficial practice can 
only go to a certain level before the norms of the university—an uneasy, 
changeable equilibrium between the formal and the informal—prevent it 
from going further. Prof. Esonwanne’s case, however, and those of others 
who have had similar experiences, illustrates that there is considerable 
flexibility in this equilibrium. The role of merit may, at times, be very 
small indeed.
Another case study illustrates the negotiation between merit and non-
merit factors, and the importance of hierarchy in determining access to 
rewards. Daniel Nwabeke, who had difficulty advancing academically due 
to his position on the wrong side of the factional divide, was advised by a 
senior member of staff to eliminate bias by using academic means:
8 This type of moral boundary was in evidence in a number of areas at USEN, including 
the numbers of students who could be admitted to the university and pass courses on the 
basis of non-merit factors, and the allocation of rewards such as promotions and commit-
tee memberships for academic staff.
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[My colleague] said what you need now is to write and publish . . . if you 
publish and people want to [frustrate] you there is a limit to how far they 
can do it. If every year they see at least one or two more articles in your 
appraisal, over the years, they will transform the hatred they have for you 
to respect (interview, 30 August 2007).
I would cast doubt on the plausibility of this statement. It appears more 
likely that Daniel’s attempts to get around his problems through using 
official channels would be frustrated by those who were averse to him 
achieving success. For top-rank academics in Nigeria, success through 
these formal mechanisms may be achievable, though first getting to the 
position of a strong academic may require either the use of personal con-
nections, qualifications from a high-ranking foreign institution or both. 
For young, inexperienced academics battling against numerous enemies 
in their own institutions, it is highly unlikely. As a result, promotions are 
not always, or even usually, reserved for the most meritorious staff.
Factionalism and Other Benefits
PhD supervision is another important site of contestation between fac-
tions. A PhD is viewed as an important aspect of an academic career in 
Nigeria, both in terms of prestige and as an important criterion for promo-
tion. However, actually receiving a PhD can be difficult if you are either a 
member of a group that is outside power in your department or you are 
assigned to a PhD supervisor with whom you have a conflict of interest.
Emeka Obi is a member of staff who has experienced difficulty in get-
ting his PhD. Emeka is an ASC member who is currently registered for a 
PhD in social work but was informed by other members of staff in the 
department that he was not allowed to do this PhD as his Master’s degree 
was in social policy and he must therefore repeat his Masters. Emeka later 
discovered that this rule had been ‘cooked up’ within the department to 
frustrate him. He informed me that PhD supervision is intensely political 
and that if the student is not liked or is not loyal to the supervisor’s group, 
they simply will not get their PhD. Indeed, he told me that members of the 
select club in the department had said that they “wouldn’t live to see [him] 
get [his] PhD from the department” (interview, 30 August 2007). Emeka is 
now searching for a scholarship to study for a PhD outside Nigeria.
USEN academics also have the opportunity to contribute to the aca-
demic life of the department and faculty through committees. Commit-
tee Chairmanships and memberships are also beneficial when seeking 
promotions—they appear on form ASAF that is used to assess suitability 
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for promotion—and are used by some staff members to divert depart-
mental funds to individuals. Committee membership is another arena in 
which those in charge of appointments can favour members of their fac-
tion. In the social policy department, non- and anti-select club members 
were excluded from influential committees with remits covering financial 
matters, appointments and promotions, all of which were used to advance 
the interests of the select club, who dominated these committees. During 
my time at USEN only one committee, the environmental committee, was 
headed by a non-select club member. The environmental committee’s 
main remit concerns litter, an extremely marginal issue. When I related 
this fact to a non-select club academic, he commented that whoever allo-
cated committee memberships was playing a joke at the ASC’s expense by 
allocating them a committee concerning rubbish.
Another area that is influenced by patronage and factionalism is alloca-
tion of courses to academics. Heavily subscribed or “juicy” (Blundo, 2006: 
86) courses were more likely to be allocated to select club members, who 
could use them to acquire wealth through selling handouts or through 
students ‘sorting’ them. ASC members were often unhappy with course 
allocation because it was not done on the basis of specialism but other 
factors. There appeared to be a concerted effort on the part of select club 
members to retain the courses they wanted to teach and foist others on 
non-select club members, regardless of their ability to teach these courses. 
A prominent ASC member told me that by forcing courses on unquali-
fied members of staff, those in charge “want to humiliate you” (interview, 
3 October 2007).
Conclusion
The careers of academics at USEN are critically influenced by their con-
nections to factional groupings. In the social policy department during my 
fieldwork, those close to the select club and its leader found promotion, 
committee membership and the right to teach the juiciest, most lucra-
tive courses relatively straightforward. By contrast, those who were either 
ASC members or non-factionalised found their working lives much more 
difficult, and even the most simple things—such as getting PhD supervi-
sion or one’s post regularized—became a struggle. However, despite this 
conclusion, factionalism has boundaries and cannot be reduced to a mere 
power struggle between identical groups. There are two reasons for this 
conclusion.
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First, there are clear differences between the two factions. While it is 
clear that both groups’ main function was to advance the fortunes of their 
members, there were both rhetorical and actual contrasts. Many, though 
not all, ASC members had a commitment to scholarship and were less 
likely to participate in extra-legal practice than members of the select 
club. Students viewed them as more likely to reward high-quality work 
as opposed to financial favours. Despite this, however, some ASC mem-
bers were just as likely to engage in sorting and lobbying as members 
of the select club. There is, therefore, an ambiguity to the ASC that com-
bines the logics of meritocracy with those of self-interest. The select club, 
by contrast, showed no such ambiguity, and were openly committed to 
material gain.
Second, there are moral boundaries at work within the factional strug-
gle. The extent to which staff can be either unjustifiably rewarded or 
frustrated has clear limits, though these show a large degree of flexibility 
and are still dependent on the personalities and positions of the individu-
als involved. As the example of Prof. Esonwanne illustrates, this moral 
boundary may be a long way from the official rules, but it nonetheless 
still exists.
These conclusions illustrate patterns of behaviour that structure the 
careers of academic staff at USEN. Patronage and factionalism are the 
strongest influences over attainment, but these logics are entangled with 
those of merit. Entrance to the university for academics is dependent 
upon achievement of a minimum qualification. Once they have achieved 
this, they enter what Young (1981) terms the ‘gray zone of ambiguity’: the 
arena in which patronage and factionalism exert an influence. Very highly 
qualified candidates, such as those with doctorates from prestigious US 
or UK institutions, are likely to be admitted on merit alone, without the 
need for a personal or factional connection, while very poor candidates 
will not gain entry, whatever their personal or factional linkages. Once 
inside the university, the factional struggle exerts a greater influence, as 
noted above. However, even in these cases there are moral boundaries 
that prevent the rules from being stretched too far. In short, then, logics 
of merit and patronage are intertwined in the careers of academic staff 
at USEN, such that for all but the most outstanding candidates, both are 
required for success.
The complexity and ambiguity of the factional struggle and its impact 
on staff at USEN illustrates the necessity for long-term ethnographic work 
to understand the character of states—in Africa no more and no less than 
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anywhere else. Reduction of the Nigerian state to simple slogans—pre-
bendalism, neopatrimonialism—glosses over the intricacy of relationships 
and how they structure access to rewards. Only by understanding how 
these relationships work at the micro-level are we able to understand the 
dynamics of the African state and how it might better serve its people.
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WORKING IN NEOPATRIMONIAL SETTINGS: PUBLIC SECTOR STAFF 
PERCEPTIONS IN TANZANIA AND UGANDA
Ole Therkildsen
Introduction1
The performance of organisations—their capacity to produce mandated 
outputs—exists to the extent that they possess and effectively manage 
external relationships and a sufficient range of human, financial, infra-
structural, coercive and normative resources (Boesen and Therkildsen 
2004). But there are often considerable differences in the performance of 
government organisations within and across countries. One explanation 
for these differences—especially among poorer countries—is that perfor-
mance is influenced not only by ‘intrastate’ governance factors such as the 
extent of rule-based decision-making, the competency of public officials 
and ‘correct’ governmental procedures in a rather narrow sense, but also 
by how—and how efficiently—various sections of the state apparatus 
interact with societal groups (Moore, Leavy, and White 2003: 189). The 
relationship between state and societal actors is at the centre of this ‘pol-
ity’ approach (Houtzager 2003: 13). 
Some observers claim that neopatrimonialism (NP) dominates this rela-
tionship in Africa. Chabal (2005: 21), for example, argues that, “[c]ontempo-
rary politics in Africa is best understood as the exercise of neopatrimonial 
power.” NP connotes “those hybrid political systems in which customs and 
patterns of patrimonialism coexist with, and suffuse, rational–legal insti-
tutions” (Bratton and van de Walle 1997: 62). Proponents of the neopa-
trimonial paradigm claim that “scholars of African politics have embraced 
the neopatrimonialism model” (ibid.: 63). It “has become the standard for 
understanding African politics” (Leonard and Straus 2003: 5).
1 This is a revised version of a paper presented at the conference, “The Artifices of 
Government. On the Appropriation, the Use and the Formation of States” held at the Max 
Planck Institute for Social Anthropology Halle/Saale, July 20–21, 2006.
Some of the empirical information used was collected through commissioned work for 
Danida and the governments of Tanzania and Uganda (see Therkildsen and Tidemand 
(2006). I alone am responsible for the opinions and assessments made here.
© Ole Therkildsen, 2014 | doi: 10.1163/9789004264960_006
This is an open access chapter distributed under the terms of the CC BY-NC 4.0 license.
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While the concept of NP means widely different things to different 
scholars (Erdmann and Engel 2006, 2007), and claims of the dominance 
of the paradigm in studies on Africa are clearly exaggerated (Mkandawire 
2001), it is certainly true that the paradigm has significant influence, and 
that this influence extends beyond academic circles. Thus, the World Bank 
states that “[m]eritocracy has not yet become established in many coun-
tries. Instead the state has often become a massive source of jobs, with 
recruitment based on connections rather than merit” (1997: 93). Interest-
ingly, this resonates well with opinions expressed by the government in 
Tanzania. The new public service management and employment policy, 
for example, states: 
For quite some time now, the public service has been viewed as a liability 
to the taxpayer rather than an asset. This is because low productivity, ero-
sion of work ethics, indiscipline, blatant violation of rules, regulations and 
procedures, weak control and corruption have been observed as common 
features in the service (President’s Office 1999: 10). 
The Ugandan government also presents a very critical picture of its own 
public service: its staff are poorly managed, it lacks integrity and it uses 
limited resources inefficiently. “A disabling public service culture” is also 
lamented (Government of Uganda 2005: 8).
But how useful is the NP paradigm for understanding African bureau-
cracies? This chapter focuses on staff perceptions of the use of merit prin-
ciples in staff management. It focuses specifically on hiring, firing, transfer, 
demotion and promotion practices in the public sector in Tanzania and 
Uganda and on how such practices influence organisational performance 
and staff motivation to work in such ostensibly neopatrimonial settings.
There are two main reasons for this focus. First, public servants are 
said to be at the centre of many patrimonial practices. Yet empirically 
grounded analyses of the motivations and performance of government 
staff at work are rare. Second, a central premise of human relations theory 
is that organisational capacity is strongly influenced by staff (Guest 1999). 
Although public servants are obviously not the only factor of importance 
for capacity, this simple premise is especially relevant for poor countries 
where public sector organisations are relatively labour-intensive. More-
over, conflicting or cumbersome bureaucratic rules, resource scarcity and 
contested relations with societal groups or individuals often make even 
simple administrative tasks demanding, so that staff efforts beyond the 
normal call of duty are required to get things done. Staff motivation and 
management are therefore central to capacity. 
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The central argument of this chapter is that the NP paradigm applied 
to these issues—both on its own, and as it is currently used in studies 
on Africa—does not provide an adequate analytical basis for understand-
ing politics and administration. Specifically, proponents of NP tend to: 
(a) ignore that legal–rational and patrimonial practices coexist and inter-
act; (b) interpret all evidence of informality and poor performance to be 
a result of patrimonial practices, thereby ignoring other relevant factors 
identified by human relations and organisational theory; and (c) use the 
category ‘patrimonial’ as a label for practices that are actually quite differ-
ent. As a result, analyses based on the paradigm tend to overlook the often 
significant variation in organisational capacity within public sectors; the 
uncertainty that characterises relations in neopatrimonial settings; and 
the particular types of hypocrisy that this generates.
The empirical basis for this study is a 2006 survey of public servants’ 
perceptions of merit, motivation and staff management in their own 
workplaces and in the public sector in general. Twelve organisations—
one pair of ministries, local governments and executive agencies respec-
tively—were selected in Tanzania and Uganda. The selection was based 
on assessments of their relative performance (as being either above or 
below average in each category). Some 400 public servants (all university 
graduates, middle-level officers and working in headquarters) were inter-
viewed in these twelve organisations. Around 100 of these officers also 
participated in a total of 24 focus group discussions (a separate group of 
younger and older staff in each case organisation). The information col-
lected in this way offers a glimpse inside the ‘black box’ of bureaucracies 
in poor countries, which more macro-oriented approaches tend to ignore. 
As a consequence of this focus, less explicit attention is paid to the gen-
eral macro-context in which public organisations operate.
The rest of the chapter is divided into seven sections. Following a very 
brief introduction to some of the main features of public service in Tan-
zania and Uganda, the concept of NP is presented and discussed, and 
the methods used to study it with respect to staff management are pre-
sented. Next, it is shown how variation in adherence to bureaucratic rule 
is clearly associated with variation in organisational performance. Some 
findings on employee perceptions of staff-related practices follow. The 
next section aims to point out that the legal foundation for legal–rational 
behaviour is often weak, and that it can be analytically and conceptually 
difficult to distinguish whether practices are driven by merit principles, 
patronage or clientelism. Finally, an analysis of staff acceptance and con-
testation of neopatrimonial practices is presented. The conclusion also 
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briefly discusses the prospects for transformation and change of public 
organisations in neopatrimonial settings. 
The Public Service in Tanzania and Uganda 
Presidential power is a key feature of the political systems in both Tan-
zania and Uganda. The president is the head of state and effectively the 
leader of government, although the prime minister is the head of the 
cabinet. While Tanzania has held competitive presidential elections every 
five years since 1995—and peacefully changed office holder two times—
Uganda has had three recent competitive presidential elections (in 2001, 
2006 and 2011) with no change of office holder. 
Although formal presidential powers are set out in the legislation 
they are reinforced by many informal mechanisms. In each country the 
most important informal channel goes through the ruling party, which is 
headed by the president. It is through this channel that he and the party 
have significant influence on who get what position in the public service 
and how particular public organisations are run. 
In Tanzania presidential appointing power over the public services is 
extensive. It includes the provision that even appointing powers which 
are delegated to others can be claimed and exercised by the president 
should he so desire (Bana and McCourt 2005: 8). In Uganda, presidential 
powers vis-à-vis the public service are written into the constitution and 
are similarly wide-ranging. The Public Service Commissions in both coun-
tries are ostensibly independent, but the presidents appoint their mem-
bers. Central control of a substantial segment of the staff in ministries 
therefore remains strong. However, the recent decentralisation reforms 
and the establishment of executive agencies in the two countries have 
given both local governments and executive agencies some autonomy in 
staff matters—more so in Uganda than in Tanzania.
The Ugandan public service had the reputation of being the best in 
Africa in the 1960s, but it collapsed during the Amin era and the subse-
quent civil war. State capacity remained weak in strife-ridden Northern 
Uganda for decades. The National Resistance Army came to power in 1986. 
After that state capacity rose significantly until the late 1990s when prob-
lems of corruption, patronage and governance came to the fore (Barkan 
et al. 2004; Robinson 2006). Public perceptions of bribery in different pub-
lic organisations, however, vary widely (Deininger and Mpuga 2005: 178). 
Since Independence, when over half the civil servants were Bangandas, 
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the ethnic composition of the public service has remained politically sen-
sitive, and the Movement has always had a rather ambivalent view of the 
public service: regarding it with suspicion while relying heavily on it to 
implement its policies. Museveni’s own writings (1997) and the 2006 elec-
tion manifesto exemplify this. 
The Tanzanian public service has had a rather different performance 
reputation. It was feeble at Independence and was soon thereafter put in 
charge of state-led rural and industrial development. Its official mandates 
have outstripped its capacity ever since, with the push for the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs) being the most recent example among many. 
Nevertheless, political stability, some political support for public service 
reform, and donor funding for implementation have meant that Tanzania’s 
public sector has been strengthened in recent years compared to other 
countries (Hydén, Court, and Mease 2004). Ethnically based recruitment 
is not common—at least not in the upper levels of the public service 
(Nyangʼoro 2004). Nevertheless, there is widespread dissatisfaction with 
the performance of public organisations, and the delivery of services is gen-
erally believed by the public to be corrupt (President’s Office 2005: 30). 
A merit-based public service is the officially declared goal in both 
countries. Public service reform efforts have aimed to promote a perfor-
mance culture in the public sector (Clarke and Wood 2001). Efficiency, 
effectiveness and accountability have been the buzzwords (Therkildsen 
2001). Major changes in size, structure and pay have been implemented 
to achieve that (Rugumyamheto 2004; Mutahaba 2005).
Thus, the size of the public service has changed significantly in the last 
twenty years.2 Following fairly drastic reductions in the size of the ser-
vices during the Structural Adjustment Programmes from the mid-1980s 
and onwards (most pronounced in Uganda) employment is now growing 
again partly due to internal political pressure (also especially in Uganda) 
and partly due to efforts to attain the MDGs. Security of employment, 
which was one of the privileges of public service in the past, is now com-
ing under pressure. Moreover, career promotions are no longer supposed 
to be based on length of service, as in the past, but on merit and individual 
2 Public service employment was 299,000 in Tanzania and 240,000 in Uganda in 1986. 
In 1998, the figures were 264,000 and 154,000 respectively. In 2004 they were 295,000 and 
219,000. In Tanzania, the employment growth rate has been lower than the population 
growth rate (2.9 per cent) since 1998 (Therkildsen and Tidemand 2006). 
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performance. Staff are ambivalent about these changes. A performance-
oriented culture in the two bureaucracies is clearly not strongly rooted.
At the same time, a multitude of restructurings have taken place. Many 
ministries are restructured regularly. Staff have also been decentralised, so 
that local government in Tanzania and Uganda now employs 64 per cent 
and 87 per cent of public servants respectively. In addition, a number of 
executive agencies and other public agencies have been established dur-
ing the last 10 years—especially in Uganda where they now employ some 
5–10 per cent of the total staff.
African public servants are the best paid in the world relative to the 
average person (Schiavo-Campo 1999)—as are those formally employed 
in the private sector. Tanzania and Uganda are no exceptions but public 
servants here (as elsewhere) have many social obligations to extended 
families. The number of dependants that rely in whole or in part on a pub-
lic servant income is often large. In our survey sample the family size of 
public servants (including dependants) was—on average—fifty per cent 
higher than the average family size in the capital.3 
Overpaid compared to ordinary people or overburdened with social 
obligations? In any case, staff complain loudly (in interviews, rarely on the 
streets) about low salaries for three reasons. Firstly, present salary levels 
are significantly lower than thirty years ago, despite recent improvements. 
Moreover, public servants do not compare their situation with that of the 
average person on the street; they use pay levels in the upper league of 
the private sector as a yardstick instead—and feel dissatisfied as a con-
sequence. Secondly, as part of the public sector reforms (which included 
substantial retrenchments), both governments promised much higher 
salaries to those who remained but then did not deliver. Pension improve-
ments have not materialised either (Kiragu, Mukandala and Morin 2004). 
Finally, substantial wage decompressions have taken place, especially in 
Uganda. Here the pay difference between the salary of the president and 
that of the lowest paid employee is 51:1—without considering fringe ben-
efits (Kiragu and Byaruhanga 2004: 4). Employees in executive agencies in 
Uganda earn some 27–60 per cent more than their occupational counter-
parts in central government (Ministry of Public Service 2005: 21). Indeed, 
massive pay differentials now exist in the public service, with the car driv-
ers in some agencies earning 50 to 150 per cent more than economists 
3 Data from the most recent population census (where a household is defined as those 
that eat together).
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working in the central ministries (Government of Uganda 2004: 140). Such 
differentials cause resentment. In both countries, but especially in Tanza-
nia, equality (among bureaucrats themselves) remains a strong norm. 
Interestingly, salary is not the most important legal source of income 
for public servants. Various allowances are equally or even much more 
important income generators for almost 90 per cent of the respondents 
in our survey. There may well be even bigger disparities between benefi-
ciaries of allowances than there are in salaries although this is difficult to 
establish (Valentine 2004). 
Finally, both Tanzania and Uganda have, at various times, been favou-
rites of donor countries. Tanzania fell from grace in the early 1990s. Rela-
tions improved after that, but have now soured again following recent 
corruption scandals involving high-level politicians. Uganda was the dar-
ling of donors for some years in the 1990s. Now political developments—
the war in the north, the political transition issue and corruption—worry 
them. Nevertheless, donors have been major funders of the two govern-
ments for years. Both countries are aid-dependent with total aid being 
12 per cent of GNI for Tanzania in 2000, and of a similar magnitude for 
Uganda. Some 30–50 per cent of the government budget is financed by 
donors. In both countries, but particularly in Tanzania, donors have 
funded major public sector reform activities, including retrenchments, 
restructuring of public organisations, decentralisation, pay reform, estab-
lishment of executive agencies and so on. 
Problems of Neopatrimonialism as an Analytical Concept 
NP has become the standard approach for analysing bureaucracy and 
politics in sub-Saharan Africa. Eisenstadt (1973) was the first to use the 
term. Médard (2002), among others, developed it for use in African con-
texts. Inspired by Max Weber they thought of it as an ideal-type concept 
against which to assess deviations. It is in this sense that it is used in the 
following.
The paradigm is based on two main propositions. ‘Patrimonial-
ism’ means that a patron, who is culturally anchored in a social and 
political order, distributes gifts from own resources to followers 
to obtain and strengthen loyalty and support. Clients, on the other hand, 
obtain material benefits and protection. ‘Neo’ means that office-holders 
in legal-rational state institutions are patrons who use public funds to 
build their personal loyalty among clients so as to stay in power (Clapham 
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1985: 47–49). In other words, a clear public/private boundary, so central to 
the notion of modern administration, is ambiguous and contested. That 
boundary may not exist at all in some cases. 
In studies on Africa, however, the use of the NP paradigm often leads 
to very different positions. Some argue that the role of the state, espe-
cially the president (the ‘Big Man’), is central, while others take a more 
society-centric view based on the proposition that the state in Africa has 
never been properly institutionalised. There are also differing views about 
distributional effects. Some claim that resource scarcity restricts the use 
of patrimonialism to try to establish intra-elite accommodation in new 
multi-ethnic and poorly integrated political systems. There are limited 
trickle-down effects. Others claim that the spoils of the state are more 
widely distributed in society (Therkildsen 2005).
Despite such differences, Africa is exceptional in the eyes of key pro-
ponents of the NP paradigm. “Although neopatrimonial practices can be 
found in all polities, it is the core feature of politics in Africa . . . Whereas 
personal relationships occur on the margins of all bureaucratic systems, 
they constitute the foundation and superstructure of political institutions 
in Africa” (Bratton and van de Walle (1997: 62–63); their emphasis). Cha-
bal and Daloz (1999: 16) make a more extreme claim: in “most African 
countries, the state is no more than a décor, a pseudo-Western façade 
masking the realities of deeply personalised political relations. There may 
well appear to be a relative institutionalisation of the main state struc-
tures but such bodies are largely devoid of authority.” 
Such claims of African exceptionalism fit nicely with images of mis-
erable conditions on the continent. Much of the paradigm’s attraction 
lies, perhaps, herein. That neopatrimonialism is especially widespread in 
Africa and less important everywhere else is based on two arguments. One 
is cultural: 
Neopatrimonialism originates in the African extended family, with the 
dominance of older males and strong interpersonal ties. It has been rein-
vented in the form of the ‘big men’ and personal political relationships that 
pervade post-colonial African political institutions, including government 
bureaucracies (Bratton 1994). 
The other argument refers to the logic of capitalism and increasingly glob-
alised markets. Competition promotes efficiency and effectiveness. Even-
tually, therefore, principles of rationality will extend to all areas, including 
that of the public sector. This has just not yet happened in Africa. 
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The use of the NP paradigm to understand politics and administration 
in Africa is problematic for many reasons.4 Eight problems are especially 
relevant for the subsequent empirical study of staff issues in Tanzania and 
Uganda. 
First, in many studies it is assumed—rather than empirically investi-
gated—that patrimonial practices dominate politics and administration 
across African countries. This bias is most explicitly stated in the quote 
above from Chabal and Daloz and less pronounced in that from Bratton 
and van de Walle. Nevertheless, this skews the empirical analyses and pre-
cludes that legal-rational practices may be important too.
Second, legal-rational and patrimonial practices may be exercised simul-
taneously. Different state organisations play different roles in the political 
economy of the country. Islands of organisational capacity in public ser-
vice can exist alongside poorly performing organisations within the same 
country, as Moore, Leavy and White (2003: 190) and Grindle (1997) point 
out. Some of these variations may be due to deliberate political decisions 
by rulers to pursue developmental and clientelistic policies at the same 
time. The United States is an example of this, as is Japan (Woodall 1996). 
Similar two-track strategies may be used in African countries. Conse-
quently, some organisations (as well as units within them) may perform 
well, while others do not.
Third, proponents of NP regard patronage as a special feature of admin-
istration and politics in Africa. This ignores that patrimonial practices exist 
in hierarchical organisations all over the world—sometimes pervasively 
so—and not just in African countries. Thus, specific personal networks at 
the upper levels of organisational hierarchies continue to play a central 
role, even in rich countries, in both the private and the public sectors. 
It is, for example, estimated that there were some 4 million patronage 
appointments in state and local government in the United States dur-
ing the early 1980s. Today, political appointees occupy some 3,000 of the 
most senior posts in government.5 The US extends this practice to the 
UN organisations as well. The Executive Director of UNICEF from 2005 to 
4 See Erdmann and Engel (2006, 2007) for a critical review, which has also inspired 
some of the following points.
5 http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTPUBLICSECTORANDGO
VERNANCE/0,,contentMDK:20134011~pagePK:210058~piPK:210062~theSitePK:286305~isC
URL:Y~isCURL:Y,00.html (accessed 1 February 2010).
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2010 Ann Veneman, for example, was positioned in the organisation by 
the Bush Administration, under which she had worked as the Secretary 
of State for Agriculture (she was earlier a director of Calgene, a major 
agro-business).6 
Patronage being so widespread, its driving forces cannot be especially 
African. On the contrary, according to Theobald (1999: 496–497), it is 
rooted in certain features of all hierarchical organisations. Required merit 
qualifications become increasingly difficult to specify as the organisa-
tional hierarchy is ascended.7 Incumbency in such positions also yields 
highly valued rewards and exceptional opportunities, so that vague cri-
teria of exclusion are needed to restrict access. In addition, occupants 
of higher positions often have to make controversial decisions that may 
subject them to public scrutiny or create conflicts and therefore they pre-
fer trusted supporters around them. To strengthen this trustworthiness, 
the rewards of office are usually high. It should be added that an influ-
ential body of studies of organisations in rich countries, both private and 
public, has shown that cliques, factions and informal networks function 
within, and sometimes dominate, formal rules and regulations (March 
and Olsen 1989).
Fourth, NP ignores insights from human resources management and 
institutional theories (e.g. Guest 1999). These argue that organisational 
performance depends not only on compliance with merit principles in 
staff management but also on motivation of staff to work (monetary and 
non-monetary factors); on staff management (supervision, encourage-
ment and sanctions, communication, etc.); and on context (relations to 
other organisations and organised groups, norms and values, etc.). There 
is no reason why such factors should not be important in African coun-
tries as well.
Fifth, the legal framework which regulates staff management in the 
public sector is often ambiguous, contradictory and complex. This is a 
common feature of many public services across the world, Tanzania and 
Uganda included (Therkildsen and Tidemand 2006). Some proponents of 
the centrality of patrimonialism in African politics and administration 
6 On Veneman’s qualifications for the UN position see Flanders (2005). Absurdly, 
the World Bank’s (1997: 93) advice to poor countries—in the face of what it calls extensive 
‘political appointments’ in industrial countries such as the United States—is that “coun-
tries with weak institutions and inadequate checks and balances are better off relying on 
more transparent and competitive mechanisms.” 
7 Peters (1995: 90–91) seeks to capture this through the concept of ‘responsive merit’. 
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may argue that this is the result of intentional decisions (or non- 
decisions) aimed at enabling the exercise of patrimonial power: disorder 
as a political instrument in the interpretation of Chabal and Daloz. A dif-
ferent interpretation of the causes of the problems of the legal framework 
is that they result from errors in legislative drafting, confusions about 
key terminology in the legislative process (sometimes a result of inexpe-
rienced and overworked legal staff ), and unsolved conflicts about who 
should control staff. It is an analytical challenge to assess staff manage-
ment practices in such situations. 
Sixth, proponents of NP tend not to distinguish between various forms 
of patrimonialism such as patronage and clientelism (as Erdmann and 
Engel (2006: 20) also point out). In this study patronage is defined as the 
practice of using state resources to provide jobs and services for political 
supporters (groups rather than individuals). It is part of high-level poli-
tics aimed at gaining political support.8 Clientelism concerns individuals. 
Whereas ‘traditional’ clientelism involves direct dyadic relations between 
patron and client and tends to be durable over time, ‘neopatrimonial’ cli-
entelism as used in this study involves the personal hierarchical networks 
of politicians and bureaucrats. Rather than being political in function, such 
networks aim primarily at using state resources for the economic sup-
port of network members. Networks may be based on ethnicity, common 
schooling, or service in the conscription army and sometimes help mem-
bers or their dependants in the absence of social security arrangements. 
Patronage and clientelism may be difficult to distinguish empirically, but 
it is important to do so for analytical reasons as the two forms have differ-
ent aims, may not be equally stable, and therefore have different impacts 
on state capacity and on the dynamics of politics and administration. 
Seventh, some versions of NP tend to exaggerate the control and power 
of the president in politics and administration. Bratton and van de Walle 
(1997: 63), for example, describe ‘presidentialism’ as a system in which 
“one individual . . . resists delegating all but the most trivial decision- 
making powers.”9 Van de Walle (2005: 20) exemplifies this by the claim 
that President Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia personally controlled some 
8 Prebendalism is a specific form of patronage. It refers to the handing out of public 
offices to individuals in order for them to benefit from personal access to state resources. 
It is not specifically dealt with in this chapter.
9 Quoted from Erdmann and Engel (2006: 15). They point out that Bratton’s and van 
de Walle’s use of ‘presidentialism’ differs significantly from conventional political science 
usage (in which the term simply connotes that the president heads a democratic regime 
as opposed to a parliamentary democracy).
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50,000 jobs in and around the city of Lusaka in the late 1980s. This image 
of overwhelmingly centralised presidential power is not only based on 
an incorrect reading of the source,10 it is also highly unlikely to exist in 
practice because it is an organisational impossibility. No individual can 
personally control that number of persons, even with the help of the most 
efficient of bureaucracies. 
Finally, NP assumes that narrowly defined self-interest motivates both 
patrons and clients. Patrons seek accumulation of personal power. Cli-
ents seek personal and family protection and economic advantages. This 
ignores other sources of staff motivation commonly recognised in studies 
of bureaucracies (Peters 1995: 102–107) such as conviction (i.e. ‘doing good 
for my country’); professionalism (‘doing things right’); or involvement in 
decision-making (i.e. as an employee in running the organisation; as a 
politically active citizen). 
To clarify some of these problems, the concept of NP defined by Erd-
mann and Engel (2007: 105) is used as the starting point for the empirical 
analysis. NP is: 
. . . a mixture of two, coexisting, partly interwoven, types of domination: 
namely, patrimonial and legal-rational bureaucratic domination . . . the dis-
tinction between the private and the public, at least formally, exists and is 
accepted, and public reference can be made to this distinction. Neopatri-
monial rule takes place within the framework of, and with a claim to, legal-
rational bureaucracy and ‘modern’ stateness.
This means that the formal institutions of the state—and the formal legal 
frameworks for their operations—are not just mere façades as Chabal 
and Daloz regard them. They must be taken seriously. Not all official rela-
tions are privatised, nor do all public organisations operate on an informal 
basis. Therefore recruitment, promotions, demotions and dismissals of 
staff are not just decided based on patrimonial logics. On the other hand, 
evidence shows that such activities do not necessarily follow stated pro-
cedures, rules and laws either. Elements of patrimonial and legal-rational 
bureaucratic domination coexist. Erdmann and Engel (2006: 15) state that 
it is the former that penetrates and twists the logic, functions and effects 
of the latter. However, the empirical analyses below illustrate that the two 
10 His source is Bates and Collier (1993: 391). They write that the UNIP party—not the 
president—filled over 40,000 local party positions in various committees and positions—
not jobs in the public sector. Even that claim appears exaggerated; it originates from a 
local newspaper.
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forms of practices penetrate—and may reinforce—each other under cer-
tain circumstances. It is therefore the mutual articulation of patrimonial 
and legal–rational practices—and the context specific relations between 
them—that are in focus in the analysis presented below. 
Methods
Most information on staff issues in the public sectors of Tanzania and 
Uganda was collected in five ways in early 2006: (a) questionnaire survey 
of perceptions of 400 public servants (around 35 from each of the twelve 
organisations selected) using mostly Likert Scale-based questions filled in 
by employees themselves in half to one hour sessions. (b) One to two-hour 
discussions in 24 focus groups (half junior staff; the other half senior staff) 
with some 100 of the 400 sampled staff members. The same questionnaire 
and focus group issues were used in both countries and in all organi-
sations to facilitate comparisons. (c) Interviews with chief executives. 
(d) Interviews with a substantial number of well-informed people within 
and outside the public sector; and (e) secondary sources such as govern-
ment and consultancy reports. 
Organisations were selected from among local governments, minis-
tries and executive agencies. Together these categories employ around 
90 per cent of all staff working in the public sector, and each category 
has specific formal arrangements for staff management (although these 
arrangements differ between Tanzania and Uganda as explained earlier). 
The aim was to select one organisation performing above and one below 
average respectively in each category in each country (twelve cases in 
total) by using information from well-informed persons and available 
official assessments. However, upon closer scrutiny of additional mate-
rial, including focus group discussions in all twelve organisations, it was 
decided that the information on performance was reliable for only nine 
organisations. Therefore, mainly information from these is used in the 
following. The details of the case organisation and identification can be 
found in Therkildsen and Tidemand (2006: appendix volume). 
Some limitations of the survey should be noted. Only officers (gradu-
ates) working in headquarters—and, in particular, finance and adminis-
tration staff but also other professional staff—were sampled. Front-line 
staff, for example, were not included. Their motivations may be quite 
differently constituted (Lipsky 1990). Lower-level staff are certainly lower 
paid than the employees included in this sample. Second, individuals that 
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had failed to get a job in the selected organisations were not sampled. 
Their views on the recruitment process may differ from those of successful 
candidates. Third, the survey was done as part of ongoing work on public 
sector reforms in the two countries. This gave access to engage with staff, 
but may also have associated the interviewers with the authorities and 
may therefore have influenced respondents’ answers. Fourth, the selected 
organisations are not representative of the public sector as a whole as the 
sample was purposely constructed to allow comparisons between organi-
sations that perform above and below average. Finally, the analyses build 
on staff perceptions and opinions solicited through interviews. 
Obviously, some scepticism about the validity of information obtained 
quickly and by outsiders unknown to staff is appropriate. Respondents 
may simply try to echo what researchers want to hear. Not surprisingly, 
some staff clearly preferred to talk about the application of merit in their 
workplace rather than about patrimonial practices. This was especially 
the case in Tanzania. Ugandan respondents seemed more frank. More-
over, people in organisations face formal expectations about performance 
and compliance with certain norms that they may not be able to meet. 
Therefore they sometimes respond hypocritically as is discussed below. 
Consequently, the survey information should be interpreted with care 
but there are two reasons to have confidence in it. First, the focus group 
discussions generally supported the findings of the quantitative interviews 
and the limited information available from secondary sources. Second, 
several of the results are consistent with findings from the relatively few 
empirical studies of merit, work motivation and staff management in the 
public sector of poor countries (for example Grindle 1997; Tendler 1997; 
Owusu 2006; Rauch and Evans 2000; Court, Kristen and Weder 1999), and 
with the general findings in the human resources management literature 
(see literature review by Guest (1999)). 
Variation in Organisational Performance  
Across the Public Sector
As argued above, performance variations across organisations of the 
same type may—in part—be caused by differences in the use of legal- 
rational and patrimonial staff-related practices.11 To establish this 
11 Since this chapter focuses on staff-related factors that affect organisational perfor-
mance, other capacity relevant factors receive less attention.
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association empirically we compared assessments by staff from organisa-
tions performing above and below average with respect to issues of merit, 
work motivation, and staff management. We found the following. 
First, staff in above average performing organisations consistently, and 
significantly, rated the merit quality of their organisation’s recruitment 
practices (as well as the organisation’s transfer, disciplinary and promotion 
practices) higher than staff from organisations performing below average. 
The quality rating is based on agreement/disagreement with questions 
such as “In this organisation, staff are hired on the basis of: . . . merit (abil-
ity and skills required for the job) . . . clear and transparent rules . . . tribal 
affiliation and home region . . . political connections . . . gender consider-
ations . . . social connections (who knows who) . . .  corruption, bribery and 
back-door arrangements.”
Second, we found significant association between staff statements 
about their own work motivation and organisational performance. 
This is based on ratings of replies to statements such as “I work in this 
organisation because I: . . . need salary/security/pension . . . have no other 
options . . . can do something important for my country . . . it gives me 
prestige . . . improves my career possibilities” and of statements about 
future employment (actively trying to find a job in the private sector, with 
NGOs or donors etc.). 
Third, assessments of the quality of staff management were associated 
significantly with organisational performance differences. Ratings were 
based on questions about the extent to which supervisors set clear targets 
and standards of work; do follow-up; encourage performance; improve 
office environment; help staff with personal problems; and reward and 
discipline staff fairly. 
The broad conclusions are that differences in adherence to merit 
principles, in rule-related work motivation and in rule-related staff man-
agement practices do help to explain differences in organisational perfor-
mance (undoubtedly these three factors interact, too).12 These conclusions 
are not surprising. They fit well with the results of similar analyses else-
where (Grindle 1997; Tendler 1997). They are, however, remarkable in light 
of the generalisations about African politics and administration made by 
some proponents of NP. 
12 Other factors than those related to staff may also help to explain performance differ-
ences (e.g. differences in access to funds and in competitive pressures). Nevertheless, even 
when such factors are considered, the staff-related factors identified here are significantly 
associated with performance as shown in Therkildsen and Tidemand (2006). 
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Employee Perceptions of Staff Management-Related Practices 
How do public servants themselves perceive staff-related practices in situ-
ations where legal frameworks do not provide a clear basis for decision-
making and day-to-day administration, and where practices of patronage 
and clientelism may be common and explicitly acknowledged by the gov-
ernment (as illustrated in the introduction), by public servants (as shown 
below) and by the public (as indicated in numerous opinion polls (e.g. 
Bratton, Mattes and Gyimah-Boadi 2005)? 
In the staff survey empirical information on this was obtained by focus-
ing on staff perceptions of hiring, firing, transfer and promotion/demotion 
practices (HFTP) in their workplaces. The survey data indicate that:
•  only slightly more than 50 per cent had ever applied in writing for the 
positions they had held in the public service. 
•  a little less than 50 per cent had ever been transferred to another job—
most by order of the authorities, fewer by own request. It is unusual to 
have been transferred more than twice.
•  some 50 per cent had been promoted twice in their career on 
average.
•  around 10 per cent had experienced a demotion for various reasons.
•  Less than 5 per cent had experienced a disciplinary case.
The first thing to note is that HFTP events are relatively rare considering 
that the sampled staff had worked in the public sector for an average of 
17 years.13 Moreover, the pattern of HFTP events is fairly similar across 
countries and organisations except for staff in Tanzania dealing with 
finances who are more frequently transferred than staff in other positions: 
handling money in the public service is a sensitive matter. 
How do public servants perceive these HFTP events in their own work-
places? Public servants have a range of views as table 1 shows. It focuses 
on recruitment practices, which the literature normally regards as the 
most vulnerable to neopatrimonial practices.14 
13 Aggregate statistics on such events do not exist. This is itself an interesting feature 
of staff administration in light of the expansion of statistical information on many other 
key issues of the public sector, especially finances. As a researcher it has always been 
much more difficult to get access to aggregated information on staff than to information 
on public finances.
14 Public servants do not agree with this. They regard the processes of transfers and pro-
motions as the most problematic. Thus, interviewees (in percentage of the whole sample) 
 perceptions by public sector staff in tanzania and uganda 129
Table 1. Staff perceptions of recruitment practices in the workplace (percentage 
of respondents that ‘agree’/‘agree very much’ that the factor is important)
Tanzania Uganda Tanzania Uganda
Organisation 
Factor ↓








Merit 80 83 94 68 82 77
Political  
connections 6 29 6 8 23 46
Social  
connections 9 22 0 19 16 38
Ethnic  
connections 9 16 8 16 13 28
Merit-based recruitment is the dominant practice in the selected public 
organisations according to the respondents. This corresponds well with 
the finding that six out of ten recruitment cases comply with rules in Tan-
zania (President’s Office 2005). That fewer than half of the staff had not 
applied for a job (see bullet points above) cannot in itself be construed 
as an indication of widespread patrimonial practice, since recruitment by 
application has only recently been introduced as a general rule. Previously 
all graduates were secured a job upon obtaining a degree. Many of the 
staff interviewed were recruited at that time. 
Non-merit principles are, however, also used. There are remarkable 
differences in answers to questions about the importance of patronage 
(‘political connections’) and clientelism (‘social connections’ and ‘eth-
nic connections’) in the recruitment process: Uganda scores significantly 
higher than Tanzania in both categories. A similar difference exists when 
patronage and clientelism in organisations performing above and below 
average are compared. Although national differences in these figures 
should be interpreted with care15 there is little doubt that patrimonial 
pressures on public sector organisations are higher in Uganda than in 
Tanzania. 
that ‘disagree’ and ‘strongly disagree’ that the HFTP process is ‘fair and transparent’ are 
as follows: recruitment (13); disciplinary action (15); transfers (21) and promotions (29). 
However, for reasons of space only recruitment is dealt with in some detail here. 
15 For example, Ugandan respondents appeared to be more open and frank in focus 
group discussions than the Tanzanian respondents. See also Peters (1995).
Source: Survey data from Therkildsen and Tidemand (2006).
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It is also noteworthy that for the sample as whole, political, social and 
ethnic connections are mentioned with roughly the same frequency in 
Tanzania. Variation is larger in the Ugandan sample (table 1). Whilst polit-
ical connections obviously involve political patronage, the focus group 
discussions and other interviews revealed three types of ‘social/ethnic 
connections’. One is constituted, in both countries, by secondary school/
university-based networks. These can be actively used to get a new job 
(and to get promotions, transfers or to handle disciplinary cases). Peer-
based relations and pursuit of mutual economic benefits are probably as 
characteristic of these networks as hierarchical patron-client relations. 
Another type of network was established during service in the conscrip-
tion army in Tanzania (now abolished)—and the national resistance army 
in Uganda in the 1980s and early 1990s.16 In Tanzania these networks seem 
to serve the same purpose as the school-based networks, whereas political 
patronage is clearly more dominant in the Ugandan version of the army 
network. The third type of network is based on ethnicity. Where relations 
in the school/army networks are intra-governmental with public servants 
and/or politicians as members, the third type involves relationships with 
prominent persons (elders, businessmen, religious leaders, etc.) outside 
the public sector. The aim of this third type of network may be to gain 
political or economic support—or both. Sometimes, however, it is analyti-
cally difficult to distinguish the political and social motivations in these 
networks, although the implications of conflating them are, obviously, sig-
nificant for understandings of staffing-related practices.
Nevertheless, ‘social and ethnic connections’ seem to be as important 
in recruitment as ‘political connections’ are. The former may, or may not, 
involve patron-client relations aimed at gaining political support. Only 
a context-specific assessment may determine this (and we did not do 
that). Van de Walle (2005: 21), who defines patronage as “the practice of 
using state resources to provide jobs and services for political clientele”, 
is therefore on uncertain ground when he makes the following generalisa-
tion: “Hiring a member of one’s ethnic group to a senior position in the 
16 The conscription army in Tanzania, which also included women, was compulsory 
for all university graduates after Independence. It was abolished due to economic crisis 
and donor pressure in the late 1980s. Its role remains poorly researched, although it was 
regarded as a central element in state building for decades after Independence. Museveni 
(1997) describes some of the prominent persons in networks originating in the Ugandan 
resistance army. Members in this network are more closely linked to the political hierar-
chy than those in the Tanzanian network. 
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customs office is an example of patronage.” In any case, all three types of 
networks aim at obtaining economic benefits and protection for mem-
bers and their families. And all three types of networks seem fairly stable 
although they are obviously not intergenerational as ‘traditional’ clien-
telistic relations are. Several networks may exist simultaneously within 
an organisation, and this may lead to unstable and conflictual relations 
(see next section). 
Table 1 is based on staff ’s general perceptions about the situation in 
their places of work—not on their assessments of specific recruitment 
events. The conclusions that can be drawn are therefore general ones: 
(a) merit-principles, as understood by staff, are often used in recruitment 
but clearly more so in organisations that perform above average; and 
(b) patrimonial practices are also used, and more so in Uganda than in 
Tanzania. 
Acceptance and Contestation of Patronage and Clientelism 
Among Staff
Patrimonial and legal-rational practices occur in all public organisations 
in Tanzania and Uganda as indicated in table 1 and vividly expressed in 
the focus group discussions. However, Chabal and Daloz argue that the 
former practices totally dominate, while Bratton and van de Walle state 
that the former ‘suffuse’ the latter. Erdmann and Engel (2007: 105) pro-
pose that the two systems operate simultaneously and coexist but that 
“the patrimonial penetrates the legal-rational system and twists its logic, 
functions and output, but does not take exclusive control over the legal-
rational logic. That is, informal politics invade formal institutions.” 
In all three formulations—domination, suffusion and penetration—
patrimonial practices are deemed to pervade all activities. The coex-
istence of legal-rational islands in neopatrimonial systems is ruled out, 
as are contestations about these practices. Also ruled out is that patri-
monial practices may interact (and sometimes strengthen) the use of 
legal-rational practices. And finally, the large variation, insecurity and 
hypocrisy resulting from such coexistence and interactions are ignored. 
Coexistence
On the one hand the case studies show that patrimonial pressures to influ-
ence recruitment “are everywhere” as one executive agency personnel offi-
cer in Uganda said. Sometimes this includes high-level outside pressures 
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on specific organisations as well. Two of the six Ugandan organisations, for 
instance, had received recent phone calls from ‘State House’17 to request 
that specific individuals be considered for a job. In both cases the vacancy 
was at the lower end of the hierarchy.18 In one organisation the request 
was rejected, according to our sources; in the other it was complied with. 
Staff involved in recruitment processes in local government in Tanzania 
also talked about how they often received “piles of written pleas” aimed 
at influencing their decisions. Here we were not told of any ‘State House’ 
attempts at influencing staff recruitment. 
On the other hand, merit-based principles also featured strongly in our 
discussions with staff and in the survey results. One personnel officer, for 
example, recorded all steps in the recruitment process in his organisation 
and volunteered to let us look through the recruitment files.19 Moreover, 
during many focus group discussions, staff and superiors talked about 
the use of merit-based principles as if they are an accepted norm in their 
workplace and a well established routine (e.g. “in this world of globalisa-
tion . . .” one respondent working in local government in Tanzania told us, 
“. . . we must accept the merit principles [in order] to survive.”) The growth 
in the numbers of universities and students in both countries illustrates a 
rapidly increasing demand for better formal qualifications. Particularly in 
Uganda, many staff members in the sampled organisations were enrolled 
for further studies to improve their qualifications for a better job. Indeed, 
the opportunities for further education offered by the workplace are a 
significant incentive in the eyes of staff. All this would not make sense 
if recruitment and promotions were only done according to patrimonial 
practices. 
Thus, legal-rational and patrimonial practices coexist within organisa-
tions in both countries. We cannot establish the extent to which officials 
follow formal workplace rules and obligations, and how many officials do 
so, but the typical situation is that compliant and non-compliant col-
leagues work in the same organisations, and are keenly aware of that. 
Moreover, formal bureaucratic behaviour seemed much more routinised 
17 ‘State House’, the official residence of the president of Uganda, is a big building. We 
do not know if the calls were from conmen (or women) or from ‘genuine’ inhabitants of 
that house. Clearly our respondents did not believe that these were phony calls.
18 And may therefore have been motivated as much by the prospect of securing a paid 
job for economic reasons as by political patronage. 
19 This executive agency has started to do consultancies in a growing market for profes-
sional recruitment services in Uganda.
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in some units (departments, sections, desks) than in others within almost 
every one of the case organisations. 
Interactions
Interactions between bureaucratic and patrimonial behaviour are clearly 
influenced by this coexistence. However, some of the well-known and 
expected findings from the case studies also turned out to have unex-
pected implications. 
It is, for example, well known that patrimonial practices can under-
mine bureaucratic behaviour, especially in organisations with low bureau-
cratic capacity. For where patrimonial practices dominate there can be 
few incentives for officials and politicians to comply with or enforce rules, 
the argument goes. That is the situation most often described in the litera-
ture (e.g. van de Walle 2005: 26). 
Paradoxically, the coexistence of bureaucratic and patrimonial behav-
iour can also strengthen the resolve to comply with rules as the following 
examples illustrate. First, weak enforcement of bureaucratic practices can 
lead to a (often unmet) staff demand for discipline in the workplace. It 
was a fairly general complaint, especially among younger staff, that supe-
riors failed to supervise; and that work plans and targets were too vague or 
unrealistic to be taken seriously. There were complaints of too much idle 
time and frustrations at having nothing much to do. Others have regis-
tered similar staff demands for strengthened bureaucratic practices (Keele 
Consortium 2005). It is part of the same picture that an opposite view was 
expressed by many older staff and women with family obligations: they 
saw the slack discipline as a clear advantage as it allowed them to tend 
to their private business or family affairs. It is this lack of discipline that 
makes employment in the public sector attractive even for staff that could 
get better paid jobs in the private sector (see also Cohen and Wheeler 
(1997). 
Second, several respondents explained how recruitment in the work-
place was done in a rigid and highly regulated manner to avoid subjective 
assessment of applicant qualifications that may give rise to accusations 
of wrongdoing and bias. Thus, as a rule for the entire public sector in 
both countries, most advertisements specify only requirements that can 
be objectively assessed (typically about age, years of experience, educa-
tional qualifications). Similarly, job interviews in some organisations are 
conducted in a highly regulated manner. The panel prepares questions 
for applicants that only probe technical competencies—not attitudes to 
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work and target groups, team efforts, social skills, past achievements and 
failures, etc. . No additional or follow-up questions are allowed. In this 
way all applicants are faced with exactly the same questions. The entire 
recruitment process is aimed at excluding any subjective assessments to 
avoid patrimonial practices. 
But could bureaucratic rules be a façade behind which patrimonial 
practices are exercised, as Chabal and Daloz claim? That cannot be ruled 
out. In Tanzania, for example, a Programme Implementation Unit offered 
positions with donor-funded salaries well above ordinary public service 
levels (see also Therkildsen 2004). Elaborate procedures for recruitment 
to these top positions were agreed with the donors to secure adherence to 
merit principles. These required an inter-ministerial interviewing panel to 
provide a priority list of candidates from which the Permanent Secretary 
(PS) could choose. He appointed three of the five positions to candidates 
identified as the most qualified by the panel, while two were given to 
persons lower down on the list. Donors complained but the priority list 
was confidential. The PS assured them that the recruitment had followed 
all the agreed procedures. But as often happens in such cases, information 
was eventually leaked, and the panel’s priority list became known. Two 
years later, when the PS was transferred to another post, the two officers 
in question were sacked immediately. 
The problem with the Chabal–Daloz position is not that it is entirely 
wrong, but that it is very often difficult to generalise as this example shows. 
And paradoxically, patrimonial practices carried out behind a bureaucratic 
façade may sometimes strengthen personal relationships and adherence 
to bureaucratic rules. For example, in a large public service commission 
in Uganda in charge of central recruitment of many public servants, can-
didates for positions were called for interview in Kampala and entitled 
to reimbursement of various expenses for transport, etc. However, the 
administrative unit in charge of processing the reimbursements system-
atically delayed and obstructed the process. Management did not attempt 
to clean out the known culprits for ‘human reasons’ as a supervisor told 
us but also for fear of reprisals: “life is cheap here.” Instead, management 
assigned a trusted employee from another department to keep the money 
in a drawer in his office, and to make the payment to applicants from 
there. To comply with legal-rational practice a personal and trusted rela-
tionship between a superior and that individual had to be relied upon. 
However, such relations burden the good performers because supervisors 
often overloaded them (or such employees volunteer to do tasks beyond 
their job assignments). While these efforts may sometimes be rewarded in 
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cash or kind, the only sure reward is more work. Consequently, in many 
organisations overworked good performers can be found side by side with 
colleagues that do not do much—or have little to do.
We encountered several other examples of such personal ties between 
trusted individual employees and their superiors. Typically, the literature 
focuses on ostensibly patrimonial networks. The person-based perfor-
mance-oriented networks (i.e. individuals who help to fulfil the official 
mandates of the organisation) receive less attention. 
Finally, the coexistence of legal-rational and patrimonial practices 
sometime provides decision-makers with useful choices. In Uganda, for 
example, a reform of pay structures in 2003/04 resulted in the consolida-
tion of lunch allowances for health staff into their salaries. This did not 
change actual pay much (allowances were now taxable). Health staff were 
still paid higher—up to 85 per cent—than other professionals on the 
same salary scale. Nevertheless, doctors and nurses were aggrieved and 
organised pay negotiations directly with president Museveni. He agreed 
that health staff be paid a lunch allowance again—on top of the one they 
now received as part of their consolidated salary—and contrary to techni-
cal advice. It is a good example of patronage in action with the president 
trying to buy support from a vocal and influential interest group. In other 
cases when Ugandan government staff demanded pay increases, no access 
to the president was granted and they had to negotiate through ‘normal 
channels’. 
There is an interesting twist to this example. The government is now, 
with reference to the example above, proposing to ‘distance’ the president 
from pay decisions in the future (Ministry of Public Service 2005: 19–20, 
27–28). This is unlikely to deter him from using pay policy for patronage 
purposes in the future. But it does make the motives for the president’s 
future involvement in pay decisions more transparent.
Variation, Insecurity and Hypocrisy
The coexistence and interaction of legal–rational and patrimonial behav-
iour across the public sector and within each of its organisations makes 
for a messy (working) life for many public employees: which practice to 
follow and which to avoid is often far from clear-cut. 
For public servants are faced with many ambiguous choices. They work 
in organisations where both legal–rational and patrimonial practices 
are typically used simultaneously. Even where the former practices dom-
inate in their workplace, their organisation often operates in a context 
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where external patrimonial pressures can be strong. These are key fea-
tures of working in a neopatrimonial setting.
Moreover, staff choices not only depend on individual preferences and 
on the consequences of alternative actions in light of these preferences: 
choice-based decisions. They also depend on the social appropriateness of 
these actions in the specific context: norm-based decisions. These are the 
two basic parameters of individual and organisational decision-making 
according to March (1994). 
These two perspectives—the political science perspective on neo-
patrimonialism and the organisational studies perspective on decision- 
making—can be combined. An individual or an organisation may act on 
the basis of choice-based decisions (seeking to anticipate the future effect 
of current actions evaluated in terms of preferences) in mixed legal– 
rational and patrimonial settings. However, the ambiguities are many, both 
with respect to reading the setting and then to calculating the actions that 
best fulfil preferences, and the capacity for such rational decision-making 
is limited. Likewise, an individual or an organisation may act on the basis 
of norm-based decisions (seeking appropriate action based on an under-
standing of the context and the rules that apply to it such that individual 
or organisational identity is preserved or enhanced). But this approach is 
also fraught with difficulties as situations, rules and identities are all likely 
to be ambiguous. The most likely outcomes of decision-making and action 
in neopatrimonial settings are therefore performance variation, insecurity 
and hypocrisy. 
Neopatrimonial settings fuel variation in organisational performance 
across the public sector as documented earlier. Comparatively well-
performing public organisations exist—contrary to many predictions—
but so do poorly performing ones. This is a logical consequence of the 
ambiguities outlined above. When public organisations are weakly insti-
tutionalised and the legal framework for decision-making is conflictual, 
vague, or poorly externally enforced, there is a larger scope for internal 
organisational decisions and actions and more space for management 
and staff to influence how these are made. There is little doubt that indi-
viduals at the top of the organisation can have considerable influence on 
the extent to which bureaucratic or patrimonial behaviour is practiced. 
Executives in the better-performing organisations clearly made a positive 
difference (and employees often admired them for this). In fact, the poor 
institutionalisation of bureaucratic rules may leave executives and staff 
with more room for manoeuvre to improve effectiveness and efficiency 
than would otherwise be the case. Nevertheless, this room for manoeuvre 
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should not be exaggerated. In one of the poorer performing organisations 
staff explained how a new executive had tried to enforce working hours: 
“. . . for one year he struggled, then he gave up . . . now we are comfortable 
with him.” The variation is both temporal and cross-organisational.
Neopatrimonialism also fuels insecurity (Erdmann and Engel 2006: 
19). A client needs a patron for protection or for improving livelihood in 
situations where prospects are uncertain. In return the provider expects 
political support or a return of favour at some future time. Insecurity is 
increased if patrimonial practices become widespread because it then 
becomes more difficult to fulfil mutual obligations.
Moreover, patrimonial practices blur hierarchical authority relation-
ships within organisations and in dealings with other organisations. It 
means that an employee can challenge the instructions of a superior with 
open or subtle reference to powerful political or social connections. One 
of the major problems in the new open staff appraisal systems that both 
Tanzania and Uganda introduced recently is precisely that supervisors 
are reluctant to exercise their authority. They fear the reactions of sub-
ordinates who now have access to the evaluation result. Previously it was 
confidential and made without a face-to-face meeting between supervisor 
and employee. Even the officially lowest-ranking employee can turn out 
to be an opponent who must be treated with caution. Where politicians 
are closer to the decision-making processes the adherence to bureaucratic 
rules seems to be especially under pressure as is often the case in local 
government.
Thus, insecurity is generated by the difficulties of individuals and 
organisations to find out what constitute appropriate norms or procedures 
in the situation they find themselves in. For what indeed is appropriate 
when both legal–rational and patrimonial practices are exercised simul-
taneously; or when they coexist both internally and externally? Moreover, 
each situation highlights a different set of relationships so that it becomes 
difficult to live up to important relationships and cultural expectations. 
This is a key feature of norm-based decision-making (March 1994: 63).20
Not surprisingly, therefore, we found widely varying staff assessments 
of their situation. At one extreme was a group of young employees in a 
poorly performing local council who frankly stated that since they were 
20 Thus, Bratton, Mattes and Gyimah-Boadi (2005: 200) are wrong when they write that 
people in Africa “are buffeted by conflicting values . . . and respond to these tensions by 
adopting multiple, shifting identities.” This is a general phenomenon.
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paid ‘tokens’ contrary to government promises of pay improvements in 
the 1990s, they were justified in seeking compensation through corrupt 
practices when given the chance. At the other extreme were supervi-
sors who preferred to work with staff from other ethnic groups, because 
this helped to clarify and amplify the formal, non-personal, hierarchical 
relationship between them. Other executives emphasised (and actually 
practised) that ‘in the interest of the nation’ it is the duty of the work-
place to provide its staff with further education—even if they would not 
return to their workplace upon completing a course. In between these 
outlier cases, there were numerous examples of fence sitting. Although 
many interviewees stressed their desire to contribute to better organisa-
tional performance through improved bureaucratic behaviour, they were 
clearly more loyal to each other as colleagues than to their organisation 
and its official mandate. Hence firing is an exceedingly rare event in both 
countries (disregarding retrenchments that are typically done to reduce 
costs not to sanction wrongdoers or non-performers and which are often 
pushed by donors). “You know, we don’t fire staff in this country” as a 
ministry official in Uganda remarked. In fact, pension and death (often 
due to HIV/AIDS) remain the two most common ways of leaving public 
service except where specific staff, such as medical personnel, have access 
to foreign labour markets.
Hypocrisy is the third outcome of decision-making and action in neo-
patrimonial settings although it is a generic phenomenon.21 It is “a way of 
handling severely conflicting values, and this is exactly what organisations 
imbued with hypocrisy do” in all societies. Hypocrisy makes it possible 
for people “to talk and make decisions about high values, even if they do 
not act in accordance with such values themselves” as Brunsson (2002: xii 
and xvii) argues on the basis of his studies of local government in Swe-
den. Thus, an organisation (or an individual) is hypocritical when what it 
says, what it decides and what it does are inconsistent. The lack of con-
ventionally assumed casual relations between talk, decision and action 
challenge traditional decision theory and traditional administrative wis-
dom. For hypocrisy may help to solve a true dilemma of how to respond 
to a situation with contradictory but compulsory demands that exceed 
capacity. It can therefore be useful in dealing with (and diffusing) con-
flicting demands within an organisation and between that organisation 
21 Riggs (1964: 201) refers to ‘double talk’, but argues that this is characteristic of societ-
ies in transition to modernity.
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and society. In this way it may enhance the legitimacy of those who exer-
cise it. When exercised without skill, hypocrisy can, of course, also have 
the opposite result. 
Although hypocrisy is not a particularly African phenomenon, neopat-
rimonial settings bring specific dilemmas to the fore. Most of our respon-
dents, for example, would claim that recruitment follows merit principles 
in their workplaces, but some would also, when explicitly asked, readily 
admit that non-compliance with such principles is common (see table 1). 
Asked about what to do about non-performing colleagues most answers 
were consistent with standard bureaucratic behaviour: they should be 
disciplined. That disciplinary action is rare was explained with reference 
to the need to understand the particular (often family) situation of the 
individuals involved. Or we were told that non-action against wrongdoers 
and non-performers was indeed a problem in the past, but that things are 
changing now (“It is a process, you know”). Or the blame for non-action 
was put on others (“a few unfortunate individuals” or on the lack of exter-
nally provided tools/budgets/training etc.) Hypocritical conduct is an art 
rather than a science, of course, but it is one that is useful to master for 
staff and organisations faced with conflicting (and often impossible) per-
formance demands in neopatrimonial settings. 
Conclusions 
To claim that African states are neopatrimonial, as many analysts do, may 
often tell us little about how politics and administration actually work 
there. This chapter focuses on employee perceptions of staff issues in the 
public sector in Tanzania and Uganda—such as hiring and firing, staff 
motivation and management. It is inspired by human resources literature 
and by institutionalism. From these perspectives the chapter provides 
a critical look at the use of the neopatrimonial paradigm for studies of 
organisational level human resource management in African countries. 
A main problem with the NP paradigm is that it takes as given precisely 
that which should be empirically investigated: namely, in specific settings, 
the actual impacts on politics, administration and organisational capacity 
of the coexistence and interactions of legal–rational and patrimonial prac-
tices in and around organisations. 
Moreover, to interpret all evidence of informality and poor perfor-
mance as results of patrimonial practices—as is fairly common in stud-
ies on Africa using the NP paradigm—is clearly a biased understanding. 
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Patrimonial practices are just one reason (albeit an often important one) 
among many for non-compliance with legal rules and regulations. These 
other reasons are well known from organisational studies: lack of capacity 
to follow rules due to underfunding, poor skills and incompetent manage-
ment; ambiguous, complex, conflicting or non-existent legal frameworks; 
etc. . Likewise, narrow self-interest is not the only motivational factor. 
Nationalism, sense of duty, professional pride and desire to influence 
decision-making, for example, may also induce people to work to enhance 
organisational mandates. 
A third problem with the NP paradigm, related to the above, is that 
the category ‘patrimonial’ actually merges widely different practices 
under this heading. Not all patrimonial practices are politically motivated 
although this is a typical assumption among NP proponents. In poor coun-
tries, economically motivated clientelism is widespread and public sector 
staff—not just politicians—are often involved in it. For such staff have 
substantial social obligations (being among the best paid groups in their 
countries) and they are strategically placed to engage in clientelism so as 
to help members of their social or ethnic networks. Patronage, by contrast, 
is politically motivated and focuses on groups rather than individuals.
If these problems are addressed, the NP paradigm may help to improve 
the understanding of the complex interactions between legal–rational and 
various forms of patrimonial practices in specific public sector organisa-
tions. However, this does not necessarily provide more clear-cut and gen-
eral answers about their impacts on politics, administration and capacity. 
Not only is there variation in impacts between countries; impacts also 
vary across public sector organisations within countries. Moreover, the 
coexistence of and interactions between legal–rational and patrimonial 
practices generate uncertainty because norms that are regarded as appro-
priate bases for action may differ depending on the specific situation. 
Neopatrimonial settings also generate hypocrisy in organisations when the 
gap between organisational means and official ends is large.
However, hypocrisy is far from being a phenomenon specific to organ-
isations in Africa. Donors and many analysts also engage in this activ-
ity. Some of their views on patrimonialism are remarkable. In spite of 
the recognition that the West’s historical experience is distinctive and 
unique there is an implicit notion that this experience provides African 
countries with a ready-to-use model of the ‘modern’ state. The recipe is 
that market-conforming economic policies and liberal democratic gover-
nance reforms are mutually supportive and jointly represent the best way 
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towards development. Quantitative regression analyses of governance and 
economic growth are increasingly used to back up such claims. Kaufmann 
(2004: 86) of the World Bank argues that even poor countries can improve 
their governance (which includes getting rid of patrimonial practices) 
because there is little evidence to support the claim that poor governance 
in Africa is attributable to its poverty. The optimistic message is that a 
de-patrimonialised state is realistic. This claim seems just as problematic 
as the general claim by Chabal and Daloz that the African state is merely 
a pseudo-Western façade. 
It is more likely that the coexistence of and interactions between 
legal–rational and patrimonial practices may produce different types of 
changes, perhaps even transformations, in both patrimonial and legal–
rational directions depending on the specific context. Some of the possi-
bilities are outlined in this chapter. However, where patrimonial pressures 
are strong, such changes/transformations will be unstable (reversible), 
certainly in the short term. But even where legal–rational practices may 
prevail (in organisations or larger parts of the public service), certain key 
transactions through the structures of formal organisations may remain 
personalised as experiences from our own part of the world indicate 
(Peters 1995: 48–51; Theobald 1999). After all, the legal–rational form of 
authority identified by Weber is an ideal type. And so it remains for most 
countries, also for some in the North.
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“WE MAKE DO AND KEEP GOING!” INVENTIVE PRACTICES  
AND ORDERED INFORMALITY IN THE FUNCTIONING  
OF THE DISTRICT COURTS IN NIAMEY AND ZINDER (NIGER)
Oumarou Hamani
Introduction: How to Manage a Public Service in Chronic Need 
of Resources?
If you insist that you need this and that to work, they will end up saying that 
you do not do your work!
This statement by a Vice President of the Higher District Court of Nia-
mey, Niger’s most important court in terms of the volume of cases 
processed, is indicative of the functioning of its jurisdiction and of the 
judicial system in general. It reflects the scale of dysfunction within the 
courts. Nonetheless, the courts continue to more or less meet the needs 
of service users. How do they manage to do this? Taking the concept of 
‘practical inventiveness’ (débrouillardise) as its starting point, this chapter 
explores the mechanisms by which these services function. These inven-
tive practices are often overlooked in the research carried out on Afri-
can public administrative systems. An ethnography of the operation of 
two district courts in Niger will not only provide insights into the state’s 
everyday functioning ‘from below’ but will also demonstrate that practi-
cal norms and ordered informality (see Olivier de Sardan in this volume) 
are not always negative and can contribute, in some cases, to making the 
state work.1
To ensure the production and delivery of public services in a context 
of state weakness, civil servants rely on a wide range of practices which 
are, themselves, based on equally diverse logics. They face organizational 
constraints in the decisions they make: they must deal with problems, 
and build strategic relations with local political authorities whose support 
they depend on for the completion of certain tasks. This constant quest 
1 The term “ordered informality” is inspired by Evans-Pritchards (1940, repr. 1987: 296) 
analysis of the working of segmentary societies. See also Olivier de Sardan (in this volume). 
Special thanks to Susan Cox for translation into English.
© Oumarou Hamani, 2014 | doi: 10.1163/9789004264960_007
This is an open access chapter distributed under the terms of the CC BY-NC 4.0 license.
146 oumarou hamani
for resources to facilitate the running of the courts shapes the magistrates’ 
image of the state.
These practices are often out of step with what is set forth in the offi-
cial documents; however, they sometimes produce unexpectedly positive 
results which are currently of interest to both the development commu-
nity and social science researchers (Jütting et al. 2007). If these practices 
help to strengthen the production and delivery of public services by the 
state, particularly in local contexts, the potential offered by the analysis 
of their emergence and embedding in public administration practices 
is considerable. In the context of the judicial system, such an analysis 
raises the question of the ‘independence’ of the judicial system and the 
capacity of the state to control a service that relies—at least in part—on 
non-state resources in order to function.
Addressing the concept of practical inventiveness is to bring to light 
certain practices—sometimes hovering on the limits of legality—which 
facilitate the functioning of the judicial system on a daily basis. It also 
means re-examining the level of commitment among magistrates in rela-
tion to the state they serve (Lentz in this volume). Contrary to the claims 
of Das and Poole (2004), this is not limited to the “margins of the state”. 
This consideration concerns the very heart of the judicial structure; it 
endeavours to give substance to the concept of ‘practical norms’ as put 
forward by Olivier de Sardan (in this volume). There is a significant dis-
crepancy between the inventive practices referred to here and the official 
functioning and the formulated policies of the state. However, far from 
impeding the operations of state justice, much like the oil that lubricates 
an engine, these practices sometimes act as a catalyst for functional-
ity. ‘Practical inventiveness’ adds to the notion of the plurality of norms 
already recognized as existing in public administrations. In an analysis of 
this plurality of norms in the implementation of public policy, Chauveau, 
Le Pape and Olivier de Sardan (2001: 150) maintain that ‘unofficial’ norms 
develop as a result of an incapacity on the part of the state to formulate 
rules and regulations and ensure their acceptance (see also Olivier de Sar-
dan 2009; Titeca and De Herdt 2010). I will argue here that the emergence 
of unofficial rules could also arise as a result of the state’s incapacity to 
provide sufficient resources to its administrations.
In the sphere of justice, unofficial practices raise a very specific ques-
tion: to what extent does the emergence of informal practices affect the 
independence of the judicial system? The literature on the subject of 
judicial independence (in francophone Africa) focuses on political inter-
ference in the treatment of court cases (Badara Fall 2003; Du Bois de 
 inventive practices in the niger judiciary 147
Gaudusson 1990). This perspective, however, is limited, failing as it does to 
take into account a number of covert forms of dependence in the justice 
system, involving manifestations of ‘powers’ other than political power. 
In the everyday functioning of the judicial system, indeed, magistrates 
have dealings with a range of institutional non-state actors, with whom 
they must negotiate in order to obtain some of the resources needed for 
the system to function. In the context of the courts, these negotiations 
also contribute to the informal privatization of the judicial service in the 
form of corruption (Blundo and Olivier de Sardan 2007), predation (Tre-
fon 2009), “every-man-for-himselfism” and “cronyism” (Olivier de Sardan 
2004). These negotiations are a double-edged sword; on the one hand, 
they present fertile ground for the emergence of corruption or clientelism 
(Titeca and De Herdt 2010). On the other hand, they may contribute to the 
operation of public services. In this text, I am particularly interested in the 
ways in which magistrates adjust their professional practice according to 
the scarcity of resources.
In other words, the purpose of this chapter is to analyze the interac-
tions between magistrates and members of the public from a perspective 
of “palliative delivery” (see Olivier de Sardan in this volume), within the 
bureaucratic mode of functioning. This perspective is complementary to 
the analysis of Tidjani Alou (2001: 64) who, with reference to the insuf-
ficient budgets allocated to the judicial system in Niger, remarks that “the 
judicial administrations find it impossible to function normally. This has 
an impact on the execution of the public judicial service, a process that is 
often compromised or diverted from its primary objectives . . .” (for similar 
perspectives see Blundo 2003b and Bierschenk 2008).2
While I am interested in the negotiations between state officials and 
their environment and the ‘transactions’ surrounding access to the public 
judicial service—practices that are situated in the context of the wider 
debate about the links between the state and the non-state sphere (Lund 
2007; Baker 2010)—this paper focuses on the mechanisms by which the 
resources mobilized from outside the system by state officials are rein-
vested in the judicial system and the state. I am also interested in how 
2 This approach is also inspired by Gobatto and Lafaye (2005), who,  in their work on 
the healthcare sector, carried out an analysis of the arrangements, adjustments and nego-
tiations employed by healthcare practitioners to incorporate or circumvent the constraints 
they face in the care given to pregnant women, particularly in the context of preventing 
mother-to-child transmission of HIV (PMTCT). In this case, the constraints were analyzed 
as the drivers of new practices rather than insurmountable obstacles. 
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magistrates view and/or legitimize these negotiations. How does the con-
cept of ‘practical inventiveness’ influence the magistrates’ perception of 
the state? 
Based on these questions, the analysis is structured in four parts. The 
first discusses the background and context of the study. The second high-
lights the weakness of the public judicial service in Niger. The third deals 
with the manifestations of inventive practices in the observed courts, and 
the fourth is dedicated to an analysis of the discourse of the judges on 
their relationship with the state.3
The Organization of the Judicial System: the Courts of Niamey  
and Zinder
The judicial system in Niger is based on the French model. In order of 
importance (from bottom to top), there are the tribunaux d’instance (Mag-
istrate Courts) at the departmental level, the tribunaux de grande instance 
(Higher District Courts) whose jurisdiction is regional in scope, two cours 
d’appel (Courts of Appeal), each with a jurisdiction of four District Courts 
and 15 Magistrate Courts. At the top of the judicial hierarchy, there are 
the cour de Cassation (Courts of Cassation), the cour d’Etat (the national 
courts), the cour des comptes (Courts of Audit), and one cour constitution-
nelle (Constitutional Court). The District Courts of Zinder and Niamey, 
the subject of this study, are connected to the Courts of Appeal of Zinder 
and Niamey respectively. To quote Raynal (1990: 7), Niger’s judicial sys-
tem is characterized by a “unity of judicial and administrative measures, a 
unity of modern and customary law jurisdictions, a unity of civil and com-
mercial jurisdictions”. Once trained, the same judge may cover all special-
izations and assume a variety of judicial and administrative functions. 
3 Fieldwork was carried out in Zinder between 2006 and 2008. The data were collected 
on the basis of a qualitative methodology combining interviews and observations. The 
observation of practices at the margin of state law is clearly problematic, both epistemo-
logically and ethically. The resulting dilemma can be summed up in the following ques-
tion: How does one observe that which is by nature hidden (Blundo 2003a), and how does 
one write about it? I adopted an approach based on the observation of work practices, the 
analysis of professional careers, and the comments of informants about their work condi-
tions, their perception of the state, their expectations etc.
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Magistrates and Prosecutors
From a functional point of view, the magistrates may be divided into 
two categories. First, there are the magistrats du parquet, i.e. prosecutors, 
comprising both prosecutors and deputy prosecutors. Hierarchically, they 
are subject to the authority of the Ministry of Justice. Second, there are 
the magistrats du siège, the independent judges whose functions combine 
instruction and judgment. Some judges are assigned to special courts/juris-
dictions, such as juvenile courts, customs courts, and civil and commercial 
courts. In principle, while assigned to a special court, a judge should not 
be involved in other cases. This embargo ceases once they have left their 
assigned jurisdiction.
The Higher District Court of Zinder has six magistrates, two of whom 
are prosecutors and four who act as judges.4 None of these are women. 
In addition to the President of the court, Zinder’s district court judges 
include a juvenile court judge, an investigating judge, and a civil and 
customary judge. Outside of the city of Zinder, the Higher District Court 
has five Regional Courts under its jurisdiction (Matamey, Magaria, Mir-
riah, Tanout, Gouré), all of which come under the authority of a single 
magistrate. Between 2002 and 2004, the Public Prosecutor's Office at the 
Higher District Court of Zinder registered an average of 300 cases each 
year, inclusive of all offences.
The Higher District Court of Niamey has 25magistrates in total, i.e. four 
times more than its counterpart in Zinder. Of these, 15 are judges and ten 
are prosecutors. On average, this court completes around 60 hearings per 
week, giving a monthly average of 240 cases. Each judge hears an average 
of 16 cases per month.
Ordered Informality 1: Court Clerks, Secretaries and Others 
The support staff in the courts of Niamey and Zinder can be divided into 
two categories based on their status. The first of these is the permanent 
staff, composed of clerks and secretaries, who are permanent public ser-
vice employees. Zinder Higher District Court has six permanent support 
staff, e.g. three clerks (greffiers) and three secretaries. Only three of these 
six staff members hold qualifications and the bulk of the clerking and 
4 The number of staff changed between 2007 and 2009. In 2009, there were a total of 
nine magistrates in Zinder’s District Court, seven of whom were judges.
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secretarial work falls to them. This kind of disparity in the distribution 
of work among administrative support staff is commonplace in Zinder 
Higher District Court: 
They (the clerks and secretaries, OH) are in great demand by different judges. 
Some tasks are regularly deferred or delayed . . . judges must wait until one 
case is completed before soliciting the services of the official for another. 
This means that work drags on (President of the Court, February 2007).
Niamey Higher District Court has more permanent support staff at its dis-
posal than its counterpart in Zinder. In 2008, there were 17 permanent 
members of staff, composed of clerks and secretaries to the clerks, repre-
senting about 46% of its total support staff.
From an administrative point of view, the head clerk (greffier-en-chef )
single-handedly manages the court operations and is responsible for the 
entire support staff. Given the huge volume of cases dealt with in Nia-
mey, several departments report to the head clerk: the secretariat of the 
offices of the clerks and prosecutors and the offices of the civil, social and 
correctional clerks. Each office collates the different records and carefully 
guards the legal files in metal filing cabinets. To quote A., greffier (clerk) 
at the Office of the Civil Clerk, Niamey Higher District Court, whom I 
interviewed in February 2008, the clerks see themselves as the “court’s 
memory”.
The second group of support staff comprises the subsidiary staff that do 
not, however, form a homogenous category. They are composed of volun-
teers, national civic service workers and, in Niamey, trainees (stagiaires).5 
Volunteers are individuals who hope to eventually gain paid work within 
the system. National civic service workers are young university graduates 
who are employed in the civil service as part of a policy to combat youth 
unemployment among young graduates. Trainees are unpaid pupils or 
students who pass a few months at the court to “learn the bureaucratic 
routines” under the supervision of one of the employees. While the vol-
unteers and trainees are unpaid, the national civic service workers receive 
a salary of FCFA 50,000 (about 76€) per month. Niamey Higher District 
Court has a large number of subsidiary workers relative to its official staff: 
according to a survey carried out in 2008, the former comprise over 50 
percent of the support staff. They often have little or no training in the 
tasks assigned to them and are left to learn on the job; they gain their 
5 In other sectors of the state, for example health and education, there are also contract 
workers (previously referred to as “volunteers”), who are paid by the state.
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knowledge and experience of professional procedures through contact 
with official staff.
The subsidiary workers—in particular the volunteers—are not under 
any obligation to produce results. They are not subject to any official 
terms and conditions, and receive no pay because they are not formally 
recruited. Nor are they included in the official organizational chart of the 
judicial administration. However, when it comes to the completion of 
tasks, these statutory differences have no impact because “due to a lack 
of personnel, the subsidiary workers perform the work of the official staff ” 
(Ms M.H.R, Clerk, Higher District Court Niamey, February 2008).
Just as there is a discrepancy in their treatment, there is also a discrep-
ancy in the way in which these two categories of workers—permanent 
and subsidiary—are recruited to the courts. The subsidiary workers enter 
the judicial administration through various channels, often at the mar-
gins of official practice. Many of them begin as trainees or national civic 
service workers employed for two years on a renewable basis. The case of 
M.M. provides an insight into the manner of recruitment of the subsidiary 
workers. 
Ms M.M. began in 1998 as a secretary-volunteer in the Ministry of Justice 
while ‘awaiting’ more steady work. Fobbed off with empty promises of 
promotion until 2008, her status evolved to that of ‘permanent trainee’ 
(stagiaire-titulaire). She held a vacant position in the Ministry of Justice 
and hoped to be made permanent. In 2005, she was ‘assigned’ (M.M.’s own 
phrasing) to Niamey Higher District Court, specifically to the Chief Clerk 
of the Court. At the time, she says, she had taken a break from the intern-
ship to return to her studies. During this period, there was a recruitment 
drive, and somebody else was given the job that had been promised to her. 
However, due to a shortage of personnel, the Director of Administrative and 
Financial Affairs assigned her to Niamey Higher District Court on the basis 
of a favourable reference from the president and prosecutor of this court. 
When we met in 2008 she was still waiting to be made permanent.
Subsidiary workers aspire to the more legitimate status of the permanent 
staff. To achieve this, they must ‘have experience’. Often the process of 
gaining work experience takes several years, during which they are heavily 
involved with court procedure. M.M. described the range of tasks assigned 
to her as follows:
When I was working with the outgoing head clerk, I sometimes worked on 
call. When you work at the public prosecutor’s office . . . it’s Niger’s secret, 
you are bound to observe professional secrecy. We are not sworn in, but 
everyone is there to do a job. When the head clerk, our boss, asks us to do 
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something, we obey . . . we help him to find files as we know how the files are 
organized . . . During the ten years I’ve worked here, I have never received 
anything. I come to work every day for love of the work and love of my 
country. If you’re out of work, you forget all you’ve learned so it’s important 
to come to work regularly. I have no support, and no wage.
It is worth examining the trajectory of this volunteer, a former secretary 
at the office of the public prosecutor in Niamey Higher District Court in 
greater detail. Over the course of her career, her status has evolved in 
a twilight zone (Lund 2007)—there is a discrepancy between her actual 
status as a trainee, and the process that led to her being made available 
to the higher district court. Her career trajectory is similar to that of a 
permanent employee. From the Ministry of Justice, she was ‘assigned’—
based on a reference from the President and the prosecutor—to the head 
clerk of Niamey Higher District Court where she had to provide off-duty 
cover for the secretariat. Her status is ambiguous, alternating between 
formal and informal. In fact, as a subsidiary worker, she performs tasks 
officially intended for completion by permanent staff. Given that she does 
not receive any official payment, she is not a state employee, however she 
is at the heart of the administrative machinery of Niamey Higher District 
Court. We may call this a more or less ordered informality which prevails 
here. This ambiguity is characteristic of the functioning of most of the 
courts observed in the course of my research. The actual work done dis-
solves the statutory divisions that separate the permanent and subsidiary 
staff. 
Moreover, M.M. is diligent in her work at the court in order ‘not to for-
get what she has learned’ at school, she claims. This work is unpaid. She 
finds it satisfying because it enables her to use what she learned at school 
and to consolidate this learning through everyday professional applica-
tion. However, the fact that she is not officially remunerated by the state 
makes her prone to corruption. On this subject and in reference to the 
judicial system in Benin, Bierschenk (2008) emphasizes the role of the 
‘minor personnel’ of the courts as a key component of corruption.
The assessments by the permanent staff of the work carried out by 
these subsidiary workers differ. One prosecutor mentions the ambivalent 
contribution made by volunteers in the administration of the office of the 
prosecutor in Niamey.
They are not a high-quality staff: they hinder as much as help (I.B., First 
Deputy Prosecutor, Niamey District Court, November 2008).
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This discourse reflects the ambivalent attitude of the court authorities 
towards subsidiary workers whom they view as both a support, or ‘those 
who help’, and as a hindrance, or ‘those who ruin things’. Their skills often 
are not equal to the tasks with which they are entrusted and their work 
is marked by ambivalence. Although these volunteers are not sworn in, 
they have access to court records. They provide support to the secretar-
ies and clerks in the drafting of correspondence, the transmission of files, 
the registration and filing of records, and the referral of users of the jus-
tice system. In this way, they may be seen as discharging some of the 
core duties of the permanent staff. Due to the numerous tasks that they 
carry out and that have rendered them essential to the service, the subsid-
iary workers have established themselves at the heart of the court. Thanks 
to this position, they have managed to create networks of internal and 
external relations that sometimes fall outside the context of the formal 
organization of work.
Ordered Informality 2: Gendarmes, Policemen and Assessors
Ordered informality also characterizes professional categories which are 
auxiliaries of the justice system like gendarmes, policemen and assessors. 
In Zinder, despite being under the authority of the Ministry of Defence 
and the Ministry of the Interior from an institutional perspective, two 
gendarmerie stations and one police station are regularly ‘placed at the 
disposal of the justice system’. The services of the officers of the Crimi-
nal Investigation Department are sought for the purposes of preliminary 
enquiries into breaches of the law. Since they provide the minutes for 
these preliminary enquiries, the gendarmerie and the police are the first 
link in the penal chain. From an operational point of view, these officers 
report to the state prosecutor (procureur général) who is placed at the 
level of the Court of Appeal. However, in the implementation of their 
everyday duties, they have more dealings with the Public Prosecutor (pro-
cureur de la République) at the District Court level, to whom they submit 
their daily investigation reports.
Very often, the investigating officers do not adhere to their preroga-
tives in the execution of their duties. They regularly encroach on the remit 
of the prosecutors by dealing with cases at the police station or gendar-
merie station “unbeknownst to the prosecutor’s office”, as reported by 
one public prosecutor whom we interviewed in Zinder. However, these 
encroachments are embedded in the judicial administration as some 
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prosecutors ‘prefer that certain cases be dealt with on the level of the 
police or gendarmerie stations’. 
Another group which supports the justice system from the outside are 
the so-called assessors. To overcome the difficulties inherent in interpret-
ing customs that are by their very nature uncodified, the law appoints two 
assessors to the judge of customary affairs. The customary affairs asses-
sors, who were previously known as interpreters, are the judge’s principal 
advisors in civil and customary law matters. They are called on to shed 
light on the customs of conflicting parties.6 The nomination of the cus-
tomary assessors is beyond the control of the judges and is decided by 
the administrative or customary authorities. In the municipalities, it is 
the duty of the mayors to prepare an annual list of skilled assessors to 
assist the judges in customary affairs. The judges must accept the asses-
sors assigned to them by the administrative authorities. The assessors 
can, however, be dismissed in the case of a complaint from a judge. They 
receive a monthly salary based on the number of cases they have been 
assigned. The assessors have a solely advisory function. However, in prac-
tice, when faced with a case that depends on the interpretation of Muslim 
custom, for example, a judge in a customary court will have little or no 
choice but to submit to the advice of the assessor if he is not familiar with 
Muslim law.
Lack of Resources as Discourse and Reality, and the Idealization 
of the Past 
The Lack of Resources: Discourses and Realities
According to the magistrates with whom we spoke, if there is a common, 
recurrent characteristic to be observed throughout the courts, it is ‘work 
overload’ and the ‘wretchedness of the judicial system’ (see also Du Bois 
de Gaudusson 1990: 10). Two types of discourse emerge with reference to 
the resources available to the judicial system. One of these treats the lack 
of resources as the key to the functioning of the judicial system; the other 
idealizes the past. 
In relation to the lack of resources, the younger magistrates highlight 
the ongoing imbalance between the increasing demands on the judicial 
6 Loi 2004-050 du 22 juillet 2004 fixant l’organisation et la compétence des juridictions 
en République du Niger: 2029.
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system, on the one hand, and the insufficient resources provided to meet 
this demand, on the other. The pressure the magistrates are under is evi-
dent from the following accounts:
You know, the difficulties experienced in public administration are exactly 
the same. It’s a question of not having enough resources, the offices are 
not equipped with information technology. There’s also a lack of human 
resources because there isn’t enough magistrates . . . Niamey Higher District 
Court should function as a collegial service, if there were enough officers; 
there should be three judges with a deciding rule as opposed to one. . . . 
There’s also a shortage of support staff, of secretaries and clerks. For the 
most part, these roles are filled by volunteers. We have to make do in this 
way! (M.I.S., Deputy Prosecutor, Niamey Higher District Court, 2006).
 For example, in the past five months, we’ve received nothing at all! In the 
meantime, we manage as best we can. . . . We should receive quarterly allo-
cations of operational funding, the sum of which is unfixed. In the past year, 
I’ve only received two instalments of funding! (ODA, President of Zinder 
Higher District Court, 2007).
The lack of resources has come to represent the norm in the operation 
of the justice system. This deficiency is felt on many different levels: in 
the shortage of personnel as compared to the volume of work, the short-
age of working materials in the courts, the insufficient levels of funding 
etc. According to the rules regarding the allocation of funding, the courts 
are entitled to receive quarterly allocations of funding from the central 
administration to facilitate their operations. In actual fact, as described 
by the President of Zinder Higher District Court, the courts often have to 
make do with receiving the designated funding once every six months. 
Moreover, the allocated sum is not dictated by the needs of the court, 
but by the resources available (Interview with the Director of Administra-
tive and Financial Affairs at the Ministry of Justice, 2009). Furthermore, 
as Department of Justice officials report, the courts regularly suffer due 
to the under-funding of the budget allocated to the Ministry of Justice, 
which, in the best-case scenario, still only receives ‘a quarter of the amount 
envisaged by the budgetary legislation.’ The total funding allocated to the 
courts is insufficient, irregular and unstable. 
“Previously, we had Resources”: Idealizing the Past
Older magistrates refer regularly to the past when discussing the current 
state of the judicial system. In fact, many older magistrates, who have 
either retired or hold a position in the judicial hierarchy, never fail to refer 
to the former glory of this state sector.
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Twenty years ago, we never had these problems with resources; we were 
able to function with no difficulty. At the time, there was respect for the 
judicial service. President Kountché loved justice, and this ensured that the 
magistrates had a real commitment to their work (M.B., Advisor to the Con-
stitutional Court, May 2008).
The period M.B. speaks of refers to Kountché’s period in office (1974–
1987), which is generally remembered as a time of plenty. This high-
ranking magistrate associates the ‘respect’ afforded the judicial system 
with the resources allocated to it by the state. The judicial system was 
not neglected; on the contrary, it enjoyed preferential treatment from the 
regime in power at the time. This may appear contradictory in the con-
text of a military dictatorship. However, another magistrate interviewed 
in Niamey reiterates M.B.’s statement:
I have spoken with many magistrates . . . they told me that magistrates were 
better equipped with vehicles, for example the R4s which enabled them to 
make work-related journeys. Each magistrate had a house or a rental prop-
erty . . . One time, the President attended a swearing-in ceremony to greet 
the new magistrates. At that time Bondieré was President of the Appeal 
Court and he asked him (the President, OH) to take off his kepi.7 When 
the swearing-in ceremony was over, the president greeted them, and asked 
them ‘Are there any problems?’ Sissoko, the President of the Supreme Court, 
replied ‘Sir, we do have some problems. We do not have any means of trans-
port, nor the minimum housing requirements.’ So the President went to the 
Ministry of Finance and told them to see that these requirements were ful-
filled. At that time, when Kountché gave orders they were obeyed to the 
letter!’ (Interview with G.S., Magistrate at Niamey Higher District Court, for-
mer Under-Secretary General of the Independent Magistrates’ Association 
of Niger (Syndicat autonome des magistrats du Niger), August 2007).
The idea that working conditions were significantly better in the past can 
be contextualized by analyzing the relationship between the develop-
ment of the budget allocated to the justice system and the increase in the 
operating costs of the courts. The budget allocated to the judicial system 
has never exceeded one percent of overall national expenditure—this 
includes the period under Kountché referred to by the former magistrates. 
During this period, in fact, the percentage of the national budget allocated 
to the judicial service was on average 0.42 percent, which is considerably 
lower than that allocated during the periods before (0.82 percent) and 
7 Every person entering into a courtroom is obliged to remove his hat, as a sign of 
respect to the judicial authority. This symbolic display of power may still be seen at hear-
ings held in Niger’s courtrooms today.
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after Kountché’s period in power (0.61 percent). Hence it is difficult to 
support the argument of the magistrates who maintain that this sector 
of the state was prioritized in the context of the evolution of the budget 
allocated to the justice system. 
This idea that justice received special treatment also warrants some 
qualification. Under Kountché’s authoritarian regime the costs incurred 
by the operation of this sector were low: Niger only had 48 magistrates in 
1988. The 1990s saw a marked departure from this situation. First, there 
was an increase in the number of magistrates. Up to 1990, the low number 
of magistrates meant that the annual judicial budget could cover their 
salaries. From 1990, the situation changed dramatically due to a policy 
for the recruitment of huge numbers of new magistrates. Fifty-five magis-
trates were trained and appointed to the judiciary during two recruitment 
sessions (in 1989 and 1990), bringing the total number in the country to 
103. This meant that the judicial system required a lot more state fund-
ing. However, the budget allocated to the judicial system remained the 
same as it was during the period 1985–1986 when there were barely 30 
magistrates.
We must also bear in mind the expansion in the total number of judicial 
districts initiated in 2002 with the support of the European Union. Until 
1994, Niger had 37 jurisdictions, encompassing all levels. From 2004, the 
‘legal realm’ was expanded to include 43 jurisdictions. The creation of new 
jurisdictions was also a factor in the increased demand for operational 
funding for the judicial system; however state resources were already in 
short supply and were, therefore, unable to meet this increased demand. 
These changes came on top of the institutional changes of the 1990s 
and were marked by the appearance of the very first Union (syndicat) 
for the representation of magistrates, which publicly highlighted the dif-
ficult working conditions faced by the judiciary. The early 1990s saw the 
progressive distancing of the state from the justice sector, a development 
that coincided with the emergence of inventive practices by the sector’s 
personnel so that they could do their work. The testimony of G.S., a mag-
istrate in Niamey Higher District Court at the time, provides an insight 
into the way the judiciary were left to invent methods to ‘make do’ when 
faced with this systemic insecurity:
We began the trade union fight based on material issues because the sys-
tem was antiquated from the point of view of equipment, buildings and 
the prisons, which were undersized and crumbling. We started with these 
issues, but also with simple problems to do with our everyday operations. At 
the time, the judges themselves were drawn into these issues, as judges in 
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Niamey were forced to buy paper personally or to ask friends for it. Institu-
tions like the postal service, as it is related to our sector, provided us with 
reams of paper as we have friends there. On occasion the Ministry for Justice 
would send us two reams. This was not enough for even the prosecutor’s 
office. Imagine that at that time there were 13 judges in the court, and they 
received only one ream of paper between them. This was in 1992–1993 (G.S., 
August 2007).
Having been circumvented for a long time, the justice system was now 
increasingly used as a channel for regulating conflicts. With the judicial-
ization of social relations (the frequent use of the law in settling disputes), 
a phenomenon that emerged with the advent of democracy and has been 
reinforced by the influence of human rights organizations, the judicial 
system increasingly faced ‘demands for justice’. These demands grew 
not only in terms of the number of cases, but also in terms of the com-
plexity of the cases assigned to the magistrates. The number of civil and 
commercial cases dealt with between 1987 and 1989 by Niamey Court of 
First Instance was 283 (Raynal 1990): this figure had grown to over 442 in 
2006, i.e. almost double that of 1989.8 Judicial administration being ‘paper-
based’, the increase in the number of official files was accompanied by an 
increased need for storage facilities and office equipment in the courts.
From the 1990s onwards, the magistrates were caught in a bind: they 
had to manage with the meagre resources provided by the state while 
attempting to meet the increasing demands on the judicial system. To 
contend with this challenge, they had to learn to adapt, applying the 
inventive practices referred to earlier. I will now examine some concrete 
examples of this concept.
Inventive Practices as Local Tailoring of the  
Judicial Administration
In the judicial system, inventive practices express themselves in 
various forms. These include decision-making based on work con-
straints, the establishment of strategic relations in order to ‘deal with 
problems’, the extension of official working hours and the creation of 
an informal mail delivery system.
8 Statistics collected by the Civil Registry Office of Niamey Higher District Court, 
December 2006.
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Reinventing the Internal Organization of Work
In Zinder Higher District Court, the dearth of magistrates has resulted 
in the emergence of new methods for the internal organization of work. 
Criminal trials, which would normally be dealt with by the President, are 
delegated to the sole court judge (juge au tribunal), who happens to be a 
juvenile judge. Hence, although he is not technically authorized to deal 
with cases other than those concerning minors, this judge must take on 
all criminal cases not dealt with by the President of the court. 
On his own [the President of the Court], he cannot manage all the cases (A.I. 
juvenile judge, Zinder Higher District Court, 16 February 2007).
The President of the court should deal with criminal, administrative and 
customary appeal cases. Aside from these judicial functions, the President 
must also deal with administrative requests, for example the numerous 
applications for certificates of nationality, of which over 2,000 were pro-
cessed by Zinder Higher District Court in the six months from October 
2006 to March 2007. In response to this deluge of demands, the President 
chose to delegate many administrative tasks to other judges, the court 
judge and the investigating judge ( juge d’instruction).
Depending on the internal organization of hearings, the court tries 
criminal cases on two days of the week, Tuesdays and Thursdays. Custom-
ary law appeals, and civil and commercial cases are heard on Wednesdays 
and Fridays respectively. However, as noted by the President of the Higher 
District Court: “younger judges are reluctant to deal with civil or com-
mercial cases as these present the most difficulty”. Hence, if the President 
complied with the official distribution of tasks, he would have hearings 
all four working days of the week (Tuesdays, Wednesdays, Thursdays and 
Fridays). One can imagine the pace at which he would have to work to 
prepare for the hearings alone. Therefore, it would be rather difficult for 
him to find sufficient time for the administrative element of his duties.
While it does not lead to a completely dysfunctional state in the courts, 
the lack of magistrates affects the planning of work. Through the delega-
tion of tasks, the court ensures that the public’s judicial requirements are 
met on a daily basis. A similar approach may also be observed among 
the clerks of the court who are not limited to specific tasks. They can 
be called on by any of the magistrates as and when the need arises. For 
example, as he has no clerk assigned to his staff, the investigating judge 
must constantly send for the clerk officially assigned to civil and custom-
ary matters. The President of the court does not regard this makeshift 
administrative approach as a weakness but as a local solution. 
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The judge holds both a judicial and a political mandate (Commaille and 
Kaluszynski 2007: 14). The judicial mandate of the judge is well known. 
The political mandate, on the other hand, is a complex one. In the courts, 
the judge is instrumental in implementing the judicial policy (extending 
or alleviating sentences) developed by the Ministry of Justice. There are 
two elements to this policy. There is a broad-ranging judicial policy, which 
is difficult to apply to a range of cases as it fails to take regional specifici-
ties into account. Furthermore, this policy is rarely based on field data:
Today, normally, a division (e.g. the Judicial Affairs and Seals Division, OH) 
should be able to record statistics of the cases processed over the course of 
the year. But it is not possible to do this, and it is unclear how many court 
cases are ruled on each year, and which cases are the most common: theft, 
rape, embezzlement, murder? The division ought to provide these analyses 
to help direct penal policy . . . if it is made clear that the courts are harsher 
on a particular crime, there is usually a decrease in this type of offence. At 
the moment, penal policy suggests that the courts should treat crimes more 
severely. . . . But unfortunately . . . we have not been able to provide these 
statistics (Interview with A.D., Magistrate and former Division Head at the 
Central Administration of the Ministry for Justice, November 2006).
For its part, the General Assembly of Magistrates which is supposed to 
meet once a year on the level of the jurisdiction of a Court of Appeal, 
also sets out a ‘court policy’ which is more closely aligned with everyday 
reality. In the case of recurring offences, the heads of the courts instruct 
magistrates in the General Assembly with regard to the severity of their 
sentencing. In practice, magistrates defer more often to the resolutions 
reached by the General Assembly than to the directives originating from 
the political authorities. Indeed, the district courts enjoy relative auton-
omy in assessing the appropriateness of ‘state judicial policy’ within their 
jurisdiction. In certain situations, the priorities of the courts differ from 
those outlined in government policy and the heads of the courts reallo-
cate the limited resources to what they consider to be priorities in their 
courts.
I myself believe that whatever the resources at our disposal, it is of the 
utmost importance to ensure that the mail service functions. Because if the 
mail isn’t delivered, there is no way of ensuring that hearings will take place. 
If you go the court in Niamey, to the hearings for traffic violation cases, 
you will see cases that are 15 to 20 years old. They are scheduled and then 
rescheduled because the mail does not reach the intended recipients. Even 
if it means taking it from the funding for supplies and even if the allocated 
budget for supplies is only FCFA 100,000, I myself always try to put aside 
FCFA 20,000 to 25,000 to ensure that the mail is delivered. That is why it 
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takes at least a month to give notice to those required to attend a criminal 
case, be it an expert witness, a civil claimant or the defendant, if they are 
based somewhere outside the constituency of the court (G.S., former Presi-
dent of Arlit Higher District Court, August 2007).
The use of the first person singular ‘I’ and the insistence conveyed by the 
repeated use of ‘myself ’ reveals the personal nature of the management 
of the courts. As the actor primarily responsible for the ‘judicial firm’, the 
President of the court acts as the policy developer within his jurisdiction 
and the arbiter of its implementation. If, from a functional point of view, 
these initiatives help the courts to operate, in the name of ‘innovation’, 
it must also be noted that this operation depends very much on the per-
sonality of the head of the court. These initiatives are not rooted in any 
permanent framework capable of ensuring regularity in a public judicial 
service. The court functions solely according to an ‘irregular regularity’. 
The irregularity stems from the personal factor, from the high turnover of 
magistrates at the head of the courts and also from the irregularity of the 
funding allocated by the central judicial administration.
Short-Circuiting Letters Rogatory
Informal procedures are employed also by the investigating judges to 
sidestep the administrative burdens involved in executing letters roga-
tory (commissions rogatoires). These practices may be seen in situations 
in which the settlement of a dispute is a matter of urgency. A magistrate 
shared his personal experience with us:
In N’Guigmi (a town situated in the far east of Niger on the border with 
Chad, OH), I encountered many problems with witnesses, particularly in 
cases concerning the theft of livestock as this is a major problem in that 
region. Sometimes the witnesses, and the victims, are from Chad, and the 
object of the dispute, that is to say the animal, would invariably be found 
in Niger; the thief would also be found in Niger, hence, it was necessary 
for the victims and the witnesses to travel . . . the law required a long and 
complicated process. There is the possibility of issuing a summons but sum-
monses go through the Ministry of Justice, which refers it to its colleagues 
at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which in turn must refer it to its coun-
terpart in the country in question, who must refer it to his colleague, the 
Ministry of Justice of the country in question. In this way, a simple sum-
mons can take years. The procedure specified by law is arduous and slow. 
Therefore, there are times when we operate informally, that is to say that 
the victims and witnesses are located in a foreign country, and if there is 
more than one person from a given foreign country implicated in the case, 
they are told to bring their colleagues with them. This method does not 
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work with the perpetrators of a crime: somebody who knows he has bro-
ken the law will not come forward as he knows that he will invariably be 
tried and sentenced. But witnesses or victims often come willingly because 
a witness wishes to present his version of the facts and the victim is seek-
ing justice for the injury done to him, whether in one country or another. 
So we operate informally because if we follow the legally prescribed route, 
the case may even fall by the wayside (Investigating Judge, Zinder Higher 
District Court, February 2007).
The execution of a letter rogatory, which is signed in the framework of 
judicial cooperation agreements, is not systematic. It is always subject to 
review by the judicial authorities of the country in question. Clearly, the 
judicial authorities responsible are not inclined to implement such let-
ters rogatoryas they do not give rise to any reimbursement of the costs 
incurred by the relevant courts in these cases.
In order to avoid the ‘long and complicated procedure’ required by 
these letters rogatory, conflicting parties living on two sides of a border 
are directly summonsed by an investigating judge. A kind of ‘cross-border’ 
ruling takes place in the case of certain crimes, which evades the admin-
istrative channels of the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry for Foreign 
Affairs in the relevant countries (Niger and Chad in the case in point).
Orders of Remand in Custody
Orders of remand in custody (ordres de mise en détention), which are stan-
dard practice in the prosecutor’s office are acknowledged by magistrates 
as an obstruction of the law, however they are tolerated. They involve the 
interaction of the Public Prosecutor (procureur de la République) and the 
criminal investigation department (which is composed of both gendar-
merie and police officers). Orders of remand in custody arise in cases in 
which accused parties are referred to the prosecutor outside of the hours 
of service (4pm on normal days, and 1pm on Friday). Referred at the time 
of the deposition, the ‘accused parties’ are placed at the disposal of the 
prison governor pending the provision of a legal detention order. Con-
sidered as a “service requirement” by one magistrate (I.M., Magistrate at 
Zinder Higher District Court, interview on 13 December 2009), orders of 
remand in custody are a “practice that we must put up with. The police fre-
quently come to the depositions. And we can’t just turn suspects loose . . .” 
(M.W., Court Auditor, interview on 23 February 2007).
Magistrates believe that the orders of remand in custody are the result 
of the delayed transfer of reports by the criminal investigation depart-
ment. The law specifies that after a 48-hour period in police custody, 
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offenders must be referred to the prosecutor. However, it is often only at 
the deposition that police hand offenders over to the courts. This situa-
tion presents the prosecutor with a dilemma: he must either prolong the 
term of custody (which would be illegal) or let the accused go (and run 
the risk that the person could abscond). An illegal practice involving the 
holding of suspects in provisional detention, orders of remand in custody 
directly contravene a decision by the judicial authorities for their aboli-
tion (according to the President of the Appeal Court of Zinder, a circular 
was issued to put an end to Orders of remand in custody).
Alternating Roles of Police Officers
In Zinder Higher District Court, alternating roles are a regular feature of 
working life among the auxiliary staff. Thus, for example, the police offi-
cers who work as security staff to the Public Prosecutor are often assigned 
supplementary tasks that do not fall within the scope of their duties. Dur-
ing my fieldwork in 2007, I was very often informed of the absence of 
the police officer from his post, and this happened repeatedly throughout 
my stay. His regular presence at the Higher District Court enabled him 
to create a parallel network of relationships, which gave him a certain 
symbolic status in the eyes of the litigants and also put him in touch with 
the magistrates and clerks. This police officer was also called on to act as 
a courier, particularly for the collection and delivery of mail on behalf of 
private transport companies. He was also involved in the daily administra-
tive functioning of the Zinder court.
Law enforcement officers are also involved in judicial procedures. They 
are required to deliver summonses to those involved in trials. In principle, 
this relieves the bailiffs of the task. A deputy prosecutor justifies the use of 
law enforcement officers in the justice system as follows:
This way is effective. When people are summonsed by the police, they will 
come. But this is not lawful because people panic. Sometimes it’s even the 
complainants who are most upset! You see, it’s a dilemma! (O.B., Deputy 
Prosecutor, Zinder Higher District Court, January 2007).
Hence, law enforcement officers, whose official task is to protect the pros-
ecutor, are also entrusted with new responsibilities in the name of the 
‘efficacy’ of the service.  
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Litigants and Defendants Helping to Make the State Work
In the provinces, land and inheritance conflicts account for the majority 
of legal disputes. To make a decision on such cases, the judge is required 
to move to the location in question to familiarize himself with the char-
acteristics of the disputed property. In reality, getting the judge to these 
locations is easier said than done.
In these cases (moving to assess sites), we ask for help from the parties 
involved, especially in cases of land disputes. Without these contributions, 
we wouldn’t be able to carry out the work. In the same way, in cases of 
people seeking certificates of citizenship, we require that people bring their 
own paper to photocopy the printed documents. Then we can give them 
one copy and the court can keep the second in its archives. We are aware 
that this is problematic but we have no choice as we don’t have a photo-
copier (ODA, President of Zinder Higher District Court, March 2007).
The contributions required from users of the justice system are either ‘in-
kind’ or financial. They account for a key part of the non-state resources 
mobilized and reinvested in the operation of the justice system. Hence, 
in addition to the officials, the users of the justice system participate in 
‘making the state work’. Reliance on litigants and defendants is one of the 
strategic options taken by magistrates when faced with the ‘absence’ of 
the state. To deal with certain emergencies, such as repairing the District 
Court’s only vehicle, the court officials dip into the material placed under 
seal for the resources they require. (The material placed under seal refers 
to any material or financial object confiscated in the course of a legal dis-
pute and bearing the seal of the court or the bailiff who affixed the seal.) 
This is an infringement of the law, which forbids all use of material under 
seal placed at the disposal of the justice system.
Getting on with Local Administrative Authorities
The relationship between judicial professionals and local administrative 
authorities can vary according to the community, but also according to 
the level of the material constraints faced by the magistrates on a daily 
basis. In his account of his experience as a judge in a secondary town in 
the region of Tahoua (in the north of Niger), R.O. stresses:
In Bouza . . . at the level of these jurisdictions, land disputes are very com-
mon, and the majority of the time, it is necessary to travel to the location 
involved. You have no car, so you are forced to go to the administrative 
authority in order to obtain a vehicle from another department so that you 
can carry out your duties. And this is much easier when you have a good 
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relationship with the administrative authority in question. Because if you 
don’t get on with the departmental prefect or his subordinates, when you 
request a vehicle to travel to the site in question, he’ll tell you that there is 
no vehicle (Deputy General, Zinder Court of Appeal, February 2007).
For the judges, ‘getting on’ with the local administrative authority appears 
to be the contextual norm in courts located in the provinces far from 
the central administration. This reflects a dimension of power relations 
between the administrative authorities with the power to assign vehicles 
to all departments and the magistrate who does not have the resources 
necessary to carry out his job. It is worth noting that in the provinces, 
technical services, beyond those of the judicial system, are placed within 
the administrative jurisdiction of the Prefect or the Governor. Based on 
the local administrative hierarchy, the heads of the services are required 
to comply with the orders of the administrative authority. 
Exceeding the Official Hours of Work
In the name of the ‘efficacy’ of the service, judicial professionals (mag-
istrates and clerks) do not always adhere to the official timetable of the 
service. Their works spills over into their free time (in the evenings and at 
weekends). This failure to observe the regular hours of service is common 
practice in public services in Niger. According to the new civil service 
timetables introduced in 2007, the working day ends at 4 pm on Mon-
days to Thursdays and at 1 pm on Fridays. These guidelines are rarely 
adhered to by the magistrates, who regularly remain at work until after 
8pm. They dedicate a proportion of their personal time to state work. 
According to the President of Zinder Higher District Court, this practice 
of unpaid overtime is commonplace. Without actually complaining of his 
situation, he stated that he ‘often works until 8pm, although the working 
day ends at 4pm.’ The same phenomenon may be observed among the 
clerks, notably at the office of the clerk of civil and commercial affairs 
Niamey Higher District Court.
We should really have at least four clerks here but there are only two of 
us, as you can see. The magistrates are equally overwhelmed with their 
workload. We have practically no private life. Sometimes we are even in the 
office until 3pm on Sundays!
Q: These extra hours are not considered working hours?
R: No! [but] there’s the efficiency of the work to be considered. For example, 
if you miss a beat in the processing of one hearing, when the documents 
begin to accumulate, it’s over, you can’t catch up. As I have some free time 
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I might as well update them (M. civil clerk, Niamey Higher District Court, 
2007).
Two clerks carry out the work normally assigned to four. In other words, 
they must dedicate twice as much time to their work. This means sacrific-
ing some of their personal time in order to ‘make progress’ on the pending 
files.
An Informal Postal Delivery System
The delivery of mail is an example of the ordered informality of the func-
tioning of the judicial system. Since the state stopped providing the courts 
with postage stamps, the magistrates make use of the public transport 
courier service to communicate with each other. These couriers make 
many stopovers before arriving at their destination. The judges sometimes 
use their influence to ‘impose’ the duty of delivery on public transport 
workers. For their part, the workers volunteer to ‘be of service’, wishing 
both to help and to create a good relationship with the judge. The use of 
the transport workers has become commonplace in the country’s prov-
inces. Magistrates are aware that the documents may get lost sometimes, 
however they believe that this is the only option available to them for 
sending and receiving mail. 
The magistrates do not evade the question as to the risks presented by 
this form of communication. They discuss it but, in their view, they ‘have 
no alternative’. Gayakoye (2005), at the time a judge in the judicial sector 
of Arlit, describes the scale of the risks involved in this informal postal 
delivery system in the journal of the Independent Union of the Magis-
trates of Niger (Syndicat autonome des magistrats du Niger, SAMAN):
Instead of being sent via the postal service, summonses, notifications, docu-
ments, and appeal and assize files are transported across the country by 
brave citizens. These letters are transferred from hand to hand at each 
vehicle’s terminus until they reach their destination . . . Sometimes, the last 
bearer forgets the letter and passes by its destination and does not remem-
ber it until he has reached Sokoto (Nigeria) or Malanville (Benin) (Gayakoye 
2005: 17).
The use of public transport vehicles has mixed results. On the one 
hand, it is a local palliative solution that facilitates correspondences 
not only between jurisdictions, but also between judges and defendants 
in the absence of both a reliable postal service and a supply of stamps in 
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the courts. On the other hand, as the magistrates are all too aware, these 
inventive practices constitute a real threat to the independence of the 
judicial system:
Q: Surely if you negotiate a service, that negotiation implies a chain of . . .
R: An element of our independence is lost in this way. You can’t negotiate 
with a certain service in order to make photocopies for your service. If an 
employee or head of this service has a problem tomorrow, he will come 
to you with it and you’ll be obliged to treat him with leniency. The favour 
must be returned (I.L., investigating judge at Zinder District Court, Febru-
ary 2007)
Judges and the State: An Ambivalent Relationship
The magistrates’ discourse reflects the way they perceive the state. They 
construct an image of the state regarding ‘what the state does’ against the 
backdrop of the failure of the state to honour its obligations. With this 
image in mind, they define their relationship with the state and their place 
within the state’s structure. For the magistrates, there are two dimensions 
to this representation of the state.
The state is judged with reference to its ability to provide the resources 
necessary for the functioning of the judicial system. This dimension 
became evident when the magistrates spoke of their working conditions. 
They have a negative perception of the state. Their discourse reveals a 
distance between them and the state:
Q: As a judge, as a man of the law, what place do you see yourself as occupy-
ing within the structure of the state?
R: In my opinion, we should look to the Constitution to answer that ques-
tion. There are three powers: the executive power, legislative power and 
judicial power and, honestly, even if something is recorded as official policy, 
it does not mean it is respected. The judicial system may be seen as the poor 
relative, because I cannot compare myself to a member of parliament or a 
minister today. . . . A minister drives around in a black car [an official recog-
nition of his status, OH], embossed with the crest of the Republic. Where is 
the judge’s vehicle? Not all magistrates have one, by a long shot. The Head of 
court and the President of the court and some others may have vehicles. But 
go and ask them how they manage to pay for the fuel, and ask also whether 
among all these magistrates any one of them receives allowances for accom-
modation, electricity etc. I pay my own electricity and water bills. Ministers 
and deputies do not have to shoulder these expenses themselves. In reality, 
168 oumarou hamani
the three powers are not equal although the Constitution has conferred us 
with the same powers. In reality this is not the case. In reality, Ministers 
have more resources (E.M., judge, Niamey Higher District Court, November 
2007).
E.M.’s testimonial expresses a sense of abandonment by the state stem-
ming from the lack of resources allocated to the judges to facilitate the 
fulfilment of their duties. With reference to primary teachers in Benin, 
Bierschenk speaks of a ‘breach of moral contract by the state’ (Bierschenk 
2009; see also Bierschenk in this volume). In the case of judges in Niger, 
their complaints are not followed by an ‘exit’ from the service (one strategy 
often chosen by teachers). In the courts they display a kind of resilience—
the magistrates do not resort to suffering or complaining about the lack 
of resources. Instead, they attempt to work within a hostile environment 
and within the limitations they face in the performance of their duties, 
mobilizing networks outside of the state in order to ‘make the state work’ 
(an alternative strategy also adopted by other public servants). Far from 
giving in, the magistrates overcome the difficult conditions in which they 
are forced to work, sometimes by mobilizing personal resources:
When I need to travel for work, I take my own car to go and assess a situ-
ation . . . If I take my own car for a case, I must pay for my own petrol. The 
state will not pay my expenses to go to see a house or field which is the 
subject of a lawsuit . . . The state really ought to provide me with the means 
to exercise my duties. It does not do that very often, which can give rise to 
certain situations, and then people say that the judge is causing problems! I 
have a laptop computer of my own and a printer, and I paid for them out of 
my own pocket. The state gives me nothing for this and I pay for the ink. I 
often provide copies myself for the litigants and defendants! (E.M., judge at 
Niamey District Court, November 2007).
These excerpts of interviews carried out in Niamey reveal the frustra-
tion experienced by this judge. He points out the discrepancy between 
the principle of the tripartite separation of powers as outlined by the 
Constitution and the discrimination experienced by the judicial sector. 
A discourse of this nature with its tone of ‘protest’ is indicative of the 
general ambivalence of the position which this judge believes he occupies 
in the machinery of the state. While asserting his status as a ‘represen-
tative of judicial power’, a constitutive power of the state, he also feels 
aggrieved and against the background of comparing his actual status to 
that of a minister (executive power) or of member of parliament (legisla-
tive power), accuses “the state” to do not perform its duties.
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It is worth noting that in this type of discourse, popular within the 
courts, there is a semantic confusion between the concept of the state 
and that of executive power. In claiming that “the state really ought to 
provide me with the means to exercise my duties”, E.M. is referring to 
the executive power which draws up the budget and distributes resources 
among the services of the state. ‘The state’ he evokes is here reduced to 
the government, whose mission is to mobilize resources and ensure that 
certain policies are implemented, in this case, judicial policy.
The feeling of outsider status expressed by magistrates with regard to 
the state is explicitly present in the frequently recurring phrase that ‘the 
state has failed us, we’re trying to do something about it.’ This sentiment 
is roughly equivalent to the idea of substituting for the state. The magis-
trates justify their own actions. They understand their actions as a way of 
supplementing the state whose deficiencies need to be compensated for.
Q: How do you feel when you are dealing with these specialists [ judicial 
experts]?
R: I don’t feel culpable in any real sense as this is not our fault. We don’t 
need a registered psychiatrist to tell us that this is not our fault; somewhere 
along the way the state has failed but we’re trying as best we can to make do 
(investigating judge, Zinder Higher District Court, February 2007).
At the same time, the judges clearly also see themselves as representatives 
of the state:
Q: When you say that you are doing this for the state, that the state should 
provide you with resources, what exactly do you mean by the word state?
R: To define the state, you must refer to the Constitution; there are three 
powers which constitute the state. The state is the sum total of them. We 
represent the state to a certain extent (E.M., judge, Niamey Higher District 
Court).
The end of the interview summed up all of the ambivalence and complex-
ity that characterizes E.M’s representation of the state, and particularly 
his place in relation to the state. The judge uses two distinct registers to 
express his links to the state. He considers himself sometimes as exterior 
to the state when speaking of the resources he needs to do his job prop-
erly, but sometimes he is one with the state, of which he considers himself 
a representative and an enforcer of the law. The concept of the state is not 
fixed in the minds of the judges; it is ambivalent and varies according to 
the register being used. 
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Conclusion: Circumventing the Rule of Law in the Interest  
of Judicial Efficiency
‘Practical inventiveness’ appears to be an interpretive key that can be 
used to unlock the general question of the discrepancy between prac-
tice and regulation. This discrepancy has been analyzed in studies on the 
delivery of goods and public services by public administrations in Sub-
Saharan African states (Bierschenk 2008; Olivier de Sardan 2004; Blundo 
2003b; Darbon 2001). These studies focused on the misappropriation of 
public funds by state officials for their personal ends, which contributes 
to the weakening of the state. However, the results of my study show that 
the reality is rather more ambivalent. Without disregarding corruption, 
I conclude that certain conduct may contribute to the alleviation of the 
state’s shortcomings and allow the public service to function despite its 
limitations. Officials refer to “palliative norms” in order to make the state 
work. This recalls Blundo’s (2011: 438; and this volume) research on the 
water and forestry services of Senegal and Niger where the water and for-
estry officials “buy their own uniforms and sometimes even make their 
own trimmings”, e.g. the very symbols of their state functions. Hence, the 
analysis of ‘inventive practices’ reveals the blurred boundaries between 
the formal and informal, between the state and non-state. The lack of for-
mal state resources can be compensated by a range of informal non-state 
resources, which civil servants may mobilize to carry out their duties. 
First, non-state resources originate in part from the personal initiative 
of the magistrates, who dip into their own salaries to equip themselves 
with materials for work or to fund their travel in the case of land disputes. 
Second, the resources mobilized by the magistrates also originate from a 
variety of private actors. The magistrates sometimes obtain photocopies, 
office supplies and vehicles for field trips from development aid projects. 
They also negotiate office supplies from local businesses while waiting for 
the release of their allocated funding. Private transport services are also 
called on to ensure the conveyance of mail between the courts and the 
central administration at the Ministry of Justice. Third, also the people 
involved in court proceedings pay for the provision of certain judicial ser-
vices, such as the issuing of civil status documents or trips made by judges 
in the case of land property disputes.
While these practices render the boundary between state and non-state 
porous and fluid, formal boundaries within the state are also constantly 
breached. For resources for judicial purposes, more often than not, have 
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to be obtained from the administrative authorities (governors, prefects) 
who enjoy considerable powers in the provinces. Their ability to control 
the vehicles of the technical services makes them actors with whom the 
magistrates must cooperate. The functional relationships established in 
this way are informal and are not regulated by official documents; in fact, 
they run counter to the official norm of the separation of constitutional 
powers. But they involve local initiatives by magistrates and local admin-
istrative, by which they assure a minimum public service.
The judicial system operates thanks to a combination of public 
resources allocated by the central state and ‘private’ resources which the 
magistrates are able to negotiate not only with external actors, but also, 
so to speak, with themselves. This combination generates new dynamics 
in the judicial system’s relationship with its social environment. It decom-
partmentalizes the justice system and, in such a context, the capacity of 
the judicial system to function resides in the scope and depth of the net-
work which its managers negotiate, and above all, in their willingness to 
serve the state and to place its needs before their own (Bierschenk in this 
volume). These numerous forms of ‘support’ admittedly enable the courts 
to function, however they also highlight the structural dependence of the 
judicial administration on its external environment.
In conclusion, inventive practices redefine the vertical relationships 
between the magistrates and the state. From the very moment that state 
officials develop and mobilize extra-professional networks to access 
resources, they distance themselves from the centralized state, which can 
no longer control them. State resources cease to constitute the sole means 
of regulating judicial operations. Non-state means of regulation are put 
in place, which are linked to the networks constructed by the state offi-
cials. In appealing to actors outside of the state structure for resources, the 
state officials participate in the creation and reinforcement of a system of 
rules separate from that of the state itself. Sociability, affinity, solidarity 
and reciprocity become the framework of ‘practical’ action in place of the 
‘official’ framework supported by impersonal rules which—according to 
Weber (see Bierschenk and Olivier de Sardan in their introduction to this 
volume)—are supposed to govern the functioning of public administra-
tions. These palliative delivery modes of functioning reinforce the plu-
rality of norms. This in turn contributes to the limitation of the central 
state’s capacity to control the conduct of its civil servants. 
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“I TAKE AN OATH TO THE STATE, NOT THE GOVERNMENT”:  




Emmanuel Zuwera, a retired career diplomat, entered the Ghanaian Civil 
Service in 1969. Serving in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs since 1971, he 
was posted to a variety of embassies in Africa and Europe, with intermit­
tent periods back in Accra, and eventually rose to the rank of a Minis­
ter, the highest administrative grade in the Foreign Service. Zuwera has 
worked under governments of different ideological orientations. When I 
first interviewed him in 1989, he commented on the challenges that the 
repeated regime changes had presented for his career, and insisted that 
a civil servant is supposed to loyally serve every regime that comes in. This 
is what I was taught. And because you are not supposed to be biased in your 
political thinking, it doesn’t matter whether it is a socialist or a conservative 
government.2
In a more recent interview after his retirement, Zuwera told me one of 
the stories that must have circulated among his colleagues at the time. 
During the early days of the Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) 
1 A first draft of this paper was presented in the seminar series of the Department of 
Anthropology and African Studies, Mainz University; for a more detailed version, see Lentz 
(2010). I thank my colleagues at the department, and particularly Thomas Bierschenk, for 
their helpful comments. Research for this paper, conducted in 2006−07, was made pos­
sible by the VolkswagenStiftung­funded project ‘States at Work’; earlier field work in the 
Upper West Region was financed by grants by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft. A 
sabbatical year (2008−09) at the W.E.B. Du Bois Institute for African and African American 
Research and the Committee on African Studies, Harvard University, provided the oppor­
tunity to analyse my interviews and write up the findings. I am grateful to the Fulbright 
Foundation for supporting my stay in Cambridge with a travel fellowship. Thanks also go 
to the Institute of African Studies at the University of Ghana to which I was affiliated as 
a research associate, and to my many Dagara colleagues, friends, and adopted family who 
have supported me during my many years of research in Ghana. Because I have not yet 
been able to get an authorisation from all my interview partners for the quotes used in 
this text, I have decided to anonymise their names.
2 Interview with Emmanuel Zuwera, Bonn­Meckenheim, 2 Aug. 1989.
© Carola Lentz, 2014 | doi: 10.1163/9789004264960_008
This is an open access chapter distributed under the terms of the CC BY­NC 4.0 license.
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government under Jerry Rawlings, Zuwera related, one of the Foreign Ser­
vice directors was removed from office because in his welcome address to 
the young men who had just been sent to his department, he told them 
“that their loyalty was to the state and not to any government”. This can­
did avowal of the classical professional ethics of the civil service effec­
tively cost the outspoken diplomat his job.3 Zuwera fully subscribed to 
the director’s understanding of the duties of a worthy civil servant and to 
the idea of a moral contract sealed between the state and the officer. ‘ The 
rule of the civil servant’, he explained, ‘is that we should be neutral so that 
we are able to give our best to our governments. . . . I serve the state. . . . We 
take an oath to the state, we don’t take an oath to the government’.4
Political neutrality, professionalism, and commitment to the welfare of 
the nation: these are the basic pillars of the professional ethics that all 
Ghanaian civil and public servants whom I interviewed endorse. They dif­
fer in their motivations to join the public service and their career trajec­
tories, but unanimously share this Weberian ideal­type image of a worthy 
bureaucrat and well­functioning public institutions. They believe that the 
state is distinct from the current government. And many told me stories 
like Zuwera’s tale of the heroic director who suffered the consequences for 
upholding these ideals, or of related conflicts they themselves had faced 
when confronting ‘nepotism’. While admitting that it was sometimes nec­
essary to mobilise their ‘networks’ in order to enter the public service, 
they were adamant that ideally only a high standard of qualification, ‘hard 
work’ and dedicated service towards the common good should determine 
public service careers. 
In this chapter, I explore such normative statements and narratives that 
feature role models or castigate discrimination and patronage. I argue that 
these ideals and stories create moral boundaries and support an ‘esprit de 
corps’ of dedicated public servants. Such “boundary work” (Lamont 1992: 
1−14) often invokes stereotypical images of opportunistic or corrupt politi­
cians, or of less qualified and uncommitted civil servants, against which 
the interviewees set off the group of highly motivated, competent and 
honest administrators to which they aspire to belong. These stereotypes, 
in turn, are often associated with ethnic and religious distinctions, and 
I will discuss how such particularist identities are mobilised in the con­
struction of an universalist ethos of public service.
3 Interview with Emmanuel Zuwera, Accra, 13 Feb. 2007.
4 Interview 13 Feb. 2007.
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My discussion is based on a case study of thirteen public servants 
from Ghana’s Upper West Region who have entered government service 
between the late 1960s and the late 1990s, and, in the case of my older 
interviewees, have risen to top positions in the civil or public service. The 
chapter explores how my interviewees’ career trajectories and work expe­
riences in the public service have changed over the decades, and how 
these changes, in turn, have influenced their images of the state, pub­
lic service and the ideal administrator. Most of these men, with whom I 
conducted in­depth biographical interviews in 2006 and 2007, sometimes 
following up on initial encounters in the late 1980s, were among the first 
educated members of their extended families. My sample is biased in that 
I am dealing not with street­level bureaucrats, but members of the upper 
echelons of the public service, with successful career­makers, not ‘losers’, 
and with people from a specific region. Northern Ghana, and the Upper 
West in particular, is, until today, generally regarded as an economically 
and politically marginalised region. This regional background plays an 
important role for my interviewees’ careers in and perceptions of the 
public service. ‘Marginalised’ people who believe that they have to work 
very hard to gain entry into an institution tend to identify strongly with 
the latter’s ideals and official norms. An analysis of their experiences and 
‘boundary work’ can thus throw a particularly interesting light on broader 
questions of the construction of professional ethics in the public service. 
By focussing on the administrators and their perspectives, like all the 
other authors of this book I hope to contribute to the renewed sociology of 
(African) bureaucracy that Jean Copans (2001) has recently called for in an 
article whose title provocatively suggests that former studies have treated 
‘the African state’ as if it worked without bureaucrats. There are only few, 
mainly historical, studies on African administrators, and virtually none 
ask how professional ethics are generated, disseminated and upheld.5 One 
may object that it is naïve, if not misleading, to study what public servants 
say about professional ethics and official norms because the institutional 
framework in which they work is so thoroughly structured by neopatri­
monial logics that no administrator can escape its dictates. One could 
5 Robert Price (1975) has conducted a survey among Ghanaian civil servants in the late 
1960s that I will discuss below; for examples of historical research on African administra­
tive careers, see Eckert (2007 and this volume) and Lawrance et al. (2006). Haruna’s (2008) 
discussion of public service ethics in Ghana develops a “transcultural” normative model 
of how the administration’s integrity should be based on a traditional “community ethos”, 
but is not based on any empirical study of public servants.
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thus contend that my interviewees simply put up a façade of universalist 
ethics to camouflage their ‘real’ actions, that are in fact guided by par­
ticularistic interests and clientelist ties. However, this is, on all accounts, 
a far too simplistic approach. On the one hand, as Jean­Pierre Olivier de 
Sardan (2004, 2008 and in this volume) has convincingly argued, it is not 
sufficient to simply point to the difference between official norms and 
observed behaviour, and then explain away the latter with broad, gener­
alising concepts such as neopatrimonialism and clientelism. Rather, we 
need to engage in a detailed analysis of the “practical norms” that do in 
fact guide the pragmatics of administrators’ day­to­day conduct of busi­
ness. On the other hand—and this is the focus of this chapter—we should 
also pay more attention to the “official norms” as phenomena sui generis, 
and analyse how public administrators produce, defend, or modify them.
As Ayee (2001: 1) contends in his analysis of the recent civil service 
reforms in Ghana, “the motivation and involvement of civil servants 
themselves” are particularly relevant “in a bureaucratic system that is too 
weak to impose central top­down reform”. In other words: the less coer­
cive power a state bureaucracy commands in imposing a specific work 
discipline on its members, the more its efficiency depends on how reliably 
administrators perform their role, as well as how willing and able they 
are to improvise and innovate in the interest of attaining organisational 
goals. This, in turn, requires bureaucrats who are not only well trained, 
but also committed to serving the public interest. The ways in which they 
have come to identify with and adopt official norms, and how such norms 
affect their own and their colleagues’ actions thus matters. And, I would 
argue, this is particularly true for public servants who, like most of my 
interviewees, occupy top positions in their institutions and control, or at 
least attempt to influence, the actions of often numerous colleagues and 
subordinates.
In what follows, I will first briefly sketch some aspects of the changing 
institutional context in which my interlocutors’ careers developed, and 
give an overview of the educational background of the public servants 
whom I interviewed. I will then discuss their experiences and views with 
respect to two major themes: firstly, the motivation to join the public 
service and the factors they identify as determining their own and other 
public servants’ career trajectories; secondly, their ideas about the state, 
their own role and their professional ethics. Finally, I will look at the ideo­
logical and social resources that they mobilise in their quest for a dignified 
professional life.
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The Ghanaian Public Service: Some Facts and Figures
Up until the Second World War, the civil service of the Gold Coast Colony 
and the Ashanti and Northern Territories Protectorates was a rather small 
institution. In 1931, there were altogether 866 senior posts, and just about 
20 of them occupied by Africans. Even in 1948, when the total number of 
senior appointments rose to somewhere between 1,300 and 1,400, only 98 
of them were held by Africans (Greenstreet 1963). The Africanisation of 
the civil service gained momentum after the election of Kwame Nkrumah 
as Prime Minister in 1951. Between 1952 and 1960, the ranks of the senior 
civil service (posts paying over £ 680 per annum) swelled from 1,970 to 
3,515 posts, and the percentage of Africans among these civil servants rose 
from 31% to nearly 79%. In absolute numbers, the increase of Africans 
employed in the upper ranks of the civil service was even more impres­
sive, from 620 African civil servants in 1952 to 2,766 in 1960 (Greenstreet 
1963).6
Initially, it was not easy to find enough qualified African personnel to 
staff senior civil service positions. Only from the mid­1960s onwards did 
Ghana produce her own university graduates (Daniel 1997−98). Before, 
degrees had to be awarded by external examiners from the University of 
London; students interested in subjects other than those of the liberal 
arts had to venture abroad, mainly to Britain or, in a few cases, to the 
US or Canada. Senior public servants had to be recruited either among 
these Ghanaians who had studied abroad or, more often, among gradu­
ates of teacher training colleges who were then trained on the job or at 
the Ghana Institute of Management and Public Administration.
Until well into the 1980s, the public service continued to grow, par­
ticularly in the junior ranks, but also with regard to senior positions. For 
Ghana’s university graduates this meant secure career opportunities. In 
the early 1960s, more than 80% of the secondary school leavers went into 
teaching or “clerical duties”, mainly in the public sector, and thus found 
some form of government employment (Foster 1965: 284−90). Among uni­
versity graduates, this trend must have been just as pronounced. Job secu­
rity, quasi automatic promotion, relatively high salaries with numerous 
fringe benefits such as access to government bungalows, good health care 
6 For more details on the development of the Ghanaian public service, see Lentz (2010: 
6−8).
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and easy credit, as well as the prestige that went along with a senior posi­
tion in the public service made the latter an attractive option for many 
young university leavers.
The “good days of the civil service”, as Ayee (2001: 2−3) refers to this 
period, lasted from the late 1950s until the mid­1970s, when, due to 
repeated political upheavals and a massive and prolonged economic cri­
sis, the Ghanaian public service faced increasing problems. The structural 
problems that Ayee enumerates include logistical shortcomings, i.e. over­
centralisation and excessive ‘red tape’; substantial overstaffing and uncon­
trolled recruitment at the junior level, while senior grades lacked qualified 
personnel due to the increasing ‘brain drain’; grossly inadequate wages 
and narrow increment levels; and, consequently, low work morale and 
lack of incentives to deliver competent service. Particularly senior pub­
lic servants faced a dramatic decline in salaries. In 1984, the real salary 
earned by a high­ranking administrative officer dropped to 10% of the 
1977 income, and even five years later, during economic recovery, would 
only reach 43% of the 1977 level. In short, from the late 1970s onwards, it 
became much less attractive for well­trained and high aspiring Ghanaians 
to work as public administrators. On the other hand, however, increas­
ing general unemployment and job competition in other sectors of the 
economy still made the public service an important option for many uni­
versity graduates.
First attempts to restructure the civil service were initiated in the 
late 1960s and mid­1970s, but political instability and successive regime 
changes seriously hampered the implementation of the suggested reforms. 
Renewed reform initiatives followed during the early years of the Rawl­
ings regime, but it was only towards the late 1980s, in the context of the 
Structural Adjustment Programme, that public sector reforms were seri­
ously tackled. The first initiative was the Civil Service Reform Programme 
(1987−1993) that aimed at an overall improvement of the effectiveness and 
quality of public service delivery, but ended up concentrating mainly on 
the downsizing of the staff and a reform of the salary structure (Ayee 2001: 
22−23). Figures are notoriously unreliable, but by the end of the 1990s, 
altogether 50,000 staff had been retrenched from the civil service and the 
Education Service, and the civil service was cut down to approximately 
91,000 employees (Ayee 2001: 10−12, 25). Because the first reform initia­
tive was unable to achieve its farther reaching goals, a new programme 
was set up in 1995, namely the Civil Service Performance Improvement 
Programme, that aimed at reorganising salary structures and improving 
service delivery by reforming the guidelines for career progression and 
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training. It involved senior staff in the reform effort, and introduced 
instruments of self­appraisal, management by objectives, surveys among 
beneficiaries of the services, and other measures in the vein of New Public 
Management programmes. In 1996, ‘reform’ was made a continual exer­
cise by establishing a Civil Service Reform Coordinating Unit and a Com­
mittee on Administrative Reforms.
Robert Price’s survey among Ghanaian civil servants in the late 1960s 
revealed that job security was one of the major incentives for embarking 
on a public service career, and that promotion worked quasi automati­
cally mainly along lines of seniority, resulting in a “practically age­graded” 
civil service (1975: 188). The dominance of “high security careers, shaped 
by length of service and seniority” (Ayee 2001: 31) continued until well 
into the 1990s. It is only in recent years that the efforts to re­orient civil 
service careers towards higher remuneration coupled with performance­
based evaluation have begun to be felt on the ground, and that the new 
philosophy of ‘meritocracy’ and customer orientation gradually has taken 
hold among some of the senior staff (Ayee 2001: 37−38). This trend was 
clearly noticeable in the emphasis that some of my interviewees laid on 
service delivery, efficiency and achievement while lamenting that their 
reform enthusiasm was hampered by entrenched structures of promotion 
by seniority and by the role ‘networks’ and patronage played in recruit­
ment and postings. How the retrenchment exercise and changes in career 
opportunities are reflected in my interviewees’ cases is the question to 
which I now shall turn.
Public Servants from the Upper West Region  
and the ‘Northern Factor’
My interviews with public servants are part of a more comprehensive 
study of several generations of educated men who hail from the former 
Lawra District (now subdivided into the Jirapa, Lawra, Nandom and 
Lambussie Districts) and work in a wide variety of professions.7 My first 
7 I follow here Karl Mannheim’s (1952) definition of generations as communities whose 
members have been “born within the same historical and cultural region” and participate 
in “the common destiny of this historical and social unit” (ibid.: 303). Departing from a 
genealogical as well as a biological understanding of ‘naturally’ succeeding generations, 
Mannheim suggests that generations crystallise around the historical experiences of a par­
ticular group, garnered mainly during their youth, which distinguish it from other groups. 
In my case study, the primary factor distinguishing elite generations is the various phases 
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biographical interviews in the late 1980s focused on members of the earli­
est generation of the educated elite, nearly all of whom have since then 
passed away.8 These ‘pioneers’ went to the area’s first colonial and mis­
sionary schools that were opened from 1935 onwards. They worked as 
teachers, nurses and clerks for the colonial administration, and generally 
remained within the region.
The second generation of highly educated men whom I interviewed in 
the late 1980s, and then again more recently, can be described as ‘achiev­
ers’. They entered school after the Second World War and profited from 
the expanding higher educational opportunities as well as the backing of 
their teachers and sometimes also their families. Many of them studied 
in the newly opened Ghanaian universities or abroad, and they usually 
found employment outside their home region. Their careers were the most 
upwardly mobile, and they entered a much broader range of professions 
than their predecessors, namely the public administration, institutions 
of secondary and tertiary education, the medical and legal professions, 
senior positions in the army, and the Catholic church.9
Many members of the third generation of highly educated men, who 
graduated from secondary school after the mid­1970s, have educated par­
ents and were born and raised in the cities. But due to the general eco­
nomic and political crises of the late 1970s and 1980s, they generally faced 
more difficulties in accessing high­quality education and have been con­
fronted with growing competition on the job market. Their perspectives 
differed markedly from those of the second generation, and most of them 
expressed a clear sense of belonging to a different, younger generation 
that faced new challenges. In order to succeed in their professional lives, 
they have to rely more heavily on vertical patronage and become adept 
in making broader national and international contacts. These factors have 
become even more important for the emerging careers of a fourth genera­
tion of highly educated Upper Westerners who have graduated from uni­
versity in recent years and encounter considerable difficulties in entering 
the job market.
in which the educational infrastructure developed in North­Western Ghana, where schools 
were generally established much later than in the South.
8 For some results, see Lentz (2006: 199−209, 228−233). For a study on educated women 
from Lawra District, see Behrends (2000a, 2000b); on the trajectories of first­generation 
educated men from Southern Ghana, see Miescher (2005).
9 For a discussion of the second generation of educated men from Lawra District, 
see Lentz (1994); specifically on home ties and the role of funerals as arena of elite self­ 
representation, see Lentz (2009). See also Behrends and Lentz (2012).
 professional ethics of ghanaian public servants 183
The educational and professional trajectories of ‘second­generation’ 
public servants from the old Lawra District who entered government ser­
vice before the mid­1980s and whose careers I discuss in this chapter are 
relatively smooth and straightforward. Careers were facilitated by the high 
quality of secondary school education in the North, the increasing intake 
of the universities and, finally, the growing or at least steady demand for 
university­trained personnel in the public service. While some of these 
early public service entrants put in a stint of teaching between secondary 
school and university, most continued more or less straight into university 
after passing their GCE (General Certificate of Education) A­level exams. 
All studied liberal arts or social science subjects. This actually implied 
that they had few professional choices besides joining the civil service or 
embarking on a teaching career. Some of my older interviewees also stud­
ied law, but only after they had already joined the public service.10 The 
transition from university to public service was usually uninterrupted, and 
most were recruited into the public service as soon as they received their 
bachelor degrees. Those who had to perform national service11 after grad­
uation usually served in the public sector institutions that later recruited 
them. None of them was older than twenty­eight, and by the time they 
retire, members of this generation of public servants have usually worked 
for more than thirty years in the public sector.
For later entrants into the public service, access to employment and 
regular promotions have been more difficult. Many of them also faced dif­
ficulties in organising their university education—a fact that is reflected 
in the higher age at which they eventually joined the public sector, namely 
in their early or even late thirties. Four of my six ‘third­generation’ inter­
viewees had to resit some of their A­level exams or sought alternative 
ways of accessing tertiary education. All had to work extremely hard to 
‘make it’ against all odds, and even those who gained immediate entry 
into university were faced with the disruptive developments of student 
strikes, task force exercises and university closures, particularly in the 
early 1980s and again in 1988. Members of this ‘third generation’ have 
had to struggle with the fact that the civil service in particular, but also 
10 For an overview of the sample and more details on my interviewees’ career trajecto­
ries, see Lentz (2010: 9−14).
11 The National Service scheme was established in 1973, and confirmed in 1982, and 
obliges all able­bodied Ghanaians between the ages of eighteen and forty to work for one 
or two years, depending on the candidates’ educational status, for the common good in a 
variety of employments, mainly in the public sector.
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other public sector institutions, were recruiting less new personnel while 
the expansion of tertiary education establishments has swollen the ranks 
of employment­seeking graduates. While some younger entrants were 
aided by the personal networks that they were able to build up during 
their national service, others went through a period of unemployment. 
Furthermore, an increasing number of this new generation of university 
graduates no longer aims exclusively at a public service career, but sees 
employment in the public sector as just one phase in their trajectory. Such 
considerations reflect, in turn, the trend that the public service no longer 
offers secure and relatively well­paid employment for large groups of uni­
versity graduates.
While most of the changes in civil service career trajectories discussed 
so far are probably also typical for many of my interviewees’ colleagues, 
regardless of their regional origins, the problems in accessing high­
quality secondary education are more specifically a Northern problem. 
In many respects, the highly educated men and women from the Upper 
West Region were ‘late­comers’ in the national arena. Unlike the coastal 
elite, they had no access to secondary school education before the 1950s, 
and unlike their Southern peers, no Northerner studied abroad before 
the newly independent Ghanaian universities opened their doors. Thus, 
when the civil service was expanded and ‘africanised’ in the 1950s and 
early 1960s, very few Northerners were available for recruitment for the 
senior ranks. This situation gradually changed when Tamale Government 
Secondary School, the first Northern secondary school to offer A­level 
courses, produced its first batch of sixth form graduates in 1960. Thus, 
when the first Ghanaian post­independence institutions of tertiary edu­
cation were established, Northern students were ready to participate in 
these new opportunities; and from the mid­ or late 1960s onwards, they 
could enter the senior grades of the public service.
However, university graduates from the North were very few. More 
generally, secondary school and university graduates from the Upper 
West, and more generally the North, were indeed “the fortunate few” 
(Clignet and Foster 1966). That they were often very successful in their 
studies and later careers is not as unusual as it may seem at first glance. 
As Foster (1980: 219) has pointed out, children from regions with under­
developed educational infrastructure had to overcome so many obstacles 
that they tended to be highly motivated and successful students. Or, in 
other words, the high selectivity of the educational system results in a 
larger percentage of ‘high achievers’ than is normal in situations with less 
restrictions to enrolment.
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High academic achievement alone, however, did not suffice for North­
ern graduates to enter the public service. Encouragement from friends 
and family and role models were also important factors. A central role 
in this respect was played by Abayifaa Karbo, from the Lawra chief ’s 
house, and later himself the paramount chief of Lawra. Born in 1927, he 
was among the first graduates of the Tamale Senior Boys School (later to 
become Tamale Government Secondary School), continued to the newly 
opened Tamale Teacher Training College and later returned to Lawra to 
teach. In the early 1950s, Karbo was drawn into politics, and represented 
the Lawra­Nandom constituency in the Ghanaian parliament until 1965 
when he was detained, as a member of the opposition to Nkrumah. While 
in Parliament, Karbo studied law, and was called to the bar—the first law­
yer from North­Western Ghana. After his release from prison in 1966, he 
served as a member of the Political Committee of the National Liberation 
Council government (1966−69). In 1969, he was appointed member, and 
soon afterwards chairman, of the Public Services Commission, an office 
that he held until 1977. It was in this capacity that Karbo was instrumen­
tal to the recruitment of Northerners into the public service. Not only 
did he actively propagate information about opportunities to work in the 
civil service and, during recruitment interviews, ensured that Northern­
ers were given a fair chance, but his very presence in this high­ranking 
office served as a source of encouragement for the younger generation of 
educated Northerners.
It is interesting, however, that a public service career apparently 
appealed exclusively to graduates from Catholic families who had gone 
through Catholic secondary schools. Due to the colonial educational poli­
cies, students in government­run institutions were usually recruited from 
chiefly families, and until well into the 1970s, this resulted in a bifurcated 
educational system—government and Catholic—and two groups of grad­
uates who generally pursued different careers.12 Catholics became priests, 
teachers or public servants; government school graduates often studied 
law or medicine, or they went into the army.13 One of the reasons why 
Catholics went into the public service rather than, for instance, into the 
12 See Lentz (2006: 133−137, 171−174) for more details on the government versus Catholic 
school divide, and the different educational goals.
13 That some of the Catholics studied at government­run schools for their sixth form 
was simply due to the fact that until the late 1970s none of the Catholic secondary schools 
in the North offered A­level exams. But even then, most of their secondary school training 
had been in the hands of priests and teachers approved of by the Catholic mission.
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medical field, may have been that in those early years Catholic schools 
generally offered a good liberal arts and language, but no strong science 
education. Studying liberal arts or social sciences were their best avail­
able options, and this qualified for a teaching or a public service career. 
This does not explain, however, why not more Catholics went into law, 
for instance, or why none of the government school graduates with a 
chiefly background applied for the civil service. It is likely that the Catho­
lic schools also imbued their graduates with a specific creed of rendering 
service to the common good that resonated well with a public service 
career. The educated chiefly offspring, on the other hand, tended to sub­
scribe to a leadership ideology that was not quite as service­oriented. Be 
that as it may, the Catholic background plays an important role for my 
interviewees’ understanding of their role and duties as public servants, 
and for their perspective on worthiness, ‘hard work’ and honesty.
“All along, I wanted to be an administrator”: 
Organisational Commitment and Career Motivation
A survey among more than four hundred Ghanaian civil servants that 
Robert Price (1975) conducted in 1968−69, found that more than two 
thirds would accept a job outside the public service, if it offered better 
income, and only 9% would recommend an intelligent young man to 
become a civil servant. Asked what they ‘liked’ about the civil service, 
more than 70% stated that they were attracted by the ‘security’ of a civil 
service career. Price (1975: 183) concluded that “Ghanaian civil servants . . .  
are overwhelmingly committed to the civil service in an instrumental 
sense; only a small portion manifest a commitment based on an identi­
fication with the goals which the organization could and allegedly does 
seek, such as the development of Ghana and public service, or on satis­
factions that are intrinsic to the role they are called on to perform”. How­
ever, these findings need to be taken with a grain of salt, for Price’s survey 
questions were at best rather naïve, if not outright biased. Moreover, his 
methodology did not allow him to capture the peculiar mixture of motiva­
tions that may well have characterised his respondents’ attitudes, nor was 
he able to acknowledge that motivations may change in the course of a 
professional career. As I will show below, in­depth biographical interviews 
can yield more nuanced results.
The security of civil service careers also figured prominently in my 
interviewees’ considerations why they sought employment in the public 
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service. This was true for both the older and the younger generation. But 
security was only one among several factors, and particularly the older 
generation invariably mentioned that they also had been attracted, for 
instance, by the “respect” which the Ghanaian public once accorded her 
public servants. As Peter Tangviel who entered the civil service in 1972 
narrated, “What attracted me into the civil service was the respect that 
the civil servants had at the time, particularly the administrative officer 
class.”14 He was not quite as impressed by the salaries paid to the officers, 
particularly when measured “against the responsibilities that one has to 
meet”, both in terms of his work load and the expectations that his wider 
rural family had for material support. But, he explained, 
I stayed on despite that bad salary because initially, for the first ten years, 
the situation . . . looked quite promising, the job was quite secure, and one 
was very optimistic that the economy would expand and you could have 
better opportunities or make it better still within the civil service. It hap­
pened not to have been it, after the tenth year. But then after ten years, 
getting out into a new place, you’d probably most likely go and meet your 
former colleagues and you will be a subordinate to them. So that was one 
thing that kept me back in the civil service all this while. The other one, too, 
of course is the general attitude of one not being sure of what the future 
holds for you.
Despite the fact that the conditions of service and salary levels improved 
in recent years, Tangviel would still not recommend his children and 
other young people to join the civil service; he would rather see them 
work in a private enterprise with higher remuneration. His pragmatic 
considerations of job security, income levels and lack of opportunities 
to change his career mid­way did not prevent Tangviel, however, from 
speaking quite enthusiastically about the challenges of his work in the 
ministry and the personal satisfaction he derived from honesty, integrity 
and loyal service.
Ivan Dometang’s reflections make particularly clear that Price’s sur­
vey method misses out on the important temporal dynamics of career 
motivations. Dometang remembered that his initial motivation of joining 
the public service in 1978 after his university studies was “just finding a 
job”, and since many of his peers had joined the civil service, “we also just 
followed”.15 However, as Dometang explained, “I wanted to do something 
14 Interview with Peter Tangviel, 10 Feb. 2007, Accra.
15 Interview with Ivan Dometang, 12 Feb. 2007, Accra.
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different, I didn’t want to go where most of my people were”, namely the 
administrative officers’ class. He decided to apply for the Internal Revenue 
Service, underwent the obligatory in­service training, and worked as tax 
administrators in various regions until he finally rose to become the Head 
of Operations of the collection of direct taxes in the entire country. He 
described vividly how he soon developed a strong interest in his work, 
and how “exciting”, “interesting” and “very engaging” his tasks have been 
all along. Raising taxes was providing the basis for the country’s develop­
ment, he believed, and thus his work was of utmost importance. 
For the younger generation, the security of a public service career seems 
to have lost nothing of its attraction. Ignacio Zaabaar, for instance, who 
finally secured employment with the Ghana Highways Authority after an 
extended period of unemployment, compared his peers’ opportunities 
with the career trajectories of the older generation and found that for the 
latter,
it was much easier for them to find a job. . . . the opportunities were there, 
much more than we have now. . . . Because the private sector is not too 
stable, everybody wants a stable job, [like in the public service] where when 
you are taken, it is very difficult for you to lose your job. . . . So that is why 
there is . . . that competition, the jobs are not enough for us. . . . It is becom­
ing more and more difficult by the day.16
At the same time, Ignacio Zaabaar, like Tangviel and Dometang, devel­
oped a strong intrinsic motivation, and derived satisfaction from “seeing 
after my duties”. “There is no way”, he proudly stated, “I will be given a 
task, and it will be half done. I must be very concentrated to do it com­
pletely, to the satisfaction of whoever has given me the assignment”.
Without any prompting from my side, most interviewees expressed 
such a strong commitment to their work. John Tangsege, for instance, 
who joined the police service in 1968 and later rose to become the director 
of the Bureau of National Investigation and Inspector General of Police, 
explained that as a young man he was attracted by the “respect” that 
police officers enjoyed “at that time” and by their “many privileges”. At 
the same time, he enjoyed telling me about the excitement of intelligence 
work and the unique opportunities “of seeing many different people and 
different directions” and acquiring “an all­round knowledge of nearly 
everything” that the police service provided.17 Charles Zaabaar, for his 
16 Interview with Ignacio Zaabaar, 2 Feb. 2007, Accra.
17 Interviews with John Tangsege, 24 and 30 Jan. 2007, Accra.
 professional ethics of ghanaian public servants 189
part, could have chosen a career as a lawyer outside the public service, 
but decided to join the Prison Service, where he had been posted during 
his national service. His superior had advised him that he “would have a 
future in Prison Service”, and could rise fast to the top ranks, and Zaabaar 
indeed made himself a name in the institution by building up its legal 
department, and finally became the service’s director general, not least 
due to the professionalism of his job performance.
More generally, even if my interviewees entered the public service 
because of down­to­earth considerations such as the availability of 
employment, job security, income levels and status, this does not mean 
that they did not also develop an intrinsic interest in their work. They 
were all proud of their professionalism, and although some would, with 
hindsight, not “travel the same road” again, all of them found satisfaction 
in performing their tasks with commitment and “excellence”. Further­
more, many expressed a sense of “serving the nation” and contributing to 
the public good through their professional work. Such nationalist commit­
ment, however, did not preclude a pragmatic interest in earning a decent 
income, or as Emmanuel Zuwera expressed it, tongue in cheek, “in serving 
your country, you also earn some money”.
There was only one member of the younger generation who expressed 
a decidedly instrumentalist attitude towards his work in the public ser­
vice. For Alexander Kuuyaa, a quantity surveyor who worked with private 
firms before joining the Ghana Health Service, his current employment 
was helping him to acquire the know­how and establish the contacts that 
he would later need to set up his own property investment and construc­
tion enterprise. He explicitly criticised the older generation of civil ser­
vants who were “always looking at job security” and had joined the civil 
service because they were “risk averse”.18 Alexander had always made it a 
point during his secondary school and university days to establish friend­
ships with peers beyond the narrow circles of the Dagara community, and 
thus exposed himself to other perspectives on making a career and earn­
ing one’s living. He felt that it was important to overcome the “inferiority 
complex” that was typical of many Northerners. Whether Alexander will 
serve as a role model for future generations of Dagara graduates is an 
open question, but he is certainly typical of the “business” orientation that 
some of my youngest interviewees outside the civil service expressed. At 
the same time, he fully subscribed to the ethics of professionalism, and 
18 Interview with Alexander Kuuyaa, 6 Feb. 2007, Accra.
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“hard work” and “excellence” that my other public­servant interviewees 
held in high esteem.
“Godfathers”, “Friends” and “Untouchables”:  
The Role of Patronage in Public Service Careers
Max Weber described bureaucracies as professional “machines” that 
achieve “technical superiority” (1978: 974−7). Bureaucracies need “experts 
and specialised knowledge” (1978: 1002), and the recruitment of personnel 
is therefore regulated by meritocratic principles and certified educational 
achievements (“Fachprüfungswesen”) (1978: 999). Similarly, promotion 
within the service follows, in principle, universalist rules, namely a fixed 
career trajectory (“Laufbahn”) through which the entrant moves accord­
ing to work experience, measured in terms of seniority, and intellectual 
qualification, determined through a system of examinations (1978: 963). 
Patronage or the purchase and use of public offices as a prebend are, in 
Weber’s eyes, characteristic of a feudal administration and “tend to loosen 
the bureaucratic mechanism” (1978: 967). 
The Ghanaian public service’s official norms correspond quite neatly to 
Weber’s ideal­typical description, and it was these norms that my inter­
viewees had in mind when discussing their own and their colleagues’ pro­
fessional trajectories. But they also developed ‘unofficial’ normative ideas 
about the (il)legitimacy of patronage and ‘friendship’ in public service 
careers that adapted these official norms to local realities of ethnic and 
political clientelism. In this section, I will first discuss my interviewees’ 
personal experiences of recruitment and promotion, and then explore 
their views on the changing role of patronage, networks and ethnicity.
Speaking about their own careers, all of my interviewees, across the 
generations, emphasised “hard work”, “intelligence” and “excellence” as 
decisive factors that allowed them to enter into, and progress in, the pub­
lic service. Most of my older interviewees prided themselves on not having 
relied on a “godfather” or “friend” in order to obtain employment in the 
public service. “Sacrificial and hard work”, loyalty and “intelligence” were, 
according to John Tangsege, the qualities that had made his career in the 
Police Service possible. Ivan Dometang, for his part, believed that his suc­
cessful career in the Internal Revenue Service was “earned by merit”.19
19 Interview with Ivan Dometang, 12 Feb. 2007, Accra.
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At the same time, Dometang felt that in addition to being hard­working 
and dedicated, “luck also has gone my way”. In a similar vein, Charles 
Zaabaar declared that he was “accidentally” drawn into the Prison Service, 
and that he was “lucky” and even did not quite “know what happened” 
that he eventually rose to the position of the service’s director general. All 
interviewees indeed believed that their professional success was owed to 
a combination of ‘hard work’ and ‘luck’. ‘Luck’ could mean, for instance, 
that a sympathetic superior ‘discovered’ the interviewee’s exceptional 
abilities; or it could refer to the fact that someone had to face few com­
petitors when applying for a position. The idea that success depended 
on both ‘merit’ and ‘luck’ was reflected in the language that my intervie­
wees employed: they combined an ‘active’ register (“I struggled hard”, “I 
was anxious to learn”, “I took advantage” etc.) with ‘passive’ constructions 
such as “I was nominated”, “I was sent”, or “I was asked”. ‘Luck’, in any 
case, was not the same as protection or patronage; it rather explained the 
fact that others who had been similarly hard­working were not as success­
ful as my interviewees. It was a metaphor that summarised the fact that it 
is never sufficient to be highly qualified and dedicated, but that one also 
needs opportunities and to be at the right place at the right time.20
All interviewees agreed, however, that the combination of opportuni­
ties and qualifications that could ‘move’ someone ‘up the career ladder’ 
did not suffice to bring a public servant to the very top positions in their 
respective institutions. In order to be appointed ambassador, for instance, 
from among the higher ranks of career diplomats, “you need a little bit of 
patronage, you need somebody powerful to help you get up”, Emmanuel 
Zuwera explained. This ‘patron’ does not necessarily have to be from one’s 
own ethnic group, he continued, “you just need a mentor, somebody who 
likes you and thinks you are a very hard­working officer, and who is in the 
position to guide you and take you along”.
When considering the different factors that played into top­level 
appointments, Charles Zaabaar, who had been ousted from his position 
as director general of the Prison Service, felt that his regional background 
had played an important role for his dismissal. Networks based on ethnic­
ity could have kept him in office, Zaabaar believed, but of equal impor­
tance for arriving at, and remaining in, top positions in the public service 
20 More generally on the conditions of ‘success’, see Gladwell (2008). For an extended 
discussion of the motif of ‘luck’ in the Dagara educated elite’s biographical narratives, see 
Lentz (2008).
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were party­political alliances and the ability to “survive intrigues” by 
knowing “the ins and the outs of the office”, having “informants” in the rel­
evant ministries and maintaining good contacts with the media.21 In other 
words, a ‘godfather’ alone was not sufficient; horizontal networks, based 
on ‘old boys’ associations, shared ethnicity or other linkages of friendship 
were just as important.
The older generation asserted that ethnicity could play a role for passing 
the bottleneck to very senior appointments, but they insisted that ethnic 
background had not mattered for their recruitment into the public service 
and for regular promotion. Interviewees from the younger generation, on 
the other hand, mentioned more often that ethnic background and, more 
generally, patronage played an important role in gaining access to the 
public service (like in Nigeria, cf. Willot in this volume). They attributed 
their own or their peers’ failure to enter a specific segment of the public 
service or to be promoted as rapidly as they thought they deserved to the 
increasing competition for public sector employment and their lack of a 
‘pivot’, a ‘godfather’ or some other useful ‘connection’. But just like their 
predecessors, the younger public servants explained their professional 
success by a combination of hard work, determination and ‘luck’. John 
Mwinyele’s thoughts on “godfathers” are a case in point:
some of us are basically here on the basis of merit [but others had a god­
father who supported them] . . . a godfather means you come in, maybe you 
have one of your bosses there who you are pet to, and then he keeps moving 
you, putting you where you want to be. Some of us didn’t come in with that 
kind of background. We just came in, and by virtue of the discharge of our 
responsibilities, we are where we are. . . . I don’t owe anything to anybody . . . 
I’m working hard to justify myself and where I should be.22
Mwinyele and other interviewees thus drew a boundary between ‘we’, 
the morally upright who did not rely on patronage, and ‘the others’ who 
did. Placing oneself in the group of the incorruptible ones stabilises self­
esteem and, in the long run, enhances job satisfaction as well as security. 
All interviewees argued, however, that competition for public service posi­
tions had increased, and thus made patronage and protection ever more 
important. John Mwinyele, for instance, felt that incidences of “tribalism” 
in the public sector were on the increase. Jessi Bonaventure Beyaa, too, 
asserted that “ethnicity, old­boyism, influence of maybe your parents, 
21 Interview with Charles Zaabaar, 19 Jan. 2007, Accra.
22 Interview with John Mwinyele, 29 Jan. 2007, Accra.
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political alliance or leaning would play a role in jobs right now” and that 
much depended on “the networks, associations, clubs that you belong 
to”.23 At the recruitment stage, ‘godfathers’ and ‘friends’ were needed, my 
interviewees explained, in order to receive information about job oppor­
tunities that were sometimes not publicly advertised, and to make sure 
that the selection committee did not ‘overlook’ a qualified candidate or 
conduct the recruitment interview in an unfair manner. Furthermore, 
patronage was often necessary in order to ‘follow up’ and make sure that 
the successful interview eventually resulted in actual employment. Pro­
motion within the service then usually followed “the normal channel”, as 
Ignacio Zaabaar put it. But a ‘godfather’ could help to be selected for some 
special training, including well­remunerated international courses, or to 
be awarded a study leave or other extras. And, as mentioned above, some 
sort of protection was regarded as necessary for passing the bottleneck to 
the superior positions in the respective service.
Interestingly, my interviewees invariably presented the increasing 
necessity for younger Northerners to rely on some form of patronage as 
an unfortunate, but basically legitimate reaction to the dominant and 
illegitimate nepotism by non­Northerners. The justification was tied to 
the status of Northerners as a disadvantaged minority. “I’ll call it nepo­
tism”, Ignacio Zaabaar explained with regard to the general trend in pub­
lic service recruitment and promotion. Access to “bottleneck positions” 
should definitely be based on merit, but in reality, “there is always a lot 
of lobbying”,
because everybody wants to help his brother, so when we all have the 
same qualification and he [the employer] now has a choice, he’ll definitely 
choose the brother. So for us who are from up there [Northern Ghana], . . . we 
are a minority, so when you come to nepotism, we are at a disadvantage.24
By the same logic, my older interlocutors who had risen to top positions 
in their respective services did not hesitate to admit that they acted as 
“patrons” and protectors of younger entrants from the North. Charles Zaa­
baar, for instance, related how he responded when he was questioned as 
to why he should have endorsed the employment of so many Northerners 
in the Prison Service:
23 Interview with Paul Beyaa, 16 and 20 Nov. 2006, Wa.
24 Interview with Ignacio Zaabaar, 2 Feb. 2007, Accra.
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I told them that the Constitution said ‘equitable distribution of positions 
in the public service’. It’s there, among the ‘directive principles of state 
policy’. So, I said, look, if there are ten regions, and we have recruited a 
hundred people, then every region should have ten. So if I am bringing four 
or five people from each Northern region, from any of the regions from 
the North, I have not even complied with the Constitution. That one, they 
keep quiet. Of course, some definitely grumbled, he is filling the place with 
Northerners.25
Other interviewees, too, reported that they actively intervened to help 
highly qualified Northerners to be placed according to their merits. They 
all believed that some amount of patronage and protection was necessary 
in order to implement meritocratic principles of recruitment and promo­
tion according to achievement. Yet patronage that promoted candidates 
who did not have the necessary qualifications, on the other hand, was 
regarded as illegitimate.
On a more general level, one could argue that bureaucratic norms 
indeed need to be upheld through personal intervention when the 
institutionalised checks and balances are not strongly rooted. My inter­
viewees’ statements regarding the legitimacy or illegitimacy of protec­
tion and networks reflect ongoing debates among peers and colleagues, 
both within and outside the public service. Sometimes, their judgments 
are made explicit, but much is also said in more indirect ways through 
narrative strategies and semantic choices. They construct boundaries, 
by the use of ‘we’ and ‘they’, between deserving bureaucrats and reform­
ers on the one hand and scroungers, nepotists and unqualified protegées 
on the other. They narrate stories of morally upright martyrs and victims 
who put up with condescending criticism of their naiveté and sacrifice 
by more adept winners. They employ a variety of terms and metaphors 
with different connotations, sometimes with a note of irony, for support­
ive networks that mark different degrees of legitimacy. The ‘godfather’, 
for instance, reminds of problematic Mafia networks, the ‘untouchable’ 
of the Indian caste system; reliance on ‘friends’ is certainly more accept­
able than ‘favouritism’, ‘old­boyism’ and ‘nepotism’. And they oscillate 
between the optimistic hope that their personal behaviour might serve as 
an example and the pessimistic resignation that ‘nepotism’ is a ‘disease’ 
that spreads and that it is very difficult to avoid ‘being infected’, or, as 
25 Interview with Charles Zaabaar, 19 Jan. 2007, Accra. The relevant section of the 1992 
Ghanaian Constitution is § 35, 6c.
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Sebastian Debuur put it, “personal conviction doesn’t matter, you have to 
reckon these forces”.26
‘Hard Work’, Excellence and Commitment to the Nation:  
Images of a Worthy Public Servant
The discussion on patronage and meritocratic principles feeds directly 
into my interviewees’ image of a worthy bureaucrat. Some of my inter­
locutors spoke eloquently and at length about the ideal public servant; 
others presented their ideas more implicitly in the form of stories and 
examples. Again, the norms they subscribed to did not differ much across 
the generations. This is in itself an interesting finding because it means 
that despite the increasingly difficult conditions of recruitment and pro­
motion, my interviewees did not adopt a cynical view of what it meant, 
or should mean, to be a public servant.
My interviewees’ image of the worthy bureaucrat was closely tied to 
their view that the ideal state should serve as an effective agency to pro­
mote the public good, uplift the poor and bring about regionally equi­
table development. They distinguished between ‘the state’ and incumbent 
governments, and while governments were dominated by party politics, 
inevitably partisan and catered to special interests, the state should, at 
least to a certain extent, be politically neutral. The major figure against 
which the ideal public servant was set off was, therefore, the politician, 
and in many interviews, the conflict­ridden relations between public ser­
vants and political appointees were an important topic. Politicians, my 
interviewees elaborated, want to be re­elected and therefore need to act 
in accordance with short­term considerations aimed at securing the vot­
ers’ favour. Civil servants, on the other hand, should consider the long­
term effects of their actions for the public good, and have to implement 
sometimes unpopular measures that will, nevertheless, in the long run 
help to increase state income, distribute benefits more equitably accord­
ing to impartial rules, or in other ways serve the nation’s interests.
It is useful to keep in mind here that I am not dealing with “street­level 
bureaucrats” (Lipsky 1980) at the interface of bureaucracies and popular 
clients, but mainly with high­ranking officials whose relevant partners in 
professional interactions are, on the one hand, their subordinates in their 
26 Interview with Sebastian Debuur, 13 Nov. 1989, Wa.
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respective departments and, on the other, ministers or other political 
appointees and politicians. It is against this background that their critique 
of the irresponsible behaviour of politicians, but not the state as such, 
needs to be understood. My interviewees would complain about salaries 
that did not adequately compensate their professional efforts or about 
the lack of sophisticated equipment to support them in their duties. But 
they did not express any feeling that the state to whom they had pledged 
their loyal service had not honoured its side of this contract and failed 
them, and that they could therefore legitimately withdraw from their obli­
gations. On the contrary, the sense of a moral contract which both sides 
needed to respect, and indeed did respect, was dominant (see Bierschenk 
in this volume). This is an important difference compared to lower rank­
ing state employees who may well complain that the state has broken this 
moral contract by neither acknowledging their services with an adequate 
remuneration nor providing them with the sufficient means to fulfil their 
professional duties.
Most interviewees insisted that their moral contract was with the state 
and the constitution to which they pledged an oath, not the government. 
Reflecting about the difficulties, but also advantages of steadfastly declin­
ing to do the politicians’ bidding, John Tangsege, for instance, asserted 
that
the politicians want you to do what is not right. If you are somebody 
who is frank and truthful, they can’t even sack you because what you 
have done is the truth, they can’t send you away. They will want you to 
do what they want, and not what you want and what is right. . . . But the 
moment they realise that this man, he calls a spade a spade . . . if you tell 
them the truth and they find out it’s the truth, they will receive it.27
Ivan Dometang was not quite as optimistic that the politicians would 
eventually change their mind about what was right. He was discouraged 
that they remained reluctant to support his work of raising state rev­
enue, because they feared for their own popularity. Politicians feel, he 
explained,
that talking about taxation would diminish their political support. . . . But if 
they kept on talking about it, the people would begin to know that it’s not 
something to be hated, it’s part of the civil responsibilities. But we haven’t 
27 Interview with John Tangsege, 30 Jan. 2007, Accra.
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succeeded in getting that round. . . . and when you go so firmly about some 
tax issues, they call and say that you have to be careful, that kind of thing.28
In all these narratives, my interviewees presented themselves as “state men”, 
as Ivan Dometang put it, that is as professionals who were working for the 
public good in a non­partisan way. They felt frustrated that politicians, as 
well as media or other public voices, usually did not recognise, much less 
praise their service, but they compensated this by taking pride in their work 
and holding fast to the conviction that they contributed towards the well­
being and progress of the nation. As Dometang explained,
I’m only being a good citizen, I’m trying to be a state man. I’m prepared to 
do my professional work. . . . My job is to be a state man. People want to 
be a politician to come up. But I want to end up with the state as a state 
man . . . of course a politician is committed to the state, but in the partisan 
way. But for me, it’s just on the public service. Trying to serve in the public 
service dutifully, to record that you really contributed to the nation . . . A 
state man who is prepared, whoever is the government in power, I am there 
to contribute for the nation and not for one particular government. That is 
the kind of person I would call really a state man. His interest is in serving 
the nation and that is all.
With his rejection of party politics, Dometang even went a step further 
than Zuwera and Daanikuu, who had both stood as party candidates for 
elections. While distinguishing between their professional role as civil 
servants and their personal political convictions, Zuwera and Daanikuu 
were convinced that certain developmental problems, and more specifi­
cally regional inequality, could only be addressed by politics. But Ivan 
Dometang, like a few other interviewees, did not even want to become 
involved in politics, but rather wished to devote all his energy to his work 
as a public servant.
Political neutrality was only one of the criteria that distinguished a 
worthy public servant in the eyes of my interviewees, albeit an impor­
tant one. Other elements that defined worthiness were professionalism 
and expertise, commitment and dedication to one’s work, rule­bound and 
even­handed discharge of one’s professional duties, and, finally, a spirit 
of service to the nation. “Qualification first” was John Mwinyele’s suc­
cinct answer when I asked him what defined a good public servant. All 
interviewees agreed that a high educational standard and the necessary, 
job­related expertise were of utmost importance. Some pointed to further 
28 Interview with Ivan Dometang, 12 Feb. 2007, Accra.
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qualities that a public servants should have: politeness, fairness and the 
ability to work collegially in a team.
Public servants should strive for “hard work and excellence”, many of 
my interviewees believed. When asked what advice he would give to a 
new member of the civil service, Peter Tangviel elaborated with the fol­
lowing little speech:
Approach your work with commitment, be loyal to your political boss of 
the day. Be honest and sincere with him, open about what you are doing 
and what you are saying, and be as hard­working as possible. Accommodate 
both your superiors and your subordinates and guide your subordinates as 
much as possible to do what they are expected to do. Put in your best, so 
that at the end of each day when you are going home, you are convinced 
that you have earned the day’s wage. That is what I’ll tell anybody joining 
the civil service at any rank.29
In addition to commitment, a good public servant was defined by the 
“impartial discharge of our responsibilities”, as John Mwinyele put it. He 
told me how as director of personnel he had to learn from a senior and 
more experienced colleague how to deal firmly, but also politely, with 
particularist expectations of family relations or friends. And he used the 
popular image of the government as “elephant meat” to explain how 
important it is to distinguish between private and public property and to 
drive this distinction home to all public servants:
In our Ghanaian parlance they say the government is an elephant meat. 
An elephant meat, in their local dialect means that it’s so big that one man 
can’t eat it all. So several people eat it. So they look at it from the other 
side: government is the big elephant, and so everybody accesses it in dif­
ferent ways, in whatever manner. So if I can pick [sic] this copier home 
to my house and own it, even though it is for government, then I have picked 
my part of the elephant. Somebody will use the offices to extort monies, you 
know. Government allocation is there for a purpose, they misappropriate 
it. . . . So there needs to be a radical change in our attitude in the civil service, 
in general.30
Mwinyele firmly believed in the value of training in order to effect a 
change in attitudes. Not all of my interviewees were as optimistic. Ivan 
Dometang felt that serving as a role model himself was certainly impor­
tant, but insisted that it was also necessary to be “very smart and check­
ing”. And later in our interview he added that in the field of tax collection, 
29 Interview with Peter Tangviel, 10 Feb. 2007, Accra.
30 Interview with John Mwinyele, 29 Jan. 2007, Accra.
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computerisation and certain institutional designs also went a long way in 
making the personal appropriation of public funds more difficult.31
Personal integrity, my interviewees agreed, is the indispensable founda­
tion both for controlling the behaviour of one’s subordinates and dealing 
with the illegitimate expectations of one’s superiors. One of the driving 
forces that motivates a good civil servant to remain steadfast and duty­
bound despite various temptations or lack of respect is his conviction that 
only in this way will he serve the nation. All of my interviewees felt that 
the basic aim of their work was “to help the country”, as Matthias Kuusob 
put it. Or, as John Tangsege explained, whenever he found that “govern­
ments want their work to be done” but what they want “is not necessar­
ily the right thing”, he would ask the simple question of whom his work 
served: 
Does it offend more people, do people derive pleasure from what you have 
carried out? Or only few people derive pleasure? You are supposed to maxi­
mise felicity for the majority of the people.32
All of my interlocutors took pride in describing how their particular duties 
contributed to the common good—by increasing the state revenue, secur­
ing societal peace and safety, improving Ghana’s international relations, 
developing her infrastructure or increasing agricultural production. And 
contributing to the public good by rendering competent and impartial 
service and being dedicated to development, not pursuing personal 
enrichment, was the most important element of what constituted a wor­
thy bureaucrat.
Religious and Ethnic Sources of Professional Ethics
Which role did these public servants’ Northern background play for their 
professionalism and commitment? First, the personal convictions that 
informed their professional ethics are rooted in the interviewees’ indi­
vidual upbringing and beliefs. Secondly, the Northern public servants 
are influenced by their membership in a collective ‘sub­culture’, formed 
both among the regional peer groups of highly educated men and women 
from the North and, regardless of regional origin, among the higher ranks 
within the bureaucratic institutions. These peer groups are particularly 
31 Interview with Ivan Dometang, 12 Feb. 2007, Accra.
32 Interviews with John Tangsege, 30 Jan. 2007, Accra.
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important in order to insulate the bureaucrats against particularist expec­
tations of their extended rural and urban kin and of other persons from 
the home area or ethnic group. 
With respect to the individual resources that support personal integ­
rity, my interviewees’ religious background was of utmost importance. All 
of them regarded their strict Catholic upbringing as crucial for the forma­
tion of their ideas of a meritorious life. It is most likely that in a different 
historical setting, and in other parts of Ghana, Protestant churches could 
work in a similar way, and it would be worthwhile exploring in which way 
a Muslim upbringing affects a public service career. In the Upper West 
Region, however, with the exception of the area around Wa, the Catho­
lic church has been, since the 1930s, the dominant Christian denomina­
tion. Since most public servants are Catholic school graduates, they have 
been impregnated with these schools’ ideals and norms. Furthermore, 
the fathers’ of four of my interviewees were catechists, providing for an 
even more direct influence of Catholicism on their sons’ moral upbring­
ing. Ivan Dometang, for instance, narrated how his catechist father was 
at first shocked that his son wanted to enter the Internal Revenue Ser­
vice and deal with other people’s monies because he felt that it would be 
very difficult to resist the temptations to pocket some of these resources 
for personal ends. It was Dometang’s firm resolution to disprove his 
father’s fears that kept him disciplined, despite the fact that not many 
people would praise him for such steadfastness, but rather think that he 
was being naïve. That such considerations did not make him falter was, 
Dometang believed, due to his upbringing and his faith in God: “I have the 
fear of God in me. And I’m a very timid person, . . . and the fear of God is 
the beginning of wisdom”.
In a similar manner, John Tangsege, another catechist’s son, regarded 
his “good conscience” as the most important orientation for constantly 
interrogating his actions, both within and outside his profession. When 
I asked him where he learnt such an attitude, he pointed to his Catholic 
upbringing:
The Catholics have pumped in a lot of discipline in my mind. If you are 
doing anything wrong. . . . If you lie down to sleep, it [your conscience] says: 
‘no, it’s not right’. So that’s the conscience and the way you are brought 
up. . . . I told you, my father was a catechist and the moment you told a lie 
about your sister, my mother or my father would beat you. So we got used to 
speaking the truth, nothing but the truth. It is the Christian principles that 
I inherited from the Church.
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Most of my interviewees regarded these Christian principles as intimately 
connected with the Dagara ‘ethnic’ character of “hard work” and “hon­
esty”. The greater part of the Dagara are indeed Catholics,33 and my inter­
locutors felt that the church has left an important imprint on the way the 
Dagara act and perceive the world. John Mwinyele, for instance, who was 
brought up by educated white­collar parents outside the rural context, 
claimed not to know much about “Dagara culture”, but was still convinced 
that he was socialised according to the Dagara principles of “honesty” and 
“uprightness”:
Catholicism has actually dominated and it has schooled us in a certain 
manner. . . . I think that tradition is still trickling down to some of us where 
you can’t do a wrong. It’s extremely difficult to do the wrong, yes, I think 
culture has inculcated this pattern of behaviour in the Dagaare man.
Peter Tangviel sketched the same ethnic psychology, but wished that the 
Dagara would become more enterprising and interested in material prog­
ress. He felt that their sense of humility and honesty was standing in their 
way, and he included himself among those whose careers had been char­
acterised by these commendable principles that did not quite fit with the 
dominant ways of ‘making it’ in Ghana. But even Tangviel would not, of 
course, want this progress to be achieved by illegitimate means.
That my interviewees talked about “the Dagara character” in very simi­
lar terms reflects not only a similar upbringing, but also the fact that they 
do indeed exchange such ideas in meetings among Dagara educated men 
and women in Accra and other Ghanaian cities. All of my interlocutors 
are involved in one or more of the ethno­political associations that Dagara 
migrants have created since the mid­1970s (Lentz 1995), and they also meet 
in church or informal get­togethers. These social networks are usually 
grouped according to generations, but at certain festive occasions, such 
as marriages or funerals, Dagara from the Upper West meet across distinc­
tions of gender and age, and often also social position. But it is particularly 
in the more elitist social circles that the public servants’ careers and life 
styles are evaluated and compared with those from other ethnic groups. 
It is at such occasions that stories and comments regarding what is con­
sidered legitimate or illegitimate behaviour, regarding ethnic traditions, 
33 On the history of Catholicism in the Upper West Region which started with the 
coming of the White Father’s mission to Jirapa in 1929, see Lentz (2006: 153−74).
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necessary reforms and commendable lives circulate and constitute a rela­
tively close­knit tapestry of social control—a phenomenon that Richard 
Werbner (2004) has highlighted in his study of the Kalanga bureaucratic 
and managerial elites’ contribution to the public good in Botswana. Such 
exchanges among the elite also establish norms regarding the amount of 
support that one’s rural relatives can legitimately expect, and where to 
draw the boundary with regard to favouritism. Robert Price (1975) con­
tended that Ghanaian bureaucrats were victims of their extended family’s 
particularist expectations and would compromise their professional ethics 
because they found it much more important to maintain their good name 
in their rural home communities. This was probably already a problem­
atic assumption at the time Price conducted his research during the late 
1960s. It is most certainly too simplistic now, some forty years later. One of 
the factors that allows public servants to insulate themselves, to a certain 
degree, against their relatives’ demands is precisely elite sociability. That 
honour and shame are ascribed not only by one’s ‘home’ community, but 
also, or even mainly, by one’s peers allows precisely the compartmentali­
sation of roles—the public servant distinguished from the kinsman—that 
Price sees as the prerequisite of an efficient bureaucracy.
This insulation is also supported by an inner­bureaucratic ‘esprit 
de corps’ to which my interviewees referred when they distinguished 
between ‘we’, the reform­oriented and dedicated public servants, and the 
politicians or corrupt officials. It is further strengthened by cross­ethnic 
associations such as the Free Masons or other lodges to whom many of my 
interviewees belonged and that partly overlap with ethno­regional net­
works. All of these networks serve to stabilise professional ethics and pro­
mote a spirit of ‘excellence’ and ‘service’ by creating a moral community 
in the eyes of which the public servants want to be regarded as worthy 
and deserving. They constitute arenas in which standards of legitimate 
patronage, aspirations to material wealth, engagement in political activ­
ism and many other aspects of professional life are constantly negotiated 
and re­evaluated.
That in such discussions my interviewees tended to subscribe to rather 
strict norms of meritocracy and ‘hard work’, finally, also reflects a specific 
‘Northern’ perspective. Because they had to struggle so hard to pursue 
their education and achieve entry into the public service, they fiercely 
defend the universalist norms of a meritocratic order. It remains to be 
seen whether the younger generation of Dagara that has grown up in an 
urban, multiethnic environment with educational privileges provided by 
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the professional positions of their parents will develop a different out­
look. The recent public service reforms, in any case, have apparently not 
transformed the dominant professional ethics, on the contrary, they have 
reinforced my interviewees’ images of a dedicated public servant.
References
Ayee, Joseph R.A. 2001. Civil service reform in Ghana: a case study of contemporary reform 
problems in Africa. African Journal of Political Science, 6 (1): 1−41.
Behrends, Andrea. 2002a. ‘Pogminga’—the ‘proper Dagara woman’: an encounter between 
Christian thought and Dagara concepts. Journal of Religion in Africa, 32: 231–53.
——. 2002b. Drahtseilakte. Frauen aus Nordghana zwischen Bildung, Beruf und gesell-
schaftlichen Konventionen. Frankfurt/Main, Brandes & Apsel.
Behrends, Andrea and Carola Lentz. 2012. Education, careers and home ties: the ethnog­
raphy of an emerging middle class from Northern Ghana. Zeitschrift für Ethnologie, 137 
(2): 139−64.
Clignet, Rémi and Philip Foster. 1966. The Fortunate Few: A Study of Secondary Schools and 
Students in the Ivory Coast. Evanston, Northwestern University Press.
Copans, Jean. 2001. Afrique noire. Un État sans fonctionnaires? Autrepart, 20: 11−20.
Daniel, G.F. 1997−98. The universities in Ghana. In: The Commonwealth Universities Hand-
book 1997−98, 1, 649−56.
Eckert, Andreas. 2007. Herrschen und Verwalten. Afrikanische Bürokraten, staatliche Ord-
nung und Politik in Tanzania, 1920−1970. Munich, Oldenbourg.
Foster, Philip J. 1965. Education and Social Change in Ghana. Chicago, Chicago University 
Press.
——. 1980. Education and social inequality in sub­saharan Africa. Journal of Modern Afri-
can Studies, 18: 201–236.
Gladwell, Malcolm. 2008. Outliers: The Story of Success. New York, Little, Brown and 
Company.
Greenstreet, D.K. 1963. The development of the Ghanaian public service. Journal of Man-
agement Studies (Legon), 2 (2): 23−29.
Haruna, Peter Fuseini. 2008. Recovering integrity in Ghana’s governance: a transcultural 
study in public service ethics. Public Integrity, 10 (2): 113−132.
Lamont, Michèle. 1992. Money, Morals and Manners: The Culture of the French and Ameri-
can Upper Middle Class. Chicago, University of Chicago Press.
Lawrance, Benjamin N., Osborn, Emily Lynn and Richard L. Roberts, eds. 2006. Intermedi-
aries, Interpreters, and Clerks: African Employees in the Making of Colonial Africa. Madi­
son, University of Wisconsin Press.
Lentz, Carola. 1994. Home, death and leadership: discourses of an educated elite from 
northwestern Ghana. Social Anthropology, 2: 149–69.
——. 1995. ‘Unity for development’: youth associations in north­western Ghana. Africa, 
65: 395–429.
——. 2006. Ethnicity and the Making of History in Northern Ghana. Edinburgh, Edinburgh 
University Press.
——. 2008. Hard work, determination and luck: biographical narratives of a Ghanaian 
elite. Ghana Studies, 11: 47−76 (published in 2010).
——. 2009. Constructing ethnicity: elite biographies and funerals in Ghana. In Rosenthal, 
Gabriele and Artur Bogner, eds. Ethnicity, Belonging and Biography: Ethnographical and 
Biographical Perspectives. Berlin, Lit, 181−202.
204 carola lentz
——. 2010. ‘I take an oath to the state, not the government’. Career trajectories and profes­
sional ethics of Ghanaian public servants. Working Papers of the Department of Anthro-
pology and African Studies of the Johannes Gutenberg University Mainz, 119, available at: 
http://www.ifeas.uni­mainz.de/workingpapers/AP119.pdf.
Lipsky, Michael. 1980. Street-level Bureaucracy: Dilemmas of the Individual in Public Ser-
vices. New York, Russell Sage Foundation.
Mannheim, Karl. [Mannheim] 1952. The problem of generations. In Kecskemeti, Paul, 
ed. Essays on the Sociology of Knowledge by Karl Mannheim. New York, Routledge, 
276–322.
Miescher, Stephan F. 2005. Making Men in Ghana. Bloomington, Indiana University Press.
Olivier de Sardan, Jean­Pierre. 2004. Etat, bureaucratie et gouvernance en Afrique de 
l’Ouest francophone. Politique africaine, 96: 139−62.
——. 2008. A la recherche des normes pratiques de la gouvernance réelle en Afrique. Afrique. 
Pouvoir et politique, Discussion Paper 5, London, Overseas Development Institute. 
Price, Robert M. 1975. Society and Bureaucracy in Contemporary Ghana. Berkeley, Univer­
sity of California Press.
Weber, Max. 1978 [orig. 1922] Bureaucracy. In Roth, Guenther and Claus Wittich, eds. Max 
Weber, Economy and Society. Berkeley, University of California Press, 956−1005.
Werbner, Richard P. 2004. Reasonable Radicals and Citizenship in Botswana. Bloomington, 
Indiana University Press.
“WE MUST RUN WHILE OTHERS WALK”:  
AFRICAN CIVIL SERVANTS, STATE IDEOLOGIES AND BUREAUCRATIC 
PRACTICES IN TANZANIA, FROM THE 1950S TO THE 1970S
Andreas Eckert
Civil Servants and the Making of Independent Tanzania
This paper attempts to shed some light on the crucial importance of 
higher civil servants in the making of independent Tanzania. It looks at 
the larger political context, the strong amalgamation of (party) politics 
and administration, the attitudes of higher civil servants towards general 
aspects of society, economy and politics, and more specifically, at their 
ideas about work. The latter aspect, however, is difficult to analyse, as 
related source material is fairly limited. The work of civil servants in early 
independent Tanzania was very much defined as ‘work for the nation’,1 
and this definition went along with ideas of discipline, a strong connec-
tion between political issues and administrative duties, and the idea of 
having little time to fulfil the goals that had been set.
The development of an arguably specific Tanzanian policy making 
strategy has been the subject of a large number of studies. In his influ-
ential book, Göran Hydén (1979) refers to a “we must run while others 
walk”-strategy, using a famous quote from Tanzania’s first president Julius 
Nyerere. In many speeches, and especially in the famous Arusha Declara-
tion (see below), Nyerere stressed Tanzania’s poverty and the hard work 
needed to develop the country, which implied that substantial effort was 
necessary. “By adopting the notion that ‘we must run while others walk’, 
the impression of a revolutionary atmosphere . . . [was] created”, which 
aimed “partly at holding expectations back, partly at enforcing the need 
for discipline and restraint” (Hydén 1979: 5). This strategy was intended to 
create a sense of participation in the socialist transformation of society, as 
part of the effort to reinforce moral incentives (Jennings 2003).2
1  See Lentz (in this volume) for the persistence of this perception among contemporary 
Ghanaian higher civil servants.
2 The formula ‘running while others walk’ is still used in articles referring to develop-
ment issues in Africa. See for instance Mkandawire (2011).
© Andreas Eckert, 2014 | doi: 10.1163/9789004264960_009
This is an open access chapter distributed under the terms of the CC BY-NC 4.0 license.
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Four elements characterized the strategy (Skoog 2000: 111; Hydén 1979: 6). 
First of all, Tanzanian politicians, above all Nyerere, created an atmo-
sphere of urgency in which everything was to be done at once. Secondly, 
in order to provide this sense of rapid advancement, policy decisions 
were announced under dramatized circumstances. The results sought 
after through these policy measures were declared so important that they 
should be achieved at any cost. The ends justified even the harshest means. 
Thirdly, policy makers claimed to carry out a radical break with the past 
associated with colonial rule. Finally, and as a consequence, employees in 
the public sector constantly had to work in an atmosphere of high expec-
tations, promises and anxieties. In this context, civil servants took on an 
ambivalent role: on the one hand they were key figures within the ‘we 
must run while others walk’-strategy and in most cases were convinced 
by their mission to bring progress to a supposedly backward peasantry; on 
the other hand, civil servants became a symbol for laziness and arrogance, 
especially when—as happened so often—promises were not fulfilled or 
specific measures were pushed through arbitrarily or even with violence.
Why are African civil servants important in order to understand the 
history of Tanzania between the 1950s and the 1970s? The importance of 
the African state employees in Tanzania hails from the fact that although 
they constituted a small group, they became the champions of political 
modernization and later important protagonists of anti-colonial nation-
alism, before going on to inherit state power at the end of colonial rule 
(Eckert 2006). It is instructive to see that before 1963 a considerable num-
ber of Tanganyikan cabinet members had worked at some point for the 
colonial administration (Who’s Who in East Africa 1964; Nye 1965: 32). Sur-
vey research done in the 1960s clearly demonstrates that the rulers of inde-
pendent Tanzania were overwhelmingly salaried administrators. A team 
from a private research firm found that more than half of the members of 
the elite in 1967 were “higher civil servants” (McGowan and Bolland 1971). 
According to Feierman (1990: 240), the salaried class with its roots in the 
colonial administrative service, “was so powerful in the early years of inde-
pendence that it was able to prevent the emergence of alternative nodes 
of power, whether among the traders [. . .] or among the trade unions.” 
These African employees belonged to the first individuals who—at colo-
nial schools and in the workplace—were familiarized with the values of 
the colonizers. In their new positions they spread what they had learned. 
Moreover this group was at the centre of British attempts to discipline 
in schools and administrations, and to regulate time, space, clothing and 
food—character training, as the British called it (Eckert 2007b).
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On the eve of independence, a senior administrative job represented 
one of the greatest opportunities. In May 1960, the newspaper Mwafrika 
published a letter to the editor written by a clerk from Tabora, in which 
he proposed that clerks be promoted to higher administrative posts while 
women should take over the poorly paid clerk jobs:
These days we see that many Africans who do not come from among the 
clerks . . . are taken to study in Europe, and others are given high positions 
here in Tanganyika without going to Europe to study. The thing which 
distresses us, for our part as clerks, is that it is our brothers who are not 
clerks [that] will get the benefit of important positions like Field Officers, 
Labour Inspectors, Co-operative Officers, Public Relations Officer and so 
on . . . Clerks are people who have special knowledge of work in offices, and 
therefore ought to be thought of for higher positions and to leave the clerks’ 
jobs for women (Quoted in Feierman 1990: 238).
As Feierman adds, “the clerk’s proposal became, to some degree, a reality” 
(Ibid.). In fact, after independence, male employees soon made a career 
in the party and state bureaucracy and occupied important political posi-
tions (Bienen 1967; Tordoff 1967).
What was the situation of Tanzania at the moment of independence 
in December 1961? In his ‘Independence message to TANU’ Nyerere 
declared that
this day has dawned because of the people of Tanganyika have worked 
together in unity . . . All the time that TANU has been campaigning for Uhuru 
we have based our struggle on our belief in the equality and dignity of all 
mankind and on the Declaration of Human Rights . . . Yet we know that on 
9th December we shall not have achieved these objects. Poverty, ignorance, 
and disease must be overcome before we can really establish in this country 
the sort of society we have been dreaming of. These obstacles are not small 
ones, they are more difficult to overcome than any alien government. From 
now on we are fighting not man but nature (Nyerere 1966: 138f.).
But as Iliffe (1979: 576) so aptly commented on this message, “it was more 
complicated than that”.
In the two decades following independence, Tanzania’s government 
under Nyerere pursued a policy that was much celebrated by international 
observers for its commitment to “self-reliance” (Jennings 2007a). The gov-
ernment was also celebrated, at least in some corners, for its efforts to 
create and practice a specific ‘African Socialism’. Nyerere himself became 
a world figure, a spokesman for the ‘poorest of the poor’, demanding a 
new international economic order that aimed to give a greater share of 
the world’s wealth to those who suffer, and ensure that the non-aligned 
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countries acted as a kind of trade union, merging some of their individual 
interests to campaign on a common programme (Eckert 2011). Nyerere’s 
long-term vision was in many ways a familiar one to Western socialists. 
A perspective close to Fabian socialism, in which the state owns most of 
the means of production, equalizes income and provides a wide range 
of social services (Coulson 1982: 2, 327). Tanzania became a major tar-
get for development aid. Western governments did not wish to be seen 
as offering all their aid to avowedly right-wing regimes; as such ‘socialist’ 
Tanzania was a useful corrective (Jennings 2007b). Moreover, the govern-
ment successfully obtained substantial support from non-Western camps, 
most notably from China, which funded the TAZARA railway connect-
ing Tanzania and Zambia (Monson 2008). Nyerere’s numerous writings 
earned him much respect and admiration among Western intellectuals. 
However, the supposedly promising Tanzanian path was full of paradoxes: 
restricted freedom of expression, political prisoners, the increasing power 
of state bureaucrats, and many economic failures; among other aspects, 
these stand for the dark side of post-independence Tanzanian develop-
ment (Brennan 2005; Burton 2007). The first decade after independence 
was also characterized by massive conflicts between an urban youth that 
viewed itself as a part of modern global culture, and a state launching 
“decency campaigns” banning cultural forms such as soul music, mini-
skirts, wigs, and bell-bottoms (Ivaska 2011).
The Africanization of the Civil Service
Since the late colonial period, the Africanization of the civil service fea-
tured very prominently among the central aims of the nationalist party 
TANU (Aminzade 2001). In October 1960, in a speech at the Legislative 
Council, Nyerere offered his vision of affirmative action:
First, it will remain the policy of the Government that every vacancy arising 
in the civil service should, if possible, be filled by an appointment made 
locally and that recourse should only be had to recruitment from outside of 
East Africa if no suitable candidate (of any race) can be found locally [. . .] 
Secondly, within this policy, in the case of new appointments to the service, 
it is Government’s intention that African candidates of Tanganyika should 
have prior claim to consideration. Thirdly, only if no suitable, qualified Tan-
ganyika African candidate is available should other candidates be consid-
ered (Nyerere 1966: 100).
The pace of Africanisation soon accelerated. In 1962, short-term prime 
minister, Rachidi Kawawa, appointed a ‘Commission for Africanisation’ 
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that was given the task of reviewing “every cadre and grade in the Civil 
Service with a view to ensuring that a satisfactory plan for complete Afri-
canisation exists” (Government of Tanganyika 1963: 1). Tanzanians with a 
secondary school education or university degree were not allowed to work 
in the private sector; all had to become members of the state bureau-
cracy. During the 1960s, both the number of administrative posts and the 
involvement of Africans considerably rose.
The Africanisation of the civil service went along with the amalga-
mation of government, administration and party. Shortly after indepen-
dence, Nyerere sent around a circular letter to all government branches in 
which he explained the relationship between the public, civil servants and 
politicians. He stressed that on the one hand, civil servants had no busi-
ness being in the political arena, and on the other hand, that politicians 
had no right to intervene in the affairs of civil servants. “I would remind 
you”, Nyerere wrote, “that policy is decided by the central government 
and not by local party representatives. Political party organizations are 
not concerned with the execution or implementation of policy” (quoted 
in Bienen 1967: 125). Here Nyerere was speaking as a representative of a 
classic bureaucratic ethos and wrote in favour of the norm of a neutral, 
apolitical civil service, sheltered from the interventions of politicians. A 
similar attitude was shared by many African civil servants around inde-
pendence: they were convinced that civil servants should have sufficient 
educational qualifications; positions within the civil service should have 
3 Sabot 1979: 210; Government of Tanzania 1969: 27.
Table 1. Africanisation of civil service, 1961–19703
Year Total Africans Others African share (in %)
1961 4452 1170 3282 26.1
1962 4723 1821 2902 38.5
1963 5049 2467 2580 48.9
1964 5389 3083 2306 57.2
1965 5962 3851 2011 66.2
1966 6262 4364 1898 69.7
1967 6754 4937 1817 73.1
1968 7827 6208 1619 79.3
1969 7474 6123 1351 81.9
1970 9419 8042 1377 85.6
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clearly distinguished areas of competence; and that office and person 
should be separated.
A few months after independence, however, TANU began to link local 
state structures and local party structures. For instance, regional commis-
sioners also had to be TANU’s regional party secretaries. From 1964, TANU 
began recruiting civil servants for the posts of commissioners. This effort 
was associated with the hope that civil servants, with their administrative 
and leadership experiences, could strengthen TANU’s competence at the 
regional and district level. In August 1964, Nyerere underlined this point:
Responsibility cannot be entrusted to people for sentimental reasons, or left 
with them once they have failed because they are nice people [. . .] these are 
circumstances which call for the use of every person who can be obtained 
and whose skill or experience contributes in any way to movement in the 
desired direction. (Nyerere 1966: 309).
A month earlier, Rachidi Kawawa had stated:
We want civil servants to join TANU so that they can help us in our strug-
gle against poverty, disease and ignorance [. . .] Civil servants are the most 
educated people in our country. We cannot afford to leave them aside in 
important discussions concerning the country of which they are a part [. . .] 
It would be sheer hypocrisy to refuse government employees the permission 
to become a politician and at the same time to rely on them to prepare 
political speeches to be delivered by ministers (The Nationalist, 1.7.1964).
Nyerere, who a few years ago had clearly argued that strict distinctions 
be made between civil servants and politicians, had apparently changed 
his view:
[. . .] there would be no need to continue with the present artificial distinc-
tion between politicians and civil servants—a distinction desirable only in 
the context of a multi-party system where the continuity of public admin-
istration must not be thrown out of gear at every switch from one ‘party’ 
government to another. For, once you begin to think in terms of a single 
national movement instead of a number of rival factional parties, it becomes 
absurd to exclude a whole group of the most intelligent and able members 
of the community from participation in the discussion of policy simply 
because they happen to be civil servants. In a political movement which is 
identified with the nation, participation in political affairs must be recog-
nized as the right of every citizen, in no matter what capacity he may have 
chosen to serve his country [. . .] (Nyerere 1966: 309).
Some Government representatives saw the need to substantiate their part-
ing from bureaucratic ideals with references to African traditions and the 
specific situation of a young African state. Amon Nsekela, state secretary 
in the Ministry of Industries, stated at a seminar for civil servants:
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In Tanganyika and the United Republic we are faced with problems, tradi-
tions and ways of life peculiar to our countries; it is obviously expedient to 
adapt our civil service to meet those conditions and control them. We can 
do this by retaining what is best to the past and adapting it to the future [. . .] 
It would only be odd if we persevered with a civil service tradition alien to 
our heritage [. . .] There is a vast difference between countries with long-
established civil services and the new developing countries like our own, 
which have to build up their administrative systems from scratch [. . .] We 
have complete freedom of choice, and we are under no obligation whatso-
ever to copy any other country (Mbioni, 10.9.1964).
Interestingly enough, in many regions a distance could be felt between well-
trained former state employees now in political positions on the one hand, 
and long-serving party members on the other. One (anonymous) govern-
ment member used drastic words to describe the possibility of civil servants 
becoming TANU members: “No, it’s not a good thing. There has been no 
change in the civil servants. These people simply can’t change their colours. 
They don’t trust politicians and they feel our ideas are no good unless we 
have a B.A. or something else” (Quoted in Hopkins 1971: 115).
This conflict is nicely captured in the following quote from The Civil 
Service Magazine (November/December 1965):
In the sense that Tanzania is a one-party state and will be for a long time to 
come, this is all right. And the result has been to create a lot of confidence 
among those who are civil servants. Politicians were under the impression 
that civil servants were holdovers from the old colonial regime; their ideas 
were suspected. Politicians were saying: ‘We fought for the country and the 
civil servants didn’t.’ It was a fact that civil servants were alienated, even 
though they fully supported the party as did all thinking people. Now civil 
servants are accepted [. . .] Since the change, in fact, civil servants may be 
a real threat to the career of politicians. The problem is to try to allay their 
suspicions and overthrow the idea that civil servants didn’t fight for the 
country’s independence.
Local government reforms provide a good example of the problems result-
ing from introducing new administrative forms and personnel. As already 
mentioned, the political ambitions of the TANU administration centred 
on the achievement of rapid progress. This would ensure the stability and 
continued popularity of the government. Pursuant to this strategy, deci-
sions were made without the sufficient involvement of local authorities. 
Sometimes they were not even involved at all; whether or not they were 
involved, local authorities were left with the task of implementation. Thus 
the government under Nyerere continued the colonial policy of centra-
lised authoritarianism. Unlike the British, however, the post- independence 
government did not rely on supposedly ‘traditional’ authorities and chiefs 
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to implement their concepts. The dependence of newly created rural local 
authorities upon the administrative support and assistance of the central 
government was an essential feature of the local government system dur-
ing the 1960s. From December 1962 to July 1965 the supervision of local 
government was transferred to a separate Ministry of Local Government. 
The Ministry recruited a corps of local government officers to perform 
field inspections under the control of regional commissioners. The major-
ity of these officers, however, neither had the relevant qualifications, nor 
any understanding of local government problems. They made no signifi-
cant impact in enhancing administrative capacity. Thus after three years 
the cadre was abolished and the staff absorbed into the general adminis-
tration (Eckert 2007a).
The Arusha Declaration, Ujamaa and Civil Servants
Most state employees who occupied higher administrative posts after 
independence, shared Nyerere’s main goals. They wanted to fight poverty 
and illness, they wanted to avoid those forms of exploitation which were 
connected with the spread of large individual fortunes. The national goals 
of Tanzania as mainly defined by Nyerere were so important and humane 
that it seemed imperative to carry them through, if necessary, from above 
(Eckert 2007b).
Between 1961 and 1965, Nyerere and the TANU leadership recogn-
ised that their freedom was limited by the structural dependence of the 
economy and the shortage of trained Tanzanians. This situation began 
to lower the aspirations of those who thought that independence meant 
immediate prosperity, or even control of the economy (Pratt 1976: Ch.7; 
Coulson 1982: Ch.16). As part of the process of transition, in January 1962, 
only one month after the triumphant handing-over of power, Nyerere 
resigned as Prime Minister, “. . . to act as a bridge between the people and 
the new government by demonstrating in practical terms the importance 
of the Party” (Nyerere 1966: 157). Most observers agree in retrospect that 
this was “a shrewd tactical move in the nature of reculer pour mieux sau-
ter” (Sadleir 1999: 252). Rashidi Kawawa became Prime Minister. Nyerere 
spent some time reflecting and writing. He then began to travel widely 
within the country, explaining to enthusiastic audiences that indepen-
dence was only the first step to full liberation, which could be achieved 
by self-help and hard work. He was becoming more and more the Mwal-
imu, the far-seeing moral teacher, who knows what is right for his subjects 
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and is never wrong (Coulson 1982: 136; Hatch 1972: 180ff.; Eckert 2011). Not 
surprisingly, some years later the cynical quote that “it is hard to build up 
socialism in a country where there is only one socialist” was attributed to 
him (Ansprenger 1999: 90).
By 1967, the government of Tanzania was experiencing a severe cri-
sis of political legitimacy. The peasants had benefited very little, if at all, 
from the economic growth that had taken place since independence so 
that widespread disillusion and discouragement seemed almost inevitable 
(Pratt 1976: 227). Tanzania’s economy was in a state of crisis. The Arusha 
Declaration can thus be seen as a reaction to a difficult situation, which 
Nyerere used to introduce policies that fitted his own philosophy. Although 
the declaration was amended by the National Executive Committee of 
TANU, which discussed and approved it a week before its publication on 
5 February 1967, the draft was written by Nyerere and the idea and strate-
gies were largely his (Nyerere 1968: 231–250). He had tied up a carefully 
balanced package. The declaration claimed that building a socialist state 
was TANU’s central aim and emphasized the role of agriculture and rural 
development. It formulated five ‘leadership conditions’, which included a 
whole series of limitations on the freedom of state employees to benefit 
personally from their positions. The declaration became extremely popu-
lar all over the country. Everywhere Nyerere was the hero and the villains 
were the politicians and civil servants who had been growing fat at the 
expense of the masses. The publication of the Arusha Declaration was 
soon followed by the nationalisation of key sectors in business, industry 
and banking.4
When explaining his political programme to students of the University 
of Dar es Salaam, Nyerere once again referred to what he assumed were 
“traditional African values”. He urged
a full acceptance of our African-ness and a belief that in our past there is 
much that is useful for our future . . . We have to reactivate the philosophy of 
co-operation in production and sharing in distribution, which was an essen-
tial part of traditional African society (Nyerere 1968: 316, 325).
The Arusha Declaration must, incidentally, be seen alongside two other 
essays Nyerere wrote the same year. Education for Self-Reliance (Nyerere 
1968: 267–290) was an attempt to reform the educational system so that 
4 On the Arusha Declaration see the good summary by Coulson 1982: Ch. 19, which 
I paraphrase here.
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it would provide useful training for the mass population and not just the 
few who would proceed to secondary education or university. In this area, 
Nyerere could claim considerable success. When he stepped down from 
the presidency in 1985, he declared that 91 per cent of the adult popula-
tion was literate (Stöger-Eising 2000: 133).
Socialism and Rural Development (Nyerere 1968: 337–366), the second 
essay, was “a dream of an ideal world” (Coulson 1982: 240). In this paper 
the idea of Ujamaa is married to the idea of villagization in the concept of 
an Ujamaa village. This was a small group of politically committed farm-
ers who worked together on a communal farm, using their savings to pur-
chase equipment that would benefit the group. The efforts to implement 
this “dream” between 1967 and 1976, without any doubt, represent one of 
the darkest chapters in Nyerere’s career as a politician, and sometimes 
proved demonstrative of the flagrant contradiction between his writings 
and his policies (Schneider 2007). Moreover, during this process Nyerere 
became more of a paternalistic “know-all mwalimu” (Scott 1998; Spalding 
1996). Yet, as Schneider (2004: 346) has aptly observed,
when discussions move beyond a treatment of the goals and ideals of Uja-
maa, and toward its coercive realities, Nyerere typically recedes into the 
background of a stage that is taken over by anonymous ‘officials’, as well 
as ‘policies’ and ‘campaigns’ without authors or initiators. The effect is a 
tendency for Nyerere to emerge from these narratives as a tragically fail-
ing hero, whose attractive and hopeful visions for rural development were 
derailed or subverted in implementation.
Numerous authors have directed our attention to the gulf between 
 Nyerere’s ideological project of a classless African society and realities in 
post-independence Tanzania. Two terms are particularly important here. 
Kabwela (urban poor) was the common denominator of urban national-
ist frustrations: despite working hard and (somewhat) honestly, kabwela 
found themselves exploited by rack-renting landlords, cheating shopkeep-
ers and abusive employers. The popular discursive antonym to kabwela 
was naizesheni, or naizi for short. Naizesheni referred to those urban Afri-
cans who with relatively little effort came to enjoy the lion’s share of the 
fruits of independence by inheriting privileges from the departing colo-
nialists. The term clearly derives from ‘nationalization’ and less directly 
from ‘Africanization’, both processes remained in the public eye during 
the early years of independence. The term naizi generally stood for civil 
servants and politicians as they apparently profited most from indepen-
dence (Brennan 2006).
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On the other hand, many civil servants shared the peasants’ impatience 
and expressed their concern that the majority of the people was ignorant 
about the central aims and tasks of nation-building. The following state-
ments from higher civil servants may illustrate this:
The greatest need is for a citizen to understand his country’s problems and 
contribute to their solution. But unfortunately, only a few do this.
His greatest responsibility is to know what is expected of him by his coun-
try, to do the things for the sake of his country. But there are very few who 
do this. In every person there is an element of self-interest. What is needed 
is that one must understand his obligations.
All of them should be as the president. That is, each should regard every 
problem of the country as their own problem—to feel the problem as the 
president does. (Quoted in Hopkins 1971: 106).
Civil servants were unclear about what Ujamaa or African socialism really 
meant. Some waited for an official council to fix a definition. Others 
regarded Ujamaa as a continuation of traditional cultures and practices, 
the transferral of communal obligations into modern society:
We have clearly told the world we want African socialism and that it is not 
copying the East or the West. Now we are awaiting a committee which will 
tell us exactly what this means.
I don’t like the word ‘African’. Socialism is the same in every country, but 
we’re trying to find out what it means in this country. We’re supposed to 
have a commission sometime to examine this idea.
Africans have had their culture, have had certain obligations among 
themselves, for example, helping each other so that everybody lives. It is 
the translation of this culture into the framework of modern life or modern 
way of living which is African socialism. It is not communism, and although 
it has not been defined, Africans have had this socialism for some time 
(Quoted in Hopkins 1971: 99).
But what role were civil servants expected to take on in a one party state? 
The government assigned two tasks to them: on the one hand, the classic 
task of ensuring the functioning of state and administration. Moreover, 
they were urged to contribute to the modernization of society and to 
promote projects that helped improve the economic and social situation 
of the people (Tanzania Central Establishment Division 1965). Joseph A. 
Namata, the Head of Civil Service in Tanzania, stated in 1966:
Here the civil servant is expected to be committed to development for 
the masses [. . .] In our conditions, it is essential that good civil servants 
understand the politics of the country, the objectives of the party, and they 
share the basic philosophy of the nation [. . .] Once a policy decision has 
been made, and a particular project is adopted, the civil servant in the field 
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can—with the concurrence and cooperation of his Area Commissioner—
work directly with the people [. . .] The civil servants [. . .] can brief their 
Party colleagues, and have it known that they are available for question-
ing [. . .] However, there still must be a distinction between the work of 
a senior civil servant and the politician. The decisions on policy have to 
be made by ministers. The good Tanzanian civil servant thus recognizes 
two things; firstly that the ministers and other political officers are respon-
sible for policy, and secondly that his role is to help the politician to achieve 
the national objectives by the full use of his brains, training, and experience 
(Namata 1966).
At least in retrospect, some civil servants were critical about the influ-
ence of the party on administrative issues and about the political func-
tions of civil servants. Francis Damien, who in the 1960s was a member 
of the Ministry of Education’s staff, stated: “Civil servants are no policy 
makers. Politicians make policy and it is our duty to see that it is carried 
out. Therefore, my duty as a civil servant is to carry out whether I like it 
or not” (Interview with Francis Damian, 11 August 1999).
Conclusion: The Golden Age of the Civil Service
“Duty, discipline and hard work are the key to success”, Martin Kivumbi 
stated in an interview I conducted with him in August 1999. During the 
1960s, Kivumbi worked as an economist for the Tanzanian Ministry of 
Finance and later moved to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. “A good citizen 
does his work, pays his taxes, and causes little trouble”, he added. These 
statements provide a small hint about the way civil servants understood 
their work during the first one and a half decades after independence. 
In general, however, we still know very little about the work ethos and 
work practices of African civil servants in the early independence period 
in Tanzania and elsewhere in Africa. In the context of nation-building in a 
one-party system, civil servants were assigned the task of working for the 
nation and helping the party push through their projects. Civil servants 
were regarded as having profited the most from independence by the 
masses. Many civil servants insisted on training, professionalism, experi-
ence and knowledge as important elements of their job (directed against 
party members in important positions without these qualifications), but 
at the same time this self-perception made them vulnerable to arrogance 
and accusations of being know-it-alls.
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, Tanzania underwent the most dra-
matic economic crisis since independence. This was a result of a number 
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of coinciding factors, such as the evidently disastrous economic outcomes 
of forced villagization (total agricultural output declined drastically), 
soaring oil prices, the collapse of world commodity prices, severe and 
extensive droughts, as well as the costly war with Uganda in 1978/1979. 
In 1981, a hurriedly conceived National Economic Survival Program failed 
to secure the necessary support from external sources that were demand-
ing a reduction in state intervention in the economy. The government 
under Nyerere resisted these pressures at first, but finally capitulated as 
the economic crisis deepened. The first structural adjustment program 
was reluctantly adopted by Nyerere in 1982. The economic performance 
of Tanzania remains mixed; it is still one of the poorest countries south 
of the Sahara.
In many ways and despite all the contradictions, the 1960s and early 
1970s represented the ‘golden age’ of civil service in Tanzania. Since then, 
working for the state has become much less attractive. At the end of colo-
nial rule a career as a civil servant meant training, social security and social 
prestige, whereas today the civil service often stands for want, insecurity 
and personal dependence. Public servants are often associated with cor-
ruption, while they regard themselves as underpaid and undervalued (Heil-
man and Ndumbara 2002; Therkildsen 2010). Today, those who attempt to 
make a career or money in Tanzania, only rarely work for the state.
References
Aminzade, Ronald 2001. The politics of race and nation. Citizenship and Africanization in 
Tanganyika. In Davis, Diane E., ed. Political Power and Social Theory, Vol. 14. Amsterdam, 
Elsevier Science, 53–90.
Ansprenger, Franz. 1999. Politische Geschichte Afrikas im 20. Jahrhundert. München, 
C.H. Beck.
Bienen, Henry. 1967. Tanzania. Party Transformation and Economic Development. Princ-
eton, Princeton University Press.
Brennan, James. 2005. The short history of political opposition and multi-party democracy 
in Tanganyika 1958–1964. In Maddox, Gregory & James Giblin, eds. In Search of a Nation. 
Histories of Authority and Dissidence in Tanzania. Oxford, James Currey, 250–276.
——. 2006. Blood enemies. Exploitation and urban citizenship in the nationalist political 
thought of Tanzania, 1958–1975. JAH, 47 (3): 1–25.
Burton, Andrew. 2007. The heaven of piece purged: tackling the undesirable and unpro-
ductive poor in Dar es Salaam, c.1950s–1980s. IJAHS, 40 (1): 119–151.
Coulson, Andrew. 1982. Tanzania. A Political Economy. Oxford, Clarendon Press.
Eckert, Andreas. 2006. Cultural commuters: African employees in late colonial Tanzania. 
In Lawrance, Benjamin N. et al., eds. Intermediaries, Interpreters, and Clerks. African 
Employees in the Making of Colonial Africa. Madison/Wisc., University of Wisconsin 
Press, 248–269.
——. 2007a. Useful instruments of participation? Local government and cooperatives in 
Tanzania, 1940s to 1970s. IJAHS, 40 (1): 97–118.
218 andreas eckert
——. 2007b: Herrschen und Verwalten. Afrikanische Bürokraten, Staat und Politik in Tanza-
nia, 1920–1970. München, Oldenbourg.
——. 2011. Julius Nyerere, Tanzanian elites, and the project of African socialism. In Dülffer, 
Jost & Marc Frey, eds. Trajectories of Decolonization. Elites and the Transformation from 
the Colonial to the Postcolonial. New York, PalgraveMacMillan, 216–240.
Feierman, Steven. 1990. Peasant Intellectuals. History and Anthropology in Tanzania. 
 Madison/Wisc., University of Wisconsin Press.
Government of Tanganyika. 1963. Report of the Africanisation Commission 1962. Dar es 
Salaam, Government Printer.
——. 1969. Annual Manpower Report to the President 1969. Dar es Salaam, Government 
Printer.
Hatch, John. 1972. Tanzania. A Profile. London, Praeger.
Heilman, Bruce & Laurean Ndumbara. 2002. Corruption, politics, and societal values in 
Tanzania. An evaluation of the Mkapa administration’s anti-corruption efforts. African 
Journal of Political Sciences, 7 (2): 1–19.
Hopkins, Raymond F. 1971. Political Role in a New State. Tanzania’s First Decade. New 
Haven & London, Yale University Press.
Hydén, Göran. 1979. Beyond Ujamaa in Tanzania. Underdevelopment and an Uncaptured 
Peasantry. Berkeley, University of California Press.
Iliffe, John. 1979. A Modern History of Tanganyika. Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press.
Ivaska, Andrew. 2011. Cultured States: Youth, Gender, and Modern Style in 1960s Dar es 
Salaam. Durham/NC, Duke University Press.
Jennings, Michael. 2003. We must run while others walk: popular participation and devel-
opment crisis in Tanzania, 1961–1969. JMAS, 41: 163–187.
——. 2007. ‘A very real war’. Popular participation in development in Tanzania during the 
1950s and 1960s. IJAHS, 40 (1): 71–95.
——. 2007. Surrogates of the State. NGOs, Development, and Ujamaa in Tanzania. Bloom-
field, CT, Kumarian Press.
Mbioni 1964: The Monthly Newsletter of Kivukoni College. Vol 1.
Mkandawire, Thandika. 2011. Running while others walk: knowledge and the challenge of 
Africa’s development. Africa Development, 36 (2): 1–36.
McGowan, Patrick J. & Patrick Bolland. 1971. The Political and Social Elite of Tanzania. An 
Analysis of Social Background Factors. New York, Program of African Studies, Syracruse 
University.
Monson, Jamie. 2008. Africa’s Freedom Railway: How a Chinese Development Project Changes 
Lives and Livelihoods in Tanzania. Bloomington, Indiana University Press.
Namata, Joseph A. 1966. The role of the civil service in a one-party state. The Civil Service 
Magazine, July/August, no pagination.
Nye, Joseph S. 1965. Pan-Africanism and East African Integration. Cambridge/Ma, Harvard 
University Press.
Nyerere, Julius. 1966. Freedom and Unity. A Selection from Writings and Speeches 1952–1965. 
Dar es Salaam, Oxford University Press.
——. 1968. Freedom and Socialism. A Selection from Writings and Speeches 1956–1967. Dar 
es Salaam, Oxford University Press.
Pratt, Cranford. 1976. The Critical Phase in Tanzania 1945–1968. Nyerere and the Emergence 
of a Socialist Strategy. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
Sabot, Richard H. 1979. Economic Development and Urban Migration: Tanzania 1900–1971. 
Oxford, Oxford University Press.
Sadleir, Randal. 1999. Tanzania. Journey to Republic. London & New York, Radcliffe Press.
Schneider, Leander. 2004. Freedom and unfreedom in rural development. Julius Nyerere, 
Ujamaa Vijijini, and villagization. CJAS, 38 (2): 344–393.
——. 2007. High on modernity? Explaining the failures of Tanzanian villagization. African 
Studies, 66 (1): 9–38.
 civil servants in tanzania, 1950s to 1970s 219
Scott, James. 1998. Seeing like a State. How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition 
Have Failed. New Haven & London, Yale University Press.
Skoog, Gun Eriksson. 2000. The Soft Budget Constraint. The Emergence, Persistence and 
Logic of an Institution. Dordrecht, Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Spalding, Nancy. 1996. The Tanzanian present and Ujamaa: a study in contradictions. Third 
World Quarterly, 17 (1): 89–108.
Stöger-Eising, Viktoria. 2000. Ujamaa revisited. Indigenous and European influences in 
Nyerere’s social and political thought. Africa, 70 (1): 118–143.
Tanzania Central Establishment Division. 1965. Professional Careers Guidebook. Dar es 
Salaam, Central Establishment Division.
Therkildsen, Ole. 2010. Working in neopatrimonial settings: perceptions of public sector 
staff in Tanzania and Uganda. Working Papers of the Department of Anthropology and 
African Studies of the Johannes Gutenberg University Mainz, 117, available at: http://www 
.ifeas.uni-mainz.de/Dateien/AP117.pdf.
Tordoff, William. 1967. Government and Politics in Tanzania. Nairobi, East African Publish-
ing House.
Who’s Who in East Africa 1964. Nairobi, Marco Surveys.
SEDIMENTATION, FRAGMENTATION AND NORMATIVE  
DOUBLE-BINDS IN (WEST) AFRICAN PUBLIC SERVICES1
Thomas Bierschenk
The Kouandé gendarmerie brigade was established in 1962. When we vis-
ited it in March 2009, it was manned by five gendarmes, of whom only four 
were present as one was on a training course in Porto-Novo. It is the only 
police force in an area of 4,500 square kilometres (almost twice as large as 
the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg which has an area of 2.600 km/2) and with 
a population of almost 100,000 people. The outermost frontiers of the com-
mune are 100 km from the municipal centre. Apart from the road linking 
the town of Kouandé to Natitingou some 50 km away, where the regional 
gendarmerie headquarters are located, there are no other tarmac roads.
The brigade registers between one and five cases per week, which are doc-
umented by official reports, and there had been 123 official written commu-
nications with the commander of the gendarmerie company in Natitingou 
since the beginning of 2009. In fact, it appears that these official documents 
relate mainly to more serious crimes and misdemeanours in flagrante. A 
good deal of the work of the gendarmerie is informal and actually involves 
the dispensing of justice; there is a preference for ‘amicable arrangements’ 
(reglements à l’amiable), as they are called. These settlements, which are 
moderated by the gendarmes, often include cases which, like financial debts, 
would be considered as warranting the resort to civil, and not penal, justice 
in other places. In making these judicial settlements, the gendarmerie is in 
competition with other regulatory instances, such as the ward heads (chefs 
de quartier) and the conciliation tribunal.
The gendarmerie has one Nissan pick-up vehicle which is broken. To find 
spare parts, the brigade chief himself had to go to the city of Lama Kara 
in Togo, about 200 km away, by bush taxi. The car will be repaired locally 
using the gendarmes’ own resources as the officially stipulated procedure, 
e.g. towing the car to the repair shops of the gendarmerie in Natitingou 
(50 km) or Parakou (100 km), would be very awkward. In theory, the brigade 
has an annual budget for petrol of 12,000 CFA francs, which equals around 
EUR 18. However, this money never arrives. (In fact, it would be interest-
ing to find out where this money is actually used in the hierarchy.) If it 
did arrive, it would buy about 35 litres of gas oil, which would enable the 
1 A first version of this chapter was read as a key-note paper at the conference ‘States 
at Work in Sub-Saharan Africa’, LASDEL, Niamey, 7.–12. December 2009 and published in 
2010 as Working Paper No. 113 of the Department of Anthropology and African Studies of 
the Johannes Gutenberg University Mainz (http://www.ifeas.uni-mainz.de/92.php). 
© Thomas Bierschenk, 2014 | doi: 10.1163/9789004264960_010
This is an open access chapter distributed under the terms of the CC BY-NC 4.0 license.
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pick-up to travel around 300 km. For their official missions, the gendarmes 
use their own private motor-bikes. They also do this when they have to 
transport arrested persons to the Natitingou prison, and when they evacuate 
victims of mob justice to other gendarmerie posts to bring them to safety. In 
the former cases, the arrested person is handcuffed and put on the back-seat 
of the motor-bike, behind a gendarme. A second gendarme will be seated 
behind the detainee, or may follow the first on his own-motorbike. There is 
no telephone and the in-service radio-station has been broken for two years. 
As is the case in all Benin administrations, the gendarmes use their private 
mobile phones for all communications, including those carried out with the 
hierarchical chief. The brigade also boasts an old typewriter, however paper 
and everything else must be bought locally by the gendarmes themselves. 
The brigade chief comments that they are “doing the work of the state” but 
“the state doesn’t send us anything”.
He sees the present situation, in which, as he says, they “endure” (nous 
souffrons), as the result of a long process of deterioration, which acceler-
ated after what Beninese refer to as the ‘democratic renewal’ of 1990. Their 
predecessors (les anciens) still had work equipment, he says, and there were 
15 staff “under the revolution”, e.g. at the time of the Marxist-Leninist regime 
which lasted from 1974 to 1989. At the same time, he continues, democra-
tization has translated into a loss of respect, both the respect that people 
have for the police and the respect of subordinates for their superiors. In 
other words, their work has become more complex as they cannot rely on 
the old means of repression, and, at the same time, their working conditions 
have deteriorated.
In order to maintain a minimum of service, the brigade needs the help 
of what one of the gendarmes calls “well-disposed people” (gens de la bonne 
volonté). However, their number is limited as there are no big business-
men in Kouandé who would be capable of “giving a helping hand” ( faire 
des gestes), as exist in bigger centres and, in particular, in border posts. 
The town hall recently gave them a computer, and one of the small Igbo 
merchants has given them a car tyre. This was the point at which, without 
any prompting by us, the chief began to talk about corruption. (From the 
author’s field notes, March 2009)
The Objective: Bringing the State Back into  
Anthropological Research
This chapter—like most other contributions to this book—makes the case 
for the anthropological or, to be more precise, ethnographic study of state-
hood, which is severely lacking in the case of Africa. In concrete terms, it 
summarizes the findings of an international research programme carried 
out by a team of African, French and German researchers in four coun-
tries of West Africa (Benin, Ghana, Mali, Niger), which are occasionally 
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supplemented by evidence from other parts of the continent. It will be 
obvious to the attentive reader, however, that this chapter has a distinctly 
‘Beninese’ bias.2
In line with the general objective of the project and this book, this 
chapter addresses the question as to what states—in particular states in 
West Africa—do when they are ‘at work’ (Bierschenk and Olivier de Sar-
dan, Introduction, this volume). It concentrates on a few selected findings 
of the research project and argues that, by a process which I will refer to as 
sedimentation, historical trajectories—colonial and post-colonial—have 
resulted in the emergence of heterogeneous and fragmented bureaucra-
cies which, from the perspective of the public servants working in them, 
are complex normative universes shot through with numerous double 
binds. I conclude that the ‘ordered informality’3 of bureaucratic processes 
is at least as much a product arising within the state apparatuses them-
selves as it is an expression of the cultural logics of an African environ-
ment, and that any quest for the uniform logics of the African state will 
ultimately prove fruitless. Macro-differences between public services 
around the globe should not, therefore, be essentialized but understood 
as the accumulated products of numerous micro-processes.
2 For a more detailed description of the project, see Bierschenk and Olivier de Sar-
dan (Introduction, this volume) and the project homepage (http://www.ifeas.uni-mainz 
.de/277.php). As is inevitable in this type of collaborative work, many ideas—some of 
which are presented here—were developed in countless discussions among the project’s 
researchers over the years and cannot always be attributed to a particular author. The 
perspective which I try to develop is strongly influenced by my previous work on poli-
tics and the state in Benin (Bierschenk, Thioléron and Bako-Arifari 2002, Bierschenk 2006, 
2009a, 2011), in particular my own fieldwork on Benin’s justice (Bierschenk 2008) and 
education (Bierschenk 2009b) sector, as well by relevant PhD theses, which I have either 
supervised directly (Chabi Imorou 2010, Fichtner 2012, Tama 2011, Tchantipo 2012, Badou 
2013) or which I inspected as a member of the respective PhD committees (Hahonou 
2006, Hamani 2011, Yessoufou 2011, Budniok 2012), or which are currently being compiled 
in Mainz (Jan Beek, Mirco Göpfert). The work of master students, whose research on the 
education (Brandecker 2007a, 2007b, Hällmeyer 2007, Voss 2007, Wetzig 2007) and justice 
(Bierschenk 2010) sectors in Benin I followed, was also a source of inspiration. Many of 
the examples I cite are taken from these texts; however, so as no to overload the present 
contribution, I have kept the references to a minimum. I would also like to thank the 
participants in the different panels organized by the project between 2007 and 2011 for 
many inspiring discussions. 
3 This term of ‘ordered informality’ is adapted from Evans-Pritchard’s (1940: 296) 
description of segmentary societies as ‘ordered anarchies’—e.g. social configurations 
which, despite outer appearances, are regulated by routines and practices that are not 
always immediately obvious. The term ‘ordered informality’ is also used in this book by 
Olivier de Sardan and Hamani.
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Historicity: The Sedimentation of Colonial and  
Post-Colonial Experiences
Like all societal phenomena, statehood is path-dependent.4
Colonial Rule: The Projection of a Despotic Model of State
In the case of Africa, the colonial experience assumes a special signifi-
cance in this context (Bierschenk and Olivier de Sardan, Research para-
digm, this volume). With the establishment of colonial rule, a  European 
form of statehood was projected onto African societies. What was involved 
here, however, was not simply a matter of ‘the’ European state. The colo-
nial administration had few of the attributes required for African states 
today and in relation to which they are found to be deficient. The colonial 
state apparatus was at a remove from society; some authors have even 
described it as autistic (Spittler 1981). It was not at all accountable to its 
subjects and scarcely accountable to the European metropolitan public. 
Its main function was that of exploitation and political control, its pre-
ferred method the use or threat of physical violence. The colonial state 
engaged in little division of powers; executive, legislative and judicial pow-
ers largely coincided in this state. The lower one penetrated into the hier-
archy, the more true this was; office and officer increasingly overlapped 
here. At the same time, due to its low level of human and fiscal resources, 
on the one hand, and the special problems of control it encountered in 
a peasant society with little market integration, on the other, this repres-
sive colonial state was weak in terms of regulation and policy. As a result, 
at local level, it always relied on middle men who were difficult to con-
trol and whose practices were experienced by the population as largely 
arbitrary. Bureaucratic characteristics of the Weberian ideal type (Bier-
schenk and Olivier de Sardan, Introduction, this volume) were only found 
at the higher levels of the administration. The people who displayed these 
characteristics had a privileged world view, however; as expatriates, they 
expected an all-inclusive package with official residences, personnel and 
foreign allowances.
This very specific model of statehood was adopted in toto, as it were, at 
independence in Africa. Initially, only the European staff was replaced by 
African nationals at varying speeds. The fact that the African staff often 
4 The following historic review is more broadly developed in Thomas Bierschenk and 
Eva Spies (2012).
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lacked the necessary qualifications for the work to be carried out was a 
result of the highly selective colonial educational policy. Hence, the real 
winners in the decolonialization process were the few well-educated 
Africans. This bureaucratic elite became the real power elite, saw itself 
as the avant-garde of the state and nation-building processes and devel-
oped an “arrogant paternalism” (Eckert, this volume) vis-à-vis their fellow 
citizens.
The Fiscal Crisis of African States (After 1973)
This historical legacy—a despotic model of state, small, poorly-trained 
elites who were ill-prepared for independence and prone to factionalism—
was in itself a particularly difficult one, even when compared to those of 
post-colonial states in other parts of the world (Nugent 2004: 58–71, Young 
1994). After all, many African states were structurally bankrupt when they 
embarked on independence, not least because of high, and internation-
ally uncompetitive, labour costs, a product of late-colonial development 
policy (Cooper 1996). After independence, further historical experiences 
accumulated. The safeguarding of the power position of the ‘political-
bureaucratic’ class quickly emerged as a matter of priority over the task 
of development (Bates 2008) while the state-centred economic develop-
ment model soon revealed its limits. The model finally shattered in the 
early 1970s under the influence of the oil crisis, heralding two decades of 
economic decline, which, in most states, led to high debt and structural 
adjustment under the auspices of the International Monetary Fund in the 
1980s. This deepening fiscal crisis of African states resulted in the increas-
ing dilapidation of state apparatuses.
African Countries as Objects of Experimentation Under  
the Post-Colonial Development Regime
No other continent has been such an intensive focus of development-
policy intervention and social-policy experiments in the post-colonial 
period as Africa (Cooper 1997). The paradigms of intervention followed 
each other in increasingly rapid succession, the speed of which acceler-
ated after 1990, in particular: the funding of infrastructure projects, the 
Basic Needs approach, Structural Adjustment, the fight against poverty, 
Good Governance, decentralization, participation, Millennium Develop-
ment Goals—to name only a few of the adopted paradigms.
Within African countries, these paradigms translated into cascades 
of reforms, in particular after 1990. These reforms present a number of 
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common features: they are externally driven, imposed from above, with 
only rhetorical nods towards ‘participation’, they are often contradictory 
and/or redundant, and highly selective. In any case, they place govern-
ment employees, who are at once the agents and the objects of reform, in 
an ambiguous position. Learning to navigate numerous and contradicting 
reforms has become part of the professional skills of African public ser-
vants (Charton, Muñoz, this volume).
To begin, the paradigms of development were not generally created on 
the basis of internal political debates in the African post-colonial states 
themselves: apart from short spells of African socialism in some countries, 
in terms of their own development, post-colonial African governments 
and African populations have had no “discursive sovereignty” (Nganang 
2012). On the contrary, development paradigms are almost always gen-
erated from outside. They do not, therefore, represent tailor-made 
responses to the specific problems of African states but, to paraphrase 
Naudet (1999), the importation of ‘solutions looking for problems’. One 
of the consequences of this is the generalizaton of political irresponsibil-
ity: African governments can attribute failures and responsibility for the 
general course of action adopted to the donors, and vice versa (van de 
Walle 2001).
The reforms often incorporated a strong utopian element, hinging on 
the hope that ‘if only’ such and such reform were implemented, things 
would change profoundly (for examples from the education sector, see 
Bierschenk 2007). In the long term, this continuity of the rhetorical ele-
ments of development paradigms squares awkwardly with the contra-
dictory approaches adopted by donors to African states as bureaucratic 
institutions. These approaches ranged from policies inspired by modern-
ization theory, which viewed the state as a main vector of development 
(from the 1950s to the 1970s), to outright anti-state policies in the area 
of structural adjustment programmes (in the 1980s and early 1990s), aug-
mented by a participation ideology, and, lately, a partial rehabilitation 
of the state under the banner of capacity development and institution-
 building inspired by principles of New Public Management. However, 
even in the short term, and within specific public policy areas, the con-
tradictions are striking (Charton, Muñoz, this volume).
Hence, it is reasonable to doubt whether donor-led reforms render 
public policies more coherent and more efficient; in fact, they appear to 
increase institutional complexity (Anders, Charton, this volume). This 
complexification is increased by a parallel tendency, which has been 
referred to as the “multiplication of units syndrome” (Bergamaschi, this 
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volume). Governments and donors alike tend to respond to new chal-
lenges by doing their work through ‘projects’—involving the creation of 
new institutions parallel to the existing ones. Examples of this practice are 
legion: from the creation of user committees around each little develop-
ment project, to the predilection for Cellules de la moralisation de la vie 
politique, which replicate the internal control mechanisms of government 
departments in the fight against corruption, and special units in ministries 
which are solely occupied with the coordination of donor organizations. 
At best, ‘islands of efficiency’ are created which, however, are dependent 
on external funding (Roll, this volume). At worst, these projects and spe-
cial units tie up the human and financial resources of national bureaucra-
cies for months if not years into the future, and deflect the energies of the 
officials working there from all other tasks.
The Resilience of a Politicized and Under-Resourced  
Prefectural Bureaucratic Mo del
However, reforms do not—and, in fact, cannot—take effect on a clean 
slate. They are interventions in dynamic systems (Elwert and Bierschenk 
1988). On the ground, reforms encounter bureaucratic structures, rational-
ities and personnel—the legacy, so to speak, of previous reforms—which 
they try to reform, in turn, but which are at the same time the means 
by and contexts in which these reforms have to be implemented. Three 
aspects of these local bureaucratic configurations seem to be of particu-
lar relevance in this respect: state bureaucracies are dramatically under-
resourced, in terms of personnel and equipment; they have been heavily 
politicized since the 1960s; and they reveal the authoritarian ethos of a 
command administration which itself is a colonial legacy.
Under-Resourcing
Despite statements frequently presented to the contrary, the public sec-
tor in African states is not ‘inflated’ (Goldsmith 1999). Correlated with 
the size of its population, Benin has only just over one third of the num-
ber of police officers found in Germany and only 40% of the number 
employed in France, and only five percent of the number of judges and 
state prosecutors in Germany. Following the economic crises of the late 
1970s and early 1980s, salaries decreased, dramatically in some cases, and 
the number of public service employees, which had risen continuously up 
to then, decreased. (Both trends have recently been reversed.) Even more 
dramatic, however, was the decline in working resources: today, many 
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local officials have de facto no budget whatsoever at their disposal. As we 
have seen in the ethnographic example presented at the beginning of this 
text, if local officals want to maintain a minimal state service, they must 
use private resources,. This is the other face of the creeping privatization 
of public services, which, more often than not, is viewed exclusively from 
the perspective of corruption. If the payment of a regular salary that is suf-
ficient to cover living costs and access to an office and the necessary work-
ing resources constitute the minimum requirements for the existence of 
a state bureaucracy (according to Max Weber, see Bierschenk and Olivier 
de Sardan, Introduction, this volume), it follows that state bureaucracies 
do not exist in many parts of rural West Africa. The state is clearly unrav-
elling at these edges; it is “dissolving”, as Jean-Pierre Olivier de Sardan 
(2000) put it.
However, not all areas of the state bureaucracies have been equally 
affected by this decline. Some have managed to withstand the crisis better 
than others: in particular, the higher levels of the bureaucracy have been 
less severely affected by the crisis than the small interface officials (Lentz, 
Therkildsen, this volume).
Politicization and Weakening of Internal Controls
The state apparatuses were also weakened from within, however: the 
internal sanction and control mechanisms were systematically hollowed 
out in the course of their Africanization. A transfer to the suivi et évalua-
tion department of any ministry today effectively means being politically 
side-lined (mis au placard). The motives behind this weakening process 
were political: they allowed the heads of state to implement a clientelist 
personnel policy. In the long term, this undermined the legitimacy of 
administrative sanctions which are usually understood as simply politi-
cally motivated, thereby eroding the control capacities of the leadership.
A Prefectural Bureaucratic Model
Ministries are organized according to a rigid hierarchical pattern and a 
very high level of centralized decision making. For example, in the educa-
tion ministries, before any decision reaches the teachers, it has gone down 
through all the levels of the administrative ladder, while any information 
from the schools goes up the same ladder, feeding into increasingly syn-
thetic reports on each level. An example are the subjects for the examina-
tions taken at the end of primary school (certificat d’études primaries/CEP) 
in Cameroon: while teachers propose these subjects, they are revised at 
harmonized at each administrative level, validated by the central exami-
nation bureau and then transmitted downwards to the teachers.
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As Hélène Charton (this volume) shows for Cameroonian primary edu-
cation system, this leads to paradoxical results of reforms: educational 
reforms like the competency-based approach are implemented in a 
 system called formation en cascade which corresponds to this prefectural 
model of a command bureaucracy. As in the training-and-visit system 
of agricultural extension, the idea is that the top echelons of the educa-
tion administration are trained in the new principles first, and that they 
then pass on their new knowledge to the inferior levels. The effect is 
that the top echelon, e.g. school inspectors, who do not teach, receive far 
more training than the people who are ultimately supposed to implement 
the reform, i.e. the teachers: whereas the former were trained in up to 
30 days of seminars (with all the perks in terms of per diems attached to 
these seminars, cf. Smith 2003), teachers received only one or two days 
of training on average. Furthermore, the principle of the reform itself— 
putting the learner at the centre of the educational exercise—is con-
tradicted by the authoritarian form of these training sessions, in which 
knowledge is dispensed ex cathedra.
In other words, reforms are distinctly top-down in nature, and are 
barely discussed with the stakeholders; if discussions and ‘participation’ 
take place they are highly ritualized. As a consequence, educational 
reforms are as much reforms implemented without the input of teachers 
as security sector reforms are reforms without the input of policemen and 
gendarmes. In this respect, many administrative reforms in Africa can, 
indeed, be studied as examples of how not to implement reforms. Instead 
of increasing the efficiency of public service delivery, more often than not, 
they provide opportunities for staging a technocratic and legal-rational 
discourse with the outside (Muñoz, this volume).
The Simultaneity of the Non-Simultaneous
As a result, African bureaucracies are very heterogeneous, if not frag-
mented, building sites, a point which we develop in the introduction to 
this book. Instead of buildings that are based on a more or less coherent 
plan and which are more or less efficiently used, they resemble landscapes 
of disjointed vestiges of reform. The ‘products’ of these reforms have depos-
ited like sediments in the African bureaucracies we studied: the effects 
of a particular reform do not usually displace the results of the previous 
one—at least not completely. Instead, each institutional reform and each 
round of development policy intervention leaves behind an institutional 
legacy which slots into the group of existing institutional arrangements. 
Nicolas van de Walle (2001) has captured this dynamic in the notion 
of “the partial reform syndrome”. However, he wrongly attributes this 
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phenomenon exclusively to the interests of African elites who, for selfish 
reasons, boycott well-meant reform attempts by the donors; he fails to see 
how this partial reform syndrome is a result also of the dynamic of the 
development regime and the resulting donor competition.
Over 50 years of development policy have not led to the homogeniza-
tion of these institutional arrangements; instead they became increasingly 
complex. If one considers the individual elements of the bureaucracies—
personnel, official rules, practical norms, discourses—they paint a picture 
of the accretions of time that have accumulated, side by side, on top of 
each other, or in other twisted configurations.5
The simultaneity of the non-simultaneous is, of course, an attribute of 
all bureaucracies—which, after all, as organizational sociology has shown, 
are merely loosely coupled systems, at best (Weick 1976; for an applica-
tion of this idea, see also Titeca and De Herdt 2010). However, sedimenta-
tion and the resulting heterogeneity appear to be particularly prominent 
features of the African bureaucracies we studied. Public bureaucracies in 
Africa can unite elements of an ancient colonial state with the very lat-
est trends in administrative reform: for example, forestry officials are still 
very influenced by the repressive paramilitary, colonial operating style but 
at the same time support the principles of participative community for-
estry (Blundo, this volume); teachers teach in an authoritarian style that 
goes back to the 1950s but are expected to profess to the latest pedagogi-
cal fashions such as pupil-centred teaching, which, as everyone knows, is 
impossible to practice in the reality of an African school (Chabi Imorou, 
this volume); Benin’s penal law originates in part from the 19th century, 
however its commercial law was recently modernized.
Dimensions of Heterogeneity in African Bureaucracies
In fact, the multiplication and fragmentation of public authorities (as well 
as their increasing competition with non-public authorities) has been of 
increasing concern to scholars of politics in Africa (Bierschenk and Olivier 
de Sardan, Introduction, this volume). To describe this phenomenon, 
Jean Copans (2001: 14) proposed the allusive metaphor of “administra-
tive archipelagos”: i.e. African public services as a collection of peninsulas 
5 This process of ‘piling up’ resembles mechanisms of local political arenas which were 
analysed in Bierschenk and Olivier de Sardan (2003).
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and islands which are connected to and isolated from each other to vary-
ing degrees. In some sectors of political science, this is not a new idea: 
 Schmitter (1985: 33) sees the modern state as “an amorphous complex of 
agencies with ill-defined boundaries, performing a great variety of not 
very distinctive functions”.
At least seven interconnected dimensions of this structural heterogene-
ity can be identified for the African bureaucracies we studied:
Different Colonial Histories and Institutional Lagging
Obvious differences arise due to the variations in the colonial pre- histories. 
For the sample of countries we studied, this relates, first, to the differ-
ent institutional set-ups of former Anglophone and Francophone colo-
nies. However, these differences do not affect all state sectors to the same 
extent; the colonial heritage is far more visible in some than in others. 
Thus, the justice sector in Ghana is clearly influenced by the British tradi-
tions while those in Benin, Niger and Mali are influenced by the French 
one. Similar differences also exist in the education sector: the normative 
model of the teacher as a state official is clearly inspired by the French 
system, and from the beginning of the colonial era to the present day, cor-
poratist policies relating to teachers have always largely evolved around 
the objective that the various categories of non-functionary and non-ten-
ured teachers be integrated in the country’s civil service.
However, if the influence of the metropolitan model remains strong, 
it is often a model that was already replaced in the metropolitan coun-
try some time ago. For example, in the post- 1960 decade, the Dahomean 
educational system resembled different elements of the French model 
of the 1930s and 1940. Some central elements of this old French model 
even lingered in Dahomey (then re-named Benin) until the 1970s, while 
French reforms of the 1970s were adopted in Benin only 25 years later, if 
not later. This phenomenon, which may be termed ‘institutional lagging’, 
is widespread in African public services (but not, of course, unknown else-
where): while the organizational model of the metropolitan country has 
evolved long since, organizational configurations found in the ex-colony 
today may still contain elements that were copied in colonial times. In 
this sense, African public bureaucracies could be described as still only 
partly decolonized.
It needs to be added that, in general, national structures in the edu-
cation sector across African countries have converged to a greater 
extent than in the justice sector. Whereas the justice sector presents a 
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professional culture with strong national characteristics, the language 
of the educational sector today is becoming increasingly international 
(Bierschenk 2007).
The Differentiating Effects of Development Interventions
Another dimension of the heterogeneity, often within the same sector 
but also between sectors, arises from the influence of development policy 
interventions. These often create “two-speed bureaucracies” (bureaucrat-
ies à deux vitesses) (Chauveau, Le Pape and Olivier de Sardan 2001; see 
also Blundo, this volume): a state bureaucracy which is completely under-
resourced and condemned to inactivity is faced with a ‘project bureau-
cracy’ with far better working conditions and higher salaries. The creation 
of parastatal agencies for the fulfilment of public tasks has a similarly dif-
ferentiating effect (Therkildsen, this volume).
Competition between State Ministries and Services  
Intensified by Donor Intervention
Reforms, often implemented under pressure of donors, may also increase 
the competition between services. A well-known example from the Fran-
cophone countries is the competition between ministries of finance, 
strengthened and supported by the international finance institutions, 
and the planning ministries, which the international finance institutions 
associate with old-fashioned planning ideology and hence attempt to 
marginalize, but which, in turn, are often supported by the UNDP and 
bilateral donors critical of Structural Adjustment Programmes. Another 
example from Cameroon is cited by Muñoz (this volume). Here, the taxa-
tion of the livestock sector had been the task of agents of the Ministry of 
Livestock, Fisheries and Animal Husbandry (MINEPIA). Over the years, 
the latter developed routines involving collusive arrangements with tax-
payers, interspersed with practices of unofficial exaction. Under a reform 
programme, which is intended to increase the efficiency of internal rev-
enue mobilization and mirrors a string of other similar projects in neigh-
bouring countries encouraged by donors, the agents of the ministry are 
now obliged to cooperate with officials from the Ministry of Economy and 
Finance (MINEFI)—an institution with not only a quite different political 
culture, but one which is also part of a different politico-ethnic network: 
while MINEPIA is considered to be within the Northern bloc islamo-peul, 
MINEFI is considered a Beti ministry, whose staff originate mainly from 
the southern part of the country. Hence, tax reform became a stage on 
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which conflicts between local representatives of the state were played out 
(for a similar fragmenting effect of reform, see Anders, this volume).
Islands of Efficiency and Inefficiency
Different state bureaucracies vary significantly in their efficiency (not only 
but also) because of differences in their material resources. Just as ‘islands 
of inefficiency’ can be found in otherwise seemingly well- functioning state 
apparatuses, ‘islands of efficiency’ (or ‘pockets of effectiveness’) can be 
found, even within the state bureaucracies which were generally char-
acterized by a low level of productivity in the countries we researched 
(Roll, this volume).6 As a general trend, our empirical studies suggest that 
the higher echelons of the public service function at a level that is closer 
to international professional norms than the lower echelons (Lentz, this 
volume). This is obvious, for example, in the judiciary and, judging from 
impressionistic evidence, it may also apply to institutions like central 
banks and finance ministries, at least in part. However, this concerns a 
point at which our sample (mainly lower-rank interface officials) shows 
its limits and where further empirical clarification is required.
Differences in Working Conditions between  
Different Categories of Personnel
The working conditions of different categories of public sector employees 
can vary significantly. Overall, the vertical spread of salaries is far more 
extreme in Africa than elsewhere. Whereas the ratio between the lowest 
and highest salaries paid in the German public services is around 1 to 9 
and the World Bank recommends a ratio of 13 to 1 (Lentz, this volume), in 
Benin the corresponding ratio is 16 to 1. In Uganda it appears to be 50 to 1 
(Therkildsen, this volume). These figures only refer to the basic salaries 
of the employees, however, and therefore conceal a far higher spread in 
real terms: first, the privatization of public tasks, e.g. in primary school 
education as a result of the introduction of various contract teacher mod-
els, has led to the reduction of the salaries paid for lower-ranking roles 
which no longer feature in the public service salary tables. Second, vari-
ous allowances and the differential possibilities for acquiring additional 
6 These structural pockets of effectiveness need to be analytically distinguished from 
temporary ‘islands of efficiency’ which are created by the infusion of development aid 
resources, see above.
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income carry far greater weight in Africa than in Europe. In some Afri-
can countries these amount to more than the basic salary. The spread of 
these allowances is even wider than that of basic income: for example, a 
high ranking official from the Beninese primary education ministry on an 
official mission to a rural area, for which he does not actually incur any 
accommodation or food costs as he will be lodged and fed by the teachers 
he visits, receives a daily per diem that may be twice the monthly salary of 
a community teacher. As we shall see, these material differences between 
the higher and lower ranks correlate with differences in the normative 
relationships with the state.
Growing Internal Heterogeneity of Professional Groups
These general differences between higher and lower ranks of public ser-
vants are thwarted, however, by the extensive and growing internal het-
erogeneity of the individual professional groups. This heterogeneity also is 
a sedimented product of bureaucratic history. Different eras leave behind 
different categories of personnel with the result that the internal compo-
sition of a professional group becomes increasingly differentiated: ‘On ne 
sait plus qui est qui’ is the view expressed in relation to the many categories 
of teachers who can end up working together today at one and the same 
school in Benin: i.e. teachers with civil-servant status, contract teachers, 
community teachers and unofficially employed assistants. The situation 
among police officers is quite similar. One feature of this differentiation 
is the very unequal salaries paid for the same work. Thus, for example, 
employees in public agencies or development projects in Uganda earn 
up to 60 % more than their professional colleagues in the central gov-
ernment apparatus; some drivers in these agencies earn between 50 and 
150 % more than economists working in the ministries (Therkildsen, this 
volume). Remarkable differences also exist in the availability of working 
resources—for example IT equipment—within one and the same pub-
lic bureaucracy, e.g. between schools, courts, ministries and ministerial 
departments .
To conclude this point: my claim is not that European bureaucracies are 
homogenous formations while African bureaucracies, in contrast, are het-
erogeneous ensembles. All bureaucracies are characterized by sedimenta-
tion and structural heterogeneity. The difference between European and 
African bureaucracies lies in their specific combination of heterogeneous 
elements and in the resulting degree of heterogeneity, which, overall, 
appears to be greater in Africa.
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Co-Productions of Public Services
The notion of what constitutes a public good or service is an historically 
rooted one (Bierschenk and Olivier de Sardan, Introduction, this volume). 
Therefore, whether a public service is delivered by a public authority, 
private commercial actors, or private non-profit associations varies over 
space and time. A good example is education: the fact that Europeans 
view primary school education as a public task today is, in historical 
terms, a comparatively recent product of 19th century history associated 
with the rise of the modern nation-state. And even the fact that education 
is viewed as a public responsibility does not say who should be running 
schools: the government or private, for-profit or non-profit, actors or both. 
In fact, many ‘public’ services, beyond education, are co-produced by state 
agencies together with private actors. Furthermore, it is possible that a 
particular public service is not rendered by the category of actor or insti-
tution foreseen in the official organigrams. In our research programme, 
this confusion of roles and functions concerned, in particular, teaching 
(by public and private schools, different categories of teachers from public 
servants over community teachers to private homework teachers), secu-
rity (by the police, the gendarmerie, private security forces, village chiefs 
and many others) and the justice sector, especially at local level (first-
instance courts, conciliation tribunals, the different police forces, village 
chiefs and many others).
Co-production of public services by public and private actors is not, 
again, a purely African phenomenon; it is a feature of all public services. 
Nevertheless, it also appears to be particularly marked in Africa. However, 
there are no clear tendencies across the board, either in the direction of 
increasing privatization, nor increasing statism, and differences between 
countries and sectors have always been considerable. While education 
was delivered predominantly, if not exclusively by private actors—
mainly Christian missions—in the African colonies up to 1906, it became 
a decide dly state affair in the French colonies after that date—with the 
paradoxical effect that educational parameters in the British colonies, 
which continued to rely heavily on missions, have been much better to-
date than in the Francophone countries.
However, the public-private divide cannot simply be projected onto dif-
ferent types of organizations. For example, even in theoretically free edu-
cational systems, strong private elements persist within the public system 
whereby some of the costs of running schools (mainly equipment) are 
borne by parents, the use of private homework tutors is very widespread 
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and, even in public schools, some of the staff are private employees: they 
are privately sub-contracted by school directors who feel overburdened by 
their administrative tasks. This widespread practice is illegal but tolerated 
and is also found in other public services like the police and gendarmerie, 
courts and the customs service (Blundo and Olivier de Sardan, with Bako-
Arifari and Tidjani Alou 2006). On the other hand, private schools, in all 
our sample countries, remain publicly regulated. The same is true of the 
production of security: the work of public police forces—the police in the 
strict sense of the word as well as gendarmerie and forestry services—
always depends on the cooperation of private actors, and vice versa 
(Beek 2008).
In other words, the co-production of public services rests on complex, 
and shifting configurations of actors, and boundaries are not stable; these 
“delivery configurations” (Olivier de Sardan, this volume) are the object of 
continuous ‘work’ by the actors. The Good Governance ideology recently 
en vogue, which is based on the idea of a harmonious balance between 
the three sectors of the state, the market and non-profit associations, has 
certainly been a factor behind the push in the direction of increasing 
the ‘private’ element in education. One particularly fascinating phenom-
enon has been the ‘disciplining’ of the state—in this case, the education 
system—by private international NGOs which try to channel the public 
education sector in the direction of strict criteria of budgetary discipline, 
accountability, community participation and modern educational princi-
ples (Fichtner 2012). However, the results are far from unidirectional, and 
more often than not more complex than the blueprints drawn up abroad, 
with local political and bureaucratic logics often gaining the upper hand 
over attempts at modernization from the exterior (Anders, Bergamaschi, 
Chabi Imorou, Muñoz, this volume). Far from the harmonious picture of 
good governance ideologies, the public-private boundaries remain highly 
charged sites of conflict and creative strategies.
Therefore, it would certainly be wrong to assume that the role of 
the state is a generally diminishing one—in Benin and Mali, for example, 
we observe instead tendencies to for the re-enlargement of the role of the 
state in education by bringing community school under stronger govern-
ment control (Félix Koné, private communication) and by putting formerly 
privately paid community teachers on the government payroll (Benin). 
Incidentally, this means that the internal brain drain is not unidirectional 
either: while working for an international NGO is in many respects—
salaries, working conditions—more attractive than working for the state, 
and international NGOs in the education sector heavily rely on the work 
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of (retired) school inspectors as local consultants, since the beginning of 
colonization, the corporatist interests of private actors in education in the 
Francophone countries have always been focused on the overriding objec-
tive of attaining the status of a government functionary.
The Public Service as a Complex Normative Universe
For the officials who work in these bureaucracies this heterogeneity means 
that they act in professional contexts marked by enormous normative plu-
ralism (Chauveau, Le Pape and Olivier de Sardan 2001).
Modern bureaucracy not only has a technical side but also an ethi-
cal one. Hence, when the modern civil service was developed in the 
19th  century—the British civil service having been invented in colonial 
India—it was not merely a matter of creating institutional innovations to 
replace the patrimonial bureaucracy that had dominated up to then with 
its abuse of privileges, corruption and high dependency on politics. The 
creation of an “appropriate bureaucratic persona” and the “fashioning of 
an appropriate administrative subjectivity” were equally important. The 
modern civil servant was the product of a “codification of an ethical type 
that bears particular competence to rule”, he became the bearer of a “ruling 
habitus” (Osborne 1994: 290). Therefore, the civil service entrance exami-
nation and corresponding preparation were not exclusively focussed on 
knowledge, but were primarily seen as character training: “The aim was 
not, in a negative sense, to create a bureaucracy, but to motivate offi-
cials for public service” (p. 306). Ideas about the radical non-ethic char-
acter of the modern bureaucracy, as often ascribed to Max Weber, are, 
therefore, misleading—both as regards bureaucracy and as regards Max 
Weber, who spoke of the office as “life order” (Lebensordnung): “Bureau-
cracy . . . presupposes an ethical formation on the part of the bureaucrat, 
a bureaucratic vocation, as opposed to a more or less blind obedience to 
rules and orders” (p. 309). An ethical understanding of bureaucratic office 
is, therefore, the necessary complement to the power of discretion of the 
bureaucrat and, specifically, the condition for the restriction of bureau-
cratic tendencies in the negative sense.
Contrary to prevailing clichés, this ideal image of the bureaucrat also 
exists in Africa and it comes into play there. It is taught in the teacher 
training institutes and police schools, its formulations—for example the 
ethical code of the customs officer or the “ten commandments of the 
good policeman”—can be read in many state offices. This ideal image was 
238 thomas bierschenk
repeatedly referred to without prompting by our informants. The extent 
to which this image of the correct and responsible official is part of the 
external representation of many state authorities is in fact very striking 
(see also Lentz, this volume).
In their professional practice, officials must, however, act in complex 
normative universes, for which this ideal image can only be one template 
among many. These moral universes are characterized by an intense double 
tension. First, a tension between the different official norms themselves. 
These are often contradictory, in part obsolete and frequently simply not 
applicable. Extensive areas of educational practice, for example, are either 
not controlled by texts or the texts that exist are contradictory. The per-
manent intervention of many uncoordinated donors and the resulting 
stop-go policy, for example in the area of human resources policy, further 
exacerbate the problem. Moreover, these norms change constantly—as a 
result of reforms—sometimes from one year to the next.
The inadequacy of the official rules and regulations, which are often ill-
adapted to reality, necessitates the production of informal norms which 
actually enable the minimal functioning of the apparatuses (Olivier de 
Sardan, Hamani, this volume)—albeit, in a negative feedback loop, inten-
sifying its functional problems. As a result, the officials navigate in a con-
text that appears to be fundamentally unpredictable and they frequently 
deplore this absence de vision prospective. They become masters in the selec-
tive application of contradictory norms of varying origin, of “organisation 
improviste” and “bricolage”. This is aptly expressed in the saying familiar to 
every street-level bureaucrat in Benin: “c’est le terrain qui commande”.
Therefore a second source of tension exists between these official 
norms—which, as underlined, are contradictory in themselves and con-
stantly changing—and the practical norms. Again, this too is not a purely 
African phenomenon. No bureaucracy functions in accordance with the 
Weberian ideal type (which is, first, an ideal type and, second, limited to 
the formal aspects of the functioning of a bureaucracy). A bureaucracy is 
not a machine but a configuration of social processes. As the sociology of 
organizations has shown in recent decades, all formal organizations require 
informal rules and practices in addition to formal ones to be able to func-
tion. Most individual characteristics that are frequently cited as typical of 
African organizations can be found, therefore, in Western bureaucracies. 
For example, the German civil service has been described by leading orga-
nizational sociologists as a “patronage bureaucracy” (Bosetzky 1971, 1974). 
In addition to all of the meritocratic criteria (which are also effective), 
promotion in the German civil service is largely based on “promotional 
relationships among the employees” and on the “instrumentalization of 
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the employees by external organizations”, hence largely on the patron-
age of parties and interest groups (Bosetzky 1974: 431). Indeed, Bosetzky 
(p. 433) concludes that “a completely objective system of promotion lib-
erated from all micropolitics, formalized and mathematicized” would 
involve considerable losses of efficiency for the public administration and 
actually cause its collapse into subsystems as the administration is reliant 
on “a high degree of group cohesion”.
Officials in the countries we studied are given little preparation during 
their training on how to deal with these tensions. Instead, they are taught 
an ideal image of their future profession. They only learn to do deal with 
reality during the phase of informal professional socialization which they 
undergo in the early years of their career. This leads to a conclusion that 
may not be immediately obvious: the internal motivation of the bureau-
crats is even more important in African bureaucracies than in those with 
greater top-down control, for example the German civil service!
In fact, one recurrent theme emerging from our interviews with African 
officials was the notion of a moral contractual relationship which binds 
them to the state. More senior officials describe this moral relationship 
as largely intact: “we work for the nation”, they say, and they consider 
that meritocratic principles for hiring and promotion are in fact opera-
tional (Lentz, see also Willott, this volume). In the opinion of the lower 
ranks, the interface bureaucrats, however, the state has contravened the 
terms of this contract: “l’Etat nous a laissé”, they say. This situation can be 
seen as a typical double-bind situation: low level bureaucrats are exposed 
to paralyzing, because contradictory, messages. Officially, their superiors 
insist on an ideal of behaviour, but, so to speak, with a wink, letting it 
be known that they, too, realize that this ideal cannot be followed. In 
certain circumstances, however, they may actually find it convenient to 
insist on the ideal being followed to the letter. This possibility of switching 
between official and practical norms—for example in the decisions over 
promotions and transfers between different posts—is an important basis 
of power within an organization together with the more or less deliber-
ate creation of informational opacity (see also Therkildsen, this volume). 
Subordinates react to this double-bind by pretending, again with a wink, 
to be following official rules. The result is widespread hypocrisy: the state 
pretends to pay its officials and give them an operating budget and the 
officials pretend to work (see also the notion of ‘double speak’ in Olivier 
de Sardan 2009).
A wide range of the behaviours we observed among the street-level 
bureaucrats can, therefore, be understood as compensation strategies 
developed in response to this moral double-bind. Most of these strategies 
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basically involve the principle of limiting professional commitment. The 
limiting of professional commitment means, first, that entry into a pro-
fession is very often based on highly random conditions. Many officials 
told us that they applied for different careers and that they became what 
they now are simply because they passed one exam and not another. Even 
when they have embarked on a particular career path, they keep a close 
eye out for alternatives; exit options are permanently scrutinized. This 
process of scanning for exit options can take different forms. It can mean 
the search for professional alternatives within or outside the relevant pro-
fessional field. The low-level bureaucrats interviewed by us displayed an 
astonishingly firm belief in the professional significance of knowledge and 
its sanctioning by qualifications. Therefore, many officials spend a great 
deal of their spare time pursuing further training activities: police officers 
and gendarmes study law to gain access to the entrance examinations for 
qualification for the position of commissioner; teachers enrol for sociol-
ogy courses for the same reason; contract teachers apply for work with the 
customs authorities; teachers in Ghana train to become lawyers; etc. This 
culture of qualifications (culture de diplôme) alone can be interpreted as 
empirical proof of the strong embedding of meritocratic principles at local 
level (see also Willott, this volume). Another strategy involves second-
ary employment. For example, the majority of younger teachers appear 
to be employed outside of their official hours of work as tutors. In other 
words, officials often only have limited investment in what they are actu-
ally doing, and are permanently on the lookout for exit options. They are 
“doing the state, en attendant” (Bierschenk 2009b).
Some General Conclusions
These observations suggest three general conclusions for the understand-
ing of statehood in Africa:
The Production of Informality within the Bureaucratic Apparatuses
The enormous emphasis on informal norms and practices in African 
bureaucracies is often interpreted as an adaptation to local social contexts, 
as the displacement of bureaucratic norms by social ones. In its most sim-
plistic formulation, it is considered the expression of an ‘African mental-
ity’ (cf. Olivier de Sardan 2010). We believe that such an interpretation 
misses the fact that the informal norms are largely produced within the 
apparatuses themselves. It is less culture, than history and organization 
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that explain the characteristic features of African states. The immedi-
ate context in which this extensive production of informal norms takes 
place is the lack of steering capacity at the top level of African bureaucra-
cies; another factor is the constant interventions by numerous uncoordi-
nated donor organizations. Furthermore, all factors—bad management, 
bad functioning, constant interfering from the outside—are linked in a 
feedback loop and mutually reinforce their effects. In this situation, the 
production of informal norms is the functional equivalence to reforms 
which neither local leadership nor foreign donors are able to implement 
(Hamani, this volume).
These feedback loops render the informality that characterizes African 
bureaucracies collusive: a considerable degree of hypocrisy can be found 
in African bureaucracies—as, indeed, in all bureaucracies and modern 
organizations where it has been described as “the practice of incorporat-
ing different organizational structures, processes and ideologies for inter-
nal and external use” (Brunsson 2002). The management levels are aware 
that many formal rules are not implementable and that informal practices 
are required if the apparatus is to function at all. For example, school 
principals have significantly more tasks to fulfil than is officially admit-
ted and yet they are still expected to complete a full teaching load. Many 
principals solve this problem by appointing private teaching assistants. 
Strictly speaking this is not allowed. Faced with this situation, manage-
ment at the ministry officially insists on compliance with the official code 
but usually tolerates the practice in reality—in compliance with an infor-
mal code of conduct that characterizes many areas of life in Benin and 
is expressed in the saying “you must know when to close your eyes”. All 
participants pretend to observe the official rules despite being fully aware 
that they cannot be implemented. In the emic discourse of public servants 
in Benin, this is referred to as navigation à vue. These informal practices 
should not necessarily—or primarily—be equated with corruption, but 
they can become the gateway to it. They fundamentally blur the boundar-
ies between the state and non-state areas. And while the centrally regu-
lated reforms go nowhere, the basis produces many small ad hoc reforms 
or réformes dérivées (Blundo, Hamani, this volume).
African Statehood not Subject to a Uniform Logic
Hence, the empirical research of statehood deconstructs the state fic-
tion often presented by jurisprudence and the political sciences. It 
focuses on the heterogeneity, the incompleteness and ‘omnipresence’ 
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of statehood—so that it is impossible to define, once and for all, where 
exactly the border between state and non-state lies. As a result of ethno-
graphic research, this may not come as a surprise: within the ranks of the 
social and cultural sciences, anthropologists tend to side more with the 
splitters than the lumpers. Linear explanations are not allowed from this 
kind of perspective: it is difficult to ascribe a single cause or consequence 
to a given factor. Depending on the context and its position in a sequence, 
the same factor can have very different effects and the same phenomenon 
be triggered by different factors.
Thus, African statehood is not based on an ’essence’ of its own; it has 
no inherent “grain” (Kelsall 2008); it does not represent the exotic ‘com-
pletely other’ as compared with western statehood. Just as African agricul-
ture is characterized by high micro-variability, the characteristic feature 
of African bureaucracies is their enormous heterogeneity. Contrary to 
what some authors claim (see Bierschenk and Olivier de Sardan, Research 
paradigm, this volume), politics and statehood in Africa are not subject to 
any uniform moral matrix.
Macro-Difference as the Result of Cumulated Micro-Differences
The question arises, however, as to how we should understand differences 
between public services around the globe, in particular as regards their 
relative efficiency in the delivery of public goods and service. These differ-
ences undoubtedly exist and to a considerable extent. In an international 
comparison, African public bureaucracies are particularly unsuccessful at 
the production of public goods such as education, justice and social order. 
I argue that we should understand them as the accumulated outcome of 
many small differences. The difference between African and other, say 
European, bureaucracies does not, therefore, lie in the fact that they work 
on the basis of essentially different criteria. They function largely on the 
basis of the same elements, however with a different ‘mixing ratio’, and it 
is the accumulated effect of these many small differences that ultimately 
generates a different ‘macro’-quality. As in a chemical process, macro-
difference emerges, therefore, from the interaction of many different 
small factors and mechanisms. These, in turn, are only loosely linked and 
cannot be depicted by a single principle, for example neopatrimonialism 
(Therkildsen, this volume). Moreover, it is precisely this loose link that 
brings stability to the difference; the alteration of a single factor does not 
as a rule change the entire outcome. This overdetermination has an impor-
tant implication for reformers: complex bureaucratic phenomena—like 
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everyday corruption—cannot be addressed by one-factor measures, e.g. 
the raising of public salaries. In the complex bureaucratic systems of West 
Africa, such measures largely dissipate.
In other words: attributes of statehood that may appear to be ‘typi-
cally African’—for example widespread everyday corruption of public 
officials—are overdetermined: they are not conditioned by a single factor 
but by a series of elements. These elements, and their complex, and shift-
ing, articulations, are the objects of examination in this book.
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PART THREE
BUREAUCRACIES AT WORK
THE POLITICS OF REFORM: A CASE STUDY OF BUREAUCRACY  
AT THE MINISTRY OF BASIC EDUCATION IN CAMEROON
Hélène Charton
This chapter deals with reform processes in African bureaucracies taking 
place in an internationalized context. It examines the dynamics gener-
ated by the implementation of a specific reform, the competency-based 
approach (CBA) within the Cameroonian educational system. It thus pro-
vides an example of the political economy of reforms in countries of the 
global South. It also aims to capture the dynamics of change within a spe-
cific administrative segment as well as document each segment’s capacity 
to reshape and redefine the programme itself through logics of change 
and resistance.
Over the past 20 years, education in Africa has become a major field 
of development experimentation. The achievement of the second Mil-
lennium Development Goal (‘Ensure that, by 2015, children everywhere, 
boys and girls, will be able to complete a full course of primary schooling’) 
prompted the implementation of educational reforms. Most of these pro-
grammes seek to provide quality education for all at limited costs. Hence, 
much consideration has been given to educational inputs (class size, teach-
ers training, curricula, etc.). In fact, competency-based approach curricula 
are part of the quality education tool box designed by international insti-
tutions (mainly the World Bank) as a way of improving quality and access 
to basic education in African countries. This kind of reform, designed 
externally as a technical tool for resolving specific issues, epitomizes the 
nature of the set of reforms currently implemented in Africa. Although 
these processes require a high degree of external expertise and funding, 
the main agents of their implementation remain the local bureaucracy. It 
is precisely the interactions between the pre-existing administrative pat-
tern and the new dynamics produced by the reform process that is under 
scrutiny in this chapter.
The issue of reform (de-)politicization has been raised by some authors. 
In his analysis of a World-Bank-sponsored project in Lesotho, James 
Ferguson highlights the way in which reforms enforce bureaucratic state 
power:
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The short answer to the question of what the “development” apparatus 
in Lesotho does, then, is found in the book’s title: “it is an anti-politics 
machine”, depoliticizing everything it touches, everywhere whisking politi-
cal realities out of sight, all the while performing, almost unnoticed, its own 
pre- eminently political operation of expanding bureaucratic state power 
(Ferguson 1996: xv).
However, his analysis fails to account for local and individual responses to 
reforms and, more particularly, the way social actors are diverting reforms 
packages for their own benefit as underlined by Elwert and Bierschenk 
(1988) and Olivier de Sardan (1988). Far from enhancing bureaucratic 
power, reforms actually enforce individual positions within the bureau-
cratic system. Although reforms have been major issues in public policy 
analyses in Africa over the last 25 years, the process of reform itself has 
not attracted much attention (Chibber 2003; Lipsky 1980). Consequently, 
the specific role played by African public bureaucracies in these reforms 
has been neglected. The methodological debate between Dominique Dar-
bon and Jean-Pierre Olivier de Sardan in the journal Politique africaine in 
2004—which contrasted a theoretical state perspective as developed by 
political scientists with a more concrete analysis of ‘states at work’ based 
on their interrelations with users and citizens as developed by socio-
anthropologists—is indicative of the renewal of research perspectives 
on the state and bureaucracies in Africa (Darbon 2004; Olivier de Sardan 
2004). The general assertion about the weak and uncertain capacities of 
African states to properly exercise their power (expressed in derogatory 
terms like ‘soft’, ‘weak’ and even ‘failed’ states) does not mean that states 
and their agents do not produce anything—in fact, this is the starting 
point of all of the contributions to this book. Recent studies in politi-
cal science and social anthropology focus on the interaction between 
states and citizens through a close examination of certain actors, such as 
street-level bureaucrats (Lipsky 1980), and certain practices and modes 
of interaction, such as corruption (Blundo and Olivier de Sardan 2007). 
They have contributed to a reinterpretation of the role of bureaucracies 
in state-making and social change.
This paper is about bureaucratic state power and, more specifically, 
about the way in which international reform implementation processes 
contribute to strengthening such bureaucratic power, or, to put it more 
precisely, the power and status of particular actors in the bureaucracy. 
Our basic assumption is that reforms, such as the introduction of the CBA, 
are part of the international aid technology. However, the implementa-
tion of this externally derived technology is being challenged by internal 
bureaucratic dynamics, a process that feeds into conflicting perspectives 
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on the reform process. From the point of view of their initiators, reforms 
are supposed to be a source of improvement and are presented as major 
instruments of change. However, from the point of view of bureaucrats 
in charge of their implementation, reform processes are perceived as a 
major means of rent-seeking. The ways in which the benefits of reform are 
captured and distributed within the bureaucratic apparatus transform the 
very objective of the reform.
In order to understand the CBA reform process, over the course of a 
four-week field study, approximately 60 interviews were conducted with 
a wide range of actors from the educational scene at international (inter-
national organisations and NGO representatives), national (education 
inspectors, heads of administrative services at the Ministry of Basic Educa-
tion, representatives of parents’ and teachers’ associations and of teachers’ 
unions), and regional and local levels (provincial and district inspectors, 
school heads, teachers, heads of teacher-training colleges, teachers and 
students in these institutions), and in school and district, departmental 
and provincial administration of three provinces (Central, Southern and 
 English-speaking South Western province).1 This chapter will begin by out-
lining the national and international logics that have led to this specific 
reform process and that could appear contradictory or even conflicting. 
The following section explores the way in which the reform is currently 
being implemented in Cameroon with a view to gaining an understanding 
of the political economy of reforms in Africa. Indeed, this case study on 
the implementation of the CBA reform in Cameroon aims to demonstrate 
how internal bureaucratic dynamics have emptied an educational reform 
of its main pedagogical content and have turned it into a purely admin-
istrative exercise.
Reform at the Juncture between External and  
Internal Dynamics
Since the mid-1990s, the government of Cameroon has been engaged in a 
stream of reforms aimed at reshaping and improving the country’s educa-
tional system. This is the general context in which the CBA was introduced 
1 This field study was carried out in the specific context of a research-action pro-
gramme funded by the Agence française de développement on the implementation of the 
competency-based approach in Cameroon between October 2008 and February 2009. It 
was part of a comparative study conducted in five African countries: Cameroon, Senegal, 
Mali, Tunisia and Gabon.
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into the country. A reform of this nature manifests as a two-fold process: 
it relies very much on international expertise and engineering, however, 
at the same time, local bureaucracies play a major role in its implementa-
tion. Hence, we shall begin by analysing these internal and external, and 
sometimes conflicting, interactions.
National Politics versus International Expertise:  
The Cameroonian School System at a Crossroads
Like many other African countries, Cameroon faced a major crisis in its 
education system in the early 1990s. While the country almost achieved 
universal primary school enrolment in the 1980s, gross enrolment rates 
dropped from around 96% in 1990 to 81% in 1995 (MEC 2003: 4). The 
impoverishment of people due to the economic crisis and aggravated by 
the devaluation of the CFA franc and the reductions in state expenditure 
under structural adjustment programmes, which incidentally led to the 
closure of teacher-training colleges, were among the causes of the crisis. 
In May 1995, the government convened a general assembly of education 
actors to resolve the crisis and establish new foundations for the school 
system, to be known as the ‘New Cameroonian School’ (Nouvelle école 
camerounaise).
This consultation at national level was part of a more general politi-
cal process. From the beginning of the 1990s, opposition parties and civil 
society organizations had been putting significant pressure on the govern-
ment to restore democracy to the country. A National Consultation was 
launched in 1993 (a year after the first multiparty elections) and led to the 
revision of the Constitution in 1996.2 Luc Sindjoun (1996) stresses that the 
ambiguities of this new constitution were exploited to legitimize Presi-
dent Biya’s power. However, he also highlights the fact that much of the 
debate turned on ideas of national identity and the production of a com-
mon national reference system in the context of strong regional and eth-
nic antagonisms (most particularly in the English-speaking provinces).
In this political context, the reshaping of the national school system 
emerged as a major political tool that aimed both to solve the educational 
crisis and to foster national identity and unity. Basic education was made 
2 January 19, 1996, Law revising the Constitution of 2 June, 1972 adopted by the National 
Assembly, December 23, 1995.
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compulsory under the revised Constitution.3 The new education law was 
passed in April 1998 and provided the legal framework for the enactment 
of the general principles set out by the national education convention.4 
The rewriting of curricula and the harmonization of the English- and 
French-speaking educational sub-systems were also supposed to produce 
this common set of references.
This process occurred at a time when international donors were becom-
ing most influential in the definition of education strategies in Africa as 
part of the implementation of Education for All policies (EFA). A number 
of international conferences on education (Jomtien 1990, Dakar 2000) and 
aid (Paris Declaration on Aid efficiency, Organisation of Economic Coop-
eration and Development, 2005) contributed to the setting of a general 
reform framework. New policy instruments were developed by interna-
tional experts. In that context, as in many other African countries engaged 
in the same process, the achievement of universal education in Cameroon 
was seen as a technical challenge requiring both specific and standardized 
technical solutions.
Under the new international aid paradigm that emerged in the first 
decade of the new millennium, based on aid efficiency, donors were 
bound in technical and financial partnerships (TFP) under sector-wide 
approaches (SWAP) with a view to eradicating poverty (as defined in the 
Millennium Development Goals). These general objectives were operation-
alized and rationalized in Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP). In 
the education sector, this kind of approach gave birth to a new generation 
of documents, such as Status Reports on the National Education Systems 
(Rapport d’Etat du Système Educatif National, RESEN) all of which were 
based on the same standardized model.5 In Cameroon, the Rapport d’Etat 
du Système Educatif National Camerounais, éléments de diagnostic pour la 
politique educative dans le contexte de l’Education pour tous et du DSRP 6 
(RESEN) was published in 2003 by a team of national and international 
3 Cf. article 18 of the preamble to the Cameroonian Constitution: “The state shall guar-
antee the child’s right to education. Primary education shall be compulsory. The organi-
zation and supervision of education at all levels shall be the bounden duty of the state.” 
(http://www.icrc.org/ihl-nat.nsf/162d151af444ded44125673e00508141/7e3ee07f489d674dc12
56ae9002e3915/$FILE/Constitution%20Cameroon%20-%20EN.pdf, accessed 15/02/2013).
4 Loi N° 98/004 du 14 avril 1998, portant orientation de l’Education au Cameroun: 3.
5 RESEN were conceived and developed as a specific diagnostic tool for African educa-
tion systems by a team of economists from the World Bank.
6 Document stratégique de réduction de la pauvreté, Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers 
(PRSP) in English.
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experts coordinated by the World Bank and French bilateral development 
cooperation. As in most African countries, the Education Sector Strategy 
(Stratégie sectorielle d’éducation) was defined on this basis. The document 
was finalized and signed by all stakeholders (the government, donors and 
civil society representatives) in June 2006.
This was the general context in which various sets of reforms were 
launched. The competency-based approach was introduced in Cameroon 
in 2004 to enhance the quality of education in primary schools.
The competency-based approach (CBA) had been introduced in French-
speaking Africa during a 1998 meeting of the Conférence des Ministres de 
l’éducation ayant le français en partage (CONFEMEN). This educational 
reform was presented as a means of improving the quality of basic educa-
tion in the context of Education for All programmes. At that time, most 
Western countries had changed their knowledge-based curricula into 
competency-based ones to respond better to the challenges of the mod-
ern labour market in the industrial world. However, the shift did not hap-
pen overnight in these countries. On the contrary, the reforms triggered 
numerous debates, resistance and adjustments (for France, see Ropé and 
Tanguy 1994). By way of contrast, in Africa, the CBA was transferred as a 
specific Western technology with no prior discussion. After the CONFE-
MEN meeting, the International Organisation of La Francophonie (IOF) 
launched a series of seminars to train African experts, both in West and 
Central Africa. A CBA pilot project was conducted in Cameroon between 
September 2003 and August 2004 by a national team of experts trained 
by the OIF. The CBA was then officially introduced in Cameroon at the 
end of 2004. It became a component of the education sector strategy, and 
most donors (the World Bank, UNICEF, Plan Cameroon, a subsection of 
the NGO Plan International, OIF etc.) started to fund and organise train-
ing sessions on the CBA.
The CBA belongs to the category of international standardized set of 
reforms described by Dominique Darbon (2003) in his analysis of ‘pro-
jected administrations’. Designed externally by international experts, the 
CBA is presented as a transferable and replicable model that responds 
to the cost/efficiency concerns of donors. The way in which educational 
issues were set out as technical problems that could be solved with an 
appropriate set of reforms and tools is symptomatic of the capacity of 
development policy “to depoliticize whatever it touches” (Ferguson 1990: 
xv). However, as we shall attempt to show in this chapter, technocratic 
reforms does not mean the end of politics. On the contrary, reforms pro-
duce their own political logics which are played out in bureaucratic and 
administrative processes.
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A ‘command’ Administration
The Ministry of Basic Education (MINEDUB) was created in 2004, fol-
lowing the division of the former Ministry of Education into four distinct 
ministries: the Ministry of Basic Education, the Ministry of Secondary 
Education, the Ministry of Higher Education and the Ministry of Tech-
nical and Professional Education. Officially, the MINEDUB, which is in 
charge of pre-primary and primary education and primary teacher train-
ing, was created in order to pay more attention to the specific needs of 
basic education in the context of Education for All programmes. In fact, 
this division diminished the size and power of a huge Ministry of Educa-
tion while at the same time opening up new ministerial positions and 
extending the bureaucratic apparatus both at central and local levels. At 
a time when the Cameroonian educative system is exposed to intense 
international collaboration, this means, for example, that a person in each 
Ministry is responsible for the coordination with each donor programme 
(e.g. World Bank, Plan, UNICEF). This administrative reorganization con-
tributed to the blurring of the connections between the various levels of 
education at the expense of an inclusive sectorial approach to education 
from pre-primary to university levels, which was praised by the interna-
tional donors, and by multiplying the interlocutors and aid entry points, 
it expanded the opportunities for the capture and control of the resources 
released through international reforms.
Like other ministries, the Ministry of Basic Education’s administra-
tion is organized on the basis of a prefectural model which replicates the 
national administrative network at all territorial levels. The Directorate 
of Primary and Pre-primary Education and Teacher Training (Direction 
de l’enseignement primaire maternel et normal) is in charge of administra-
tive supervision while the Inspectorate-General for Education (Inspection 
générale des enseignements) is responsible for all educational issues. It has 
three subdivisions: Information and Communication Technologies (Tech-
nologies de l’information et des communications or TIC), Bilingualism, and 
Pre-Primary Education.
This general organization is roughly replicated at the regional and 
departmental levels, with a strong dichotomy between politico-adminis-
trative functions and educational work. Each of the 20 regional primary 
education delegates (délégués régionaux pour l’éducation de base) rep-
resents the minister’s authority over the regional school systems. Effec-
tive educational supervision at the regional level is in the hands of the 
provincial co-ordination inspector (inspecteur provincial de coordination) 
and of three provincial educational inspectors (inspecteurs provinciaux 
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de pédagogie) for bilingualism, primary/pre-primary/teacher training 
and information & communication technologies respectively. In the 58 
departments, two education councillors supervise the work of the 367 
district inspectors (inspecteurs d’arrondissements), and the latter, in turn, 
supervise the school principals. Table 1 summarizes this administrative 
organization.
This highly centralized administrative structure shapes the nature of 
the work conducted by the Inspectorate-General for Education. Indeed, 
most of its tasks are organized along a rigid hierarchical pattern. Before 
any decision reaches the school teachers, it must descend through all of 
the levels on the administrative ladder. And any information originat-
ing in the schools must ascend through all of the educational levels. For 
example, school teachers are supposed to produce exam topics for the 
Primary School-Leaving Certificates (Certificats d’études primaries or CEP) 
awarded on completion of primary school education. The proposed sub-
jects are revised and harmonized at each stage of the educational chain 
(head teacher, district, province) before they reach the MINEDUB’s exam-
ination office which selects items for the examination.
This administrative structure produces paperwork at all levels. In fact, 
it would appear that the main activity of the school inspection adminis-
tration is to produce, revise and compile reports. For example, routine 
reports written by the school principals are reviewed and compiled by the 
district inspectors who forward their reports to the department level, from 
where they are then sent on up the hierarchical chain. Since each level 
is responsible for the supervision of all levels below, this means that all 
field inspectors are supposed to conduct school inspections and supervise 
the administrative work of their colleagues at lower levels. However, as 
it emerged in the course of our interviews, school inspections are quite 
Table 1. The prefectural organization of the Cameroonian education system
Level Position Number
National National inspectors for education (bilingualism; 
information and communication technology;  
pre-primary, primary, and teacher training)
21
Region Regional inspectors for education and regional 
inspectors for coordination
80
Department Education councillors 116
District District inspectors 367
Schools School principals 13 000
Schools Teachers 84 765
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rare. For example, some national inspectors had not been on even one 
inspection tour in the course of the past year. All schools are visited twice 
or three times a year by the district inspectors, at the beginning and again 
at the end of the school year to supervise examination sessions. However, 
these inspections are merely administrative: their main object is to col-
lect administrative information for the reports submitted to the hierarchy. 
There are very few contacts with teachers. Due to the lack of finance for 
transport, inspectors do not go out into the field as often as they should 
or would like to. Consequently, when they occur, these school visits take 
place in the most accessible or convenient locations, resulting in huge 
geographical discrepancies in the actual supervision of the school sys-
tem. All of the inspectors interviewed complained about the administra-
tive aspect of their work (mainly reviewing reports). According to them, 
inspection should be more practical and educational, i.e. they should be 
out in the field more often. These kinds of complaints could also be read 
as demands for greater visibility in terms of the exercise of power.
When they happen, school inspections mobilize the entire school com-
munity (principal, teachers, parents and district inspectors) who are sup-
posed to accommodate, feed and entertain the inspection team (in some 
cases, national inspectors even receive livestock). This kind of unloading 
of material charges to the lower levels of the education chain (or civil soci-
ety) has two consequences. First, it fosters personal relations within an 
administrative system which, according to the legal-rational logic, should 
be depersonalized. Second, it also reinforces the authoritative character of 
the system by publicizing the power of the administrative agent.
To some extent, the way the national system of educational inspection 
is organized shows important similarities with what Dominique Darbon 
(1994) describes as “command administration” in that it combines a high 
level of centralization with a powerful bureaucracy. In this kind of con-
figuration, power and authority directly originate from the position held 
within the system rather than from skills and competencies, or even the 
capacity to perform the assigned tasks correctly.
All central services (including the Inspectorate-General for Education) 
of the Ministry of Basic Education, which is based in Yaoundé, are accom-
modated in an eight-storey building. The top flour is allocated to the Min-
ister and direct collaborators. The General Secretary and the Direction for 
Primary Education are on the seventh floor. The sixth floor is occupied by 
the Inspectorate-General for Education. The size of the offices, the num-
ber of auxiliary staff posted in the waiting room and the quality of the 
equipment (size of the carpet and TV screen, video and audio equipment, 
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quality of air conditioning) are directly related to an actor’s rank in the 
ministry’s hierarchy. This is a quite common situation in most African—
and indeed Western administrations—however, the level of the discrep-
ancies in the quality of the resources provided to the administrative and 
educational services is striking.
In fact, the working conditions in the services of the Inspectorate-
General for Education are very poor. Five to six national inspectors share 
the same office and have no telephones or computers. The few cars con-
trolled by the ministry are allocated to the heads of the general services; 
none are available for inspection tours. The same situation prevails at the 
provincial, departmental and divisional levels: most resources go to the 
administrative staff and very few are made available for actual education-
related tasks.
This diversion of resources towards the administrative rather than 
educational functions and towards the higher ranks of the administrative 
structure is symptomatic of the morphology of a command administra-
tion. What is at play here is less the ability to perform a task than the 
capacity to exercise power and authority. In this kind of administrative 
structure, the position provides authority. And, in reality, administra-
tive appointments do not always follow a clear rule. While—as in many 
 African administrations—personal relations, kin and family networks play 
a key role in access to certain positions, the capacity to control access to 
resources is also important for agents to secure their authority and legiti-
macy. Therefore, at each level of the administrative structure, agents try 
and develop specific strategies for capturing material and symbolic capital 
that will strengthen their own authority while reducing the state’s power 
and capacity to its bureaucracy. Such strategies appear particularly clear 
when reforms are being implemented.
The Bureaucratization of an Educational Reform
The CBA reform, which was devised at an international level and conducted 
by education actors under the responsibility of the Inspectorate-General 
for Education, offers a good example of the multilevel and multi-actor 
dynamics at play. International reforms usually inject new resources into 
an administrative system characterized by scarcity. Hence the reform pro-
cess must be analyzed and interpreted as the result of combined internal 
(bureaucratic) and external (donor) logics. Like many other educational 
reforms, the CBA was introduced in Cameroon as a technical device 
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aimed at solving educational issues. In the following section I will ana-
lyze the way in which a theoretically cost-efficient reform process is being 
circumvented by bureaucratic actors in order to capture and capitalize 
on the external resources generated by the reform and thereby divert the 
reform from its initial objectives.7
The Anatomy of a Reform Process: The CBA in Cameroon
The way the CBA reform began to be implemented in Cameroon from 
2004 corresponds to the two main characteristics of the new interna-
tional aid paradigm. First, it encourages a close partnership between 
technical and financial partners and state actors, and second, it promotes 
cost-efficient technologies. The cascade training scheme, through which 
the CBA reform was channelled, provides a good example of this type of 
technology.
The CBA was introduced and generalized in Africa in the mid-1990s 
alongside reforms aimed at generating large-scale change in education. It 
actually appeared to offer a cost-efficient training scheme at a time when 
international aid resources and technical resources, in particular, were 
drastically reduced (Hayes 2000). The principle of this training scheme is 
that a handful of recipients receive direct training that they then pass on 
to others in the context of in-service teacher-training sessions. Based on 
the multiplying effect of this training approach, it is assumed that large 
scale educational reform could reach all teachers at minimum cost. The 
examination of the initial steps in the CBA implementation process in 
Cameroon tells another story, however.
All heads of central services, national education inspectors’, and 
regional coordination inspectors attended a one-week seminar on the 
CBA in November 2004. The trainers were a group of four inspectors (the 
general inspector for education, two national inspectors and one regional 
inspector) who had benefited from first-hand training sessions on the CBA 
organized by the IOF for all French-speaking countries of central Africa. 
Trainees were identified for each country as national resource persons on 
the CBA. Following the national seminar, training sessions were supposed 
to be organized on a regional basis for regional, departmental and district 
7 For a similar dynamic between donor logics and ‘peasant logics’, see Elwert and 
 Bierschenk 1988 and Olivier de Sardan 1988.
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inspectors so that they could pass on their new knowledge about the CBA 
to teachers during the annual in-service training programme.
Alongside this national training scheme, the donors started to finance 
training sessions on the CBA. Ten training sessions were organized 
between 2006 and 2008, all of which were based on the same classical top-
down model of cascade training. In 2006, the World Bank started a three-
year programme of workshops focusing on competencies and evaluation 
within its Sector Strategy Assistance Programme (Programme d’appui à la 
stratégie sectorielle, PASE). UNICEF and Plan Cameroon also held training 
sessions on the CBA during the same period. All were more or less orga-
nized on the basis of the same hierarchical pattern. When summing up 
the total number of days of training received on the CBA by each category 
of education actors, there is a striking discrepancy between the top and 
the bottom of the education chain.
Between 2006 and 2008, national inspectors spent 29 days in training 
sessions organized by donors. However, the district inspectors, who inter-
act more closely with the school teachers, only received seven days of 
training; no teachers or principals attended any of these training sessions. 
In one of these training sessions, for example, it was the local head of UNI-
CEF who insisted that local officers (at district and department levels) be 
part of the training scheme at some point while the Inspectorate-General 
for Education would have preferred to reserve it for the highest levels in 
the hierarchy. In fact, these training schemes follow administrative rather 
than educational logics as the level of training directly depends on the 
position held in the bureaucratic hierarchy. The fact that some education 
actors might be ‘over-trained’ in some regards clearly does not mean that 
the educational reform will be more effective (for a similar analysis from 
West Africa, see Yessoufou 2011).
The way in-service teacher training is planned in Cameroon makes it 
difficult for such comprehensive educational reform to effectively reach 
the “street-level” actors (Lipsky 1980) of any educational change: the teach-
ers. At the beginning of each school year, in-service training sessions are 
organized at the district level for the school principals and some teachers 
(animateurs pédagogiques de niveau). They last for one to two days and 
are run by the district inspectors and other departmental and provincial 
staff when available. Various issues are discussed during these sessions. 
The CBA and its various aspects were one of the national themes chosen 
in 2008, in order to disseminate the training received by the higher staff. 
For this purpose, weeks of training had to be compressed into three-hour 
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sessions for dissemination to a limited group of teachers (principals and 
animateurs de niveau). In other words, the content of these sessions is 
more informative than formative, and the people attending these sessions 
received only second- or third-hand information. Because the length of 
training session is reduced as it reaches intermediate and local levels, 
there is a corresponding loss in content. The level and quality of infor-
mation transmitted during these sessions depend on the capacity of the 
trainer to understand and reformulate what he or she learned from his 
or her own training. In fact, several teachers expressed doubts about the 
capacity of some principals and animateurs to share and transmit any new 
knowledge as they might not be able to understand it themselves.
In fact, when teachers were asked about the CBA four years after it 
was introduced in Cameroon, they made it clear that they had not been 
trained, and thus were not able to use this approach in their classrooms. 
They were 25 out of 32 to declare that they did not receive any training in 
the CBA before 2007 and 19 since 2007.
Widening the Gap: Teachers vs. Managers
The principle underlying the entire process of reform implementation 
is the opposition between trainers and learners, linked with the bureau-
cratic polarization between administrative staff (inspectors) on one side 
and teaching staff on the other. The quantitative and qualitative deficien-
cies in the training of teachers, who are supposedly the main target group, 
demonstrate the limits of the reform. This actually raises the question of 
the capacity of the reform to meet its objectives, namely to produce sig-
nificant educational change and improve the quality of education.
One issue frequently raised by the inspectors in the interviews was that 
teachers (especially the most senior among them) were not willing to 
change their practices because they did not see the point of these reforms 
which were very demanding and time-consuming. Interviews with the 
teachers reveal a different perspective. Most of the latter clearly see the 
benefits that the Cameroonian school system could yield from the CBA. 
However, their main problem is that they were not equipped to teach it 
properly, neither intellectually nor materially (in some urban areas, there 
are around 90 pupils per class). Moreover, teachers were not involved in 
the reform design. Their training, the reality of the school system and of 
teaching conditions had not been taken into consideration. In fact, the 
entire reform process from design to implementation is based on the 
administrative staff ’s representations of schools and of teachers.
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Consequently, what could be perceived by the administrative staff as 
reluctance to change might equally well be interpreted, from the teachers’ 
point of view, as a form of resistance to the ways in which the reform is 
being implemented. In other words, the reform process itself is an obsta-
cle to change. For example, during in-service sessions for the promotion 
of active teaching methods, teachers had to listen passively to their hier-
archical superiors lecturing them about theory rather than practice.
None of these criticisms are actually new. The limited efficiency of cas-
cade training has been demonstrated by several researchers (McDevitt 
1998; Wedell 2005). As McDevitt stresses in his paper about Botswana:
One of the ironies of the situation, then, is that the cascade may succeed as a 
training mechanism, but fails in its primary goal as a means of disseminating 
ideas or of changing behaviour patterns. (. . .) Perhaps its failure lies within 
the metaphor of the cascade itself: if you’re too far away from the source, 
you can easily avoid getting soaked (McDevitt 1998: 428).
This actually raises the question of the persistence of such dominant 
models in the field of education reform in countries of the South. There 
are various reasons why the criticism frequently expressed by research-
ers might not reach decision-making levels, one of them being, perhaps, 
that this kind of criticism is scarcely audible. There simply may not be 
any other training model available for such extensive reform programmes 
within the development machinery. In fact, most of the limits observed 
from the implementation of the CBA reforms through cascade training 
schemes echo criticisms of the World Bank’s Training and Visit Extension 
system (Nijanyanupi 1976) that were formulated a long time ago.
This model of training was suggested by Daniel Benor, James Harrisson 
and Michael Baxter in a booklet entitled Agricultural Extension: The Train-
ing and Visit System (Benor et al. 1977), which was published by the World 
Bank in 1977. Up to the late 1990s, it had been implemented in over 50 
developing countries. It was progressively abandoned due to its high cost 
and lack of sustainability for national governments (Anderson et al. 2006; 
for a critique based on a West African example, see Lühe 1991). One of the 
main principles of this method was to rationalize methods of improving 
agriculture using locally available resources. The training schemes were 
slotted into the hierarchical command line of agricultural departments 
with five levels of officials above the farmers who were located at the bot-
tom of the system. As pointed out by Nijanyanupi, this theoretically ‘ratio-
nal’ structure in practice tended to divert resources by artificially feeding 
the bureaucratic structure. Equally problematic was the way information 
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is actually being transmitted within this system. If a strict programme of 
training and visit at the bottom level was supposed to provide farmers 
with an intensive exposure to new methods, the way these methods were 
exposed are highly problematic. In fact, as Nijanyanupi stresses, the entire 
system was grounded in a categorical opposition between teachers and 
‘doers’: “The teacher does not do and the doer cannot teach. In this sys-
tem, knowledge is being passed on from one non-doer to another with 
the ultimate idea of influencing the doer” (Nijanyanupi, 1976). This author 
actually goes on to insist on the unbridgeable communication gap that is 
generated in this kind of system and hampers any possibility of change.
When the general features of the cascade training scheme in the 
Cameroonian education sector are considered, it appears that very little 
progress has been accomplished over the past three decades: indeed, 
the training models have actually deteriorated. Under the cascade sys-
tem, few resources are allocated to the bottom level, the cornerstone 
of the training and visit extension system. Far from having been aban-
doned, it would appear that this model has had enduring effects. As far as 
the development technology is concerned, this corroborates the idea that 
 development programmes are rather conservative:
This inability to learn from the past is primarily due to the fact that the 
development aid world has its own cognitive structures and its own com-
munication channels. It pursues its own internal discourse, the central cat-
egories of which must be mastered. The reality which forms the frame of 
reference for the management and within which development projects are 
conceived (or implemented) is largely a derived reality, produced within 
this communication system itself (Bierschenk et al. 1991: 94).
Therefore, the achievement of the expected goals, e.g. changes in teaching 
practice in the case of educational reform like the CBA, matters less than 
the routinized exercise of the reform which in itself justifies the entire 
business of development.
The Political Economy of the Reform Process:  
The Limits to Coordination and Training
The resources brought in by reforms opened up new accumulation and 
redistribution opportunities which could be used to foster the position 
of bureaucratic actors within the administration. Most training schemes 
aimed at disseminating the CBA were funded and organized by interna-
tional donors. The strategies set up by bureaucratic actors and the ways 
in which these new resources are shared and distributed are critical to 
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understanding the status and function of the reform from a bureau-
cratic perspective. The reform process is shot through with contradictory 
dynamics. On the one hand, international reforms belong to a specific 
cognitive order ruled by its own temporality (the project), its own set of 
replicable technologies and its own channels of communication. On the 
other hand, bureaucratic actors pursue their own agenda in the imple-
mentation process. Two further examples of these contradictory process 
and its consequences are developed below to illustrate the issue of reform 
planning and the individual uses of reform dividends.
Theoretically, the Inspectorate-General for Education is responsible for 
the coordination of all teaching activities, both internal and external. How-
ever, as far as the CBA is concerned, most training schemes and teaching 
programmes were carried out without any real effort at coordination. At 
a structural level, both technical and financial partners are represented in 
the Ministry by an official who is in charge of linking up donor projects to 
the Inspectorate-General for Education’s agenda. However, in fact, most 
of these programmes were conducted independently both in terms of tim-
ing and content and thus led to conflicts and confusion.
In spring 2007, for example, some inspectors attended almost three 
consecutive weeks of training sessions on the CBA held by Plan Cameroon 
and the World Bank. However, the contents and approaches varied from 
one donor to another and, depending on the consultancy firm hired for 
training sessions or the teaching material used, caused much confusion 
in the minds of the so-called beneficiaries. Some activities were clearly 
redundant. In 2007, Plan Cameroon and UNICEF produced two sets of 
guidelines on the CBA, which turned up to be almost identical. It was 
only when the booklets were completed and ready to be sent out that the 
two organizations realized that the work had been duplicated and paid 
for twice. This lack of coordination and planning of the reform process 
raised major educational problems. Hachette Livre International, a pri-
vate publishing house, published a complete set of school textbooks based 
on skills (in a series called Nouveaux champions). They were adopted as 
official text books in most Cameroonian primary schools in 2006, a time 
when new CBA curricula had not been officially adopted and when the 
training of teachers on this approach had scarcely begun. To make mat-
ters worse, the CBA approach was introduced alongside other educational 
approaches. For example, the French Académie des Sciences developed its 
scientific experimental programme known as ‘La main à la pâte’, LAMAP 
(‘Hands On’), at a time when Cameroonian teachers were still trying out 
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micro-science tool kits. These last programmes, which focused on the 
teaching of science, were not really competing with the CBA, which is far 
more inclusive, however from the teachers’ point of view, and consider-
ing the way educational innovations are being implemented, the value 
and opportunity presented by this reform overload may be questioned. In 
fact, all of these programmes were introduced in Cameroon when teach-
ers were only beginning to adjust to and master the previous educational 
reform called the Nouvelle Approche Pédagogique, NAP (‘new pedagogical 
approach’) which is based on active teaching methods and started at the 
end of the 1990s.
It is less the diversity of these pedagogical experiences that is prob-
lematic than the limited space provided for knowledge transfer under 
the current in-service training schemes whereby (some) teachers are only 
exposed to these new approaches once a year. In fact, this “piling up” 
(Darbon 2003: 13) of educational innovations sheds light on the political 
economy of reform. Far from being a Cameroonian specificity, the lack 
of coordination appears to be part of the general reform outlook and 
economy.
“The systematic sabotage of all efforts towards co-ordinating develop-
ment planning” (Bierschenk et al. 1991: 4) raises the issue of who benefits 
from this reform overload. The more reforms there are, the greater the 
opportunities available to bureaucratic agents to reap individual benefits 
from them. However, this proliferation of reforms is also generated by 
donor agendas. Most projects are scheduled on a short-term basis (two to 
three years), which is also the length of staff contracts. The record of most 
international aid agencies is evaluated on the basis of their capacity to 
fund a certain amount of projects. Against this background, organizations 
are eager to answer as many demands originating from national govern-
ments as possible. On the other hand, government services are happy to 
multiply such demands as reform processes feed into the development of 
bureaucracies.
In addition, international reforms produce material and symbolic 
resources used by bureaucratic agents to foster their power and author-
ity within the command line. Most training sessions funded by technical 
partners are organized in cosy beach hotels, and participants are granted 
per diems. One of the district inspectors interviewed was very forthright 
in his analysis of the situation:
When we talk about training, people think of the per diem. This is why at 
the central level people will try their best to keep the per diem up there. 
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This is not based on any educational reason, but people think of the money 
first, the money they want to keep for themselves.8
In fact, interviewees tend to have more memories of the locations and the 
‘quality of service’ offered during the training sessions than their content. 
However, the very same people often vehemently defend the intellectual 
value of such training courses.
The following excerpt from an interview conducted with a group of 
educational councillors (department) shows how access to training ses-
sions also is a key instrument for building up and assessing their own 
authority and legitimacy within the system:
Q: Is the competency-based approach to curricula effective in Cameroonian 
primary schools?
A: It’s starting. But we need to enforce it (twice). We ourselves are not 
sufficiently trained. The better we are trained, the better the information 
that will be passed to the teachers. Most teachers are familiar with the 
“New Pedagogical Approaches”. But the competency-based approach is 
still a problem.
Q:  How come?
A: Because, we, the resource persons (repeated three times), did not receive 
formal training that will enable us to supervise the teachers properly. It is 
our own curiosity that led us to teach ourselves some things but we did not 
receive any specific training.
Q: But you seem to have some knowledge of competency-based approaches.
A: This is because, as intellectuals, we shouldn’t talk nonsense about com-
petency-based approaches. It is through our individual work that we were 
trained. We have bought and read books from abroad. We also have talked 
with colleagues who have been trained abroad.
The claim made by this intermediate section of the bureaucratic struc-
ture of being fully integral to the reform process highlights two issues. In 
their discourse, they clearly try to position themselves as key actors of the 
reform process between the teachers (compared to whom they are ‘the 
intellectuals’) and the armchair inspectors (who do not have any practi-
cal field-based knowledge). On a symbolic level, being part of the reform 
process through either training or self-teaching also means belonging to 
an epistemic community sharing the same language and representation of 
the universal value of reform as a means of progress and modernity. This 
specific knowledge produced by the reform appears as major symbolic 
source of authority and legitimacy.
8 For an analysis of the per diem mentality based on a Ugandan case, see Smith 2003.
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However, like any resource, the dividends of reform can be distributed 
and hence also appear as a way of fostering personal links within the 
administrative structure. For example, the criteria for selecting national 
inspectors as trainers in the CBA training schemes were not always very 
transparent. Some of them did not really have any direct experience with 
the CBA while some of the OIF-trained Cameroonian experts were delib-
erately excluded from these programmes. Various factors (including the 
place of origin of the people and personal relationships) appear to have 
played a greater role in these decisions than effective knowledge about 
and experience of the CBA. This further example shows how and to what 
extent the reform processes can be manipulated by bureaucratic actors 
for their own ends. It also highlights how international reforms are part 
of the political economy of African bureaucratic structures.
Conclusion
The description of the implementation process of the CBA in Camer-
oon illustrates the different uses and functions of reform in Africa. The 
 competency-based approach, as many other educative reforms intro-
duced in the broader context of Education for All programmes aimed at 
improving the quality of African educative systems. Far from producing 
the expected change, the reform was turned by bureaucratic agents into 
a very normative, hierarchical and administrative exercise. In fact, the 
main output of the reform, at this stage of implementation, has been to 
strengthen bureaucratic dynamics through the distribution of new sym-
bolic and material resources.
International reforms such as the CBA, produced externally and diffused 
through international organizations, create a specific set of references and 
technologies which are supposed to trigger change and improvements in 
developing countries. Therefore they are infused with a kind of messianic 
aura of modernity and universality. As noted by many authors, the suc-
cess of reform does not really need to matter as it is the reform itself that 
counts most. However, even if the reform does not produce the expected 
change in many cases, this does not mean than it does not produce any-
thing. In fact the various resources brought in by reform processes are 
manipulated and diverted by bureaucratic actors in order to enforce their 
own position within the bureaucratic structure.
In developing countries and beyond, reform processes are a major field 
for the structuring of social and political relations. Not only do they sustain 
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the development of bureaucracies (in terms of manpower and activities), 
they also organize power relations within a given administrative struc-
ture. The linking up of external and internal dynamics is, therefore, part 
of state construction processes in developing countries.
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BUILDING STATE CAPACITIES? 
THE CASE OF THE POVERTY REDUCTION UNIT IN MALI1
Isaline Bergamaschi
This chapter examines the ability of international organizations to shape 
and reform African administrations. In doing this, it highlights the practi-
cal implications of buzzwords such as ownership and capacity-building. It 
builds on the case-study of the technical unit (Cellule technique Cadre stra-
tégique de lutte contre la pauvreté) established under the Poverty Reduction 
Strategy Paper (PRSP) in Mali, an aid-dependent country in West Africa.2 
Until the coup d’état that took place in 2012 and the ensuing political insta-
bility, despite its poor economic performance, Mali was considered by the 
international community as a model of democracy, good governance and 
aid management in sub-Saharan Africa. However, empirical data collected 
over the course of six months of fieldwork and participant observation 
within the PRSP unit in Bamako in 2007–2008 tells another story.
This chapter primarily seeks to explain this paradox. I argue that tar-
geted capacity-building initiatives—embodied by the PRSP unit—have 
limited impact, particularly when they have to deal with pre-existing 
institutional features, social relations and competing interests created by 
the unit itself. However, I also show that international support has made 
unexpected contributions to the process of state formation in Africa.
The chapter is divided into three main sections. The first section pres-
ents the theoretical framework used to interpret international initiatives 
1  This article is based on six months of fieldwork in Bamako in 2007 and 2008 where 
I was able to conduct approximately 100 interviews with civil servants and representatives 
of aid organizations, and to carry out participant observation as an intern in the Malian 
PRSP technical unit. I would like to thank the staff of the PRSP unit, its coordinator and 
technical assistants for welcoming me among them. I would also like to thank Jeremy 
Gould and Philippe Bezes for their early advice on how to approach this topic and conduct 
fieldwork, and Jean-Pierre Olivier de Sardan and Thomas Bierschenk for their comments 
on a draft presented at the third European Conference on African Studies in Leipzig in 
2009 and subsequent drafts. I thank Hélène Charton for proofreading the final draft of the 
text. I bear sole responsibility for any remaining errors.
2 There are approximately 40 bilateral and multilateral donors in Mali, the biggest of 
which are the European Commission, the World Bank and France, followed by the Neth-
erlands, Japan, the United States, the African Development Bank, Canada and Germany. 
Aid accounts for a large share of the country’s total budget. Between 1996 and 2005, aid 
represented an average of three-quarters of the country’s Special Budget for investment 
and 27.6 per cent of the state’s general budget (Bergamaschi 2008: 222–223).
© Isaline Bergamaschi, 2014 | doi: 10.1163/9789004264960_012
This is an open access chapter distributed under the terms of the CC BY-NC 4.0 license.
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aimed at strengthening African states. It provides both an overview of 
donor approaches to state capacity-building and a critical overview of 
how the issue has been addressed in the academic literature. The sec-
ond section explores the daily activities of Mali’s PRSP unit and accounts 
for its failure to achieve its goals. The root causes of this failure, mainly 
the external and internal resistance to the unit’s hegemonic ambitions, 
are identified. The third section presents some concluding remarks on 
 capacity-building and state formation in Mali.
International Donors and the African State:  
Shifting Paradigms
The approach adopted by international donors towards African states over 
the past 50 years has been contradictory and shifting. Over time, it ranged 
from support for the developmental state (from the 1950s to the 1970s) to 
anti-state policies (diminution of resources, retreat from the main eco-
nomic sectors, the privatization of parastatals) with structural adjustment 
programmes (SAPs) implemented in the 1980s and 1990s. A partial reas-
sessment of the role of the state was carried out in the late 1990s together 
with the promotion of capacity-building strategies (Bezes 2007). This shift 
arose in response to the mitigated outcomes of SAPs, and the harsh criti-
cisms they triggered at a time when the legitimacy of the international 
financial institutions (IFIs, e.g. the World Bank and the International Mon-
etary Fund) was called into question. The Asian miracle highlighted the 
role of the state in development success stories and invited the World Bank 
to develop a new approach, which was presented in its 1997 annual report 
under the title “The state in a changing world” (World Bank 1997).
This reassessment was limited, however. First, an implicit defiance 
towards the state persisted at the World Bank and the IMF, particularly 
when it came to dealing with Africa. Second, the myth of the ‘apoliti-
cal’ norm prevailing in IFIs led to a technical conception of state reform, 
viewed and promoted as a set of measures to be uniformly implemented 
in developing countries (Miller-Adams 1999: 5–6, Peñafiel, 2008; see also 
Anders, Charton and Muñoz in this volume).
In the post-Washington consensus, a lack of “commitment” and “politi-
cal will” on the part of recipient governments was identified as a major 
impediment to successful reform (Killick 1998). IFIs did not question the 
relevance and content of SAPs. Nor did they rehabilitate the idea of sover-
eignty, self-determination (Whitfield 2008) or indigenous policy-space as 
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a means of development (Chang 2006). Instead, they blamed insufficient 
implementation for failure (Whitfield 2008), and thus promoted the idea 
of “ownership” (Johnson and Wasty 1993).
At the same time, the development paradigm also evolved with greater 
emphasis being placed on poverty reduction. While ‘sound’ macroeco-
nomic and adjustment policies were pursued (through liberalization, 
privatization and trade openness), social safety nets based on human 
development policies were introduced with a focus on basic education 
and health, specific measures targeted the poorest alongside compre-
hensive state reform processes (Fine et al. 2001). Indeed, since the late 
1990s, good governance has become a cornerstone of donor intervention 
(Hatcher 2009) and has hence led to the proliferation of conditionalities, 
triggers and benchmarks. In this new context, the scope of international 
intervention was broadened, shifting from the economic to the institu-
tional arena as greater attention was being paid to the policy-making pro-
cess in addition to policy content (Fraser 2008).
Reforming the state from within is increasingly been seen as a way 
of enhancing ownership and embedding poverty reduction strategies 
in developing countries. This functionalist approach is inspired by neo-
 institutionalism: from this perspective, better institutions are necessary 
for the success of economic reforms (Campbell 1997; Stone and Wright 
2007). Some authors have argued that the current aid agenda deals at 
least as much with state formation as with economic reform (Gould 2005; 
 Peñafiel 2008). In the Western project of global governance (Williams 
2006) state reform and poverty reduction should, therefore, be regarded 
as the two sides of the same coin.
These principles, which are at the heart of the new international aid 
system, have been enshrined in the Poverty Reduction Strategic Papers 
(1999), which were introduced by the World Bank as a condition for eligi-
bility by developing countries for the Highly Indebted Poor Country Ini-
tiative (HIPC). PRSPs are pluri-annual plans geared towards the fulfilment 
of the Millennium Development Goals.
The Paradoxes of Capacity-Building in Mali:  
‘Ownership’ and Fusion
In the era of ownership, the role of donors must accordingly shift from 
coercion to persuasion and influence, and the World Bank should “ensure 
that the process of policy reform is internalized in the country as quickly 
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as possible” (Johnson and Wasty 1993). According to the IFIs, this describes 
a new, consensual ‘partnership’ with African governments.
In this context, capacity-building activities are crucial, to the extent that 
they can help to reform African states (Darbon 2003) by creating points 
of interaction and spaces for dialogue between donors and recipient 
governments. The dissemination of specific skills and capacities (stake-
holder consultation, poverty monitoring, macroeconomic literacy and 
public expenditure tracking) among recipient states is seen as a lubricant 
in the poverty reduction process (Gould 2008: 91). In an empirical study 
of the World Bank describing attempts to constitute ‘governance states’ 
in Tanzania and Uganda, Graham Harrison argues that second generation 
institutional reforms and capacity-building projects aim to generate a spe-
cific form of state administration that is capable of pursuing reform, win-
ning domestic political support and managing its relations with donors 
(Harrison 2004).
Capacity-building projects are hence intended to help governments 
develop autonomous decision-making, policy implementation and follow-
up. However, if the recipient is formally given more control over the use 
of aid and a bigger role in the development process, its supposed lack of 
capacity serve to legitimize external intervention and the placement of 
technical assistants by donors in strategic positions at the heart of Afri-
can administrations in the areas of planning, budgeting and spending 
processes (Gould 2005: 45; Bergamaschi 2008). Capacity-building, related 
units and technical assistance rest on this paradox and ambiguity. This is 
why some authors view capacity-building initiatives as technical transfers 
of knowledge as much as “political interventions designed to produce par-
ticular modern subjects” based on both coercion and inclusion, empow-
erment and discipline (Abrahamsen 2004: 1462–1463). Some African civil 
servants see technical assistance as a way for donors to keep an eye on 
public-spending process (Bergamaschi 2008: 232–233) and to become 
more closely involved in state governance (Gould 2005: 10).
In practice, capacity-building projects and units also meet pragmatic 
donor needs and interests. They give them the opportunity to choose their 
counterpart in the administration or on its periphery, to quickly establish 
functioning structures without increasing the government’s tight national 
budget, to maintain control over the operations, and to shape national 
institutions according to their needs. As donors finance the PRSPs, they 
expect a clear idea of how the funds are spent. As one donor representa-
tive puts it:
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What donors want is a structure that can start working quickly, someone 
to talk to, someone who will answer the phone, answer their questions and 
follow up their programmes—not an administration that would be efficient 
for and accountable to the population (Interview, Bamako, 2007).
To a certain extent, implementation units are also aimed at rebuilding 
what was destroyed by structural adjustment programmes in the area of 
policy planning. These parallel implementation structures enable donors 
to fill in some of the perceived gaps and claim that they reinforce the 
state while bypassing the normal administration—which they generally 
consider as unreliable and underperforming.
The “cancerous proliferation” (Interview with Technical Assistant at 
the PRSP unit, Bamako, 2007) of such project units in downtown Bamako 
is largely encouraged by donors. In 2007, their overall number was esti-
mated roughly at 33, and they were mainly concentrated in the areas of 
agriculture, decentralization, economics and finance.3 These units, which 
are often attached to a ministry but located in different buildings and 
composed mostly of civil servants with better working conditions, are 
ad hoc creations with limited life expectancy. Therefore, project aid per-
sists despite donor commitments to supporting national administrations 
through programme and budget aid: old and new mechanisms coexist and 
often overlap, thus making the aid management framework more frag-
mented and confused (Whitfield 2008).
However, the proliferation of units should not be seen as unilaterally 
imposed by donors on passive, dependent recipients; instead, capacity-
building projects are part of extraversion strategies and a source of rent 
for African elites, more specifically the highest ranks of civil servants in 
the public administration.4 Indeed, the multiplication of such units pro-
vides opportunities for additional financial and political resources. The 
post of head or coordinator of a unit is a good one, and can be assigned as 
a reward to a political supporter or a loyal civil servant. It is worth noting 
that in Mali, as is the case in Senegal, the aid market could be the second 
biggest provider of formal jobs after the civil service.5
3 This estimation is compiled on the basis of the data found on the website of the 
Malian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation: http://www.confedmali 
.gov.ml/contact.php.
4 This terminology is borrowed from Jean-François Bayart (2000).
5 This estimation about Senegal was referred to in a World Bank report (2006).
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Building on these elements of context and theoretical background, 
I shall now present my empirical material about the PRSP technical unit 
in Mali and its limited results.
The PRSP Unit in Practice: Failed Institutionalization
The government of Mali adopted its first PRSP in 2002 and second in 
2006. The first PRSP was drafted by a light and informal structure com-
posed of three people: a statistician and geographer, who was an advisor 
to the Ministry of Planning at the time, and two young economists edu-
cated in France. The United Nations Development Programme hired an 
international consultant to assist them on the grounds that drafting the 
PRSP required specific expertise.
To enable Mali’s government to write and monitor the PRSP, the cre-
ation of a PRSP ‘technical unit’ was suggested; a move that reflected 
donors’ preference for a new, special unit outside the administration. 
The unit, which is formally attached to the Ministry of Economics and 
Finance, is located in a separate building and enjoys relative autonomy. 
Its coordinator, a former official of the Ministry of Planning, is also a spe-
cial advisor to the Minister of Economics and Finance.
Since its creation in 2001, the unit has been supported by donors, both 
financially (mostly by the European Union—EU) and through a technical 
assistance (TA) programme which allocated six technical assistants (TAs) 
in total, each of whom stayed at the unit for more than twelve months.
From the donors’ perspective, the unit’s goal is to make the PRSP the 
country’s main development strategy. According to official documents, 
the unit should:
1.  ensure the good functioning of PRSP institutional mechanisms and the 
coordination of all activities related to it;
2.  reinforce the structures of the administration, civil society and the pri-
vate sector for the implementation and follow-up of the PRSP and civil 
society participation;
3.  follow-up the use of resources, and in particular HIPC resources;
4.  develop an information system to inform public policy decisions, moni-
tor and assess the implementation of the PRSP, in cooperation and part-
nership with other relevant institutions and national actors;
5.  coordinate international aid efficiently based on the needs of the PRSP 
and structure the policy dialogue with donors on the implementation of 
the strategy.
The unit was viewed as an “island of effectiveness” (Roll, this volume), 
a kind of bubble protected from the rest of the administration, an 
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institutional fix. The unit’s office is located in the quartier du fleuve—the 
capital city’s administrative district situated close to the river Niger—and 
has expanded to employ 30 people who enjoy much better working con-
ditions than their counterparts in any average administrative service: air-
conditioning, cars and petrol vouchers, chauffeurs, a broadband internet 
connection and salaries comparable to those generally paid to local staff 
in donor agencies, i.e. XOF 1,000, 000 (around EUR 1,500) per month on 
average compared to approximately XOF 400,000 (600 Euro) for a civil 
servant of similar rank in the administration (Interview, Bamako, 2007).
The unit provides an interesting site for observing contemporary aid 
practices. Indeed, the unit is extensively penetrated by donors; its mem-
bers appear to have internalized the logics of international involvement 
and policy dialogue better than civil servants in other parts of the admin-
istration. As one of them put it: “Donors are very involved, they have their 
say on everything, and that is a good thing, an asset for [our country]” 
(PRSP unit employee, interview, Bamako, 2007). This unit offers a perfect 
example of institutional entanglement (Whitfield 2008), and the merging 
of donor agencies and recipient administrations characteristic of contem-
porary aid practices (Harrison 2004).
The unit offers a setting for permanent interactions with donors which 
is considered as isolated from poor people. It is interesting to note that 
the unit’s self-sufficiency is identified as a positive step, a sign of its inde-
pendence and efficiency. As one employee from the unit put it:
The situation has improved a lot. For the first PRSP, the process was all 
brand new, and people had not grasped our role and rules. They thought 
that the unit was doing some charity work: old people, refugees and poor 
women would come and knock on our door, asking for direct support like 
financial aid or microcredit. And when we explained them that it was all 
about writing a general policy document, they were disappointed (Interview 
with employee of the unit, Bamako, 2007).
Instead, the unit’s coordinator is said to be able to respond to all of the 
donors’ demands, to convince them and find a relevant argument or data 
capable of demonstrating the efforts or progress being made (Interview 
with representative of a donor organisation, Bamako, 2007). He himself 
is mildly cynical of the donors’ real desire and ability to help Mali (Inter-
view with unit coordinator, Bamako, 2007), and constantly navigates 
between his minister and the development agencies, and between vari-
ous domestic and international constraints. He wears both suits and tra-
ditional costumes, and while he masters the donor rhetoric very well, he 
also relies on popular expressions and images to boost the morale of his 
team. At a meeting held at the unit in 2007, for example, he used prayers 
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and blessings in Arabic and Bambara to incentivize his team to become 
involved in preparing for an upcoming Round Table with donors—an 
event chaired by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), 
at which the donors and recipient government would discuss policy issues 
and donors announce indicative future aid disbursements. As the meeting 
followed the celebration of the Islamic feast of ’id al-kabir, he had brought 
along two sheep to share with the team and asked its members to forgive 
his sins and misdeeds (in accordance with the Islamic tradition). He also 
called for unity and togetherness between the managers and drivers, the 
local and expatriate employees, and the Christians and Muslims within 
the unit: “We are all here for the same cause; we share the same house and 
objectives, the same interests (. . .). If we are united, then the devil will not 
approach us, and Holy God will support us”. His greatest wish, he said, was 
to make the second-generation PRSP and the Round Table a success, “for 
the sake of the unit [and] the entire (. . .) society, and for the satisfaction 
of the international community!”. Through its fascinating mise en scène, 
mixing local customs and international agendas, this speech conveyed 
the image of a wide consensus between all of the players involved in the 
poverty reduction strategy and within the unit, which is scarcely observed 
in practice.
As of autumn 2007, the unit’s activities were mostly geared towards the 
preparation of the Round Table with donors. One of the main concerns 
was to convey the image of a responsible government to the international 
community so as to “sell Mali” (Meetings at the PRSP unit, Bamako, 2007) 
and thereby secure financial resources and aid predictability. The unit 
and its coordinator were in the frontline in the preparation of the event 
which can best be understood as a “public performance” (Scott 1985) that 
aimed to “instil trust in the capacity of the state to do what it is sup-
posed to do” and an image of unity and rationality (Lund 2006b: 689–700). 
The frenzied production of policy documents hastily validated by min-
istries in April and May 20086 fuelled a process, according to which the 
6 Initiative de mise en œuvre des Objectifs du Millénaire dans les 166 communes les plus 
vulnérables du Programme national de Sécurité Alimentaire, Plan d’Action d’accélération 
de la croissance économique du Mali, Plan décennal pour la réalisation des Objectifs du 
Millénaire pour le Développement (OMD) 2006–2015, Stratégie de croissance accélérée sur 
la période 2008–2012, and Plan de financement des Cadres Stratégiques pour la Croissance 
et la Réduction de la Pauvreté (CSCRP) et des Objectifs du Millénaire pour le Développement 
(OMD) sur la période quinquennale 2008–2012, All of these documents and a report on the 
event are available on the Round Table website at www.tablerondemali2008.org/index 
.htm.
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government of Mali was supposed to show a political will, responsibility 
and commitment to reform. The process was supervised by the PRSP unit, 
however its staff was unable to keep up with all demands and had to hire 
two consultants to provide additional support (a senior French economist 
hired by the UNDP and a young Malian economist).
The mix of national and international actors in the unit is enhanced by 
the presence of six technical assistants (TAs). The main sectors selected for 
EU-funded capacity-building are: economics and statistics, methodologi-
cal support, social statistics (health, education and water), public finance, 
logistics and management. The ambivalent logic of capacity-building at the 
juncture of control and dialogue is reflected in the words of one the pro-
gramme’s main designers at the European Commission delegation in Mali:
The introduction of the PRSP (. . .) has three implications: first, macroeco-
nomic sustainability must be ensured. This is done through the IMF and 
PRSP annual reviews. We also have demands concerning the different sec-
tors included in the PRSP. Finally, we need guarantees in the field of public 
finance management: we want clear signs of political commitment in favour 
of reform (European Commission delegation, interview, Bamako, 2007).
In addition to these EU-funded TAs, a French TA financed by the French 
embassy was posted to the unit in response to a demand from the Ambas-
sador himself, who hoped to enhance the ability of his staff to monitor the 
PRSP implementation process and lead the policy dialogue with Malian 
administration (Interview, Paris, 2006 and Bamako, 2007). Hence, it would 
appear that these TAs may be considered as “transfer entrepreneurs”, 
“importers” (Delpeuch 2008: 41) or “development brokers” (Bierschenk 
et al. 2000; Mosse and Lewis 2006; Fichtner 2012) as they are responsible 
for translating and enforcing international norms in different local contexts 
and act as facilitators between national and international arenas, actors and 
logics. Speaking about public policies in Mali, an aid agency representative 
asserted: “it’s impossible to distinguish between ‘Malian’ or donor policies. 
We chew and digest everything together” (Interview, Bamako, 2007).
Three of the remaining TAs were Africans (but not Malians) and two 
others were French. This mix of nationalities often led to situations which 
were highly confusing to the observer. Indeed, during meetings at the unit, 
it was impossible to figure out who was who and who represented what as 
the unit’s French TAs would speak on behalf of the Malian government. 
Similarly, some Malians (hired as local staff by international agencies) rep-
resented the donors and would blame Malian civil servants for their lack 
of proactiveness and assertiveness (Meeting at the PRSP unit, Bamako, 
2007). This (con-)fusion was reinforced by the project (materialized in 
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2012) to “locate the [government] secretariat for aid harmonization and 
efficiency together with the [donor] technical pool in the courtyard of the 
unit” (République du Mali 2008). The rationale was to nurture physical 
intimacy so as to bring people belonging to different institutions closer 
together and hence facilitate informal, daily and constant contact.
The question that arises here is whether this genuine fusion of actors, 
logics and practices was the result of capacity-building. Closer examina-
tion clearly reveals that the project was faced with significant limits and 
that the unit is not successful in fulfilling its various missions. The unit 
creates a space of “physical and metaphorical opportunities for engage-
ment between actors” (Wilson 2006: 513) but it has failed to meet its offi-
cially stated objectives. The reasons for this failure are explored in the 
following section.
Disappointing Outcomes, Limited Results
The unit is confronted with many limits and practical obstacles. Most 
interviewees appear to be disappointed and disillusioned about the unit’s 
achievements. In the context of the domestic institutional arena, the main 
criticisms made of the unit are twofold. Some regret that it was set up as 
a separate entity from the administration, particularly because it is not 
in charge of a straightforward development project but of national strat-
egy and planning. This, they say, impedes the unit’s ability and legitimacy 
to coordinate all of the ministers involved (Interviews with Malian civil 
servants and donor representatives, Bamako, 2007). Civil servants also 
criticize it for its porosity and dependence on donors, which threaten its 
capacity for manoeuvre and sustainability:
The unit has become bigger and bigger, but with too many TAs (. . .) Very 
often, I see them taking the lead during meetings. I’m not a racist, but how 
come you see so many white faces in a unit that is supposed to be the site of 
‘country ownership’? How can you say that the PRSP is ‘nationally owned’? 
We no longer master its conception (Interview with former employee of the 
Ministry of Planning, Bamako, 2007).
This statement reflects that in the institutional domain, “the eligibility for 
leadership often builds and depends on successful claims of autochthony 
and belonging” (Geschiere and Jackson 2006 quoted by Lund 2006b: 693).
From the perspective of the donors too, the unit has failed: in their view 
it does not follow any of the important issues for the country’s develop-
ment, it has not fostered sufficient political commitment to the PRSP and 
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reform, and/or its team is not “up to the job” (Interviews, Bamako, 2007). 
Overall, it is felt that the results achieved by the unit are inadequate in 
relation to its initial mandate.
First, frustrations concerning the unit’s work stem from the limits faced 
by the PRSP document itself. The PRSPs have been institutionalized and 
routinized into government priorities. However, it still is neither the gov-
ernment’s nor donors’ only reference and development strategy. The Mali 
government adopted the country’s first PRSP in May 2002. Some civil ser-
vants involved in the PRSP process appreciated the fact that the drafting 
of the PRSP gave them the opportunity to debate and write the document 
themselves. However, World Bank and IMF supervision and donor involve-
ment were strong (PRSP unit, interview, Bamako, 2007), and the content 
of the document is not very different from previous structural adjustment 
policy recommendations. The second PRSP (2006–2011) was adopted in 
December 2006. It focuses on three main areas: productive sectors and 
infrastructure, the pursuit of structural reforms and the strengthening of 
social sectors. It is akin to a catalogue of poverty-reduction targets. This 
can be traced back to the intervention of the supervisory ministries (Min-
istries of Health, Education etc.), which incorporated their priorities and 
strategies into the PRSP, the donors, who wanted to see their own priori-
ties included in the document to make sure that they could later “align” 
on national policies (Interview with European Commission delegation, 
Bamako, 2008), and the rather disorganized participation of civil society. 
Moreover, the document displays weaknesses in terms of prioritization, 
operational character and budgeting strategy: little is said about how the 
proclaimed objectives shall be operationalized and fulfilled (Interviews 
with Malian civil servants and representatives of donor organizations, 
Bamako, 2007 and 2008). A sensible and lengthy process led to the adop-
tion of the PRSP implementation joint assessment matrix, a complex and 
imperfect document that was criticized for its poor quality and not used 
as a result, pending further negotiations (Bergamaschi 2009).
The introduction of the PRSPs has also led to an interesting duplication 
of processes: President Amadou Toumani Touré refused to endorse the 
first PRSP because it was adopted at the end of his predecessor’s man-
date. For the 2007 election campaign, the President launched his own 
political program for economic and social development—Programme de 
développement économique et social—which is the only strategy to which 
he publicly refers to publicly and accounts for (Bergamaschi 2008). Gould 
(2005) noted that in many countries the PRSP is the cornerstone of a 
technocratic process, a tool for mobilizing aid flows which risks being 
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deprived of national legitimacy and political support. However, the case 
of Mali case shows that it is fully connected to domestic politics.
As was the case in most sub-Saharan African countries (see Stewart 
and Wang 2003), civil society participation in the PRSP process material-
ized into formal and generally superficial discussions held in hotel rooms, 
assembling aid agencies and poorly representative Bamako-based organi-
sations. The process is also believed to have had little impact on policy 
recommendations in Mali, especially concerning the country’s macroeco-
nomic framework and agricultural sector (Cissoko and Touré 2005).
In brief, the unit seems unable to fulfil most of its stated tasks in a sat-
isfactory manner, thus failing to put an end to the rampant recruitment of 
consultants (both foreign and Malian) for the production of policy docu-
ments and reports and, hence, the privatization and extraversion of public 
policies. This failure is mostly due to the fact that it cannot have a strong 
impact on what other institutions and ministries do and how they do it 
(Interviews with Malian civil servants and representatives of donor orga-
nizations, Bamako, 2007 and 2008). Coordination between line policies, 
the monitoring of the implementation of the PRSP (results and perfor-
mance) cannot be managed by the unit alone. Improving the national 
statistical and monitoring system is a very difficult task which requires 
the involvement of all the institutions in charge of public policies. But 
the unit’s failure can also be traced to several factors, such as the unit’s 
mandate, insufficient institutional backing, and a series of obstacles faced 
by TAs.
First, the unit’s mandate is fundamentally ambiguous. Since its estab-
lishment, no consensus has been reached about what the unit should 
really invest in and achieve. The concept of ‘capacity-building’ is inter-
preted differently by the actors: while Malian civil servants insisted on 
training and the unit’s material needs (cars, computers, oil coupons, etc.) 
in the early discussions, the EU promoted its own conception of how to 
improve poverty reduction methods and management through statistics 
and bureaucratic follow-up. Moreover, the unit has a cabinet-like struc-
ture: its coordinator is an advisor to the Minister of the Economy and 
Finance, to whom he is directly accountable, and therefore works on 
short-term, urgent political issues, an approach that is difficult to combine 
with long-term planning.
Second, some observers believe that the unit’s national personnel 
are not adequately trained to cope with their assigned tasks (Interviews 
with employees of the unit and representatives of donor organizations, 
Bamako, 2007 and Paris, 2008). Several of its employees are graduates in 
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law, economics and politics, and also received additional training abroad, 
for example in France, Germany and Côte d’Ivoire. Several of them are 
civil servants seconded from the Treasury or the Budget division and, 
hence, experts in public finance management or national accounting. 
According to some informants, this prevents them from seeing the bigger 
picture about development issues and strategy, a problem aggravated by 
the lack of a macroeconomist in the unit. An analysis of their CVs shows 
that many of the unit’s employees were previously responsible for donor 
projects and the amount of training they have received in a number of 
fields is impressive; however most of them lack practical knowledge and 
experience of the national administration’s procedures, formal and infor-
mal rules etc. They therefore lack both the capacity and legitimacy to 
coordinate different national institutions (Interviews with employees of 
the unit and TAs, Bamako, 2007 and 2008).
More importantly, the unit incites resistance, both externally (other 
institutions) and internally (against the TAs).
United Against the Unit? Patterns of Resistance by  
Institutional Actors
The unit is an increasingly powerful but contested actor. Its establishment 
has engendered confusion, potential for overlapping and resentment 
among national structures.
When PRSPs were introduced in Mali, the donors believed that none of 
the country’s existing institutions had the capacity and necessary resources 
to manage them. This reflects the general distrust of African institutions 
by donors and is also an implicit acknowledgement that national admin-
istrations and development planning capacities were weakened in part 
as a result of SAPs. Despite their experience in the field of development 
planning, the IFIs were suspicious of the Ministry of Planning, which they 
associated with the socialist development phase (between 1962 and 1968 
under President Keïta and, arguably also, during the subsequent military 
regime from 1968 to 1990). They insisted that the unit should be attached 
to the Ministry of Economics and Finance (Interview with Malian civil 
servant, Bamako, 2007), with whom they traditionally enjoyed privileged 
contact and have more in common. This was a turning point in a pro-
cess involving the marginalisation of the Ministry of Planning in Mali. 
Hence, this initial choice should be understood as part of a wider compe-
tition between the UNDP (which has often been supportive of planning 
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ministries in Sub-Saharan Africa) and the IFIs. This competition is both 
strategic (i.e. about leadership in the donor community) and ideological, 
since the UNDP has been very critical of IFI-driven SAPs. It is interesting 
to note that this competition is mirrored in national institutions, to the 
extent that each international agency has their particular clients within 
the government structure.7
The proactive attitude deployed by the coordinator of the PRSP techni-
cal unit in the implementation and monitoring of the PRSP was later inter-
preted as a threat by other institutions, which felt bypassed and relegated. 
The ‘ministerial super-powers’ allocated to the unit generated resentment 
and grievance among other institutions, namely the Ministry of Planning 
and other supervisory ministries which were protective of their special 
relationships and direct interactions with donors, and other structures 
such as the Observatoire du développement humain et durable (ODHD, a 
UN-sponsored human and sustainable development project responsible 
for the analysis of poverty reduction) and the presidential mission for aid 
management (Interviews with ODHD staff, Bamako, 2007). These institu-
tions have adopted resistance techniques in response, for example failing 
to share information and respect the unit’s deadlines, ignoring the PRSP 
framework when formulating their own sectoral policies, and not attend-
ing meetings. These are strong indications of their refusal to be coordi-
nated or managed by the PRSP unit. These resistance techniques, which 
have been deployed extensively in the context of the implementation of 
the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development 2005) have undeniably affected the unit’s 
ability to fulfil its role. This, in turn, confirms the instability and unpre-
dictability of the institutions as they are fundamentally shaped by “certain 
social relationships for their continued reproduction” (Lund 2006b: 698). 
These social relationships have proven somewhat superior to the donor 
will to make the PRSP unit the overarching institution, and the consid-
erable resources mobilized to achieve this goal. Capacity-building initia-
tives, in particular, have faced many challenges.
Technical Assistance Beyond Myths
In practice, the donor-supported TA programme generated power strug-
gles and low integration with the unit. Furthermore, it emerged out that 
7 A similar scenario was observed in Benin. See Bierschenk et al. 2002, 2003.
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the TAs were not the perfect missionaries of aid efficiency8 the donors 
had longed. Hence, their success in influencing the unit has remained 
limited.
It should be recalled that the TAs were appointed to the unit when 
the drafting of the second PRSP was well under way, which means that, 
for practical reasons, they could not fully influence the process from its 
inception. Also, the TA team felt they were victims of a kind of reticence 
by the unit’s other employees (Interviews with TAs, Bamako, 2007). It 
appears that the other members of the unit members had hoped to retain 
some leverage over who would be in charge of building their capacities for 
draft and implementing the PRSP and how. When the call for tenders was 
launched, a team composed of former Malian ministers was dismissed 
by the European Commission delegation on the grounds that it might 
generate ‘conflicts of interest’ with the current government. In their view, 
local TAs risk getting “too integrated socially or committed politically” or 
becoming a ‘big man’s’ protégé: “A technical assistant must be neutral. 
When conflicts emerge, he must not take a stand”. Hence, the head of the 
European Commission delegation in Mali requested that a new assess-
ment of all proposals be carried out; and the team proposed by Louis 
Berger, a Paris-based private consulting firm specialized in economics and 
development, was awarded the contract. Its ‘international composition’ 
(most of the proposed team’s TAs had professional experiences in other 
developing countries) was supposed to give it the necessary ‘distance’ and 
‘comparative perspective’. Its ‘neutrality’ (towards domestic stakeholders 
and interests), racial ‘diversity’ and good ‘representativeness’ (the pro-
posed team comprised a mix of French and African TAs) were also praised 
as features that would facilitate the team’s integration into the PRSP unit 
in Mali (Louis Berger, interview, Paris, 2008).
This initial confrontation between the European delegation and the 
employees of the PRSP unit about the selected team had enduring con-
sequences for the TA mission. Because former ministries were denied 
the right to contribute to PRSP-related activities, the unit was probably 
deprived of the political weight and backing it needed to fulfil its ambi-
tious missions. Some long-lasting defiance between the unit agents and 
TAs was also created. Some employees considered that they had been 
deprived of an opportunity to exert increased sovereign control over 
the unit and the PRSP process, and viewed the TAs as ‘spies’ sent by the 
8 The use of the term ‘missionary’ was inspired by Béatrice Hibou (1998) who refers to 
World Bank recommendations as “economic catechism”.
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European Union; others felt that they had been denied an opportunity to 
gain some advantages or opportunities for the accumulation of resources 
that the management of the unit by local former ministries might have 
allowed (Interviews with employees of the unit and TAs, Bamako, 2007). 
As a result, one TA complained that when they arrived, “the atmosphere 
was awful” and was an obstacle to their successful settlement in the unit 
(Interview, Bamako, 2007).
If they had little power and say in the initial choice of TAs, the project’s 
recipients still had significant nuisance power in terms of impeding them 
to do their job in good conditions. One African technical assistant appears 
to have succeeded in coping better with these strategies than others by 
using his knowledge of Bambara (the dominant language in the Bamako 
area) as a resource for cajoling the unit’s most reluctant agents (Informal 
discussion with TA, Bamako, 2007).
Control and authority over TAs later became a stake in the power strug-
gle between Malian public actors and international agencies. Whereas the 
unit coordinator thought that the unit was the ultimate beneficiary of TA, 
and that he could, therefore, design the TAs’ work plan, the head of the 
European Commission delegation considered that it paid the TAs’ salaries 
meant that the Commission to keep the TAs “at their disposal” (Interviews 
with TAs and donor representatives, Bamako, 2007). This prevented the 
TAs from carrying out their normal work for several weeks. In the most 
paradoxical and unforeseeable manner, the EU’s initial fear of hiring a 
‘political’ TA team (i.e. composed of former Malian ministers) appears 
to have increased the unit’s politicization at the expense of its technical 
achievements.
Furthermore, it appears that the TAs placed in the PRSP unit were not 
the perfect, hoped-for missionaries of aid efficiency, a fact that can be 
explained, first, by their professional profiles. One of them is an econo-
mist and statistician from Cameroon. He is in his fifties and worked as a 
consultant at the World Bank headquarters in Washington D.C. for many 
years. Another technical assistant is an old-style French coopérant trained 
in electrical engineering, economics and econometrics. He spent 17 years 
in Côte d’Ivoire (the showcase of economic success in francophone West 
Africa at the time), mostly as a TA at the Ministry of Finance. After that, 
he completed shorter-term contracts in many African countries, mostly for 
the European Commission. The third technical assistant is a 40-year-old 
economist and statistician from Burkina Faso who is also head of a private 
consulting company based in Ouagadougou. The expert in public finance 
management is one of Benin’s former treasury directors. The French-funded 
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TA is a macroeconomist previously hired as a non-permanent official for 
French cooperation and the EU in African countries. The TAs recruited for 
the unit have first-hand experience of the PRSP, for it is a relatively recent 
policy instrument: for obvious reasons, the French TAs would not have 
experienced PRSPs at home and did not encounter them in the African 
countries they worked for previously either. The African TAs in the unit did 
not participate in the PRSP process in their home countries.
Furthermore, the TA’s commitment to the aid efficiency model cannot 
be taken for granted. The former Benin treasury director has all of the nec-
essary technical capacities and skills to assist in public finance manage-
ment, however his own personal and professional references prompted 
him to compare Mali’s financial situation that of Benin (even in a criti-
cal way for Mali) rather than with internationally-produced best practice 
(Interview, Bamako, 2007). Another TA is philosophical about his own 
positioning in the aid arena and rather critical of all aspects of the new 
aid rhetoric and buzzwords such as donor coordination, civil society par-
ticipation, good governance, anti-corruption, results-based management 
etc. (Interviews and informal discussions, Bamako, 2007). In his opinion, 
this dogmatic toolbox sweeps industrialization, growth, economic devel-
opment and the private sector aside, and differs from what he has expe-
rienced and from what he believes really works for development in other 
countries. He is also rather blasé about the succession of international aid 
fads and aware that the commitment shown by African civil servants to 
them is often superficial and instrumental. The TA who was most con-
vinced by the IFI recommendations (the reduction of public services, the 
promotion of microcredit, the ‘change in mentalities’ required for devel-
opment, etc.) only stayed at the unit for a short period of time, hence his 
impact was probably limited.
Overall, the room to manoeuvre and commitment of TAs varied greatly. 
The reluctance shown towards them at the beginning of their mission was 
clearly an early cause of discouragement. However, the TAs’ degree of 
implication also varied on the basis of their contrasting personal profiles 
and professional prospects. One TA was eager to display a high level of 
professionalism. He was still in the middle of his career and therefore felt 
he had a lot to win (or lose) with this mission. As a result, he was very 
careful to please both the unit coordinator and the European Commission, 
in the hope that he would obtain other contracts of the kind in the future, 
perhaps with greater responsibility. As a result, he was willing to pres-
ent concrete, quantified results (Interviews, Bamako, 2007). For another 
TA, the contract with the PRSP unit was the last long-term mission of his 
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career. Also, due to his mandate, age and experience, he had to be careful 
to avoid presenting himself as a competitor to other unit members. To do 
this, he allegedly adopted a low profile posture, and may, therefore, have 
achieved less than he could or would have wanted to. Another expert 
had a position at the World Bank’s headquarters; its mission at the unit 
was temporary and he could not stay in Bamako permanently. Indeed, he 
still had to make regular trips to Washington for professional or personal 
reasons. Another TA opted for a pragmatic approach and mobilized his 
expertise to achieve delimited, technical tasks.
Finally, it appears that TAs within the unit remained strangers within 
the organization: their integration and, hence their influence and con-
trol, were weak. The separation from the rest of the team was important, 
even from a purely physical point of view: the TAs had two different 
offices—which were larger and better-equipped than those of the Malian 
officials—and separate toilets, which were accessed using a special key. 
Language was also a barrier between TAs and Malian officials; the latter 
usually interacted in Bambara. Socialization patterns widened the gap: 
TAs tended to have lunch in expensive places that mostly attract expatri-
ates, while the Malians would eat in surrounding African canteens. In the 
evenings, the unit employees were usually not free to attend social events 
as they had a family to care for after work so the TAs and local officials 
rarely met outside the unit. The TAs sometimes saw each other socially, in 
particular the Africans, who had moved to and settled in Bamako alone.
However, there were differences in the levels of integration of the TAs: 
the African TAs were better integrated to its social activities (i.e. marriages 
and burials). For example, they felt that contributing to the unit’s infor-
mal but institutionalized system of money-collecting and solidarity was a 
duty they were expected to honour (Interview with African TA, Bamako, 
2007). One of the French TAs would help his local driver in cases of finan-
cial hardship, however on a one-to-one (rather than collective) basis. The 
fact that the TA from Cameroon accepted to work part-time at the PRSP 
unit office and part-time at the office of the national division of statistics 
(a worse-resourced building than the PRSP unit) was greatly appreciated 
by Malian civil servants and probably enhanced his proximity with them 
(Interview, Bamako, 2007). On account of the extensive period of time he 
had spent on the continent, the older French TA was referred to as “an 
African” by some of the unit’s employees. He was well accepted within 
the unit and connected to former Malian ministers and high-ranking civil 
servants. He was sensitive to and interested in development issues and 
Malian history. In contrast, another TA had fewer interactions with the 
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unit employees and displayed little interest in Malian politics (Interview 
with TA, Bamako, 2007). One TA, in particular, was thought to have built 
substantial capacities and transferred knowledge and techniques to the 
unit staff and the wider administration. However, his training programme 
had limited impact because of its short-term character. One of his guest 
trainers (a European geographer) felt that the computer software he 
trained local civil servants to use was expensive, inaccessible (it involved 
frequent updates from a Europe-based hotline) and “way too complex” for 
what the Malian beneficiaries actually needed to do (e.g. compile quite 
simple statistical maps) and doubted that “the trainees will ever be able 
to make something out of it” (Interview, Bamako, 2007). This TA was him-
self worried about the sustainability and capitalization of his programs, 
which extended over a period of one year but were briefly interrupted by 
the renovation of the airport—a project hastily decided on by President 
Amadou Toumani Touré with no prior notice—and, more importantly, 
did not benefit from any clear follow-up mechanism after 2007–2008 (TA, 
interview, Bamako, 2007).
Ultimately, TAs were unable to exert much influence on the unit’s activ-
ities or monitor them very closely. If, as one of them explained to me, the 
EU systematically wanted them to be their “ears and eyes in the admin-
istration”, its representatives only “selects very technical, partial pieces of 
information on the basis of demands coming from the headquarters or 
the head of the delegation” (E-mail, 2008) and cannot fully control the 
unit and its TAs in practice. In the context of increasing decentralization 
and chronic lack of human resources, European staff is young and over-
whelmed by the huge number of projects to be supervised (Interviews 
with officials within and outside the European delegation, Bamako, 2007). 
This possibility struck me when a European Commission official asked 
me about the unit’s productivity—it appears that this person could not 
glean this information from personal observation or from the informa-
tion provided by the TAs. One of them would sometimes complain of not 
having any contact with his funding agency (Interview, Bamako, 2007), 
another indication that the reporting by TAs to donor agencies is irregu-
lar and donor surveillance restrained. The latter is further restrained by 
TA’s multiple accountability lines. Indeed, the TAs had to report to Louis 
Berger, the agency responsible for the execution of the project, every three 
months. However, this agency’s priority is the disbursement of funds and 
satisfying the European Commission and the effective capacity transfer 
within the Malian administration is merely of secondary importance 
(Email from TA, 2008).
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As a result, and despite strong donor penetration, the unit’s daily 
life and activity remains close to what prevails in the rest of the Malian 
administration. It follows rhythms dictated by social and religious events 
rather than donor agendas and schedules. Informal rules and hierarchies 
between officials are partially based on joking relationships, e.g. a set of 
institutionalized jokes and social obligations between particular groups 
common in West Africa (Canut and Smith 2006). Some interns with no 
clear formal status work at the unit; they survive on solidarity and redis-
tribution or await permanent positions. The socialization patterns of the 
unit’s employees are not highly globalized in terms of world views, profes-
sional habits and personal aspirations. They do not particularly look up 
to donor countries and their models. Dealing with their social constraints 
(distribution of wealth in their family and community) is a priority, and 
many complain about the pressures weighing on their salaries (Interviews 
with unit employees, Bamako, 2007). Like in many ministries, decision-
making is centralized at the top. Several unit members prayed five times a 
day, and received social acquaintances seeking for advice or assistance. In 
other words, the unit never became the perfect super-performer detached 
from the social reality of Mali as envisaged by the donors.
Donor-Driven Capacity-Building and State Formation in Africa: 
Concluding Remarks
The case of the PRSP unit in Mali highlights the paradoxes and limits 
of donor-sponsored capacity-building. Indeed, the unit’s hybrid status 
(as a separate entity located on the margins of the administration) was 
designed by donors to create a bureaucratic enclave that would enjoy 
better working conditions. However, ultimately, the project has proven 
counter-productive, particularly because it has affected its influence over 
other institutions involved in poverty reduction policies. Following sev-
eral years of existence and the allocation of considerable resources, the 
unit’s legitimacy and leadership are contested.
The EU-funded technical assistance programme set up within the unit 
has also faced many challenges; the TAs have failed to exert real control 
over the unit. Hence, this paper constitutes an invitation to put the power 
of international models into perspective, and, in particular, to demystify 
TA which is often accused of substitution or neo-colonial paternalism (e.g. 
by Ferguson 1990, Escobar 1995 and others). Far from being apolitical or 
able to unilaterally impose government methods serving a pre-defined 
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global social order, development experts are ‘learning elites’ who draw 
on experience. In fact, their practice and leverage depend on the envi-
ronment in which knowledge is co-produced and synthetized. Their real 
influence is subjected to genuine negotiation between actors (Wilson 
2006: 502, 509, 513, 518). Hence the hegemony of aid agencies is better 
described as an object of permanent struggle than a secure and stable 
state of affairs (Mosse 2005: 7).
Our case study also illustrates that extraverted reform remains funda-
mentally superficial and ambivalent: if, at first glance, recipients display 
openness and willingness towards donor logics, at a deeper level, they are 
reluctant and partially reject the content of the reform through informal, 
creative practices, “weapons of the weak”9 intended to bypass donor control 
or elude hegemonic regulation. As a result, the transformative dynamics of 
public administrations are “controversial and contentious” (Bezes 2007: 11) 
and affected by cultural contexts and pre-existing institutions that are able 
to instrumentalize foreign knowledge (Dezalay and Garth 2002a).
Finally, the PRSP unit in Mali is not conducive to state building 
per se—i.e. the “conscious effort at creating an apparatus of control”, a 
rational, efficient state oriented towards poverty reduction and good public 
management, but indeed contributes to the process of state formation—a 
historical process composed of conflicts, negotiations and compromises 
between diverse groups whose self-serving actions and trade-offs consti-
tute the “ ‘vulgarization’ of power” (Berman and Lonsdale 1992: 5). State 
formation is nurtured rather than contradicted by international capacity-
building initiatives and their dual, fitful processes and “ever-changing 
agendas”, which produce non-linear, unstable outcomes (Lund 2006b: 
692). These, in turn, contribute to the extension of the bureaucratic power 
of African states. This particular point was first made by James Fergu-
son (1990) in his authoritative analysis of a World Bank’s decentraliza-
tion project in Lesotho. This chapter shows that, despite the international 
attempts at fostering the retreat of the state proclaimed since the 1980s, 
his conclusions remain true in the post-Washington era. The state thus 
formed through social relationships, mundane activities and negotiations 
9 As demonstrated by Roberts (1996) for the cotton sector in Mali, ‘weapons of the 
weak’ and bypassing strategies were deployed under colonial rule. Reference can also be 
made to James Scott (1985) regarding resistance strategies deployed by subalterns in situ-
ations of domination. 
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between a variety of local and external institutions (Lund 2006a: 674, 679; 
Lund 2006b: 686, 698) is best described as an “international state”.10
It is difficult to assess the unit’s legacy to the Malian institutional land-
scape and governmental practice, however a few key features stand out. 
For all its limits, the TA project marks an institutionalization of donor 
presence at the heart of policy-making arenas that is reminiscent of early 
post-colonial times. The unit enabled the government to show its com-
mitment to reform and openness to donors. Managing aid relationships 
is an important part of the unit’s job, and the capacities actually devel-
oped by its staff relate to aid management more than national planning 
or the promotion of public goods (Bergamaschi 2008). By doing this, the 
unit fuelled an aid system increasingly “geared toward ensuring its own 
self-perpetration” (Gould 2008: 8). International interventions are normal-
ized, banalized and projected into the heart of African administrations 
through daily routines (Whitfield 2008) that blur the distinction between 
international and national actors. This co-production of public policies 
and government methods is not linear, however. The creation of the unit 
generated important debates about development, sovereignty, national 
capacities and donor interference amongst Malian bureaucrats. It also 
contributed to a shift in power relations in Mali: the power of the Minis-
try of Economics increased relatively while the Ministry of Planning has 
been further marginalized.
Moreover, capacity-building initiatives lead to imperfect outcomes 
because they are characterized by rigid procedures, short-term vision 
and objectives, and a restrictive and normative conception of the state 
(Campbell 1997; Darbon 2003; Bezes 2007). After a relative loss of donor 
interests and institutional backing, the unit has gained interest again 
and is recruiting more experts. In parallel, since 2010, donor funds are 
also directed towards the secretariat of aid harmonization and efficiency, 
another donor-initiated structure hosted by the Ministry of Economics 
and Finance and entitled to follow up the implementation of the Paris 
Declaration (Interview with international consultant, Paris, 2009). In 2012, 
both entities moved to a bigger building, in the more modern and expand-
ing neighbourhood of Bamako called ACI 2000.
This multiplication of temporary, semi-institutional entities dilutes 
responsibility for action. The fragmentation of donor-sponsored capacity-
10 I borrow the expression coined by Yves Dezalay and Bryant Garth (Dezalay and 
Garth 2002b: 313) in reference to the US-led export of the rule of law to Latin American 
countries.
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building initiatives tends to destroy the possibility of institutional coher-
ence and reform. It obscures the object referred to as ‘administration’ and 
hinders predictability in roles and conduct, and continuity of the state 
apparatus (Darbon 2003: 142). The contours of the state are also blurred 
and hard to identify. Institutions evolve in a “deluge of meaning” in which 
various actors and repertoires exist and compete for legitimacy as public 
authorities (Lund 2006a: 673; Lund 2006b: 692–693).
However, these permanent changes and instability may also be part of 
the division of bureaucratic labour that is characteristic of the modern 
state described by Weber (Bierschenk and Olivier de Sardan, Introduc-
tion, this volume). Indeed, the unit has generated debates but also contri-
butions to clarify the role, resources and responsibilities of various public 
institutions. And the capacities built within the unit in recent years will 
be disseminated in a variety of settings (the administration, aid projects, 
donor agencies or NGOs) where its agents will get other positions, how-
ever the capitalization prospects remain uncertain. As such, ad hoc units, 
institutional changes and instability ought not to be primarily analysed as 
obstacles to state formation in sub-Saharan Africa per se, but as its very 
components and ingredients. Thus, reform presents as a constant feature 
and essence of African administrations, which appear to be more adapt-
able, flexible and open to change than is usually assumed by international 
donors and some academics.
Post-Script: The PRSP Unit in 2013
Shortly after completing the final version of this chapter, I visited Bamako 
in June 2013 and interviewed former contacts in the Malian public admin-
istrations, at the PRSP Technical unit and in donor agencies. The context 
has consistently changed after a coup d’état in March 2012, the subsequent 
partition of the country and occupation of its Northern parts by Tuareg 
and Islamist insurgents, a French military intervention launched in early 
January 2013 and the preparation of the United Nations Multidimensional 
Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (Minusma) established by Secu-
rity Council resolution 2100 of April 25, 2013, and officially launched on 
July 1. International aid had almost totally been suspended for a year, and 
Mali’s status of model and “donor darling” had been badly affected. I was 
surprised, however, to find the unit in a rather good shape given those 
difficult circumstances.
As mentioned earlier, the unit moved to another building situated in 
the recently constructed, administrative neighbourhood called ACI 2000 
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in July 2012. The new location has ensured the unit an increased isola-
tion appreciated by some staff—since they now receive less visits from 
family and acquaintances than when the unit was located in the city 
centre—but has created major problems with the provision of electric-
ity and chronic shortcuts impeding their productivity, too (interviews at 
the PRSP unit, Bamako, 2013). The unit now shares offices with the donor 
technical pool and a new instance in charge of aid harmonisation, the 
Secrétariat à l’harmonisation de l’aide (SHA).
Some continuity could be observed in the way unit members think 
of and negotiate sovereignty, and deal with international donors on a 
daily basis. Concerning the French military intervention, the head of the 
Sustainable Human Development division believed that for colonial rea-
sons, “only France could answer” and that “we need to insert ourselves 
in globalizing processes, because we have no choice” (interviews at the 
PRSP technical unit, Bamako, 2013). The unit coordinator considered that 
“the international community has helped to protect Mali’s sovereignty” 
by restoring Mali’s “territorial integrity” and compelling the Mouvement 
national de libération de l’Azawad to abandon the idea of independence 
and negotiate with the central government.11 There is no doubt that they 
also trust in the government’s well-proved abilities to deal with inter-
national constraints in a way able to preserve some interests. They also 
asserted that “ordinary Malians” are more touchy, proud and nationalistic 
about these things.
The unit had elaborated the third PRSP in late 2011—that is, just before 
the crisis. The process has led to some interesting innovations aimed at bet-
ter taking the country’s changing context into account. As the document 
was drafted while tensions and combat between the army and Northern 
insurgent groups were intensifying, the unit insisted that it include some 
“pre-conditions” related to peace and security. Furthermore, to enhance 
ownership and sustainability (i.e., to incentivize the candidates running 
for presidents in the 2013 election and avoid the experience of duplica-
tion materialized with the Programme de développement économique et 
social), the unit insisted that the PRSP should be validated by the Council 
of Ministers before December 31, 2011, and shared with the country’s main 
political parties before the election.
11 For a detailed account of the events that occurred in Mali since the coup in March 
2012, see Bergamaschi (2013).
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On the other hand, in the preparation of the third PRSP, several regional 
consultations were carried out by the unit countrywide, for which they 
had difficulties getting external funding (interview with Technical Assis-
tant and unit employee, Bamako, 2013). The consultative process provided 
an opportunity for the unit staff to hear the aspirations of civil society rep-
resentatives, religious and political leaders at the local level and to real-
ize that ‘they know what they want’, and in particular: the efficient use 
of remittances from the diaspora in the Western region of Kayes; access 
to land and micro-finance in the central area around Segou; improve-
ments in cotton production in the Southern region of Sikasso; cattle in 
Mopti along the Niger river; and finally, women’s empowerment, the fight 
against desertification and water provision in the Northern regions of 
Timbuctu, Gao and Kidal (interview with head of the unit’s Human Sus-
tainable Development division, Bamako, 2013). However, for lack of time 
and incompatibilities with national planning tools, it was not possible to 
fully integrate these priorities in the PRSP nor translate it into regional 
operational schemes for implementation.
Initially, the unit agent felt confident and enthusiastic about drafting 
the third PRSP themselves; and they wanted to put the focus on agri-
cultural production and equitable growth. But Danish insistence to hire 
an international consultant (from Senegal) to draft the PRSP once again 
demobilized the unit staff, which felt dispossessed of its principal mission. 
The consultant associated all sectors and actors in the PRSP (interview 
with the consultant, Paris, 2012), and was tempted to ‘copy-paste’ line pol-
icies, while mixing them with other existing frameworks and international 
requests (for example, Handicap International asked for a reference to 
the rights of disabled people to be added). This has led, once again, to a 
lack of prioritization. When the consultant left in late November 2011, the 
team—and especially its coordinator—amended the document, but had 
little time to do so since they wanted to comply with the political deadline 
(31 December 2011) that they had set themselves (interview with technical 
assistant, PRSP unit, Bamako, 2013).
The unit still found it hard to get access to some key policy documents 
like, for instance, the Government Financial Operations Table produced 
by the Ministry of Economy and Finance. However, in June 2013 it seemed 
better accepted by other actors. It is worth noting that like the rest of 
the administration, and despite the paralysis created by vacant political 
leadership and the suspension of international aid, the unit started to 
work again just a few days after the coup instigated by Captain Sanogo 
on March 22, 2012. The coordinator and most of his staff have kept their 
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positions despite the coup and the several government shifts that occurred 
under transition governments. Since 2008, the team has also been suc-
cessful in ‘keeping’ a young and competent national economist trained in 
Canada from working for aid agencies.
The unit is now part of Mali’s normal institutional landscape. Staff con-
tinuity is ensured by the fact that the unit’s coordinator is not affiliated 
to any party or political leader but ‘has his entries’ at the primature no 
matter who the prime minister is (interviews and informal discussions at 
the PRSP unit, 2013). He is recognized as a technocrat, for his professional 
background at the Ministry of Planning, his working ethos and ability to 
appeal to aid partners. As a result, he enjoys functional autonomy from 
the Ministry of Economy and Finance.
This process can best be accounted for as ‘institutionalisation through 
adaptation’, which describes how donor-sponsored entities are being 
absorbed and transformed by African states. Indeed, the unit’s role differs 
from the one initially stated. It has never had the legitimacy to drive a 
national development strategy encompassing all sectors and actors, and 
has focused on managing aid relationships and translating international 
demands into national public policies and politics. But it has confirmed 
its role of entry point for donor support and of intermediary at the junc-
ture between national politics and donor priorities. Resilience, translation 
and adaptation are key features of the unit’s achievements and accep-
tance over time.
Some consider that, because of the accumulated experience, a better-
designed technical assistance programme after 201012 and the wake-up 
call created by the coup, the unit has gained autonomy and confidence, 
including in its relationships with other public administrations, foreign 
technical assistants and donors. For example, in the preparation of the 
Conférence des donateurs for the ‘recovery’ of Mali held in Brussels on 
May 15, 2013, some agencies like the UNDP and the World Bank were 
eager to sideline the PRSP and urged the government to produce a new 
document adjusted to the crisis—a Plan d’actions prioritaires d’urgence 
that would be seen as more ‘political’ by diplomats and donor headquar-
ters, better articulated with the ‘roadmap for the transition’ adopted by 
12 Four technical assistants are now funded by the UNDP and France. Only one per-
manent French TA works at the unit, while the others are based at the Malian Ministry 
of Health and the National Statistics Institute. Another TA only comes to Bamako three 
weeks every three months. Consequently, according to staff, he brings “new energy”, new 
ideas and comes with a clear working agenda, while the risk of “substitution” is limited. 
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the government in January 2013 (in particular, concerning actions to 
strengthen the Malian army and deal with refugees), more limited in 
scope (it would only be relevant for the years 2013–2014) and hence eas-
ier for them and the government to monitor. The unit and government 
(backed up by France) refused, arguing that it was more appropriate to 
promote the continuity of public administrations and policies—that is, 
to reactivate and rely on pre-existing frameworks such as the third PRSP 
adopted in late 2011. The PRSP was hence slightly adapted to include some 
elements of the roadmap for the transition, translated into English and 
renamed the Plan for the Sustainable Recovery of Mali 2013–2014 (PRED) 
for the Brussels conference.
During my visits in June 2013, the unit staff was working to establish a 
monitoring mechanism for the PRED that would combine previous pol-
icy tools with the demand for greater supervision of implementation by 
headquarters and European capitals. To a great extent, some continuity 
in personnel, policy tools and institutional processes was hence guaran-
teed within and by the unit in the midst of political crisis. The unit was 
also busy controlling that the disbursement promises made to Mali by 
donors in Brussels in May 2013 (over three billion euro) will flow into the 
country. The unit will be instrumental in the allocation and management 
of these funds. Its future partly depends on the outcome of the presiden-
tial elections to be held on the July 28 and early August 2013. Finally, its 
role in practice is likely to evolve as a result of the on-going shifts in pri-
orities, modalities and actors of international intervention in Mali, from 
poverty reduction supported by traditional donors to military, humani-
tarian, security and transitional justice programmes sponsored by NGOs 
and emergency organizations, French and African troops and the staff of 
the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in 
Mali (Minusma).
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A BREEDING GROUND FOR REVENUE RELIABILITY? 
CAMEROONIAN VETERINARY AGENTS AND TAX OFFICIALS  
IN THE FACE OF REFORM
José-María Muñoz
On November 2004, over the course of an interview conducted in the 
city of Ngaoundéré, Adamaoua Province (Cameroon), a senior tax official 
shared his views about the difficulties involved in making those active in 
the cattle economy comply with recent innovations in tax law:
It’s a sector that the state protects enormously. We would have liked to 
lay our hands on herders and traders to make them pay what they should 
but it’s terribly difficult. We go about it gradually. We’re trying to tax 
those who trade cattle in the south. We can control their railway ship-
ments . . . It’s certainly an undertaxed sector. On the one hand, there is 
[the]  problem . . . [that] herders, not only in Adamaoua but pretty much 
everywhere, distrust the authorities, specially the tax authorities. On the 
other hand, we lack the means to go after them. And the Ministry of Live-
stock, for the most part, does not make our task any easier . . . Truth be 
told, this sort of problem concerns our relations with all branches of pub-
lic administration. They should help us because it is us who generate their 
budgets, who allow them to function. But we only get help from any of 
them in extremely rare cases.
These words serve as a reminder that effective reform does not only 
depend on the response of citizens or the overhaul of the structures and 
procedures of a given administrative department but also on the coopera-
tion between different departments. My informant’s straightforward point 
provides the impetus for the following pages, which explore how reforms 
affect public administrative action on the ground and how officials negoti-
ate interdepartmental tensions. My focus is the Cameroonian tax adminis-
tration, whose face began to change markedly in the 1990s. Since then, state 
officials and taxpayers have experienced this reform effort not so much as 
a package but rather as a succession of changes to law and administrative 
organization. Based on ethnographic research in Adamaoua, one of Camer-
oon’s three northern provinces, this article examines the effects of a recent 
program aimed at improving the efficiency of the state’s revenue-raising 
© José-María Muñoz, 2014 | doi: 10.1163/9789004264960_013
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efforts.1 I set out both to analyze in detail the Program for Improved Reve-
nue Reliability in the Animal Husbandry and Fisheries Sector (PSREP), one 
such relatively modest component of these reforms, and to place the scope 
of this program within a broader spectrum of administrative practice.
By looking into a Cameroonian case, in which the spheres of author-
ity of different branches of public administration were reconfigured, I 
intend to contribute to two bodies of scholarship: a still sparse literature 
that approaches the workings of revenue authorities and their reform as 
ethnographic objects (Cantens 2009; Chalfin 2010; Abelin 2012; Boll 2012); 
and works that analyze the exercise of public authority in present-day 
sub-Saharan Africa. Despite its obvious implications for the questions 
of democracy and state building (Guyer 1992; Bräutigam 2009; Martin, 
Mehrotra and Prasad 2009), taxation has received only limited ethno-
graphic attention in sub-Saharan Africa. The reform of tax administration 
has certainly been the object of intense debate and scrutiny, since tax 
authorities have long been held to be a strategic choice for attempts at 
reforming state bureaucracy (Kaldor 1963). This literature, however, has 
placed much of its emphasis on the assessment of state (in)effectiveness 
in mobilizing revenue (Stotsky and Wolde Mariam 1997; Chambas 2005; 
Gupta and Tareq 2008) and the potential for privatization in this domain 
(Kiser and Sacks 2009). Yet, as Ole Therkildsen (2001) has noted, the gap 
between revenue figures and the empirical research required to interpret 
them, in relation to policies, administrative action, and taxpayers’ behav-
ior, remains striking.
Recent studies have demonstrated how a transnational epistemic com-
munity of tax experts has played a major part in the design of strategies to 
improve tax administration in developing countries (Fjeldstad and Moore 
2009a). Notwithstanding this strong international consensus on what the 
centerpieces of tax reform should be and the attested interest in under-
standing how this consensus is reconciled with national particularities 
and governmental priorities, the anthropology of policy in this domain is 
1 These pages are based on fourteen months of fieldwork during several research trips 
between July 2003 and November 2004. They draw on participant observation and semi-
structured interviews with numerous state officials and cattle herders and traders working 
in Adamaoua Province. Research took place within the framework of a British Economic 
and Social Research Council-funded project. I am deeply indebted to the two other mem-
bers of the research team, Philip Burnham (principal investigator) and Martial Massike 
(research assistant). I would also like to thank Thomas Bierschenk, Giorgio Blundo, Philip 
Burnham, Jane Guyer, Karen Hansen, Robert Launay, and Jean-Pierre Olivier de Sardan for 
their comments on earlier versions of this article.
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still in its infancy. “Tax administration is tax policy” is an often quoted dic-
tum in the literature (see, for example, Bird and Casanegra de Jantscher 
1992). In spite of the valuable invitation this maxim contains to go beyond 
programmatic policy formulations, from a heuristic point of view it is pro-
ductive to make a distinction between general policy ‘frameworks’ and 
what is generally subsumed under ‘policy implementation’ (Shore and 
Wright 1997; Mosse 2004; Shore, Wright and Pero 2011). Accordingly, I will 
discuss the general contour of the administrative reforms in Cameroon 
before delving, through a specific example, into the nature of the trans-
formations that they have triggered. 
These pages, like the rest of this book, are also intended as a contribu-
tion to scholarship on the exercise of public authority in present-day sub-
Saharan Africa. Here I follow in the footsteps of Bierschenk and Olivier 
de Sardan’s (1998, 2003) dissection of the ‘polycentric’ political arenas in 
rural Benin during the era of democratization and decentralization. They 
propose to approach public authority in such a setting in terms of ‘sedi-
mentation’ and empilement (superimposition). In a different vein, Achille 
Mbembe (2001: 66), in his seminal discussion on ‘private indirect govern-
ment,’ referred to the ‘fragmentation of public authority’ as a major histor-
ical process in postcolonial contexts (see also Bierschenk in this volume). 
His ideas are particularly apposite for my purposes here, since he thinks 
such a fragmentation should be at the center of the analytical questions 
that he groups under the broad rubric of ‘fiscality.’ Mbembe also under-
scores the erosion of the mobilizing power of metaphors such as ‘public 
interest’ and ‘common good,’ a crucial development shaping Cameroon’s 
political and economic landscape in the last two decades (for a somewhat 
different view, see Lentz’s contribution on higher civil servants in Ghana, 
in this volume). An increasing number of works have taken heed of such 
lines of inquiry, combining an explicit focus on “the substantive activity of 
competing political organizations as they exercise public authority” with 
the belief that these matters are “not beyond detailed and vivid empiri-
cal analysis” (Lund 2006a: 675, 682). In this light, the “the practical form 
of public authority” appears as “composite and chimerical” (Lund 2006b: 
689). My article finds its rationale in this larger endeavor to document 
how state officials and other power brokers—with varying degrees of self-
awareness and for a broad range of ends—mediate between the state and 
its citizen-subjects.
Technologies of taxation and the exercise of public authority also 
occupy a prominent place in Janet Roitman’s influential work on economic 
regulation in the Lake Chad Basin, an admittedly vague designation that 
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includes Adamoua Province (2005: 5 n.7). For my purposes here, what she 
terms the ‘pluralization of figures of regulatory authority’ is of particular 
interest. Roitman (2005: 18) elaborates on this notion as follows:
Effective authority over [commercial and financial] exchanges [in the Chad 
Basin] and the surpluses they generate is exercised by an amalgam of per-
sonalities associated with state bureaucracy, the merchant elite, the military, 
and non-state militia groups . . . They manage to regulate local populations 
and define access to material resources and wealth, to tax the profits of eco-
nomic relationships, and to establish preeminent authority over certain sec-
tors of economic activity.
However, in Roitman’s account, the ‘personalities’ whom we are told 
exercise authority seemingly dissolve in the alchemical image of the 
‘a malgam’—or in a ‘military-commercial nexus,’ as she prefers to desig-
nate it other times. In her work, such personalities often do not get past 
the status of faceless silhouettes. By drawing the readers’ attention to 
the competition for authority between two branches of Cameroon’s state 
bureaucracy, I want to recalibrate the debates that Roitman’s book and 
numerous articles have inspired.
I present my argument in four sections. First, I offer an overview of 
two decades of reforms that targeted Cameroon’s public administration 
as a whole and its tax administration in particular. Second, I introduce 
readers to the professional cultures of veterinary agents and tax officials 
in Adamaoua Province. The third section discusses how this program 
reorganized the collection of cattle-related taxes. The final section takes a 
look at cattle exports to Nigeria, which provide a vivid illustration of the 
uneven impact of this reform initiative on the practices of state officials.
Reforming Tax Administration in Cameroon
Reforms in sub-Saharan Africa have placed many government employ-
ees in the dual position of agents and objects of reform, a Janus-faced 
role that has not failed to generate ambiguities and paradoxes. Cameroon 
has had its share of both, as will become apparent in the analysis of the 
Programme de Sécurisation des Recettes de l’Elevage et la Pêche (PSREP, 
Program for Improved Revenue Reliability in the Animal Husbandry and 
Fisheries Sector). The PSREP is a modest addition to an open-ended series 
of ambitious administrative reforms undertaken by the government since 
1988, when it adopted its first International Monetary Fund-supported 
program.
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In the early years of structural adjustment, marked by the emphasis on 
the need to cut public spending in order to achieve macroeconomic sta-
bility, administrative reform was largely understood in terms of reducing 
the state payroll through layoffs and salary cuts. Even within these nar-
rowly defined terms, a regime trying to navigate the troubled transition 
to multiparty politics showed itself unable and unwilling to implement 
such measures. Operation ANTILOPE, for example, was launched in 1987 
but its main goal, to clean up the state payroll of ‘ghost’ civil servants, 
proved to lie beyond reach. The government has been grappling with this 
problem for more than two decades now. As late as November 2008, the 
minister of public service told national deputies that 5,324 new cases of 
fictive employees and pensioners had been detected. That the civil ser-
vice, which Jean-François Bayart (1985: 216) in his groundbreaking analysis 
of the Cameroonian state, had singled out as the “main social force in the 
country,” would resist these measures is anything but surprising. In the 
years of crisis and adjustment, the social and political position of govern-
ment officials was significantly eroded. It was only in 1993 when, unable 
to cover the public wage bill, the government decided to take the drastic 
step of reducing the salaries of civil servants.2
The scope of reform was broadened in 1994 with the introduction of a 
legal framework aimed at improving civil service efficiency (Ngouo 1997).3 
Despite its ostensible aims and although it listed the dedication to the 
service as fundamental obligation (article 15), the new statute for state 
employees explicitly accepted their parallel involvement in private activi-
ties (article 37). This unprecedented formal sanction of the widespread 
practice of ‘straddling’ did not pass unnoticed to critics (Sindjoun 1996: 
64, Nanga 2000: 5). Indeed, far from disappearing, as some reformers had 
anticipated, straddling (the seeking of economic advantage by the simulta-
neous involvement in state employment and private business) continued 
2 In January 1993, salaries were reduced by 15 percent on average, excluding police and 
military personnel. Later that year, in November, there was an additional reduction of 
32 percent. The 1994 CFA franc devaluation further eroded their economic position. Senior 
civil servants, for example, saw their real wages fall by 75–80 percent from 1992 to 1995 
(World Bank 2001: 4). In the last three decades, late payment of civil servants’ salaries has 
also become commonplace. 
3 Statut Général de la Fonction Publique de l’Etat, contained in decree 1994/117, of 
October 7, 1994. The decree was drafted with the United Nations Development Program’s 
active participation (Bruneau and Abouem 2004: 7). In fulfilment of conditions imposed 
by the World Bank, the decree opened the door for an attempt to reduce the number of 
civil servants by 30,000 through voluntary departure and early retirement (Bayie Kamanda 
1999).
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unabated and extended to the lower ranks of the civil service (Geschiere 
and Konings 1993).
From 1994, numerous governmental initiatives tackling different aspects 
of the state organizational structure have seen the light. Most of them 
have been placed under the mantle of the ‘good governance’ agenda and 
largely draw their inspiration from New Public Management ideas (Ngouo 
2000; Tamekou 2008), (for similar reforms of Ghana’s civil service in the 
mid-1990s, see Lentz in this volume; for the reforms in the Cameroonian 
education sector, see Charton in this volume).
These include an overarching National Governance Program (NGP, 
which has known two phases, 2000–2004 and 2006–2010)4 and a myriad 
other programs and projects.5 These initiatives offer ample room for 
“the dramatization (théâtralisation) of technocratic and legal-rational 
discourse” (Sindjoun 1996: 65). Each new attempt acknowledges the 
 contributions—and sometimes even the shortcomings—of previous 
ones. Often mandated by Cameroon’s international ‘partners,’ each new 
effort contains the promise that things will be different thereafter. As the 
burden of acknowledged ‘mitigated successes’ and ‘failures’ increases, 
the leaps of faith required to keep the flame of reform alive are bigger. A 
recent Canada-sponsored program to introduce result-based management 
methods (PROMAGAR), for example, “has not aroused special enthusi-
asm,” the ruling party’s newsletter told its readers. The reason being that 
4 The NGP was first announced by President Biya in his 1996 New Year’s Eve speech 
but was not approved by him until 2000. A 2004 critical evaluation gave the impetus for a 
reformulation of the program in 2005. The UNDP participated in the program’s conception 
at both stages. Progress in achieving the NGP’s goals has been closely monitored by the 
World Bank and the IMF. It is also claimed to have played an important role in determin-
ing when Cameroon reached the Highly Indebted Poor Countries initiative’s “completion 
point” that gives access to substantial foreign debt relief (Charlier and N’Cho-Oguie 2009). 
Cameroon finally reached the completion point on April 28, 2006.
5 SIGIPES, a computer system that manages state personnel and payroll, is probably 
the single initiative that has attracted most attention and controversy (Ngouo 2008). It 
was initially conceived in 1992 by then minister of public service, Garga Haman Adji, who 
was soon to resign. After several false starts, its pilot phase, which focused on four strategic 
ministries, began in 2002. In December 2005, the system’s tortuous implementation made 
the headlines of the national press (for a sample, see La Nouvelle Expression, December 8, 
2005; Le Messager, December 12, 2005). Alleged corruption in the provision of technical 
support by outside contractors motivated the suspension of two top officials within the 
Ministry of Public Service and Administrative Reform for “dishonesty and serious breach 
of trust.” Ultimately, and largely on account of his parallel ‘crusade’ to expose irregulari-
ties in the admissions to ENAM, Benjamin Amana, the minister behind SIGIPES ‘clean 
up’ operation was replaced in September 2006. SIGIPES is now in the process of being 
extended to several other ministries. 
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the “beautiful promises” contained in “similar projects, some still in place 
and others already buried,” have been engulfed by “centrifugal forces” 
stemming from an “irréformable” civil service (RDPC 2009). As suggested 
by Béatrice Hibou (2006: 297) in her work on the Tunisian regime, we 
should be advised not to discard the possibility that these “reforms in per-
petuity” are what constitutes the “success of reformism.” Be it as it may, 
learning to coexist with reform has become part of the social condition of 
Cameroonian civil servants.6
Because of its critical role in revenue generation and its potential to 
showcase improved efficiency, the tax administration has figured promi-
nently in the attempts to reorganize the civil service. It is often claimed 
that revenue offers a yardstick to assess administrative efficiency that is 
lacking in other areas of public administration—although the challenges 
of delivering on such claims can be daunting (Barbone et al. 1999 and 
Raffinot 2001). A senior official writes with a touch of pride that “Within 
the Cameroonian administration as a whole, the Direction Générale des 
Impôts (DGI, the national tax authority) is unique in having firmly and 
irreversibly embarked on the hazardous road to performance-based man-
agement” (Evina Obam 2005: 24). Changes introduced in the tax adminis-
tration, however, cannot be understood in isolation from the overhaul of 
the tax and customs system more generally. Since 1994, the transforma-
tions of the customs regime and of personal and business taxation have 
been substantial and far-reaching. These transformations took place as the 
government gradually recovered from the 1991 Villes Mortes campaign, a 
wave of popular protests that contested its legitimacy and explicitly called 
for tax boycotts (Takougang and Krieger 1998; Roitman 2005). Revisions 
of the tax code included the suppression of the head tax and the creation 
of a specific tax for persons operating outside the regulatory framework 
(impôt libératoire) in 1995 and the introduction of a value-added tax (VAT) 
in 1999.
These changes called for considerable additional efforts from disaf-
fected state officials, whose salaries, which were not always paid on time, 
afforded a severely diminished standard of living after the 1994 CFA franc 
6 Of course, this is far from being the exclusive trait of Cameroonian or African civil ser-
vices. An illustrious specialist in the workings of the French administration, for example, 
talked about the “permanent failure of reform” in the former metropolis (Crozier 1995). 
These remarks, at a time when French public administration was in the midst of two 
waves of reform decided by Prime Ministers Rocard and Juppé (Guyomarch 1999), were 
made roughly when the above-mentioned succession of reforms was being tried out in 
Cameroon.
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devaluation. Their administrative services, as a result of the unevenly 
implemented austerity measures, lacked previously taken-for-granted 
resources. Moreover, not unlike the Nigerien court officials faced with an 
increase in the number and complexity of cases Oumarou Hamani (this 
volume) analyzes, tax officials confronted a considerably enlarged pool 
of taxpayers subject to a variety of new tax regimes. This represented, 
on the one hand, more files to be dealt with by each agent and, on the 
other, the urgent need to catch up with new law. Indeed, some transi-
tional regulations were only in force for a few years. All these novelties, 
in turn, increased the possibilities for manipulation of the regulatory 
devices. Any official willing to get a supplemental income through col-
lusive agreements with taxpayers and other extra-legal exactions could 
arbitrarily invoke new regulations to justify abuses.
As far as the reforms of the administration itself are concerned, a senior 
tax official in Adamaoua aptly summed up their presiding idea: “We are 
now compelled to deliver in terms of results, somewhat like the private 
[sector].” At the provincial and district levels, the system relied now on 
annual revenue targets. Under the new system, tax officials also receive a 
share in the improved tax payments as well as in the fines and penalties 
levied—although in Cameroon performance-based formulas have had 
more traction in customs than in tax administration (Libom Li Likeng et 
al. 2011; Cantens 2012). The managerial principles governing the operation 
of collection and audit services also entailed, at least rhetorically, turn-
ing taxpayers into clients. To that effect, a Taxpayer-Partner Program was 
adopted. Since 2002, taxpayers can address a single interlocutor at the 
district level in the figure of the chef de centre des impôts (CCI, head of the 
tax center), who takes on previously separate functions such as control, 
audit and dispute resolution.
The creation of the CCI also reflects a move from a system organized 
around different types of taxes to one organized around industries, locali-
ties and groups of taxpayers, which is consonant with widely followed 
prescriptions for tax reform in developing countries (Fjeldstad and Moore 
2009a). Thus, with the involvement of foreign expertise, the government 
has created separate administrative units to deal with categories of tax-
payers whose contribution could be ‘optimized’: one tailored to cater to 
a select group of the country’s largest firms (DGE) in 2004 and others 
devoted to medium-sized enterprises (CIMEs) in 2008. In fact, it was this 
new approach that justified the initiative on which this article focuses. 
Indeed, the PSREP was one among several programs oriented toward 
improving ‘revenue reliability’ (sécurisation des recettes), that is, explicitly 
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aimed at increasing the tax ‘productivity’ of certain sectors. With the active 
encouragement of its main donors, and in the face of the impending rev-
enue shortages as oil production declined, the Cameroonian government 
attempted to raise revenue from economic sectors whose poor revenue 
yields could be blamed to a large extent on administrative deficien-
cies. Animal farming and fisheries, and, more important in quantitative 
terms, the forestry sector and the mining sector were obvious candidates 
for specific attention.7 These three programs for enhanced revenue reli-
ability illustrate a critical feature of these reforms: they are premised on 
improved coordination among different agencies acting in the name of 
the state. At issue were relations between several specialized ministries 
and the Ministry of Economy and Finance (MINEFI). Other governmen-
tal efforts have sought improved coordination and data-sharing among 
tax, customs, and social security administration.8 To give a sense of the 
complexities involved in translating administrative reforms into effective 
measures in local contexts, I shall now turn to how the PSREP was imple-
mented in Adamaoua Province.
Veterinary Agents and Tax Officials in Adamoua Province
The Prime Minister launched the PSREP in 2000 (décret no. 2000/980/
PM, of December 8, 2000). The program did not create any new taxes. It 
simply tried to involve MINEFI in the collection of certain duties (market, 
slaughterhouse, and laissez-passer veterinary fees, most importantly) that 
had been hitherto the exclusive responsibility of the Ministry of Livestock, 
Fisheries and Animal Industries (MINEPIA) veterinary agents.9 Therefore, 
to borrow Olivier de Sardan’s terms (2001), at the core of the PSREP was 
the issue of the cooperation between two branches of the administration 
7 Programme de Sécurisation des Recettes Forestières (PSRF, décret no. 99/370/PM, 
of March 19, 1999) and Programme de Sécurisation des Recettes des Mines, de l’Eau et de 
l’Énergie (PSRM, décret no. 2002/1722/PM of October 8, 2002).
8 The partnership between the tax authorities and the Caisse Nationale de Prévoyance 
Sociale, the governmental agency in charge of the social security system, was established 
in 2001 (Law no. 2001/017, of December 18, 2001). Setting up a Cellule Mixte Impôts/Douanes 
(customs/taxes joint unit) had to wait until 2005. In light of its failure to operate, the 
national commission for tax reform proposed its elimination two years later.
9 Because these duties are paid in exchange of services provided (a veterinary inspec-
tion, for example), they are not taxes in a technical sense. However, the services provided 
are often more nominal than actual. For example, the veterinary inspection is ordinarily 
either cursory or inexistent. This, added to their compulsory nature, justifies considering 
them under the rubric of taxation. 
310 josé-maría muñoz
that had different ‘local professional cultures’ but that were also invested 
in ‘ privatizing’ their bureaucratic work. This call for cooperation took 
place in the context of long-standing tensions between the two ministries. 
Such tensions surfaced regularly during my fieldwork in Adamaoua.
Adamaoua is one of the country’s main cattle herding and trading areas. 
Cattle focused a large part of German and French attempts to ‘develop’ 
this area. Colonial officials were acutely aware of the importance of cattle 
from a revenue perspective. As the chef de region wrote in a letter from 
1950, “We cannot forget that Adamaoua shelters around 50,000 humans 
compared to the 300,000 head of cattle that form the tax base for the cat-
tle tax.”10 Although Adamaoua’s economy has expanded and diversified in 
the last six decades as a result, among other factors, of becoming a major 
transport hub after the completion of the Transcamerounais railway in 
1974, cattle remains its emblematic cornerstone.
As Jean Boutrais (2001: 55) reminds us, the protagonist role of veteri-
nary officials in the cattle sector dates back to the colonial era. As was the 
case in other French-controlled territories and contrary to what happened 
in British colonies, veterinary officials were involved in spheres other than 
the control of animal health. Their tasks included not only the manage-
ment and improvement of pastureland but also the selection of breeds and 
the regulation of markets and commercial flows. This colonial administra-
tive legacy was consolidated after independence, when Ahmadou Ahidjo, 
the country’s first president, created a strong national professional corps. 
Veterinary agents were an exception to the sous-administration (insuf-
ficient administrative presence) that characterized the northern part of 
the country (Marguerat 1984: 466). During this period the grid of veteri-
nary services in the area was denser than that of healthcare for humans 
(Boutrais 1999: 609).
The first national veterinary doctors received training abroad.11 In 1966, 
the inauguration of an Animal Health and Production Training Center 
in Maroua created the possibility of domestic training for veterinary 
10 ANY (National Archives, Yaoundé) 3AC 6141 Taxe sur le bétail, Avis des chefs de 
régions sur l’augmentation, 1950. Unless otherwise stated, all translations from the French 
are mine.
11 This was the case of Maikano Abdoulaye, who after his studies in France, was to 
become the head the national veterinary services in 1966. Hamadjoda Adjouji, the longest 
serving minister of livestock, also studied in France. When the Dakar Inter-State School 
of Veterinary Science and Medicine was created in 1968, it became an attractive option 
for Francophone Cameroonians. Senegal remains to this day the most common source of 
degrees for Cameroonian veterinary doctors.
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assistants. However, until 2007 no national institution offered a veterinary 
doctor degree, which meant that those in the higher echelons of MINEPIA 
necessarily studied abroad.12 At the time of my research veterinary doc-
tors working in Adamaoua had been trained in France, Senegal, the former 
Soviet Union and Nigeria. These diverse educational itineraries are a source 
of internal distinctions and splits, not unlike those that Giorgio Blundo 
(this volume) describes among Senegalese and Nigerien foresters.
To this day, veterinarians rather than administrators, engineers or 
economists have retained control over MINEPIA. Nonetheless, the vet-
erinary profession has seen considerable changes in recent decades, as 
Jean-Germain Gros (1993, 1994) has documented. From the mid 1980s, the 
state was unable to sustain its policy of automatic employment of vet-
erinary professionals. In 1988, under pressure from the World Bank, the 
government accepted in principle the private practice of veterinarians. 
The formal end of state monopolies over the exercise of the veterinary 
profession and over sales of veterinary products, however, took a few 
more years.13 This gradual process of privatization has transformed the 
paternalistic ‘assistance contract’ that linked the administration to cattle 
herders and traders (Boutrais 1999: 622). In 1991, only 12 out of a total 
of 112 Cameroonian veterinarians had set up private practice (Gros 1994: 
47). Despite the rhetorical commitment to do so, the state did not mate-
rially support the veterinary officials who decided to follow this course 
of action. Those who succeeded did so either on their own or with the 
help of international pharmaceutical companies. The numbers of private 
practitioners have increased considerably since. Adamaoua remains the 
province with highest concentration of veterinarians, boasting ten private 
importers of pharmaceutical products (Messomo Ndjana 2006). In 2004, 
the city of Ngaoundéré counted four private veterinarians, three of them 
operating as importers as well.
The career of most employees in the tax administration tends to be 
more uniform than that of MINEPIA veterinary officials. Since 1965, the 
immense majority have gone through the professional training and social-
ization that the École Nationale d’Administration et de la Magistrature 
12 Based at the University of Ngaoundéré (Adamaoua), the École des Sciences et de 
Médecine Vétérinaire started functioning in September 2007.
13 See, respectively, Law no. 1990/033 of August 10, 1990; and Law no. 2000/018 of 
December 19, 2000. 
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(ENAM) provides.14 Yet, even today, senior positions are generally occu-
pied by those who have supplemented their studies abroad, often at the 
French École Nationale d’Administration, or in Washington D.C. under 
the supervision of international financial institutions. After independence, 
the presence of public administration generally and of tax administration 
in particular was extremely thin across the north.15 In Adamaoua, it was 
largely limited to the city of Ngaoundéré. The bulk of tax collection was 
undertaken by the administration territoriale, with sub-prefects in protag-
onist roles and ‘traditional authorities’ serving as key intermediaries. In 
1983, when the status of Adamaoua changed from district to province, the 
grid of the tax administration became denser. From then on, tax officials 
took up most audit and collection tasks at the level of former sub- districts 
now upgraded to the district status. In the first half of the 1990s, in con-
junction with the severe economic crisis, the Villes Mortes general strikes 
and tax boycott, which had massive followings in the province rendered 
the tax administration practically inoperative. Tax authorities have since 
attempted to recover the ground lost during those years. The informaliza-
tion of economic activity, the limited administrative resources, and the 
disaffection of officials have marked the context in which this gradual 
redeployment of the tax administration has taken place.
A September 2004 meeting held in Ngaoundéré on the taxation of the 
cattle trade (Muñoz 2011) offers a recent example of the long-standing 
tensions between MINEFI and MINEPIA officials. The local prefect had 
conceived a conciliatory meeting with cattle merchants to overcome their 
defiance of newly imposed obligations but found that the representatives 
of the two ministries were in no disposition to present a united front 
against a set of notoriously elusive taxpayers. On the contrary, the meet-
ing became an opportunity for settling scores between them. The grudges 
of the MINEPIA provincial delegate featured prominently. He reminded 
everyone how the tax authorities, as a matter of course, unfairly accused 
MINEPIA of stoking up incivisme—a label commonly used by the gov-
ernment to stigmatize those who fail to pay taxes as bad citizens (Roit-
man 2005; Muñoz 2010)—among herders and traders. To the embarrassed 
silence of the tax officials present, the MINEPIA delegate admitted that 
14 There was a predecessor of the ENAM, the Ecole Camerounaise d’Administration, 
created by the French in 1959, on the eve of independence. 
15 Marguerat (1984: 466) describes the whole north as self-administered and sous-encadré 
(under-supervised). In 1970, there was in the north a government official per every 430 peo-
ple. The ratio of official per inhabitant in the rest of the country was much lower, 1/180.
 a breeding ground for revenue reliability? 313
he was “perplexed to find out that the measures contained in [a recent] 
letter [from the DGI] were taken without [MINEPIA] being informed. I 
must say, however, that we are already used to this kind of practice on 
their part.” Once more, he noted, the tax authorities had shown “a com-
plete disregard for the role of MINEPIA, which, as you all know, is held 
responsible for anything involving cattle.” With hindsight, it was perhaps 
not entirely surprising that this meeting dramatized the conflicts between 
MINEFI and MINEPIA officials. Such propitious occasions to air their 
reciprocal grievances are few and far between.
MINEPIA and MINEFI tend to have a markedly different rapport with 
the main actors of Adamaoua’s cattle economy. For a long time, the upper 
echelons in the Ministry of Livestock have been monopolized by Adama-
oua politicians. Foremost among them, Hamadjoda Adjoudji, the minister 
at the time of my stay in the field, had held this position for twenty years 
(1984–2004). Even by Cameroon’s impressive standards of political lon-
gevity, this is a remarkable feat as well as an extreme example of the pol-
icy of ethnoregional dosage (proportioning) of government appointments. 
Adjouji’s successor also hails from Adamaoua. Not only is the MINEPIA 
hierarchy identified with what is popularly referred to as the bloc Islamo-
Peul (‘Muslim-Fulbe power block’) but veterinary agents in charge of the 
bulk of the ministry’s groundwork are almost without exception Fulfulde 
speakers. Even those who did not initially speak the language ended up 
learning it during their training or on the job. Not having minimal skills 
in Fulfulde would make communication with herders so difficult as to 
render their task almost impossible.
By contrast, the majority of the MINEFI staff in the province is from the 
south of the country, and therefore likely to feel estranged from participants 
in the cattle economy, who are largely Fulbe and Hausa Muslims. The over-
representation of southerners in Adamaoua’s tax administration dates back 
to early independence (Gondolo 1978: 94). As far as most political posts 
were concerned, however, President Ahidjo adopted the policy of appoint-
ing northerners—and only those who were Muslim or Islamized. After Biya 
became president in 1982, the pattern was reversed and southern gover-
nors, prefects, and sub-prefects received appointments in the newly cre-
ated Adamaoua Province (Beauvilain 1989: 607–610; Takougang 1993: 95–96; 
Taguem Fah 1996: 247–248). As Philip Burnham (1996: 174 n.11) notes,
Given the substantially greater average educational level of southern Cam-
eroonians, the Biya government has been able to appoint ‘on merit’ a much 
greater proportion of southerners to administrative posts in the Mbere and 
throughout the north. Such appointments are justified by their incumbents 
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both as an ending of Ahidjo’s policy of ethnic favoritism as well as a further-
ance of [Biya’s] RDPC policies of ‘renouveau’ and modernist socioeconomic 
development.
Even under Biya’s predecessor Ahidjo, however, the small numbers of per-
sons from the north with higher education meant that southerners occu-
pied most of the technical jobs. Although the quantity of northerners in 
such positions has increased considerably in the last decade, their small 
numbers in elite training schools, such as the ENAM, and in technocratic 
governmental and parastatal jobs is still a commonly voiced grievance 
against Biya’s regime in the north. That imbalance became there the focus 
of one of the most noticeable political opposition platforms in recent 
times, the 2002 Memorandum of the Great North’s Problems.
MINEFI, in any case, has been singled out by the regime’s critics as 
overwhelmingly Beti (Biya’s ethnic affiliation). The senior tax official 
present in the above-mentioned September 2004 meeting, for instance, 
was one of only two people among more than thirty participants who did 
not speak Fulfulde. In fact, the MINEPIA provincial delegate, also from 
Adamaoua, hinted at this cultural distance in many of his remarks. Their 
respective cultural proximity and distance vis-à-vis cattle herders and 
traders translate into considerable differences between what MINEPIA 
representatives and what the tax authorities know about the cattle sector 
and its main actors.
Enhanced ‘Revenue Reliability’ of the Cattle Sector
The PSREP impinged on the (largely tolerated but unofficial) privileges 
of MINEPIA’s veterinary agents. For decades, one of the perks of being 
posted to a cattle area in Adamaoua was the significant income that could 
be obtained from siphoning off part of the revenue raised in their role as 
tax and fee collectors. These practices were widely known and colored 
stereotypes on the figure of the docta na’i (cattle doctor, a term used for 
both doctors and assistants). As a veterinary assistant who had worked 
in Ngaoui in the late 1970s summed up, “Life on the border with Central 
African Republic can be tough, but it was a fast money-saving job.” Since 
the end of the 1980s, the late payment and the diminishing purchasing 
power of salaries gave these funds renewed importance. More than ever, 
MINEPIA officials needed to “prepare their retirement,” as two of my 
informants put it. During this period, projects such as the fight against 
the tsetse fly (Boutrais 1999) or the promotion of the local dairy industry 
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(Tsapi 2002), in which the state veterinary agents played key roles, were 
equally among those ‘areas of suspicion’ of which Olivier de Sardan (2009: 
46) has written.
The PSREP acknowledged a preexisting situation of widespread misap-
propriation of public moneys at the level of MINEPIA régies de recettes 
(tax collection units). Neither one of the two parties whose cooperation 
the program required denied this state of affairs. For example, one of 
the top officials in Adamaoua’s tax administration, while minimizing the 
financial import of the taxes concerned, explained the program’s objec-
tives as follows:
Since the chefs de secteur (heads of cattle grazing zones) work in rural areas 
for the most part, they behaved as loose cannons (en electron libre). They 
undertook the collection of these duties, only to put the money in their 
pockets. The state has decided to protect these funds [against such prac-
tices] and we have succeeded. We have multiplied revenue from this source 
by three or four (. . .) Yet, it remains a pretty negligible sum. In any case, [to 
raise large sums] was not the [program’s] goal. The goal was to make sure 
that the duties that a chef de secteur collected, ended where they should.
Similarly, in relation to the PSREP’s targets, no one in the local ranks of 
the MINEPIA felt the need to beat about the bush. When I asked him 
whether there had been winners and losers in the program’s implementa-
tion, an employee at the provincial office emphasized,
It is MINEPIA that the program has penalized! The aim was to steer (can-
aliser) funds that sometimes got lost [in the collection process], because 
there were many collectors involved. It was a matter of the state being able 
to reclaim (récupérer) its own revenue.
All the same, at first the implementation of the PSREP’s new collection 
procedures was anything but straightforward. The program initially 
ran against the resistance of veterinary agents on the ground. In the 
1990s these agents had seen their prerogative as sole suppliers of vet-
erinary products and services vanish under the banner of liberalization. 
According to their testimony, some saw the initiative to subject their 
tax collection tasks to MINEFI’s surveillance as a full-fledged attack on 
their profession. Their bosses and their nonveterinarian colleagues in 
MINEPIA tended to have a more circumspect view. “After all, the tax 
collecting side of their job, it is by accident that they have come upon 
it,” one of them told me. In any case, resistance to the program made 
2001 a remarkably disappointing year in terms of veterinary taxes. The 
vested interests of municipal agents in charge of collecting market and 
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slaughterhouse fees, who were involved in similar irregular practices, 
posed additional difficulties.
In many respects, however, the veterinary agents’ battle was lost from 
the start. The tax and customs administrations would not give up the new 
remunerative share in the cattle economy to which they were now entitled. 
Whereas before MINEPIA had kept the full amount of the revenue raised 
from these sources, the PSREP decree rewarded MINEFI’s participation 
in the collection process by allocating 30 percent of that amount to the 
Treasury (MINEPIA receiving the remaining 70 percent). Moreover, the 
tax authorities soon abandoned a maximalist approach. According to my 
informants, they realized that pursuing every single instance of an indi-
vidual pocketing state revenue would be too costly. Instead, they decided 
to concentrate their actions in the provincial markets that they thought 
were most promising, namely Ngaoundéré, Likok, Banyo, and Ngaoui. At 
the time, the example of Ngaoui (Mbéré District, next to the Central Afri-
can Republic border) was presented to make a case for the need to unify 
the collection services of MINEPIA, customs and the tax administration. 
This more pragmatic approach yielded results. From July 2001 to the end 
of June 2002, taxes that came under the PSREP mandate generated the 
respectable sum of 1,800 million CFA francs (about 2,7 million €) at the 
national level, compared to a mere 200 million (300,000 €) per trimester 
in the previous fiscal year (PRASAC 2003: 77).
To add some historical perspective, it is worth noting that such dras-
tic improvements in veterinary tax figures are not unprecedented. In the 
 second half of the 1980s, for example, the tax collected by the MINEPIA 
provincial services rose significantly. Revenue raised from these sources 
went from around 42 million CFA francs (64,000 €) in 1984–1985 to over 
145 million CFA francs (220,000 €) in 1989–1990. Unlike the PSREP, this 
was an internal process that did not involve any other ministerial depart-
ment. Indeed, at the time, MINEPIA’s official explanation of this change 
emphasized tighter control of market transactions and not state agents’ 
misappropriation of revenue. This was certainly the case in terms of 
recorded transactions. In 1988–1989 sales in the province markets had 
increased 28.2 percent and shipments to the south by 31.8 percent. Yet, 
MINEPIA’s report for that year also hinted at other factors: “Adamaoua 
has not ceased to make progress in the collection and transfer (reverse-
ment) of taxes to the state coffers.”16
16 MINEPIA’s provincial archives, Rapport Annuel 1988/89, Délégation Provinciale de 
l’Elevage de l’Adamaoua, p. 91, emphasis added; see also Rapport Annuel 1990/91, p. 88.
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Despite the noticeable improvement that the PSREP had induced 
by mid-2002, important gaps in the collection of cattle-related taxes 
remained. Several incidents were aired in early 2003. With its distinc-
tive reporting style, the state-owned Cameroon Tribune drew attention 
to the discrepancy between the taxes collected and the number of cattle 
traded and slaughtered in the Mbéré District. According to this report, in 
Meiganga, where estimated levels of activity in the cattle sector should 
have generated six million CFA francs (9,150 €) in veterinary taxes per 
year, the municipality had never collected more than 600,000 (915 €). In 
Dir, another municipality of this district where “cattle is the unrivalled 
backbone of the economy,” things were “even more serious:”
On the occasion of a recent sub-prefect’s visit, voices rose crying out against 
the harm that this situation is causing to the commune. Of five cattle markets 
in Dir, the tax-collecting officer noted that apart from the revenue coming 
from Dir-Centre, he has never received any money from the other veterinary 
centers. Who specifically profits from veterinary taxes? It is difficult, very dif-
ficult to tell with any certainty, since accusations are coming from all sides. 
Mayors accuse veterinary agents. These, in turn, retort that it is municipal 
officials in charge of collecting taxes, acting on mayors’ behalf, who are to 
blame. In short, there is some sort of neglect on the part of the authorities 
and a set of collusive practices between butchers and their partners.17
By the time I arrived in Adamaoua in July 2003, the readjustment set in 
motion by the PSREP was by and large a closed matter. Customs and tax 
officials in MINEFI, who had more at stake in the program, found the 
increased productivity of veterinary taxes satisfactory. MINEPIA agents in 
the province’s most important markets had seen their income diminish, 
although, as far as I could tell, they had resigned themselves to it. Fol-
lowing a trend that had already begun in the previous decade, many had 
found private economic activities on the side to make up for those losses. 
Veterinary agents who supervised lower-ranked markets, where PSREP 
control was weak, still enjoyed considerable flexibility. The main com-
plaint MINEPIA representatives expressed about the program was that 
MINEFI, in its role as collector of funds from this source, failed to give 
MINEPIA its corresponding 70 percent in a full and timely manner.
The PSREP had strikingly little impact on the activities of cattle breed-
ers, traders, and butchers. The program did not change much in their way 
of conducting business. They had, for the most part, always paid the taxes 
at issue (veterinary market and slaughterhouse fees and laissez-passer 
17 Cameroon Tribune, April 3, 2003.
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certificates). These were difficult to avoid anyway. This is not to say that 
cattle transactions outside markets that violate existing regulations, but 
which are a long-term feature of the regional economy, came to a halt. 
Once collected, those tax funds were not their concern. Several told 
me they feared that disgruntled veterinary agents would now interfere 
in their business. Most, however, reacted more positively. Some explic-
itly welcomed the fact that the taxes they were paying financed public 
spending rather than the private whims of civil servants, some hoped that 
part of the proceeds were used in upgrading market and slaughterhouse 
facilities.
The Unreformed Taxation of Cattle Trade to Nigeria
The previous section has examined how the implementation of the PSREP 
in Adamaoua was a gradual and negotiated outcome. This section places 
the PSREP in a broader context of administrative practice. It analyzes a 
realm of administrative action that the law does not acknowledge and 
that has remained beyond the reach of reform.
One morning in the field, a group of cattle traders in Ngaoundéré 
were waiting for the military escort to leave for a rural market. A man 
approached them and introduced himself. He was a veterinary assistant in 
a village in the Faro-et-Déo District, located on the Nigerian border. What 
had brought him to Ngaoundéré, he said, were the irregularities surround-
ing cattle exports to Nigeria, which he wanted to report to his superiors at 
the provincial level. Traders did not hold export licenses nor did they file 
import-export forms when they sent new herds across the border. Instead, 
he informed us, they made payments to local authorities in the district’s 
administrative center. He even quoted the stipulated sums per animal 
that the municipality and the local chief received. None of this money, he 
claimed, reached state coffers.
His alarm about the dimensions of this phenomenon did not impress 
the traders. As a matter of fact, some of them operated in Nigeria. The 
trader he had chosen to address was quick to put him in his place. Cattle 
exports to Nigeria were “a reality,” in fact a very old one:
It has been going on for decades and it won’t stop. Then, it is a question 
of government authorities agreeing on what forms it should take. You say 
traders are behaving irregularly, when it is the authorities that have encour-
aged them to proceed the way they do. Of course, the Treasury is missing 
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revenue, but who is to blame for this? Is it the traders who are paying their 
dues, or the officials who are pocketing the money?
The veterinary agent was startled to learn that those in the upper ech-
elons of MINEPIA were perfectly aware of the situation. He had heard that 
this illicit trade had received the Faro-et-Déo prefect’s approval, but had 
never suspected that everyone else knew about it. “Everyone has given 
their laissez-passer!,” retorted the trader, putting an end to the conversa-
tion. He called a couple of other traders who operated across the Nigerian 
border and asked them to exchange views with the veterinary assistant, 
which they did reluctantly.
When the veterinary assistant finally left, his visit prompted a series of 
observations. The trader who had dealt with him remarked that they must 
remain vigilant. The cross-border cattle trade was an extremely sensitive 
issue. Not only did it raise questions about Cameroon’s relationship with 
Nigeria—a heated topic in the aftermath of the dispute over the sover-
eignty of the Bakassi peninsula—but also stirred up the specter of corrup-
tion by state officials. Others sounded more defiant. It was in the interest 
of local authorities not to meddle in this ‘file.’ If these facts were to be 
aired, they thought, traders would have little to fear. Only a naïve official 
who had not served long in his post, like that veterinary assistant, would 
think of trying to change the way things worked. Not so naïve, another 
trader countered. If he was acting like this, it was only because he had 
not yet found the way to obtain his own cut in the money being paid. Yet 
another trader, half-jokingly, went even further. In his opinion, “He has 
yet to realize he is just the last link [of the chain]. If he keeps bothering 
his superiors and other officials, he will be transferred to a remote post 
in the bush. If worse comes to worst, he could be thrown into the Faro 
[river].” Everyone burst into laughter.
This chance encounter illustrates how control over economic activities 
such as the cattle trade depends on the combined efforts of a series of 
individuals acting on behalf of the state. These range from the territorial 
representatives of the central government (prefects and sub-prefects), to 
delegates and other agents of the relevant governmental departments and 
agencies (MINEPIA, Ministry of Industrial Development and Commerce, 
MINEFI’s tax and customs administrations), and elected local representa-
tives (mayors), as well as other administrative ‘assistants’ (chiefs).18 As this 
18 Decree no. 77–245 of July 15, 1977, which regulates the organization of chieftaincy, 
defines the role of chiefs as auxiliaires de l’Administration. The decision of some chiefs 
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account shows, there is ample room for conflict and compromise among 
state officials in their exercise of authority.
The cross-border cattle trade from Adamaoua to Nigerian markets was 
banned during the colonial period. A 1946 arrêté (ordinance) forbade 
exports to both Nigeria and Afrique Equatorial Française. It did not, how-
ever, put an end to this trade. Like in other domains, the colonial state 
could not live up to its ambitions. The legal texts and administrative deci-
sions that outlawed these commercial flows were ineffectual from their 
inception and trade continued unabated. Administrative records from 
1947 to 1953 even report on its volume. The paradox of this illegal trade 
whose existence the authorities openly acknowledge has remained a fix-
ture. The postcolonial state similarly held on to the notion that Adama-
oua’s cattle should be reserved to supply southern Cameroon and thus 
refused to grant export licenses to trade with Nigeria. All the same, it was 
not in any better position than its predecessor to implement such a pro-
hibition (Boutrais, Herrera and Bopda 1992: 4). Routinely violated, regula-
tions that subject this commerce to the possession of licenses that are 
not granted under any circumstances, are nonetheless productive. They 
create a whole sphere of illegal economic activity, which, as Karine Ben-
nafla’s (2002) exemplary research on cross-border trade in Central Africa 
has shown, does not preclude entanglements between traders and state 
officials. It only colors them differently.
A taste of this peculiar dynamic may be obtained by looking back on 
the aforementioned September 2004 meeting on the taxation of cattle 
trade. An experienced trader, particularly intent in explaining how traders 
were “on the losing side every single day,” made passing reference to the 
fact that many of them had directed their efforts to the Nigerian market. 
His remarks elicited an immediate response from the MINEPIA provin-
cial delegate, “But that trade is not authorized!” Disregarding the dele-
gate’s outburst, the trader continued his impassioned speech. Everyone, 
it seemed, found the interruption either irrelevant or too trivial. A month 
later, I interviewed the delegate at his office. He openly acknowledged that 
Adamaoua’s traders regularly took part in “Nigeria’s circuit of parallel sales” 
despite its illegality. Explaining this apparent incongruity, he said, “We 
to openly get involved in party politics has led to cases of overlapping roles. The lamido 
cum mayor of Bibémi (North Province), whose controversial management of Adumri’s cat-
tle market in 1996 has been documented by Bennafla (2002: 336), is one instance among 
many. 
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lack the means to prevent it (. . .) Frankly, once animals leave Ngaoundéré 
and go back into the bush, there is little we can do.” He glossed over the 
fact that at border-crossing points the cattle convoys bound for Nigerian 
markets are highly conspicuous even for an occasional visitor like me. A 
recent report tells us: “As a result of the systematic failure to restrict cattle 
circulation to designated trails, as well as the porosity of the Nigerian bor-
der, customs cannot really control cattle flows towards this country. They 
have to resign themselves to the traders’ verbal statements on the size of 
the herds being exported, without the possibility of verification” (PRASAC 
2003: 77). This is by no means an exceptional situation in Africa, although 
cattle export bans are less common than import bans and restrictions or 
temporary border closures (Little 2003, 2010; Mahmoud 2003).
In Cameroon’s Faro-et-Déo District, the impracticability of enforcing 
a cattle export ban, therefore, does not bar state officials on the ground 
from arriving at an understanding with those who take part in this trade. 
The lack of legal cover for these economic activities means that officials 
are constantly engaged in negotiating their share, if any, of the funds 
resulting from turning a blind eye on these exports. Agreements reached 
among them rest on fragile ground. They depend on a mutual understand-
ing with traders. As the example of the newly-appointed veterinary assis-
tant shows, changes in personnel can alter the existing balance. A story 
from Tignère (Faro-et-Déo District), which circulated widely while I was 
doing fieldwork, further illustrates this phenomenon. According to sev-
eral testimonies, in the late 1990s a newly appointed Ministry of Industrial 
Development and Commerce (MINDIC) delegate for the Faro-et-Déo, who 
noticed that cross-border cattle exports went on with impunity, decided 
to take matters into his own hands. A former colleague of his, prone to 
embellish stories for dramatic effect, recounted the ensuing events to a 
group of friends as follows:
No sooner had [the MINDIC district delegate] seized several herds to pre-
vent them from crossing the border, than did the prefect turn up and nearly 
slap him. The delegate tried in vain to make him see that, according to regu-
lations in place, those exports were not legal. The prefect cut him short. He 
was not to be told what the law was in his district. The whole thing was 
settled there and then. The delegate sent a report to his superiors and kept 
silent thereafter.
Events unfolding outside Adamaoua can also upset the conduct of busi-
ness at the Nigerian border. For example, a 2001 conflict over the pres-
ence of unauthorized Chadian and Central African traders in Yaoundé’s 
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cattle market was settled, among other things, with a circular note from 
the minister. In protest against the increased presence of foreign traders, 
Adamaoua’s traders had decided on halting their supplies. The ministerial 
note, dated July 4, 2001, called MINEPIA officials’ attention to “the mas-
sive presence of foreign traders,” despite the fact that “no formal regula-
tion [of their activities] exists.” The minister further urged them “to take 
measures to put an end to [it],” to ensure that “the [beef ] demand of 
the country’s consumption centers is satisfied.” It is instructive to com-
pare the impact of this measure to that of the PSREP on cattle exports to 
Nigeria. It is ironic that a lowly ministerial circular proved in this regard 
more consequential than a Prime Minister’s decree, particularly since the 
latter was more clearly applicable to those specific trade flows than the 
former. While the veterinary laissez-passer that cattle should receive on 
their way to Nigeria fell within the mandate of the PSREP, the circular did 
not mention the trade on Adamaoua’s border with Nigeria. Nor do Nige-
rian traders operate in Adamaoua’s markets in any significant number. 
And yet, whereas the PSREP did not concern itself with these exports, the 
circular note resulted in MINEPIA’s officials taking a harsher approach to 
them. This translated into threats of cattle confiscation, and, presumably, 
bribes. The minister’s instructions did not end the economic game that 
stood outside ‘formal regulation’ but instead led to a renegotiation of the 
norms that allowed for the game to go on, with the state agents taking a 
larger unofficial fee.
Adamaoua’s cattle exports to Nigeria give us perspective on the scope of 
the PSREP. They bear out Blundo’s point (this volume) on the need to take 
a closer look at the conditions that determine what ‘the state sees’. These 
exports, which do not ‘meet the eye of the state’ (Muñoz 2010), show that 
economic invisibility is coproduced by state and nonstate actors alike, by 
citizens subject to regulations and a plethora of official or de facto state 
representatives.
Conclusions
The documents that spell out the tax administration reform tend to proj-
ect an image of the state as a unitary organization in the legal-bureau-
cratic sense, driven by deliberate projects and strategies. Numerous 
critical studies of public administration reform in Cameroon and else-
where have warned us against taking such an image at face value. The 
interest of initiatives like the PSREP is that their point of departure is 
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an acknowledgement of the difficulties involved in bureaucratic coordi-
nation. They are symptomatic of an era in which, to use the evocative 
metaphor proposed by Thomas Bierschenk (this volume), decentralized 
governance and the increased autonomy of state agencies remain ongoing 
‘construction sites.’ The PSREP pushed two sets of state officials to work 
together. The program is shown in this light as a multifaceted undertak-
ing through which the inhabitants of two islands in the Cameroonian 
‘administrative archipelago’ are forced out of the inertia of minding their 
own business. Veterinary officials were being told in no uncertain terms 
that what they had long held to be their business was not (exclusively) 
theirs anymore. This image of administrative archipelago surfaces in Jean 
Copans’ (2001) critical reflection on the links between the historical junc-
tures of African politics and the analytical models developed to make 
sense of them. In the present political context, Copans (2001: 14) argues, 
it is not entirely surprising that the state appears as a collection of islands 
“isolated from each other, where the multiplicity of local and intermedi-
ary dynamics . . . bring into question both the centeredness of adminis-
trative management and the notion of national corps of civil servants.” 
In this regard, the fragmentation of authority described by authors like 
Mbembe (2001) fits both a long durée trajectory and the recent historical 
conjuncture (cf. Hagmann and Péclard 2010: 555–557).
For all the nostalgia for ‘a general administrative organization’ that, as 
Copans intriguingly suggests, many would-be reformers and reform ana-
lysts may betray, the collaboration that programs like the PSREP called for 
had clear limits. After all, if integration and coordination had become ‘dirty 
words’ by the 1980s as Parker Shipton (2010: 125) reminds us, they have not 
quite seen their sheen restored yet in most quarters. Consider how prosaic 
the aim of the PSREP was in its ‘white paper’ version. As one of the senior 
tax officials I have quoted reminded me, the program was simply a  matter 
of ensuring that the moneys in question “ended where they should.” This 
set the limits of the coordination efforts. And revenue-wise, it is worth 
reminding, the PSREP did well enough. Compare its results to those of its 
ailing later generation cousin, the PSRR, which targeted the revenue of 
road tolls. “Trying to perform balancing acts between the different depart-
ments”, the tax officials working for the PSRR managed the ‘feat’ of reduc-
ing annual toll revenue almost in half within a two year period, a time in 
which both the number of tolls and registered vehicles increased.19
19 Cameroon Tribune, July 9, 2009; Mutations, January 18, 2008.
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Yet, in the case of the PSREP, the overriding effect of ‘the revenue 
imperative’ appears to be somewhat misleading. Undoubtedly, revenue 
weighs heavily on the outcome of reforms in the domain of taxation, the 
PSREP being no exception. The program, however, also entailed bridging 
the gap between two distinct professional repertoires. It is not simply that, 
to an extent compatible with its revenue targets, the program was prag-
matically reformulated to reconcile veterinary and tax officials competing 
claims to ‘privatize’ their bureaucratic tasks. Rather, I have shown as well 
that there are nonrevenue dimensions to the PSREP-induced realignment 
of these two departments’ respective spheres of influence.
In any case, an analysis of the PSREP on its own terms, with its focus 
on relationships between tax officials and veterinary agents, runs the 
risk of losing sight of a broader constellation of administrative practice. 
A look into the unofficial regulation of the cattle trade to Nigeria, where 
public authority results from a more complex dynamic in which authori-
ties such as prefects, mayors, and chiefs, as well as a whole array of non-
state actors take part, elucidates the contour of that constellation. No 
matter how ambitious the reforms under way in Cameroon and other 
sub-Saharan African countries may be, the ebbing tide of state control 
over the economy depends on precarious, ambivalent and often revers-
ible agreements among a variety of actors. Those processes involve vary-
ing degrees of avoidance, accommodation, cooperation, negotiation, 
resistance, and conflict.
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OLD-SCHOOL BUREAUCRATS AND TECHNOCRATS IN MALAWI: 
CIVIL SERVICE REFORM IN PRACTICE
Gerhard Anders
Reforming ‘dysfunctional’ African Bureaucracies
According to the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), 
there is little doubt that African bureaucracies are inefficient and unsus-
tainable. Corruption and mismanagement of public resources are identi-
fied as the main impediments to economic recovery. Since the 1990s, Good 
Governance has been promoted by the international financial institutions 
(IFIs) as instrument to remove these obstacles to economic growth. The 
term Good Governance denotes a set of policy-measures intended to 
transform ‘dysfunctional’ public institutions into efficient and transpar-
ent service-providers accountable to the public and subject to the rule of 
law. One of the primary instruments to improve governance has been civil 
service reform, the reorganisation of the state bureaucracy according to 
the principles of New Public Management. Accordingly, World Bank and 
IMF have made the reorganisation of the civil service one of the primary 
conditions for their financial support. In sub-Saharan Africa, where most 
countries have been implementing Good Governance reforms in the past 
decade, the reorganisation of the civil service has had mixed results. In 
spite of the introduction of new management and accounting systems, 
outsourcing and privatization of non-core government functions and the 
dismissal of government employees made redundant the performance 
and efficiency of African bureaucracies is still found wanting by the ‘donor 
community’.
This chapter argues that the implementation of the Good Governance 
agenda has failed to address the underlying dynamics of postcolonial 
bureaucracies in sub-Saharan Africa. The policies promoted by the IFIs 
are based on a technocratic conception of the state as homogenous and 
unified actor that needs to be repaired with a set of instruments or ‘tools’ 
provided by World Bank and IMF experts (see also Bergamaschi, Char-
ton and Muñoz in this volume). This perspective is flawed since it does 
not account for the colonial legacy of African states and their historical 
trajectories since independence. Drawing on archival and  ethnographic 
© Gerhard Anders, 2014 | doi: 10.1163/9789004264960_014
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 evidence1 on the implementation of civil service reform in Malawi between 
1994 and 2007 this chapter suggests that the implementation of civil ser-
vice reform has deepened already existing fissures within the civil service 
rather than contributed to greater cohesion.
This is well exemplified by one of the central elements of civil service 
reform in Malawi, the retrenchment of government employees made 
redundant, deemed to be the first step toward creating a more efficient 
civil service by the consultants of the IFIs (World Bank 1989, 1993, 1994a, 
1994b). The reduction of staff was one of the conditions for continued 
financial support from the IFIs and is usually considered to be one of the 
hallmarks of neo-liberal reform. The dismissal of employees also tends to 
be one of the most contested measures. It is, therefore, well suited for an 
analysis of the implementation of the Good Governance agenda. Accord-
ing to official figures the government of Malawi dismissed approximately 
34,000 employees between 1994 and 2000, mainly support staff and junior 
civil servants. Staff reduction widened already existing fissures in the civil 
service that were the result of the creation of new agencies with support 
from the IFIs in the 1990s, on the one, and Malawi’s colonial and post-
colonial history, on the other hand.
The aim of this chapter, therefore, is not to establish the ‘failure’ or 
‘success’ of civil service reform in Malawi but rather to transcend the con-
tingent categories of development thinking defining ‘success’ or ‘failure’ 
and thereby to contribute to a better understanding of the dynamics of 
the postcolonial state in sub-Sahara Africa. In doing so it adopts a critical 
view of social engineering promoted by the IFIs and consciously disen-
gages social scientific analysis from development practice. Such a perspec-
tive builds on a growing body of critical anthropological scholarship that 
investigates the practice of constructing or framing the very objects of 
development interventions (Escobar 1995; Ferguson 1994; Mitchell 2002; 
Mosse and Lewis 2005; Quarles van Ufford and Giri 2003; Marcussen and 
Arnfred 1998).
Transcending the instrumentalist vision of social engineering requires 
a much wider scope of inquiry, including ‘factors’ that seem to have no 
direct causal relationship with the policy intervention and unforeseen side-
effects. A number of studies investigate how unintended consequences 
1 Anthropological fieldwork in two urban areas, the capital Lilongwe and Zomba in the 
south, was carried out between November 1999 and November 2000, February and March 
2002, and November 2007.
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may undermine the efficacy of policy measures (e.g. Long 2001; Moore 
1973; Olivier de Sardan 2005; von Benda-Beckmann 1993). As early as 
1967 the famous development economist Hirschman drew attention to 
the importance of influences outside the scope of the project design and 
unexpected side-effects:
[E]ach project turns out to represent a unique constellation of experiences 
and consequences of direct and indirect effects. This uniqueness in turn 
results from the varied interplay between structural characteristics of proj-
ects, on the one hand, and the social and political environment, on the other 
(Hirschman 1967: 186).
Since the mid 1990s, Malawi, a former British colony (until 1964) and one 
of the least developed countries according to the UNDP development 
index (UNDP 2006) has implemented a number of programmes designed 
and financed by the IFIs that target perceived problems in the civil service. 
Malawi has a long history of implementing World Bank and IMF policies 
prescriptions. It was among the first countries to implement the notori-
ous Structural Adjustment programmes in 1979 and has implemented the 
usual set of reform programmes aimed at stimulating economic growth, 
generally with limited success (Harrigan 1997). Between independence 
and 1994 the country was ruled by Kamuzu Hastings Banda, President 
for Life since 1971. Under Kamuzu Banda’s paternalistic rule all aspects 
of social and political life were closely monitored by the security services 
and the only legal political party, the Malawi Congress Party (MCP). The 
civil service did not remain unaffected. A culture of fear prevailed in the 
civil service and civil servants owed unconditional loyalty to Kamuzu 
Banda and the MCP. One-party rule ended in 1993 when the majority of 
the population voted for the introduction of multi-party democracy. The 
first free elections in 1994 were won by Bakili Muluzi and the United Dem-
ocratic Front (UDF). Muluzi served as president for two terms, until 2004, 
when the incumbent, Bingu wa Mutharika, was elected. Especially in the 
first years after the introduction of multi-party democracy people enjoyed 
the new political liberties but soon disillusionment spread because suc-
cessive governments have been unable to reverse the economic decline 
that has been affecting the economy since the 1980s. In an effort to reverse 
the economic crisis the democratically elected governments have imple-
mented the policy prescriptions of the IFIs ranging from deregulation of 
the economy to civil service reform.
This sketch of the historical context provides the backdrop for a detailed 
account and analysis of the execution of the retrenchment exercise in 
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three parts. The first part situates the civil service reform programme in 
the context of the Good Governance agenda promoted by the IFIs. The 
second part presents an account of the implementation of the retrench-
ment exercise, which shows that the framing of the object of civil service 
reform, i.e. the Malawian nation-state, by the IFIs failed to address the his-
torical trajectory of the civil service in Malawi and, therefore, exacerbated 
already existing internal divisions. The third part, then, deals in more detail 
with these internal divisions and the ways how they shaped and were 
shaped by the implementation of the civil service reform programme.
The Instrumentalist Vision of Good Governance
Good Governance emerged as the new paradigm of development assis-
tance in the 1990s. It heralded an era of much bolder interference in the 
domestic affairs of governments of developing countries. The IFIs called for 
the radical overhaul of the state institutions according to the neo- liberal 
dogma in order to create favourable conditions for economic develop-
ment. Good Governance would thus contribute to “sustainable economic 
and social development” (World Bank 1992: 5) and “macroeconomic sta-
bility, external viability, and orderly economic growth” (IMF 1997: 1; see 
also World Bank 1989, 1994b).
The booklet Governance and Development published in 1992 was the 
World Bank’s first general statement of the new development agenda. It 
defined governance as “the manner in which power is exercised in the 
management of a country’s economic and social resources for develop-
ment” (1992: 3). According to the Bank the key dimensions of governance 
are “public sector management, accountability, the legal framework for 
development, and information and transparency” (1992: 6). Although this 
was the first publication to be exclusively devoted to issues of Good Gov-
ernance, the Bank had addressed the problem of state bureaucracies in 
developing countries earlier. In 1989, a World Bank report on sub-Saharan 
Africa mentioned “deteriorating governance” as one of the main causes of 
the crisis in Africa. It attributed the economic crisis to the expansion of 
state services and the interference of the state in the economy after inde-
pendence (World Bank 1989: 30). In line with this neo-liberal critique of the 
interventionist state, World Bank experts designed instruments to trans-
form “dysfunctional” and “inefficient” government institutions in order to 
create the envisaged “enabling environment” by “defining and protecting 
property rights, providing effective legal, judicial and regulatory systems, 
improving the efficiency of the civil service” (World Bank 1991).
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In subsequent years World Bank staff and researchers developed the 
“governance approach” (Dia 1993: 1996) that provided an analytical frame-
work for civil service reform in Africa. This approach attributed the failure 
of prior attempts to reform the civil service to the ‘patrimonial character’ 
of the state in sub-Saharan Africa.2 A variant of the ‘governance approach’ 
was applied in Malawi. Key functions such as revenue collection, cus-
toms and pre-shipment inspection were removed from the civil service 
and became the domain of new autonomous government agencies and 
private companies. These measures were supplemented with a civil ser-
vice reform programme, the outsourcing of non-core functions such as 
gardening, security services and carpenter workshops and the privatisa-
tion of state-owned companies. The ‘governance approach’ embodied the 
Bank’s vision of the state that would be limited to certain core functions 
the effective management of which would create the necessary room for 
private initiative to contribute to economic growth. The following part 
will discuss the consequences of the implementation of the ‘governance 
approach’ in Malawi focusing on the dismissal of staff made redundant.
Right-Sizing the Civil Service
One of the main objectives of civil service reform in Malawi has been the 
“right-sizing“ of the bureaucracy.3 According to the experts of the IFIs a 
smaller, leaner and more efficient civil service is a necessary pre-condi-
tion for Good Governance. In 1996, the government of Malawi adopted 
an Action Plan in which it announced to outsource and privatize non-
core functions, to reduce “overlap and duplication in the machinery of 
government”, to improve performance and efficiency, and to “design and 
implement a retrenchment programme which will assist in the move to 
an affordable and sustainable civil service” (GoM 1996b: 2).
The dismissal of redundant employees was deemed necessary by the 
IFIs to correct the skewed staff composition and to render the civil service 
more cost-efficient. Many civil servants perceived civil service reform as 
threat to the status quo and attempted to manipulate, co-opt and appro-
priate it. The implementation of the retrenchment exercise met the silent 
resistance of many in the civil service since it affected the long-standing 
2 The World Bank approach only bears a superficial resemblance to the neo- patrimonial 
approach developed by Eisenstadt (1972) and Médard (1982).
3 Interview with the World Bank representative, Lilongwe, March 2000.
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practice of hiring large numbers of employees with little education or 
training to perform menial tasks.
The World Bank conducted two studies in 1991 and 1993 to assess prob-
lems in the civil service and make recommendations for the civil service 
reform (World Bank 1993; 1994a). These studies recommended reducing 
the number of support staff like watchmen, cleaners, workmen, messen-
gers etc. occupying the lowest grades in the civil service, the Industrial 
Class (IC) and to a lesser degree the Subordinate Class (SC). The former 
were employed on a temporary basis and were, therefore, not part of the 
civil service establishment. The term civil service establishment denotes 
the established positions that are specified in the pay roll and controlled 
by the Public Service Commission, the body ultimately in charge of 
appointments and dismissals of civil servants. The SC, in turn, was part of 
the civil service establishment.4
Prior to the civil service reform the civil service provided employment 
and social security for thousands of manual labourers, gardeners, security 
guards, receptionists and messengers and each year more people found 
employment in the civil service. The expansion of staff was not the result 
of actual need but rather stemmed from a logic of allocating the state’s 
resources, a well-documented characteristic of African bureaucracies. By 
1995 more than 35 percent of all civil servants held lower ranks and had 
little or no formal education whereas only five percent of the civil servants 
occupied management and professional posts leaving many of these posts 
vacant due to the lack of suitable candidates (GoM 1996a: 27–31).
Although the IC posts were officially only temporary IC employees never 
had been threatened by dismissal. Prior to the 1990s government employ-
ment was a secure life-long position that entitled its holder not only to a 
regular—albeit small—salary but also to a whole range of benefits such as 
paid sick leave and terminal benefits upon retirement. Numbers of the IC 
and other subordinate staff grew because the superior officers in the min-
istries provided clients and kin with government jobs without effective 
control from the ministerial top or controlling agencies. The World Bank 
experts were the first who challenged this modus vivendi in the early 1990s. 
They argued that the IC had to be abolished and that the staff numbers 
4 Formally, civil servants proper are only those government employees holding estab-
lished positions as opposed to temporary staff and IC staff holding non-established posts. 
Temporary staff and IC staff, however, were usually referred to as civil servants and 
counted as such in the civil service census (GoM 1996b). Hence, in this chapter all govern-
ment employees are referred to as civil servants.
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in the lower grades had to be reduced while the top positions should be 
upgraded and salaries for senior management and professional functions 
ought to be increased in order to control the civil service wage bill and 
improve performance (World Bank 1994a).5
Employment of IC employees fell within the discretion of the individual 
departments compared to established posts, which had to be approved cen-
trally by the Public Service Commission and the Department of Human 
Resource Management and Development. The World Bank missions had 
identified this practice as one of the main causes for the uncontrolled 
growth of the IC (World Bank 1994a). It was a well-known secret that most 
heads of departments and other high-ranking civil servants in the depart-
ments exploited their authority to employ IC employees to provide clients 
and kin with jobs and social security. Often they also hired people on the 
instigation of politicians who used their influence to provide their clients 
with employment. This authority to employ IC workers without interfer-
ence from the Public Service Commission or the Department of Human 
Resource Management was also used to employ fictive employees, so-called 
ghost-workers. The salaries paid for the ghost-workers were pocketed by 
rackets of senior civil servants in the departments and accounting sections. 
Consequently, the World Bank recommended to abolish the IC and to make 
former IC employees redundant. Many of the tasks formerly performed 
by support staff such as gardening, manual labour and security were ear-
marked for privatisation. The remaining IC employees were supposed to be 
integrated in the establishment of the civil service (World Bank 1994a).
The actual implementation of this plan was of course much messier 
than the documents signed between the World Bank and the government 
suggest. Targets were not met, deadlines were not kept, and implemen-
tation was often subject to ad-hoc decision-making, particularistic inter-
ests and unanticipated events. Nevertheless, the World Bank and the IMF 
maintained just enough pressure to keep the government from revert-
ing to the former practice of hiring large numbers of support staff who 
enjoyed the support of patrons in the higher echelons of the civil service 
or politicians. Due to the transition from one-party rule to multi-party 
democracy there was no real opposition among the politicians of the UDF 
5 A notable exception constituted primary school teachers who were considered to be 
“juniors” but who were not threatened by retrenchment. The government had embarked 
on a programme to extend free primary school education and had hired thousands of 
primary school teachers in 1995 and 1996 thus providing employment for many dismissed 
civil servants.
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and the other political parties against civil service reform since civil ser-
vants were generally associated with Kamuzu Banda’s regime. The cabi-
net neither opposed nor promoted civil service reform for fear of causing 
social unrest among the civil servants with the exception of the then vice-
president who promoted civil service, which fell in his portfolio. The civil 
service was deeply divided between those charged with the execution of 
the Action Plan and those resisting it as I will show.
The Secretary of Human Resource Management calculated that the IC 
had to be reduced to 16,000 employees. These 16,000 employees should be 
incorporated into the civil service establishment. According to estimates 
the civil service had employed about 50,000 IC employees in 1994. This is 
just a rough estimate since no reliable data on the IC existed prior to the 
civil service census conducted in 1995 (World Bank 1994a: 18). The Letter 
of Development Policy requesting US $ 106.4 million for the first phase 
of civil service reform, the Fiscal Restructuring Development Program, 
included the implementation of the civil service reform as a condition for 
financial support of the World Bank. This letter, submitted by the govern-
ment to the World Bank, stated that between February and September 
1995 government had already laid off about 20,000 civil servants, mainly 
lower-ranking support staff of the IC, as a condition for disbursement of the 
loan. This meant that 14,000 more civil servants had to be laid off to reach 
the target of 16,000 posts. The next wave of dismissals occurred between 
1997 and 1998: Thousands of government employees holding junior posi-
tions were dismissed. By 2000 the dismissal of staff made redundant was 
by and large concluded according to senior officials interviewed by the 
present author in 2002.6
In 1997, the government established a specialized agency, the Public Sec-
tor Change Management Agency (PSCMA), with the task to conduct func-
tional reviews of each ministry. Establishment of the PSCMA was one of 
the conditions for the disbursement of the credit to finance the civil service 
reform programme. The functional reviews had to make recommendations 
on the improvement of performance, the internal command structure, the 
6 The official numbers of retrenched civil servants should be treated with caution. 
There was no reliable data on the number of IC employees in 1994 and the number of 
20,000 dismissed employees was not verifiable either. Considering that the government 
had an interest to report a high number of dismissed civil servants in the Letter of Policy 
since staff reduction constituted one of the conditions of the agreement with the World 
Bank it is at least possible that the government reported a high number of civil servants 
laid off prior to the disbursement of the credit to have a more favourable starting position 
for the civil service reform.
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“elimination of overlap and duplication” and the reduction of staff “to cut 
the wage bill”, according to the director of the PSCMA. Most of the staff of 
the PSCMA was quite young, not older than 40, held university degrees in 
economics or human resource management and represented the profes-
sional elite of the civil service. Superior officers in the line ministries such 
as Health and Agriculture often refused to cooperate with PSCMA. Among 
the management of the ministries there was only little enthusiasm for the 
civil service reform that threatened to reduce their discretionary powers 
and the staff of PSCMA complained about delay tactics and other subver-
sive forms of non-compliance from senior officers of the line ministries 
such as not keeping dead-lines and appointments or simply not following 
orders concerning the reorganisation of their departments.
By 2004, the functional reviews had been concluded and according to 
official figures all IC employees were either dismissed or incorporated into 
the civil service establishment on SC positions. Services such as security or 
gardening had been outsourced to private companies. With regard to the 
numbers of employees who were eventually incorporated into the civil 
service establishment it is quite possible that more than 16,000 employ-
ees were eventually incorporated into the civil service establishment. For 
example, the retrenchment exercise did not affect temporary staff work-
ing for externally funded projects executed by government departments 
and my evidence suggests that many people succeed to filter back into 
the civil service through these projects that fall outside the scope of the 
Department of Human Resource Management and the Public Service 
Commission. Due to the absence of statistics on this phenomenon it was 
impossible to establish how many dismissed civil servants actually suc-
ceeded in filtering back into the civil service but it is a fair guess to assume 
that it could be up to several thousand based on ethnographic evidence 
gathered during the author’s fieldwork.
Even though a few thousand former employees might have succeeded 
in filtering back into the civil service the retrenchment exercise can be 
considered a success from the perspective of the IFIs since the majority 
of junior civil servants made redundant were dismissed thus freeing up 
resources for raising the salaries for scarce professionals. But ‘success’ is a 
contingent notion depending on the objectives and political context of a 
project rather than an analytical category. Hence, this article suggests that 
in spite of reaching the targets set by the experts of the World Bank and 
the IMF the retrenchment exercise was not an unequivocal success since 
it widened fissures and fault-lines within the civil service threatening its 
cohesion in the long run.
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Increasing Fragmentation of the Civil Service
The account of the retrenchment exercise in the previous part warrants 
a closer look at the fault-lines within the civil service that were revealed 
and widened by its implementation. Two major fault-lines can be distin-
guished: The first one is the competition between new agencies with the 
task to promote the civil service reform and the classic line ministries 
and the second one is the growing gap between ‘bosses’ and ‘juniors’ that 
can be traced back to the colonial period under British rule. The frag-
mentation of state bureaucracies due to foreign interventions and the 
dynamics of postcolonial politics appears to be a widespread tendency in 
sub- Saharan Africa as a growing number of studies explicitly address this 
phenomenon. In a case study of the implementation of political reforms 
in rural Benin, Bierschenk and Olivier de Sardan (2003) use the term 
polycephaly to analyse the proliferation of agencies exercising political 
authority in the context of democratisation and decentralisation. More 
generally, a volume by Lund (2006) investigates the competition of mul-
tiple organizations in the local political arena. Anders’ (2010) account of 
the implementation of civil service reform in Malawi presents a compre-
hensive ethnographic study of the everyday experiences of civil servants 
who are confronted with the fragmentation of the state bureaucracy in 
the context of the far-reaching interventions of the IFIs and other donor 
agencies at the turn of the 21st century.
Enclaves vs. Line Ministries
The ‘governance approach’ distinguishes countries with a high patri-
monial, a medium and a low patrimonial character. For countries with 
a medium patrimonial character such as Malawi the World Bank pre-
scribed the “enclave approach” “to build or reinforce the organizational, 
managerial and technical capacity to improve the performance and pro-
ductivity of existing institutions” (Dia 1993: 3). In line with this approach 
the World Bank singled out government departments and agencies that 
would function as enclaves. These enclaves were expected to operate as 
centres from where the reform would spread throughout the whole civil 
service. Enclaves were either already existing ministries usually with cross-
ministerial mandates such as the Ministry of Finance7 and the National 
7 The Ministry of Finance usually has the “overall responsibility for managing the 
programme, and for monitoring and reporting responsibilities” (interview Ministry of 
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Economic Council (NEC), formerly the Ministry of Economic Planning 
and Development, or newly established agencies such as PSCMA with the 
mandate to implement the various measures of the civil service reform. 
Of course, these ministries and agencies were not the only government 
agencies supported by the World Bank. The National Statistics Office, for 
example, received World Bank funding and assistance to improve data 
collection and the Department of Human Resource Management received 
assistance to implement the new computerised payroll system.
Due to the financial and logistical support of the World Bank the Min-
istry of Finance, NEC, the National Statistics Office and specialised units 
such as the PSCMA tended to have more resources and better qualified 
staff at their disposal. Generally, the cooperation of individual govern-
ment departments or agencies with their respective donor agency was 
often better than between government departments. Considerable differ-
ences existed between bureaucratic routines and requirements of the var-
ious multilateral and bilateral donor agencies, which resulted in different 
bureaucratic practices between and even inside departments depending 
on the donor agency funding the projects (cf. Bierschenk and Therkildsen 
in this volume).
With regard to the implementation of the civil service reform conflicts 
arose between the ‘enclave’ agencies supported by the World Bank with 
the task to implement the various measures of the civil service reform and 
parts of the senior staff of the classic line ministries who tended to resist 
what they perceived as interference in their own affairs (cf. Botchwey 
et al. 1998: 81). These senior functionaries, having been socialised under 
Kamuzu Banda’s autocratic rule and in fact owing their positions to him 
often were confronted with younger civil servants who were mainly 
employed in the new ‘enclave’ agencies.
This finding adds another dimension to the competition between the 
‘enclave’ agencies and the classic line ministries. The ‘enclave’ agencies 
employed a high percentage of younger university-trained economists 
who are adept at using econometric theory. By contrast, many of the 
senior civil servants in the line ministries belonged to an older generation 
that made their career in the 1970s. I denote the former as technocrats 
and the latter as old-school officials. Most of the technocrats were in their 
thirties and joined the service in the late 1980s. They had enjoyed a better 
Finance, March 2000) and functions as principal contact for World Bank staff and visiting 
missions.
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education than the older generation, either abroad or at the University of 
Malawi that had been established in the 1970s. They often identified with 
the emerging transnational class of consultants and bureaucrats working 
for international organisations such as the World Bank, the IMF and the 
UN. This class set the example for the technocrats in terms of remunera-
tion and career opportunities.
The old-school bureaucrats had joined the service in the 1970s under 
the autocratic regime of Kamuzu Banda who ruled Malawi between 1964, 
when Malawi gained independence from Britain, and 1994, when the first 
multi-party elections were held. They had usually enjoyed less education 
due to the scarcity of educational facilities during the colonial era and had 
progressed slowly up the ranks by accumulating years of service. Their 
outlook was more national and they primarily perceived of themselves as 
being rooted in Malawian society. Owing their position to Kamuzu Banda, 
considered the father of the nation who secured independence from the 
British, they were brought up in a highly hierarchical culture where supe-
riors’ decisions were never questioned. Under Kamuzu Banda decisions 
were usually referred to the top, often to Banda himself, and people were 
often simply afraid to take decisions for fear of being accused of being 
a dissident. Moreover, most of them had served as junior officers in the 
colonial administration where Africans were required to follow the orders 
from their European superiors without questioning, a characteristic of the 
Malawian civil service addressed in more detail in the following section 
(for the Tanzanian civil service prior and immediately after independence, 
see Eckert in this volume).
These attitudes go a long way in explaining the absence of open pro-
test by the old-school officials who resisted retrenchment. Furthermore, 
they were afraid of losing their positions after the transition to multi-party 
democracy and preferred to keep a low profile in order not to attract undue 
attention from their new political leaders who sought to replace many of 
those suspected of being closely associated with Kamuzu Banda and the 
MCP. In fact, this fear was unfounded since Malawi is hampered by a lack 
of trained professionals willing to work in government service and the 
new government was compelled to rely on the civil service it inherited 
it bears testimony to the attitude of avoiding decisions and keeping low 
acquired during the years of authoritarianism as a survival strategy.
The younger technocrats were usually more in favour of reform than 
the older generation, although not necessarily always along the lines 
of the World Bank’s ideas. Having been brought up in the 1970s they 
were familiar with the oppressive atmosphere under Kamuzu Banda but 
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many of them longed for change although they were very circumspect 
in expressing it openly for fear of unwanted attention from the security 
forces and party functionaries. Having been exposed to economics and 
being aware of the deepening economic crisis during the later days of 
Banda’s rule in the 1980s many of them were more open to new ideas and 
many tacitly supported the reforms of the 1990s. Due to their age they 
had been less involved in the practice of hiring large numbers of sup-
port staff and, therefore, did not have the same sense of loyalty towards 
those threatened by retrenchment as the old-school bureaucrats in minis-
tries such as Health, Agriculture or Labour. Being mainly employed in the 
‘enclave’ agencies supported by the IFIs these younger economists often 
found themselves pitted against old-school officials in the line ministries 
who resisted any external interference in what they considered to be their 
affairs (Adamolekun et al. 1997: 215–217).
Dezalay and Garth (2002) describe a similar development for Latin 
America where economists trained in the elite universities of the United 
States formed bureaucratic and political elites in their countries of origin 
forming a transnational class of bureaucrats who “approach problems of 
economics and the state from precisely the same perspective” (Dezalay 
and Garth 2002: 28). In Malawi the influence of economists most of whom 
have worked either for the World Bank or the IMF is striking and it is 
noteworthy that the incumbent president Bingu wa Mutharika used to 
work for the World Bank and the minister of finance for the IMF. This 
generation gap, however, does not imply a complete rift between the old 
and the young generation. Like their cousins elsewhere the young tech-
nocrats are connected to the older elites by kinship ties and share many 
similarities with the generation of their uncles and parents although their 
outlook and style is different from earlier role models. The competition 
between technocrats and old-school officials, therefore, was not the con-
sequence of a generation conflict but rather constituted one dimension of 
the multi-faceted competition between the newly created ‘enclaves’ and 
the classic line-ministries—a direct consequence of the implementation 
of measures to improve governance in Malawi.
‘Bosses’ vs. ‘juniors’
The dismissal of employees made redundant revealed a widening gap 
between top officials or managers, on the one hand, and the rank and 
file of the civil service, on the other. In the Malawi civil service the for-
mer were casually referred to as ‘bosses’ and the latter as ‘juniors’. When 
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my informants referred to the ‘bosses’ they usually meant functionaries 
high up in the hierarchy occupying administrative and professional posi-
tions with the authority to issue orders and make decisions and other 
senior officers who supervise subordinate staff in a department. ‘Bosses’ 
constituted not more than five percent of all civil servants, i.e. about 5,000 
persons (GoM 1996a: 29). The mass of civil servants was casually referred 
to as ‘juniors’ by my informants. Under this category fell all civil servants 
who were considered to be subordinate including lower-ranking civil ser-
vants such as support staff, unskilled workers and extension workers with 
no or little formal education and middle-ranking officers such as teachers 
and office clerks with no authority over other civil servants.
This rigid division between ‘bosses’ and ‘juniors’ is one of the character-
istic elements of the postcolonial state in Africa that can be traced back to 
the notorious colour bar between European expatriate officers and African 
employees found in all African colonies.8 Under British colonial rule all 
senior positions in the civil service of what was then Nyasaland were held 
by Europeans whereas Africans were only found in junior positions such 
as teachers, clerks and labourers. According to Africans who served in the 
colonial civil service they were looked down upon by European officers who 
considered the African civil servants as inferior only emulating the man-
ners of their colonial masters. Under colonial rule it was unthinkable for an 
African to challenge the decisions taken by Europeans and Africans were 
required to refer all decisions of importance to their white superiors.
The colonial division between superiors and subordinates was retained 
after independence in 1964 since Kamuzu Banda strongly discouraged 
any questioning of his authority, which he interpreted as critique of his 
regime. Juniors were not to challenge the orders of their superiors who, in 
turn, were not to challenge Kamuzu Banda’s orders, who exercised abso-
lute power between 1964 and 1993. In addition Kamuzu Banda—unlike 
Nyerere in Tanzania (Eckert, in this volume)—continued to rely on Euro-
peans in running the civil service whom he considered no threat to his 
claim to absolute power. He only reluctantly embarked on a programme 
of ‘Africanization’ and until the early 1980s a number of Britons who had 
already served in the colonial administration held key positions in the 
civil service, the police force and the army. This continuity with the colo-
8 On Africans in the colonial civil service, see Bâ (1994), Eckert (2007) and Lawrance, 
Osborn and Roberts (2006). 
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nial civil service did much to maintain colonial attitudes between ‘bosses’ 
and ‘juniors’ even after the retirement of the European officials.
It should also be noted that in spite of the ritualistic invocation of a 
shared African culture there is actually quite a considerable social dis-
tance between ‘bosses’, many of whom were trained abroad and enjoyed 
a formal western-style education, and ‘juniors’ who often hail from more 
humble origins. The ‘bosses’, either old-school officials or technocrats, 
belong to Malawi’s tiny elite and consider themselves to be more ‘mod-
ern’ or ‘civilised’ than their cousins with less social status whereas many 
‘juniors’ look with certain envy on the affluent life-style of ‘those at the 
top’, referred to as apamwamba in Chichewa, the country’s main lan-
guage. Although society at large in Malawi avoids the more ostentatious 
consumption observed in other African countries and people generally 
emphasise harmony and egalitarian values it is obvious that a consider-
able degree of alienation between ‘bosses’ and ‘juniors’ existed even prior 
to retrenchment. Because of that social distance the heirs of the colonial 
masters, the high-ranking functionaries, did not really go out of their way 
to protect people with whom they often had very little in common and 
whom they tended to look down upon in spite of the pervading logic of 
clientelism and solidarity. Instead, the ‘bosses’ preferred to keep a low 
profile in order not to jeopardize their own precarious position after the 
change in government after 1994.
Since the implementation of the civil service reform constituted a con-
dition for financial assistance of the IFIs the government did not really 
have a choice regarding the retrenchment of the redundant support staff. 
Of course, the president, the ministers and the top functionaries in the 
‘enclave’ agencies knew that this decision would be extremely unpopular 
among the tens of thousands of ‘juniors’ who would be threatened with 
the loss of their jobs. Therefore, those responsible for the retrenchment 
exercise tried to put at least part of the blame for the unpopular measure 
on the World Bank and IMF, the institutions that had demanded staff 
reduction. Malawi’s new democratic rulers feared the wrath of the civil 
servants who had become accustomed to go on strike to lend more weight 
to their demands. In fact no year passed between 1993 and 2004 without 
civil servants going on strike.
Considering the frequency of strikes in the civil service since 1994 the 
absence of large-scale or organized protests against retrenchment is strik-
ing. Several factors need to be considered in this regard. First, the level of 
organization among civil servants was very low during the second half of 
the 1990s, the time when most support staff was dismissed. Trade-unions 
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had been prohibited during one-party rule and the new trade-unions, 
which were founded after 1994, remained weak with insecure funding 
and few members. Owing to their weakness trade-unions such as the 
Civil Servants Trade Union (CSTU) played a relatively minor role in the 
often-spontaneous strikes prior to 2000. This changed after 2000 when 
the CSTU was recognized by the government as the representative of civil 
servants’ interests but it was too late to affect the retrenchment exercise, 
which had been largely concluded by that time. Second, many of those 
made redundant found employment elsewhere while their less fortunate 
peers still hoped to find employment although few of them eventually 
found their way back in the civil service, even after years of patience. This 
attitude derives from the clientelistic logic permeating the civil service, a 
well-known phenomenon in Africa, and the attitude inherited from the 
colonial era. Many dismissed ‘juniors’ thought it unwise to alienate their 
patrons by openly resisting retrenchment. They preferred to hover close 
to their patrons constantly reminding them of their obligations as patrons 
and some of them succeeded in finding other employment in the civil 
service or in the private sector due to the brokerage of patrons who suc-
cumbed to this subtle but strong social pressure.
The belief in the efficacy of clientelistic relationships, however, was 
thoroughly demystified when thousands realized that their patrons would 
not help them and many junior civil servants I worked with during my 
fieldwork expressed their alienation from the ‘bosses’ whom they accused 
of being selfish, an accusation not taken lightly in a society where the 
obligation to share one’s wealth is a central moral principle. The alien-
ation between ‘bosses’ and ‘juniors’ can be expected to undermine future 
efforts at transforming the civil service since trust in superiors is one of 
the preconditions for a functioning civil service. The frequent strikes by 
junior civil servants since the mid 1990s testify to the loss of confidence in 
clientelism although it is the subject of future research to investigate the 
impact of the growing alienation of the ‘juniors’.
My interlocutors had a tendency to frame the conflicts triggered by the 
dismissal of staff made redundant and the introduction of the new hous-
ing allowance scheme in terms of ethnic and regional rivalries. Northern-
ers and southerners accused people with a Chewa ethnic background 
from the central region for conspiring against them. People from the cen-
tral region, in turn, would often point towards conspiracies of northerners 
against people from the centre.
To express conflicts in the idiom of ethnicity and regionalism has 
been a general characteristic of Malawian politics since the country’s 
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independence. President Banda, a Chewa from Kasungu in the central 
region, aggressively promoted Chewa tribal identity as the national iden-
tity at the expense of other ethnic groups in the north and south (Chirwa 
1998; Kaspin 1995; Vail and White 1989). As Kaspin (1995) notes, ethnicity 
and regionalism provide distinct, although partly overlapping, registers in 
Malawi’s cultural politics. The northern region is mainly associated with 
the Tumbuka and to a lesser extent Tonga and Ngonde. The central region 
is considered to be Chewa, although there are sizeable Ngoni popula-
tions. The south is primarily associated with Yao and Nyanja/Mang’anja, 
although there are also large numbers of Lomwe in the southeast who 
arrived in the early 20th century from Mozambique to work on estates in 
the British protectorate. The Chewa and the Nyanja/Mang’anja speak the 
same language, which is referred to as Chinyanja in neighbouring Mozam-
bique and Zambia, where there are sizable Chinyanja-speaking popula-
tions. In Malawi, Banda decreed this language to be Chichewa in order to 
strengthen his claim that Chewa tribal identity represented the nation.
Banda pursued a policy of discrimination and exclusion, in particular 
against northerners. Already in 1964, he dismissed several cabinet min-
isters, who had challenged his claim to absolute authority, during the 
Cabinet Crisis. All of them were from the north or the south and were 
forced into exile (Baker 2001). Many civil servants who were suspected 
of supporting the dissident ministers also left the country, among them 
Bingu Wa Mutharika, who returned in the early 1990s to Malawi and was 
elected president in 2004. The fear of dismissal or even imprisonment was 
ever-present during the 30 years of one-party rule. During the 1970s, when 
Banda consolidated his grip on power, thousands of civil servants, most 
of them from the north, were purged from the civil service. For example, 
my informants remembered that in 1977 several hundred employees of 
the National Statistic Office (NSO) in Zomba were suspended, some even 
dismissed and detained on sedition charges. Kaspin reports the forced 
transfer of northerners teaching in the central and southern regions to 
the north for allegedly “miseducating their students” in 1989 (1995: 609).
Banda’s hostility towards northerners has to be considered in the con-
text of colonial history. Northerners, in particular people with a Tumbuka 
and Tonga ethnic background, had dominated the colonial civil service 
because they had better and earlier access to missionary education. In 
the late 19th century, Scottish missionaries had established several mis-
sion stations in the north and Blantyre in the south, where they provided 
formal education to the surrounding areas, which afforded the gradu-
ates of these schools access to employment in government service, the 
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missions and the settler economy throughout Central and Southern Africa 
(McCracken 2000; Ross 1996). As a consequence, the majority of African 
civil servants at the time of independence came from the northern region. 
Banda wanted to correct what he perceived as a distorted staff composi-
tion, inherited from the colonial administration, by replacing northerners 
with loyal Chewa and people from the central region. The civil service 
strike in 1963 in Zomba, which had mainly been carried by northerners, 
had already raised his doubts regarding their loyalty towards him. The 
thinking in ethnic and regional categories soon permeated society and the 
civil service, and influenced many a conflict in government departments.
Ethnicity and regionalism did not vanish after the end of Banda’s rule. 
The power of ethnic and regional thinking was revealed during the ref-
erendum on the introduction of multi-party democracy in 1993 when 
the north and the south overwhelmingly voted in favour of multi-party 
democracy. The presidential and parliamentary elections the following 
year also showed the extent to which the country was split. The UDF and 
the other opposition parties received most votes in the north and the 
south whereas the MCP won the majority of votes in the central region 
(Kaspin 1995). Ethnic and regional stereotypes about Chewa, northerners 
and southerners continue to shape Malawi’s political culture. In the civil 
service, ethnic and regional background often plays a role, for example, 
with regard to recruitment or promotion. Especially at the senior level, 
the origin of a civil servant can become an issue if he or she is from the 
‘wrong’ region. Because of this it was still common practice to strive for a 
regional balance in senior government positions during my fieldwork.
Conclusions
Retrenchment of government employees made redundant was a direct 
consequence of the programmes designed by the experts of the IFIs with 
the objective to reorganise the civil service according to the principles 
of New Public Management to make it more efficient and performance-
driven, one of the preconditions for Good Governance à la World Bank 
and IMF. The implementation of the civil service reform, however, has 
not affected the underlying dynamics and structures of the civil service in 
Malawi. Instead the case presented in this article shows that civil service 
reform has widened existing fault-lines and exacerbated tensions within 
the bureaucracy.
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The analysis presented here warrants the question whether the instru-
mentalist vision of Good Governance promoted by the IFIs with its decon-
textualised and ahistorical concept of a ‘dysfunctional’ state that is in need 
of repair with the ‘tools’ offered by World Bank and IMF experts is suitable 
to bring about the transformation of the African bureaucracies deemed 
necessary by the ‘donor community’. It rather appears that the reorgani-
sation of the civil service in Malawi has not contributed to a more effica-
cious bureaucracy in spite of reaching the targets set by the IFIs in their 
stringent conditions such as laying off junior staff made redundant. The 
civil service is more fragmented than before, ‘enclaves’ and line ministries 
competing for scarce resources and ‘juniors’ being increasingly alienated 
from their ‘bosses’.
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TEACHERS’ UNIONS AND THE SELECTIVE APPROPRIATION  
OF PUBLIC SERVICE REFORMS IN BENIN
Azizou Chabi Imorou1
Introduction
The aim of this chapter is to explore an avenue that has so far attracted 
little attention, namely the response of the teaching unions to educational 
reforms. Empirical observations of the challenges to reforms of the public 
service sector in Africa enable the identification of rationales of actors, 
and highlight the interaction between different interests and professional 
practices (cf. Chabi Imorou 2010b; Grindle and Thomas 1990 for compara-
tive perspectives). They also render a re-reading of African civil services 
reforms necessary (Anders, Charton, Hamani, this volume; see also Olowu 
1999). The focus in the case in hand is on the relationship between these 
challenges and the functions of the state in producing public service 
reforms. The analysis is based on the premise that these challenges are 
not so much obstacles (Brimelow 2003; Peterson 1995 and Trefon 2010) as 
the generators of socio-political dynamics. 
Beginning with a close examination of the demands made by teachers 
throughout the implementation process of the ‘New Study Programme’ 
(Nouveaux programmes d’études, hereafter NPEs), an educational reform 
introduced in Benin during the 1993–1994 school year, I shall analyse how 
these demands, along with the practices to which they gave rise among 
teachers, helped shape the classroom delivery of public education and 
hence illustrate the complex nature of the reform process.
1 This chapter is a reviewed and revised version of a chapter of my Dr. phil. dissertation 
entitled: “Le Bénin à l’épreuve du syndicalisme enseignant. Les revendications des ‘déva-
lorisés’ et la construction de l’Etat (1945–2008)” (Department of Anthropology and African 
Studies, Johannes Gutenberg University, Mainz, 2011). Fieldwork was conducted between 
2006 and 2008 in Parakou, Cotonou and Karimama, documentary research mainly in Cot-
onou and archive material and the colonial press were consulted in Porto-Novo (Benin) 
and Dakar (Senegal). This research was undertaken within the framework of the research 
programme States at Work (University of Mainz, Germany and LASDEL, Benin-Niger, see 
Bierschenk and Olivier de Sardan, Introduction, this volume). I am grateful to Thomas 
Bierschenk, Jean-Pierre Olivier de Sardan, Marcelle Yosson, Aziz Mossi, Nouratou Danko, 
Saï Sotima  Tchantipo, Elieth Eyebiyi, Yacine Bio Tchané and Dominique Ahogbéhossou 
for their many suggestions. Special thanks to Susan Cox for translation into English.
© Azizou Chabi Imorou, 2014 | doi: 10.1163/9789004264960_015
This is an open access chapter distributed under the terms of the CC BY-NC 4.0 license.
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This chapter is organized around four key points. The first consists of 
a short history of educational reforms in Benin since 1945. The second 
briefly describes the content of the NPE reform and the context in which 
it was implemented. The third describes trade-union reactions to the 
reforms as well as the arguments underpinning the teachers’ misgivings. 
Finally, on the basis of the first three points, I shall discuss a number of 
practices at work within the state apparatus.
An Overview of Educational Reforms between 1945 and 1990
The educational system in Benin has a long tradition of reforms, which 
it is important to remember here to facilitate a clearer understanding of 
the current debate on the NPEs.2 These reforms met with varying degrees 
of resistance.
The Colonial Reform of 1945 and Its Continuity
The first reform—and perhaps the most important to have been imple-
mented in Dahomey (present-day Benin)—dates from 15 September 1945. 
It reorganized teaching in the territories of French West Africa and made 
provision for, among other things, the introduction of the syllabuses in 
force in France in schools that taught to secondary level and for the train-
ing of ‘indigenous’ teachers in the context of the extension of primary 
education desired by local populations. As Abdou Moumouni observes, 
this reform contained ‘many of the features of the educational system as 
it is organized in France, as well as others that are quite specific: this orga-
nization will remain in place until the territories of the French  colonies in 
Africa win their independence’ (Moumouni 1964: 78). The aim of the reform 
was to ‘train indigenous managers to become our assistants in every field, 
and to ensure the emergence of a carefully selected elite; it is also a matter 
of educating the masses, to make them more like ourselves and to trans-
form their lifestyles” (Governor Bévié, quoted in Moumouni 1964: 54).
The nationalist movements which preceded independence and in which 
teachers played an active role were quick to criticize an education policy 
that created a division between Africans and their everyday environment. 
As a protest against this educational policy, teachers would demand the 
2 A brief historical survey of education reforms in Benin can be found in Lanoue 
(2004: 121).
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Africanization of educational frameworks and syllabuses. However, the 
same overall policy would be pursued after independence as France con-
tinued to maintain a presence in the educational system through coopera-
tion agreements. French was adopted as the official working language and 
as the medium of instruction in schools.
However, African history and geography was introduced into the syl-
labus and a form of mass education was put in place that would allow 
schools to cater for as many children as possible. The Conference of the 
African States on the Development of Education in Africa, which took 
place from 15 to 25 May 1961 in Addis Ababa, set universal primary educa-
tion as its main goal. From 1965, and to adapt education to the natural 
(essentially rural) environment of the learner, the country opted for the 
‘ruralization’ of primary schools.
The ‘Grosse Tête-Dossou Yovo’ Reform
In 1971, Dahomey, which continued to receive assistance for education 
from the French government, put in place a reform called the ‘Grosse 
Tête-Dossou Yovo’ reform, after its main initiators. The main aim of this 
reform was to train “individuals to take on responsibilities and to use their 
knowledge to improve the environment in which they live” (Ministère en 
charge de l’éducation and UNESCO 2007).
The reform would be fiercely criticized and challenged by teaching-
union organizations of every persuasion (the SYNEPDA,3 the SYNEECAD,4 
the CUESS,5 etc.), by pupil and student organizations (especially UGEED6 
and FACEEN7), and by youth organizations (RAJEMO8 and OJSD9). These 
organizations, most of which operated partly as trade-unions and partly 
as political parties, accused the government of, among other things, seek-
ing to impose neo-colonial reforms which were alien to the basic aspi-
rations of the Dahomey people. Consequently, in a motion calling for 
strike action, dated 4 November 1971, the UGEED “. . . urges vigilance and 
engagement on the part of all pupils, students, parents of pupils, work-
ers in towns and in the countryside, patriotic soldiers, and policemen to 
3 Syndicat national de l’école publique du Dahomey.
4 Syndicat national des enseignants des écoles catholiques du Dahomey.
5 Comité pour l’union des enseignants du secondaire et du supérieur.
6 Union générale des élèves et étudiants du Dahomey.
7 Front d’action commun des élèves et étudiants du Dahomey.
8 Rassemblement de la jeunesse du Mono.
9 Organisation de la jeunesse de la sous-préfecture de Dassa.
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transform Dahomey into a vast battlefield against the ‘Grosse Tête-Dossou 
Yovo’ reform”.
The Marxist-Leninist revolution of 26 October 1972 took place in this 
social climate that systematically rejected the ‘Grosse Tête-Dossou Yovo’ 
reform. As soon as the revolution was declared, the reform was called 
into question:
In public and private education, teachers at all levels, parents and pupils 
anxiously speculated about the future of our children, compromised by a 
reform that had been hastily conceived and inadequately thought through. 
Its promoters did not even have the courage and the honesty to apply it to 
the letter (Kérékou 1987).
The National Programme of Edification of the ‘New School’
Following broad consultation with education stakeholders, on 10 Sep-
tember 1974, the National Council of the Revolution adopted a plan for 
educational reform dubbed the ‘Programme national d’édification de 
l’école nouvelle’ (‘The National Programme for the Edification of the New 
School’). The ‘New School’ sought to align teaching, life outside the class-
room and the social environment of pupils by introducing them to and 
involving them in production. The state’s new law on education, which 
was adopted in 1975, was quite explicit: “All levels of education must be 
aligned with the demands of everyday life and with the social environ-
ment, so that pupils are introduced to production. Schools are production 
units”.10 In real terms, the reform consisted in creating farm cooperatives 
in schools and in getting young people who had passed the baccalaureate 
to undertake teaching assignments.
The ‘New School’ reform, just like the ‘Grosse Tête-Dossou Yovo’ reform, 
soon faced social discontent, mainly because educational standards fell 
and the school fees paid by parents rose. However, the unions, which were 
subservient to the ruling power, had no other choice than to accept it. 
But that did not prevent sporadic protests, which were secretly orches-
trated by Benin’s Communist Party. In the face of this discontent, and 
after five years of general application, the ‘New School’ reform was the 
subject of a review in a seminar held in 1981. The seminar highlighted the 
reform’s failures and, among other things, the fact that it had been hastily 
10 For further information on this reform, see the research report by Salka Wetzig 
(2010).
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introduced and without proper planning of the school activities selected. 
At that point, Benin returned to the neo-colonial educational system.
The Origin of the NPE Reform: The ‘Crisis’, the National 
Commission on Education and the Aid Donors
A nuanced and detailed description of the context of the New Study pro-
gramme reform can be found in Fichtner (2010, 2012). It will therefore 
suffice for our purposes to briefly refer to the meeting of the National 
Commission on Education (Etats généraux de l’éducation, EGE), prompted 
by the crisis in the educational system, and the intervention of the Amer-
ican donor, the United States Agency for International Development 
(USAID).
The Crisis and the National Commission on Education 
The number one problem for education in our country is that the entire 
school system was set up to produce public servants and that, given the sat-
uration of the public service, we must now establish, as a matter of extreme 
urgency and virtually without any transition, a system that educates people 
for other things. What are these other things? Of necessity, the private sector, 
and, since this sector is still in need of development, self-employment, job 
creation, the ability to start one’s own business and to exploit new opportu-
nities whenever these arise (Paulin Hountondji, Minister of National Educa-
tion, RB/MEN 1990: 10).
These statements at the opening ceremony of the National Commission 
on Education (EGE) are testimony to the crisis in and incoherence of 
Benin’s educational system in 1990. This was why the ‘Conférence nation-
ale des forces vives de la nation’ (National Conference of Stakeholders), 
held in February 1990, decided to halt the reform in progress, i.e. the ‘New 
School’ reform, which had proved inappropriate to the new democratic 
context and the challenges of neo-liberalism. An intermediate programme 
was adopted and the conference recommended that the National Com-
mission on Education should be convened to solve the ‘crisis’ at a national 
level. This high-profile event took place in Cotonou from 2 to 9 October 
1990 and, like the National Conference a few months before, it brought 
together a large number of actors from the field of education: teachers 
and their unions, parents, government officials, pupils’ representatives, 
students, and civil society representatives (NGOs and voluntary associa-
tions, in particular).
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Among the main conclusions to emerge from the conference were the 
need for a new educational system and the reform of the content of teach-
ing programmes. This project for reform would subsequently materialize 
as the ‘New Study Programme’ (NPE) and was financed by donors who 
were becoming increasingly involved in the education sector.11
USAID Support and the NPE Reform
The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) agreed 
to provide significant financial and technical support for the reform. 
American aid was to cover all stages of the reform process from its design 
to its implementation.
In accordance with a new ‘competency-based’ approach, which was 
the main recommendation of the National Commission on Education, 
the programme was developed by teams of experts and consultants (both 
national and international) recruited from among school inspectors. 
Between the intermediate programmes that preceded it and the proposed 
new approach through the NPEs, substantial changes were introduced.
[Schools] must be capable of producing high achievers who will go on 
achieving, with entrepreneurial qualities, a passion for new ideas, the abil-
ity to run their own businesses and to create jobs, in short, citizens who can 
make an effective contribution to their country’s development (Ministère en 
charge de l’éducation and UNESCO 2007: 7).
According to Labbé, a member of the team that developed the pro-
grammes, the new approach was different from the old one in that it 
prioritized ‘social-constructivism’ (the construction of knowledge) and 
‘cognitivism’ (learning through processing information) over the ‘mechan-
ical rote-learning’ that had been the mainstay of previous programmes. In 
several respects, this approach replicated Anglo-Saxon models, especially 
the Canadian model, which is considered by the programme developers 
as one of the most successful. At the educational level, in contrast to the 
old approach, in which the role of the teacher had been paramount, the 
reform was one that was centred on the learner, that is to say, the pupil’s 
level of competence. The 30 or so subjects that had been offered previ-
ously were grouped into six subject areas: French, mathematics, life and 
earth sciences, social education, art education, and sports education. The 
11 The study undertaken by Fichtner (2010, see also Fichtner 2012) shows how the search 
for funding created a real battleground with numerous international NGOs vying with one 
another. On the financing of reforms see Darbon (2003).
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emphasis was on concepts that were ‘topical’ in contemporary develop-
ment discourse, notably the environment, the new technologies, democ-
racy etc. These areas of knowledge were given prominence in the new 
textbooks, which are distributed to pupils free of charge.
The programme was implemented gradually. It began in 1994 with an 
experimental phase in 18 pilot schools, three from each of the six admin-
istrative departments, in order to study the ‘feasibility’ and ‘applicabil-
ity’ of the new programmes before their general introduction, which was 
scheduled for the start of the school year in 2005. Training was initially 
targeted at the teachers responsible for the pilot classes, but it was later 
gradually extended to all teachers. However, the new reform was roundly 
condemned and met with various forms of resistance from both teachers 
and their unions.
Trade-Union Reactions to and Arguments against the Reform
Like the earlier reforms, the NPEs were contested. Protests were some-
times active but usually resistance was passive. The protests came to a 
head in 2002, with strikes organized, first, by the Syndicat national des 
enseignants du primaire, SYNAPRIM (The National Union of Primary 
Teachers) and, much later, by other trade-unions. There were various rea-
sons for the trade-union reactions.
Teachers Are “Disorientated by the New Approach”
Adapting to the new teaching methods promoted by the NPEs proved dif-
ficult for the majority of teachers, who had to make the adjustment from 
the ‘chalk and talk’ approach—in which knowledge is invested with the 
teacher—to a style of teaching that puts the learner at the centre of the 
transmission of knowledge. This signalled a complete break with routine 
educational practices and demanded inventiveness from teachers and a 
considerable capacity for adaptation.
The difficulties encountered in implementing the new programmes 
were the result of a lack of training for teachers themselves, a lack of 
teaching materials and, above all, a failure to consult with the teaching 
unions. For, although the unions had been involved at the diagnostic stage 
when the National Commission on Education was convened, the design of 
the courses to be taught was essentially the work of teacher- consultants, 
both national (notably, retired or active school inspectors and education 
advisors) and international (western experts), who were not engaged in 
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the day-to-day business of teaching. It should also be noted in passing 
that, since the Jomtien Conference in 1990 which had formulated the prin-
ciple of “Education for All”, union participation had become indispens-
able, not only in the decision-making process but also in the preparation 
of prognoses and strategies for action. All of this was essentially covered 
by the so-called ‘partnership’ principle (Petit 2010). In practice, however, 
participation in the field of education, as in other fields, was often a 
case of simply going through the motions (see Bierschenk, this volume) 
with the sole purpose of avoiding objections to the changes proposed by 
policy-makers. The fact remained that participation was no miracle anti-
dote to objections, especially since the unions often refused to participate 
(Chabi Imorou 2010a).
Weakened and marginalized by these educational innovations, some 
teaching unions asked the authorities to halt the reform process since the 
majority of teachers, even among the most experienced, were “disorien-
tated by the new approach” (in the words of one union member). Other 
unions, like the SNIA and the SNEC, were more flexible in their demands 
and asked for more training since the targeted training initially organized 
had involved only a small number of teachers, and since the others were 
unable to carry out their teaching duties adequately with only the newly 
published textbooks to rely on. The New Study Programme, of which so 
much had been expected, had adverse effects that could not be ignored. 
As for the parents, their own knowledge, the value of which tends to be 
exaggerated in the minds of the Beninese, was called into question.
Avoiding the Lowering of Standards
In their demands, the unions also berated falling standards of achieve-
ment. Although the new curricula were supported by the free distribu-
tion of new school textbooks, teachers were left with the impression that 
children were assimilating very little of what was being taught. Teachers 
and their unions were not the only ones to make this observation. Parents 
themselves noticed that their children, who had been taught by means of 
the competency-based approach, were under-achieving precisely in the 
areas of reading and writing, and hence developed alternative strategies, 
either resorting to additional lessons outside school hours or turning to 
the private education sector.
It should be pointed out that this finding was in stark contrast to 
the official school results, which recorded a continuous improvement in 
success rates. For example, despite the widely criticized shortcomings of 
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the programme, in June 2005, the national success rate in the Certificat 
d’études primaires élémentaires (Primary School Certificate) was 98%. 
This was due in part to examinations being tailored to pupils’ abilities 
and to the adoption of a ‘remedial’ policy, under which extra classes 
were organized outside hours, especially at weekends (Chabi Imorou 
2010b: 163–164).
Teachers obviously did not want to be blamed for these inadequacies 
and pressed for a return to the teaching methods of the old-style cur-
riculum, such as the ‘syllabic method’ for reading and ‘individual slates’ 
(cadran opératoire) for arithmetical operations. Other issues were the 
need to restore the profession’s social prestige and the need to address 
the concerns of parents.
Denouncing the Contradictions between the Low Salaries  
of Teachers and the Demands for Professionalism
The teaching unions also complained about the contradictions inherent 
in the reform process itself: while a certain amount of professionalism 
was required of teachers, their remuneration remained unchanged. The 
reform meant an increase in duties and responsibilities as well as the 
added imposition of having to master new teaching methods. Indeed, 
given that they did not receive any training, they were obliged to do their 
own research in order to adapt to the new ways of working. The reform 
focussed on pupils without taking the teachers into account. The living 
and working conditions of the latter were not deemed to be determining 
factors in the success of the reform. The training they were given was 
patchy and of very brief duration (one week, on average).
The unions criticized the actors involved in the reform process (design-
ers, consultants and ministry officials) for profiteering from American 
funding via the claims they submitted for subsistence, bonuses and 
travel expenses. It was alleged that these allegedly ‘astronomical’ ben-
efits enabled some members of the steering committee responsible for 
implementing the programme, including teachers (educational advisors 
and inspectors, in particular), to build luxury villas in Porto-Novo (the 
capital of Benin). A section of the city’s Tokpota neighbourhood (which I 
visited) was dubbed the “New Study Programme District” (quartier NPE). 
The authorities in charge of the programme were seen by a large number 
of teachers as being out of touch with the situation ‘on the ground’ as 
those who actually applied the new programme were the teachers in the 
classroom.
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Curbing Educational Extraversion
The criticism directed by the unions at the NPEs also provided an oppor-
tunity for opposing American ‘diktats’ during the reform process, a reform 
inspired by the Anglo-Saxon educational model. The government was 
accused of not having an education policy that took account of national 
realities and of taking its cue from other countries, which were imposing 
inappropriate policies or policies that went against the ‘national interest’ 
through the allocation of funding. Educational extraversion was, there-
fore, condemned and the unions did not hesitate to include the demand 
that national languages be introduced into the classroom in their cam-
paign for the revision of the new curricula.
This diversity of intermeshed arguments and rationales was based on a 
combination of a traditional form of industrial action generally focussed on 
pay and working conditions and demands that were increasingly focussed 
on educational policies, a tendency that pretty much became a universal 
phenomenon after the turning-point of post-Jomtien ‘participation’.
The Practices at Work in the State Apparatus
Union reactions and motivations were the starting point for several initia-
tives taken by teachers as a way of ‘supporting’ the implementation of the 
reform. These informal practices essentially shaped the functions of the 
state in its ongoing quest for modernization. In other words, a set of fac-
tors existing alongside the official framework of the reform were making 
their presence felt within the state apparatus: ‘adaptations’ of the reform, 
the combination of educational practices originating from different his-
torical times (‘sedimentation’, see Bierschenk in this volume), and difficul-
ties and constraints generated by the reforming function of the state. 
The Various Adaptations of the Reform
The absence of a response from the state to the demands of the teachers 
prompted them to seek other ways and means of exercising their profes-
sion. Hence, they focussed their attention on the settings over which they 
had most control, namely the classroom, where they themselves were 
in complete charge of the subject-matter which was taught in a context 
in which school inspections were a rarity. Consequently, they adapted 
the NPE reform in a number of ways in the actual classroom situation. 
Despite the highly innovative nature of the reform, a fact they readily 
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acknowledged, and the training they had received during the brief train-
ing sessions, the educational practices of primary teachers would show 
little change and continue to replicate the old ‘chalk and talk’ methods 
acquired decades earlier. In practice, depending on the particular difficul-
ties they faced, all teachers opted for educational practices that straddled 
the old and the new methods. The vast majority of teachers I encoun-
tered continued to teach their pupils to read using the ‘syllabic method’ 
(for French) and to do their sums on ‘individual slates’ (mathematics). 
They feel that these methods work, see them as irreplaceable and do not 
think that they should disappear along with the previous programme. 
There is no mistaking the fact that these are strategies for resisting the 
reform. Nevertheless, these adaptations are very informal and sometimes 
go undetected at the higher levels of authority.
However, there were times when the adaptation of teaching methods 
seemed the only option. In some schools, there were a substantial num-
ber of teachers recruited by the local community who simply had to do 
the best they could to ensure that teaching does at least take place. This 
was the experience of Rafiou, a community teacher in a village in the 
north of Benin who, on starting his job, was put in charge of a fifth-year 
primary school class, in which a competency-based approach was being 
used. Rafiou, however, had not received any professional training prior 
to being recruited and had to ‘muddle through’, thanks to the help he 
was given by the head teacher and by one of his friends, who was also a 
community teacher in the same school. Some teachers, therefore, (par-
ticularly community teachers, local contract staff and ‘voluntary workers’) 
sometimes began implementing the reform without the basic vocational 
training required, let alone the training needed to teach the NPEs.12
Consequently, disparities frequently appeared between the reform ‘on 
paper’, as conceived by the government and its consultants, and the reform 
as it was actually implemented by teachers in the schools. This obviously 
raises questions about the disparities observed in other contexts in Africa 
between theory and practice, between design and implementation, and, 
ultimately, between official and practical norms (Chauveau, et al. 2001; 
Olivier de Sardan 2004, 2009). In short, educational reform was the result 
of several adaptations. For NPEs to work, a few local ‘ingredients’ needed 
12 A similar situation was observed by Mossi (2008: 67–69) in the case of the teaching 
of literacy whereby state actors were attempting to implement a reform for which they 
lacked the necessary skills. 
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to be added for contextual reasons. At the same time, the reform was 
appropriated in various ways by the teachers, who have different aims 
from those underlying the reform.13
Although the adaptations affected by teachers differed from context to 
context, and even from school to school, they all had one thing in com-
mon: they ensured that teachers had more control over their professional 
activities. In general, the personal changes they introduced revolved 
around protecting their ‘status’ as teachers, as the repository of the knowl-
edge that they are required to transmit to younger generations. From the 
teachers’ point of view, at least, simply accepting the reform constituted 
something of a paradox since it is based on the principle that knowledge is 
‘constructed’ by the pupil and the teacher is no more than a facilitator.
The ‘Sedimentation’ Effect: The Erosion of the Link between Reform  
and Public Service Employees
The sedimentation thesis developed by Bierschenk (in this volume) in his 
analysis of the functioning of African states and power structures can be 
redeployed here to interpret state practices generally, at least as carried 
out by state actors in implementing reforms. The outcomes of a reform, 
he observes, “do not supplant the outcomes of earlier reforms, at least not 
completely. Each institutional reform, each development project negoti-
ated, leaves an institutional legacy which is incorporated into the existing 
body of institutional mechanisms”. This is confirmed by empirical obser-
vation of the educational practices of teachers. It is certainly the case that 
the NPE reform did not eliminate earlier practices. Consequently, if the 
system worked, its success was far less due to the ingenuity of the reform 
package than to the initiatives taken at various times by the actors ‘on 
the ground’. As a result, the reform eventually implemented can be seen 
as the superimposition of certain new educational practices, deemed to 
be effective, on earlier practices that have held firm under the weight of 
further reforms.
This superimposition of the different teaching methods was reinforced 
by the lack of training among teachers who entered the profession via a 
wide range of access routes (recruitment by the state or by the local com-
munity), which contributed to segmentation within the profession. Con-
sequently, teachers who had been trained to use earlier teaching methods 
13 This has also been noted by Blundo (2001) and Mossi (2008). 
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(‘chalk and talk’) were found working side-by-side with those who had 
been trained to use a competency-based approach (often over a relatively 
short period of time) and those who had received no training at all (the 
cohort of community teachers and local contract staff).
This selective sedimentation, which is typical of reform processes in 
Benin and maybe beyond, has a particular effect on the state apparatus: 
it weakens the link between the public service and public servants. In 
order to work properly, every state apparatus presupposes the existence 
of a link between the public service that it is supposed to deliver and the 
body of actors through which this service is delivered.
The “situational adjustments” (Blundo 2002) variously applied to edu-
cational practices point to a loosening of the link between teachers and 
the reform that they are responsible for implementing. First, educational 
practices are individualized on the part of teachers as they take particu-
lar advantage of the special nature of their profession; Since they each 
have the opportunity to shape and arrange their particular approach, 
they draw on the vast pedagogical universe of reforms deposited over 
the years. Second, the obligations which public servants are required to 
observe with regard to public reforms are extensively modified. Indeed, 
teachers only feel obliged to apply public decisions when these decisions 
coincide with their own professional interests or what they deem to be 
the ‘national interest’.
This erosion of the relationship between the civil servant and a particu-
lar reform or public service in general is basically attributable to the state’s 
weaknesses in the area of regulation and to the public servant’s dual iden-
tity as both ‘civil servant’ and ‘citizen’: he is simultaneously ‘outside’ and 
‘inside’ the state apparatus, leading both a ‘public’ and a ‘private’ life.
Conclusion 
The numerous reforms initiated within the public service often lack syn-
ergy with each one evolving along independent lines. In the case of the 
NPEs, there are significant discrepancies between the original intentions 
of those who designed the reform and the way in which the reform has 
actually been applied, as well as a lack of consistency and synergy between 
the reform and the measures taken to support it (especially training and 
equipment).
Moreover, public reforms nearly always appear unfinished or frag-
mented. New ones are forever being introduced, usually as the result 
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of funding opportunities, before the earlier ones have been completely 
removed (see Charton in this volume). Up to now in Benin, educational 
reforms have been introduced every five years on average since indepen-
dence: in 1960 (first reform), in 1965 (‘ruralization of education’), in 1971 
(‘Grosse Tête-Dossou Yovo’ reform), in 1975 (reorganization of the ‘New 
School’), in 1990 (General Assembly and the intermediate programmes), 
in 1994 (‘New Study Programme’). Their duration is very short and barely 
corresponds to the duration of the primary cycle. This can also be seen as 
a sign of instability in curricula development.
From another perspective, the sectors affected by reforms will experi-
ence only few of the intended changes, or even witness the completion of 
any action that is undertaken. Reforms within the public sector in Africa 
are nevertheless appropriated by public actors to make them more work-
able (for a similar idea, see Hamani, in this volume). ‘Internal’ dynamics 
(from inside the system itself) operate rather than ‘external’ ones (inter-
national communities or donors), and the latter encounter all kinds of 
difficulties: resistance from the beneficiaries and the trade-unions, a lack 
of technical preparation on the part of the authorities, a lack of financial 
support to ensure the ownership and sustainability of reforms etc.
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THE STATE THAT WORKS: A ‘POCKETS OF EFFECTIVENESS’ 
PERSPECTIVE ON NIGERIA AND BEYOND
Michael Roll
Introduction
Given the highly contingent nature of historical processes of state forma-
tion, it is not the absence of effective states that demands explanation 
but their very existence. This opening statement turns the usual ana-
lytical perspective on states in developing countries on its head: from a 
deficiency-focused perspective (why is the state not working?) to a more 
unorthodox and constructive perspective (what is working, and why?), 
which this chapter will adopt. It looks at the frequent but largely unex-
plored phenomenon of ‘pockets of effectiveness’ (PoE) in weak gover-
nance states (see Roll, forthcoming). PoE are public organisations that 
deliver public services relatively effectively in contexts of largely ineffec-
tive government. Such pockets exist in most contexts, even in the most 
corrupt and ineffective countries; however, research and academic litera-
ture on this phenomenon is scarce and incoherent. Why do PoE exist at 
all in developing countries and how do they emerge? While this chapter 
touches on these questions, it focuses on what the answers teach us about 
the nature of the state, the ‘stateness’ in developing countries, particularly 
in sub-Saharan Africa.1
This discussion contradicts some commonly held assumptions about 
the nature of the state in these countries. While the state is often portrayed 
as weak, corrupt, particularistic and lacking a commitment to public ser-
vice, our findings do not support such general judgements. Although the 
civil service in developing countries often constitutes a resource for politi-
cians engaging in patrimonial politics, some crucial distinctions need to 
be made. Our findings show that, under certain circumstances, the very 
1 This chapter is based on the research project “Pockets of Effectiveness in Nigeria”, 
coordinated by the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES), Nigeria Office, 2009–2010, when the 
author was the FES Resident Director in Nigeria. Seven PoE case studies were conducted 
by Nigerian researchers. The views expressed in this chapter are those of the author and 
should not be attributed to the FES. I thank the editors for comments on previous versions 
of this chapter. 
© Michael Roll, 2014 | doi: 10.1163/9789004264960_016
This is an open access chapter distributed under the terms of the CC BY-NC 4.0 license.
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same factors that otherwise explain ineffectiveness, such as personalisa-
tion and politicisation, may also lead to exceptional public sector perfor-
mance. Political interests and other motivations can lead politicians and 
top civil servants to find it more rational to make a public organisation 
work instead of exploiting it for individual gains. Furthermore, while over-
all effectiveness is unlikely to be found in current public administration 
systems in developing countries, individual civil servants generally respond 
to the same management techniques and incentives as their colleagues 
in the OECD world. It is not ‘culture’, narrowly defined, but the institu-
tional context that explains the difference in performance. Another finding 
that contributes an important nuance to our understanding of stateness in 
developing countries is that a public service ethos does exist in their public 
administrations, albeit perhaps not very pervasively. These and other les-
sons about the nature of the state in developing countries will be discussed 
in greater detail in the final section of this chapter. They show that our 
understanding of stateness in weak governance countries remains flawed.
Section two presents PoE-related definitions and selected elements of a 
research framework for PoE. Following the introduction of two PoE case 
studies from Nigeria, the factors that best explain why and how they emerged 
as PoE are outlined in section three. Based on these findings, section four 
discusses what PoE teach us about stateness in developing countries.
Pockets of Effectiveness: Definitions  
and Research Framework2
While PoE can be found in even the most ineffective of states, no research 
agenda has been developed to-date for their detailed investigation. A 
review of the scant literature that explicitly deals with this phenomenon 
shows that the research on what we call ‘pockets of effectiveness’ even lacks 
coherent terminology. Robert Daland (1981) and David Leonard (1991) use 
the term “pockets of productivity” while Barbara Geddes prefers “pockets 
of efficiency” (1990; 1994), a term further popularised by Peter Evans (1992; 
1995). Moreover, other labels such as “islands of excellence” (Therkildsen 
2008) and “islands of effectiveness” (Crook 2010) have been used.3 In light 
2 For a more detailed discussion of the definitions and research framework, see Roll 
(forthcoming). 
3 Through his involvement as an international peer reviewer in the FES Nigeria 
“Pockets of Effectiveness in Nigeria” project, David Leonard has also started to use the 
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of this diversity, precise definitions and elements of a research framework 
are required before empirical findings can be presented.
Definitions, Criteria, and Analytical Dimensions
A pocket of effectiveness (PoE) is defined as a public organisation that 
provides public services relatively effectively despite operating in an envi-
ronment, in which public service delivery is the exception rather than the 
norm. Most public organisations are ineffective, weak and involved in or 
affected by patronage and endemic corruption in this environment. In 
this context, ‘effectiveness’ refers to the actual provision of public services 
by the public organisation in question.
For our “Pockets of Effectiveness in Nigeria” research project we devel-
oped a set of criteria for identifying and selecting PoE, the most impor-
tant criterion of which was the relative effectiveness of the organisation in 
providing the public service(s) the organisation was mandated to provide. 
This criterion is strongly context-dependent which means that the more 
hostile the context and the less effective other public organisations are, 
the less effective an organisation needs to be to fulfil it. However, the pub-
lic organisation must still be successful in providing the corresponding 
services. When statistical data on this were scarce or of low quality, the 
results of perception polls, media reports and key informant assessments 
were used.
Other criteria included the organisation’s mission to contribute to the 
public good, the capacity to contribute to the public good at national level 
and the organisation’s persistence as a PoE for at least five years. Based on 
these criteria and the available data, a group of experts identified a sample 
of public organisations in Nigeria that qualified as PoE. Out of these, the 
seven most effective organisations were selected in a second round of 
criteria-led expert discussions. These seven organisations covered a broad 
spectrum of public and semi-public organisations and were agreed on as 
being among the most effective organisations in the overall sample.4
term ‘pockets of effectiveness’ (see Leonard 2010 and Prichard and Leonard 2010; personal 
communication). 
4 The seven case studies included the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission 
(EFCC), the National Agency for Food and Drug Administration and Control (NAFDAC), 
the Federal Inland Revenue Service (FIRS), the National Agency for the Prohibition of 
Traffic in Persons and Other Related Matters (NAPTIP), the Ministry of Environment of 
the Lagos State Government (one state-based public organisation), the Punch newspaper 
(a quasi-public but privately owned organisation) and the Fahimta Microfinance Bank 
(another quasi-public organisation).
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Apart from the definitions and the list of criteria, we clarified and iden-
tified some key analytical dimensions for our PoE research framework. 
These were, in brief:
•  Mixed performance and relative effectiveness: The performance of all 
PoE is usually mixed and their effectiveness is relative to the context, 
in which they operate and, particularly, in comparison to international 
performance standards. However, it is also relative with regard to their 
organisation units. While some units in an organisation might be effec-
tive, others might not. For our research project, this internal diversity 
served as a microscope for investigating the factors that led some units 
to perform better than others.
•  Emergence and persistence of PoE: For analytical purposes, we distin-
guished between the ‘emergence’ and ‘persistence’ phases of a PoE as 
we assumed that the factors that explain why an organisation emerges 
as a PoE might differ from those that explain its persistence.
•  Dynamic ‘lifecycle’ perspective and ‘turning points’: The effectiveness 
of PoE is also relative with regard to time. While organisations can 
emerge as PoE, they can also degenerate from PoE into ineffective 
organisations, or have upward and downward tendencies while strug-
gling to persist. This led us to apply a dynamic analytical lifecycle 
perspective that pays attention to the temporal dimension. We also 
focussed on the ‘turning points’ as special analytical foci, which are 
the points or rather periods in time in which organisations either 
emerge as PoE or degenerate (on the concept, see Abbott 1997).
•  Leadership: Leadership is a particularly tricky factor. While most man-
agement studies suggest that this is the decisive factor for explaining 
organisational performance, we were cautious on this point. We share 
these reservations with Judith Tendler who concluded that the achieve-
ments of the organisations in her case studies in Brazil were “not attrib-
utable to strongly intentional leadership” (Tendler 1997: 14). We wanted 
to establish, therefore, what the relative importance of leadership for 
PoE actually was within the context of other factors.
The Political Sociology Perspective
In our analysis, public administration is understood as a political pro-
cess which is embedded in a specific social and political context. This 
political sociology perspective explicitly takes the political dimension into 
account, including the political nature of the delivery of public services. 
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In developing countries, in particular, the delivery of public services has 
a wider significance far beyond the delivery of the service itself: it can be 
seen as a symbol for the acceptance by the state of its public responsibility 
for delivering services, at least in part. Hence, in our study we regarded 
even selective public service delivery as political action that is crucial for 
the process of establishing or rebuilding more or less effective states in 
developing countries.
Taxation and public service delivery are two sides of the same coin 
in this regard.5 ‘State’ and ‘society’ constitute each other in a contin-
gent process of bargaining with each other for resources and power. 
The legitimacy of the state as well as some form of accountable relation-
ship between the state and society have historically emerged through 
this process in many of today’s OECD member countries. In largely dis-
credited states, in which accountability relationships with citizens are 
rudimentary at best, the provision of essential public services “can lead 
citizens to re-engage with the state and can be a path towards a virtuous 
cycle of engagement and accountability in the broader political sphere” 
(Joshi 2006: 125). The political sociology perspective emphasises, there-
fore, that the relevance of PoE goes far beyond them being starting points 
for administrative reform, but rather elements for (re-)building states 
and more accountable and democratic state-society relations in weak 
governance states. While this point will be discussed in a forthcoming 
book (Roll, forthcoming), this chapter focuses more narrowly on what 
PoE can teach us about the nature of the state in developing countries.6 
Moreover, not all of the analytical dimensions and distinctions presented 
here will be referred to in the following section.
Why and How Do PoE Emerge?
This section introduces two of our case studies and presents the explana-
tory factors for the emergence of PoE. Due to the small number of case 
studies involved, this analysis is preliminary and will require further qual-
ification when additional case studies are available. The cases selected 
5 On taxation in developing countries from a political sociology perspective, see 
Bräutigam et al. (2008).
6 The forthcoming book (Roll, forthcoming) is a comparative study and includes case 
studies of PoE in China, Brazil, the Middle East, Suriname and Nigeria and across various 
historical and current periods of time.  
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for this summary are two of the most outstanding success stories among 
Nigeria’s public organisations in recent years: the National Agency for 
Food and Drug Administration and Control (NAFDAC) and the National 
Agency for the Prohibition of Traffic in Persons and Other Related Matters 
(NAPTIP). The analysis is based on extensive individual and group inter-
views with members of staff of the organisations at various management 
levels, interviews with the organisations’ ‘customers’ or beneficiaries, and 
representatives of ministries, international organisations, embassies, pri-
vate business and experts. Statistics, official documents, external reports 
and newspaper articles were also analysed.
Case Studies
National Agency for Food and Drug Administration and  
Control (NAFDAC)7
NAFDAC has a mandate to regulate and control quality standards for 
both imported and locally manufactured food, drugs, cosmetics, medical 
devices, chemicals, detergents and packaged water. It was set up by the 
National Agency for Food and Drug Administration and Control Decree 
No. 15 of 1993 as amended by Decree No. 20 of 1999 as a parastatal of 
the Ministry of Health. Gabriel Osunde was NAFDAC’s pioneer director 
general and handed over to Dora N. Akunyili in 2001. She is usually cred-
ited with having transformed NAFDAC into an effective organisation. At 
the end of 2008 she was appointed Nigeria’s Minister of Information and 
Communications, and Paul B. Orhii became NAFDAC’s third director gen-
eral in early 2009.
Apart from its headquarters in Abuja, NAFDAC maintains offices in all 
36 federal states of Nigeria along with six zonal offices for the geo-political 
zones of the country and three special inspectorate offices in big cities, 
in addition to Lagos (Aba, Onitsha, Kaduna), with strategic importance 
for the fight against counterfeit drugs and unregistered products. More 
than 3,000 pharmacists, technicians, enforcement and administrative staff 
work for NAFDAC. In terms of recruitment and promotions, financing 
and political control, NAFDAC became autonomous from its parent min-
istry, the Ministry of Health, shortly after Dora Akunyili’s appointment in 
2001. Following the adoption of a revised tariff structure for registrations, 
7 This summary is based on the NAFDAC PoE case study by Irene Pogoson with Suraj 
Mudasiru and Azeez Olaniyan (2010).
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 sanctions and penalties, NAFDAC has been able to raise more than two 
thirds of its annual income since 2003.
One of Nigeria’s greatest challenges in NAFDAC’s area of responsibility 
is locally produced and imported counterfeit drugs. In 2001 about 80% 
of medications sold in Nigeria were considered deficient in one way or 
another, many of them dangerous for the patient’s health and sometimes 
even life-threatening (Lemonick 2005). The situation was so serious that 
some West African countries banned drugs made in Nigeria all together. 
Before 2001, NAFDAC was considered an ineffective organisation, some-
thing that was also related to the constraints it faced under military rule. 
Since then, things have changed dramatically. In a representative national 
poll published in November 2007, NAFDAC emerged as the government 
agency that is considered to be the most effective (70 per cent), 12 per cent 
ahead of the organisation in second place (NOI Polls 2007: 4). This per-
ception is supported by significant achievements. According to NAFDAC 
sources, the organisation destroyed substandard products valued at over 
USD 200 million between 2001 and 2009, achieved 45 convictions related 
to counterfeit drugs, had 60 more cases pending and a steadily increas-
ing number of sanctions against manufacturers. The enforcement of 
NAFDAC’s standards and mandate are reflected in the annually increas-
ing, internally generated revenue. Both producers and consumers appear 
to have come to appreciate NAFDAC’s work and value its seal of approval. 
This new-gained trust also led to a revival of the Nigerian pharmaceutical 
industry, both domestically and abroad and countries in the region that 
had imposed bans on Nigerian drugs lifted them. A 2006 survey report 
found that fake drugs had dropped from about 41 per cent of all drugs sold 
in Nigeria in 2001 to 16.7 per cent in 2006 (Barriaux 2007). The percentage 
of unregistered drugs was also reduced from 68 to 19 per cent during the 
same period (Nduwugwe 2008).
These impressive figures earned the organisation, and particularly its 
then-director general, national and international recognition. NAFDAC 
became a model for other African countries and Dora Akunyili proba-
bly became Nigeria’s most decorated public sector executive. As early as 
2003 she received Transparency International’s Integrity Award and went 
on to win the Time Magazine Award in 2006—to mention just two of 
the hundreds of awards presented to her. Perhaps the best indicators of 
NAFDAC’s effectiveness are the reactions of the fake drug producing and 
importing cartels. Several NAFDAC laboratories and offices were vanda-
lised and set on fire, inspectors were threatened and there were several 
attempts to bribe and also assassinate Dora Akunyili. This can be the price 
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of effectiveness when policing a sector dominated by criminal cartels that 
make huge profits. 
National Agency for the Prohibition of Traffic in Persons and Other  
Related Matters (NAPTIP)8
NAPTIP was established with the enactment of the Trafficking in Persons 
(Prohibition) Law Enforcement and Administration Act of 2003. Carol 
Ndaguba was appointed in the same year as the pioneer executive secre-
tary. She retired in early 2009 and was succeeded by Simon Chuzi Egede. 
The creation of the agency marked the fulfilment of Nigeria’s obligations 
as a signatory to the United Nations Convention against Transnational 
Organised Crime (Palermo Protocols) and its Protocol to Prevent, Suppress 
and Punish Trafficking in Persons, especially Women and Children from 
2000 (United Nations General Assembly 2001). The act gives NAPTIP a 
comprehensive mandate to fight trafficking, including the rescuing and 
rehabilitation of trafficked persons as well as the investigation of traffick-
ers. The amendments that entered into force in December 2005 extended 
NAPTIP’s powers beyond investigation to prosecution, and allowed 
NAPTIP cases to be prosecuted at state and federal high courts instead 
of only in the state high courts. The organisation, which employed a staff 
of around 250 in 2006, is under the office of the Attorney-General. Apart 
from its headquarters in Abuja, it has six zonal offices with rehabilitation 
centres attached to them in cities, in which trafficking is most prevalent. 
NAPTIP enjoys autonomy with regard to staff recruitment and promo-
tion and has also benefited from almost consistently increasing budget 
allocations by government. In addition, the organisation received signifi-
cant financial and technical support from international organisations and 
governments.
Trafficking is widespread, profitable and largely in the hands of estab-
lished syndicates in Nigeria which makes NAPTIP’s task a rather daunting 
one. Against this background, the organisation is widely praised as effec-
tive as confirmed by a European diplomat based in Nigeria:
There are many other things in this country which are not going very well 
but NAPTIP is not actually one of them. NAPTIP is one of those few state 
organisations that are functioning very well. (NAPTIP interview 18).
8 This summary is based on the NAPTIP PoE case study by Antonia T. Simbine with 
Franca C. Attoh and Abubakar Oladeji (2010).
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Up to mid-2009 more than 3,500 victims had been rescued, sheltered and 
rehabilitated, while 57 convictions had been achieved with more pend-
ing since the establishment of the organisation. Although this may not 
seem much, the fact that the annual number of trafficking convictions 
for the whole of Africa rose from a meagre 10 in 2003 to 90 in 2008 (U.S. 
Department of State 2009: 51) puts the figure into context.9 NAPTIP has 
been invited by various foreign law enforcement agencies to cooperate 
with them in cracking international human trafficking syndicates, some-
thing they have done successfully. This evidence is confirmed by the United 
States Department of State’s “Trafficking in Persons Report” 2009 which 
upgraded Nigeria from tier two to tier one, which means that the gov-
ernment fully complies with the U.S. Trafficking Victims Protection Act’s 
minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking (U.S. Department of 
State 2009: 225–227).10 Apart from the island state Mauritius, which has a 
population of little over one million, Nigeria is the only African country 
placed in tier one. As confirmed by the report, this major achievement is 
due to NAPTIP’s exceptional effectiveness:
Nigeria’s strengthened anti-trafficking record over the last year reflects the 
cumulative impact of progressively increasing efforts made by NAPTIP over 
the last several years. (U.S. Department of State 2009: 226).
Explanatory Factors
What are the most important factors that explain the emergence of these 
two organisations as ‘pockets of effectiveness’? Since our focus is on the 
political dimension of PoE we neglect the contribution of technical equip-
ment. Examples of such tools include the monitoring system and database 
on trafficking established by NAPTIP and NAFDAC’s new registration pro-
cedures for producers and products. This technical side is relatively well 
covered in the literature and does not differ much from the OECD world. 
However, exactly how these organisations manage to overcome the politi-
cal obstacles in a hostile developing country environment to be able to 
   9 Attaining convictions against human traffickers is very difficult. In most cases, the 
trafficked victims are required to give evidence before the traffickers can be convicted. 
Since these victims are often relatives or otherwise known to the trafficking networks, this 
is very dangerous for them. 
10 Tier two includes countries “whose government do not fully comply with the 
Trafficking Victims Protection Act’s minimum standards, but are making significant 
efforts to bring themselves into compliance with those standards” (U.S. Department of 
State 2009: 49).
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finally make use of these technical innovations is less well known. This is 
the dimension, on which we will focus.
Although literature explicitly dealing with the phenomenon we refer 
to as ‘pockets of effectiveness’ is scarce, three broad hypotheses can be 
identified that explain the existence of PoE (see Roll, forthcoming, partly 
based on Leonard 2008):
•  Hypothesis 1—Internal factors: An organisation’s effectiveness in a chal-
lenging context is determined by leadership and management—i.e. how 
it does its tasks.
•  Hypothesis 2—External or political economy factors: The underlying 
political economy in which an organisation is placed will ultimately 
overcome and dominate all other causal factors and thus determine the 
level of effectiveness that is possible.
•  Hypothesis 3—Function or task-related factors: The function an organi-
sation performs determines the degree of specificity of the benefits it 
delivers, and also determines the incentives it provides to its staff and, 
therefore, an organisation’s effectiveness.
None of these hypotheses can explain individually why PoE emerge. In 
contrast to previous studies (for an overview, see Roll, forthcoming), we 
explain the emergence of PoE as follows: In a given political context, 
a decisive political actor (or a group of actors) has an interest in the 
effective delivery of a particular public service. The public organisation 
in question is then provided with a high degree of autonomy, focussed 
powers and political protection. Moreover, a qualified and motivated 
pioneer leader with outstanding, inclusive leadership and management 
skills is appointed. This multifactorial explanation highlights that the 
key political mechanism for the emergence of PoE is the interaction of 
political interest and function. While the leadership and management 
factors are vital, they can only produce PoE if these political conditions 
are in place; on the other hand, the political factors alone are not suf-
ficient. The factors that emerged in the analysis are presented individu-
ally in greater detail below with illustrations from the two case studies. 
Although the boundaries between them are sometimes blurred, they 
are clustered in three categories: political, institutional and managerial 
 factors (see Figure 1).
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Political Factors
Political Interest and Function
In both cases, the specific political context led then President Olusegun 
Obasanjo to develop an interest in the effective execution of the func-
tions of fighting counterfeit and dangerous drugs and human trafficking. 
Obasanjo’s particular sensitivity and attention to improving Nigeria’s inter-
national image is key to understanding how he developed these interests. 
Obasanjo had some very tangible reasons for improving Nigeria’s repu-
tation, such as seeking a debt repayment and relief deal with the ‘Paris 
Club’, a group of 19 lenders, which was finally accepted in 2006. However, 
beyond such primarily instrumental motives, it is widely believed that he 
had a genuine interest in improving the country’s reputation abroad with 
a view to boosting his own personal international prestige (see Gillies 
2007).
Moreover, both phenomena, i.e. deaths from counterfeit drugs and 























Figure 1: Explanatory factors for the emergence of Pockets of Effectiveness
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in both national and international media after Nigeria’s return to democ-
racy in 1999. They damaged the country’s reputation which was already at 
an all-time low by the end of the Abacha regime. However, the develop-
ment of this interest in a public service being provided more effectively 
is not a straightforward process. It takes shape in rather sporadic and 
unusual ways. In the case of NAPTIP for example, it was the wife of the 
then Vice-President Atiku Abubakar, who founded an anti-trafficking and 
child labour non-governmental organisation (NGO) in 1999, the Women 
Trafficking and Child Labour Eradication Foundation (WOTCLEF). 
Thanks to the strong position enjoyed by the wives of senior politicians 
in Nigeria, she succeeded in putting the topic on the political agenda. 
Supported by civil society organisations and international organisa-
tions, with her help the anti-trafficking act, which established NAPTIP, 
was enacted in 2003. This top-level political support ensured that the 
mandate of the organisation was strong and its powers far-reaching, 
while the continued support guaranteed increasing financial transfers to 
the organisation.
Dora Akunyili’s case provides another example of how important the 
political context is, not only for understanding which public services 
are considered political priorities but also for understanding how peo-
ple are selected to provide them effectively. While she was a trained 
and experienced pharmacist, this was not Obasanjo’s only criterion for 
selecting her as NAFDAC’s head. What made her stand out was proven 
integrity and incorruptibility. This factor was considered to be crucial 
by the president in the context of Nigeria at that time. The story that 
made President Obasanjo choose Mrs. Akunyili goes as follows: While 
still working at the Petroleum Trust Fund, she had to travel to London 
for medical treatment and had been given GBP 17,000 to pay her medical 
bills, including surgery. It turned out that she did not need the surgery 
and that the costs, therefore, were much lower than expected. On her 
return to Nigeria, Akunyili wrote a letter to Muhammadu Buhari, for-
mer Nigerian head of state and at that time chairman of the Petroleum 
Trust Fund, thanking him for the assistance and returned the remain-
ing money. Buhari mentioned this unusual story of a member of staff 
of a public organisation returning money to her employer to Onaolapo 
Soloye, a former minister of finance and close friend and advisor of the 
then president. The latter was impressed, requested to see Akunyili’s 
CV and recommended her to President Obasanjo. He then called her 
for an interview and subsequently appointed her as the new head of 
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NAFDAC.11 Her appointment was met with strong political opposition 
since she was neither a member of the ruling party nor of the infor-
mal political elite networks through which such positions are usually 
assigned. Akunyili also lacked prior high-level political or administrative 
experience. Without the then president’s special interest in appointing 
somebody with proven integrity, Akunyili would not have had a chance 
of being selected for this position.
Political Management and Political Protection
While the appreciation of and political support for the execution of a 
public organisation’s function may be due to very situational motives, 
its continued protection and support requires the repeated renewal of 
the politicians’ attention to it, which is why ‘political management’ is so 
important. ‘Political management’ refers to the lobbying for political sup-
port and influencing of decisions that strengthen an organisation’s posi-
tion by its leader. This continued lobbying can be carried out by various 
actors, such as the media, civil society, international organisations, politi-
cal coalitions or the leaders of the very organisations themselves as in the 
cases of NAFDAC and NAPTIP. However, direct access to and the trust of 
top politicians and—above all—the president are essential. This is even 
more important if the process of arriving at policy priorities and prepar-
ing the budget is rather erratic as is often the case in Nigeria, for example. 
Apart from the inward-oriented aspects of management, these outward-
oriented aspects of political management are of great significance in a 
fragile and hostile environment.
Two examples illustrate how crucial this ‘political management’ is. In 
the case of NAPTIP the pioneer executive secretary managed to get the 
act which established the organisation in the first place, in 2003, reviewed 
and amended in 2005. The most important change included assigning 
NAPTIP the powers to prosecute, allowing them access to the Federal 
High Court in addition to the state high courts, criminalising the traf-
ficking of children as house helps, the regulation of the seizure of assets 
from traffickers and the establishment of the Victims Trust Fund. These 
very function-oriented amendments enhanced NAPTIP’s effectiveness 
11 Apart from several newspaper articles and interviews on this, see Akunyili (2010) 
for a personal account of this story (Akunyili 2010: xxxvii–xxxviii) and a copy of her let-
ter of appreciation to the Petroleum Trust Fund’s chairman and his response (Akunyili 
2010: 320). 
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tremendously. Even by global standards it is remarkable that an act that 
had just been passed is reviewed and amended within a period of only 
two years. This involved political management by the then executive sec-
retary of NAPTIP Carol Ndaguba as well as strong political support. 
At NAFDAC Dora Akunyili used her political management skills suc-
cessfully to achieve the organisation’s autonomy from the Ministry of 
Health in terms of funding, recruitment, promotion of staff, remunera-
tion and political control. Before that, staff were transferred to NAFDAC 
from the ministry, its funding was included in the Ministry of Health’s 
budget, remuneration was regulated by general public service guidelines 
and the ministry exercised political control over the organisation. Another 
example is the return of NAFDAC to Nigerian ports from where it had 
been banned by the military government in 1996. On the request of Dora 
Akunyili, the then president Olusegun Obasanjo granted approval and the 
clearance of imported goods by NAFDAC became compulsory again in 
2001. This closed a huge inlet for imported counterfeit products and ended 
the Customs Service’s monopoly on clearance.
Using these various political management measures, these leaders of 
public organisations actively shaped the immediate political environment 
in which their organisations operated. They did not just rely on existing legal 
provisions, but sometimes ignored, creatively reinterpreted or elegantly 
by-passed rules to be able to work more autonomously and effectively. As 
we saw in other case studies, political management often included creative 
and unorthodox measures which were not always in strict accordance with 
the law and, therefore, not without risk for the respective leaders. Apart 
from ‘political management’, ‘creative interpretation and management’ as 
well as ‘taking risks’ are therefore important elements of how leaders of 
PoE use the existing latitude, redefine and reshape it.
Leaders of public organisations can only carry out these activities over 
a sustained period of time if there is substantial political interest in the 
services their organisations provide. This interest must then translate into 
the political protection of the organisation and its leader. Refusing politi-
cal interference, private interest-guided employment and complicity in 
diverting public funds are seen as an offence in a political context like 
Nigeria. Hence, organisations that operate relatively effectively rely on 
political protection for being able to persist as PoE. Political hostilities, 
strategically spread rumours and political or other coups against these 
organisation’s leaders are frequent and difficult for them to survive with-
out political protection.
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Institutional Factors
Autonomy
The various dimensions of autonomy include political, administrative 
and financial autonomy. More specifically, autonomy with regard to key 
procedures, such as staff recruitment and promotion, remuneration and 
welfare, are crucial. In an environment in which political interference in 
public organisations and their use for employing political clients and sup-
porters is the rule rather than the exception, autonomy from this envi-
ronment is essential.12 While organisation-specific acts were important 
in both case studies, political protection and continued enforcement of 
these acts and regulations were essential. It is only then that the executive 
leaders of these public organisations can establish a performance-based 
and performance-rewarding organisational culture that is necessary for 
the effective provision of the public services in question.
Apart from political autonomy, financial autonomy is also crucial. 
NAPTIP managed to obtain a secure and almost consistently increasing 
budget vote as well as support from international organisations. NAFDAC, 
on the other hand, reformed its tariff structure and from then on man-
aged to generate at least two-thirds of its annual income through internal 
revenues. In a politically volatile context, the latter option is more sustain-
able in terms of autonomy although it is not completely safe from political 
interference either. 
Focussed Powers
The term ‘focussed powers’ refers to the fact that organisations like 
NAFDAC and NAPTIP, which were established through task- and 
organisation-tailored acts, have comprehensive legal powers with regard 
to their mandate. In both case studies, these comprise of executive pow-
ers including prosecution. These organisations do not only have the legal 
authority to carry this out but also organisational means such as internal 
12 In the context of administrative reform strategies in OECD countries, the model of 
the semi-autonomous executive agency has emerged in the last decades. Our case stud-
ies reflect some of the characteristics of such agencies. However, we could not establish 
whether or how their setting-up was informed by this model. The focus of the ‘agencifica-
tion’ literature is still largely on OECD countries but case studies from developing coun-
tries are sometimes included. For more information, see OECD (2002), van Donge (2002), 
James (2003), Pollitt and Talbot (2004), Pollit et al. (2004), Larbi (2006: 31–33), Ayee (2008: 
134–137) and critically Moynihan (2006) and Joshi and Ayee (2009).
380 michael roll
law enforcement units like investigation and prosecution departments, 
which refers again to their autonomy. They are closed systems in the sense 
that they can carry out almost all tasks related to their function except 
reaching and enforcing verdicts. Especially in a highly fragmented admin-
istrative system this reduces transaction costs and enhances effectiveness. 
Such costs would and do in other cases arise from communication and 
coordination problems, inter-organisational distrust and competition. 
Moreover, the fact that all necessary steps leading to prosecution are done 
in-house is a very powerful motivating factor for staff. If inspectors know 
that their cases end up in a judicial system where decisions and verdicts 
are often politically manipulated, this can frustrate them to an extent that 
they stop carrying out their own tasks professionally and instead look for 
private gains.
Managerial Factors
Recruitment Based on Merit, Integrity, and Commitment
Merit-based recruitment is one of the better-known explanatory factors 
for exceptional organisational performance (see Owusu 2006). This is con-
firmed by both case studies. For their directorial positions, sophisticated 
assessment centres were carried out, including written tests and oral exam-
inations by a panel of interviewers, headed by independent professionals. 
At NAFDAC this procedure was unprecedented. In both cases qualifica-
tions and merit were not the only criteria, however. Commitment to the 
mission of the agency as well as proven integrity were equally important, 
particularly for those in leading positions. The pioneer NAPTIP executive 
secretary specifically selected experienced personnel from other minis-
tries and law enforcement agencies whom she knew or had information 
about as a former Director of Public Prosecution. While a personal and 
not strictly merit-based element comes into play here, it was a comple-
ment to the professional standards and expectations and did not, there-
fore, compromise them. This elaborate process for the careful recruitment 
of senior managers nurtured their commitment to the organisation and 
their trust in its leader. Political considerations did not influence appoint-
ments as is often the case in Nigeria.
Training and Performance Incentives
The former group of factors is closely interrelated with training and 
performance incentives. Merit-based, integrity-based, and commitment-
based recruitment ensures that capable, honest and motivated staff come 
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on board. Training provides further and more specialised qualifications 
through the tailor-made NAPTIP training programme on security and 
human rights for new staff. After this initial training, both organisations 
provide ongoing and often demand-driven training for staff in their respec-
tive areas of specialisation. NAPTIP also provides training for the staff of 
collaborating organisations, such as the police and immigration service.
Special international training courses and collaborative missions with 
international law enforcement agencies were applied in a focussed and 
strategic manner to reward good performance by both organisations. This 
was done in order to expose staff to international standards and best prac-
tices. In addition to international missions, greater responsibility, com-
mendation by leadership and promotion were used as internal rewards 
and performance incentives.
Good remuneration is another factor that readily comes to mind when 
considering why organisations perform well. This is confirmed in the case 
studies since it allows organisations to attract the skilled and committed 
professionals they identify through their recruitment process. Staff of both 
organisations earn much higher salaries and enjoy better welfare pack-
ages than civil servants in most other departments and agencies.
As a basis for good performance, both organisations provide the nec-
essary resources for staff to carry out their duties. This basic equipment 
includes, at the very least, functional offices and equipment, cars, genera-
tors, diesel for operating them, and computers and internet access, which 
is often in short supply or completely lacking in other public organisa-
tions, even in the capital city.
Administrative Discipline
Since the embezzlement of public funds and corruption are endemic 
in Nigeria’s public sector, containing if not eliminating them is a major 
challenge for public organisations. However, to a certain extent at least, 
this is a precondition for the ability to provide public services relatively 
effectively. The sectors, in which both organisations work are highly sus-
ceptible to both phenomena as well as to attempts by those involved 
in these activities to bribe themselves out of prosecution. To respond 
to these challenges both organisations have established strict regimes 
of administrative discipline. At NAPTIP, corruption is discouraged by a 
combination of adequate compensation, the provision of the necessary 
resources for executing their tasks, teamwork when handling suspects and 
dismissal when found guilty. The last instrument has already been used 
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in some cases. NAPTIP also has an internal anti-corruption unit. A similar 
system of zero tolerance for corruption and severe sanctions is in place 
at NAFDAC. Internal whistle blowing is explicitly encouraged and whistle 
blowers are rewarded if the case is confirmed by being promoted or sent 
on a training programme abroad, for example. On the other hand, integ-
rity is advocated through ‘leadership by example’ and practised at the top 
executive level of the organisation.   
Inclusive Leadership
A positive “organisational culture” or “organisational mystique” (Grindle 
1997; Hilderbrand and Grindle 1997) is one of the more extensively 
researched factors that contribute to making organisations in hostile and 
other environments more effective. Our case studies provide evidence to 
support this result. Both heads of the agencies studied showed outstand-
ing inclusive leadership and management skills. This does not necessarily 
mean that they worked in a particularly participatory manner in terms 
of decision-making, as they clearly had their own convictions and ideas 
and were very firm in executing them. However, at the same time, they 
encouraged staff to challenge them. They also invited external advice and 
collaboration when they deemed it necessary. Exchange, dialogue and ini-
tiative among staff were invited, and the principle of the ‘power of the bet-
ter argument’ instead of the higher authority was promoted. Due to this 
communicative and inclusive leadership style, their professional qualifi-
cations and vision they enjoyed widespread authority in their respective 
organisations. This authority was further strengthened by the fact that 
they had partly handpicked their staff in leading management positions 
based on skills and demonstrated performance. As opposed to ‘authority 
of the office’, which is based on hierarchy, this is a kind of ‘authority of 
personality’, which is more comprehensive and powerful.
The fact of having been selected for a leading position in any of the 
organisations created a special and very personal loyalty and trust-based 
relationship with the respective leader. These trust-based relationships 
were further strengthened by the accessibility of the directors for their 
staff, even for consultation on private issues as the former NAPTIP execu-
tive secretary stated:
I listen to their personal problems and am sympathetic to their problems 
if there’s a way I can help them, I help. You do these things, it motivates 
people. (NAPTIP interview 19).
The fact that she and the NAFDAC director cared for their staff was widely 
confirmed in the interviews.
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As a former Director of Public Prosecution, Carol Ndaguba was well 
qualified to head NAPTIP while Dora Akunyili was a trained pharmacist. 
Both had a vision of what kind of public services the respective organisa-
tion should provide and they communicated this vision internally while 
promoting it externally. ‘Leading by example’ in terms of discipline, integ-
rity, hard work and commitment to the organisation’s vision and mandate 
were characteristic, while public funds and internally generated revenue 
were managed transparently.
Responsibilities, expectations and feedback were clearly communicated. 
Possibly more important than this was their success in igniting and main-
taining the commitment and even passion of their staff for working with 
the organisation and providing its public services as effectively as possible 
(see below).
Both directors practised, facilitated and sometimes even enforced col-
laboration both within the organisation and with external organisations 
at government, civil society and international levels. For a Nigerian gov-
ernmental organisation, NAPTIP’s extensive collaboration with civil soci-
ety organisations working on human trafficking was rather unusual. This 
included but also went beyond the NGO of the former vice-president’s 
wife who had lobbied for the establishment of NAPTIP. The organisation 
also liaises and collaborates with the anti-trafficking units of the police 
and immigration service. While NAPTIP had been set up as a new agency 
with Carol Ndaguba as the pioneer executive secretary, Dora Akunyili 
had to reform a previously existing organisation. One of the legacies of 
NAFDAC that she had to deal with when she took over was a strong intra 
agency inter-departmental rivalry. Therefore, apart from replacing selected 
members of staff and restructuring the organisation, she ‘enforced’ inter-
nal dialogue and collaboration. Inter- and intra-departmental meetings 
were established, at least two directorates had to be involved before any 
decision could be taken, and no problem could be brought to her atten-
tion before at least two directorates had discussed it. Externally, Dora 
Akunyili liaised with NGOs as well as donor agencies and ensured that 
they provided or sponsored training programmes when the organisation’s 
own funds were not sufficient. 
A particularly interesting issue that emerged from our research is 
the relevance of gender. Half of the PoE we investigated were led by 
women, which is a much higher proportion than that generally found 
in public or private executive positions. A senior NAPTIP official even 
explained Carol Ndaguba’s outstanding performance with reference to 
gender by saying:
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She is a mother, I see her as that. You know when you are a woman and a 
mother, you push all other things aside and that passion of a mother in you 
will want you to do things that go beyond what you would have normally 
done assuming you didn’t care. (NAPTIP interview 5).
While this comment reflects gender stereotypes of a female employee, at 
the same time it also opens up an interesting perspective on the potential 
that such stereotypes can provide. The former executive secretary herself 
also made reference to gender by referring to the fact that “because I am 
a woman, I wanted to prove that I can do it.” (NAPTIP interview 19). In a 
male-dominated and patriarchal society, women in leadership positions 
can be strongly motivated to go to particularly great lengths and perform 
extraordinarily well. However, since there is no social automatism for this 
and many factors would need to be factored in for a substantiated analy-
sis, these findings demonstrate first and foremost that more studies on 
this are needed.
Public Service Commitment
A commitment to public service can have many sources. Some of the most 
important ones that we discovered in the cases of NAPTIP and NAFDAC 
were personal encounters with the victims of human trafficking and the 
pride of working for a popular and exceptionally effective public sector 
organisation. Other reasons included positive responses from the media 
and citizens and the opportunity to contribute to the positive develop-
ment of one’s country. The more sources commitment comes from and 
reinforces other stimuli, the stronger it gets. One of the key criteria of 
the executive leaders for recruiting staff, particularly for leadership posi-
tions, was their commitment to the mission of the organisation. In our 
case studies both directors had personal reasons to be highly commit-
ted to the effective execution of the functions of the organisations they 
were heading. When NAPTIP’s Carol Ndaguba was the Director of Public 
Prosecution, she occasionally also dealt with cases of trafficking of chil-
dren to Italy, which she knew could only be the tip of the iceberg. Dora 
Akunyili’s personal commitment to make NAFDAC work effectively partly 
stemmed from the death of her diabetic sister who died from an injection 
of false insulin in 1988:
Not only was it fake and did not contain the insulin she was supposed to take, 
but it was also contaminated and gave her abscesses. She did not respond 
to antibiotics, and we just watched helplessly until she died (Akunyili in 
Barriaux 2007).
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Such personal experiences appear to have had a particularly strong and 
lasting effect on personal and professional commitment to the respective 
public sector organisations.
In order to use commitment as a strong motivating factor for staff 
across the board, leadership at all levels must nurture and communicate 
it. Public service commitment can be ignited and maintained through 
inclusive and motivating leadership and management as outlined above. 
While this commitment existed at directorial level and was used by them 
in both cases, the lower ranks were also committed to the organisation’s 
mission. A NAPTIP middle-level officer said that, irrespective of the finan-
cial aspects, it is only
when there is genuine interest, when there is passion for the victims of 
human trafficking, you will go any mile to make sure you track them [the 
traffickers; M.R.] down (NAPTIP interview 6).
According to the former NAPTIP executive secretary, their staff “got emo-
tionally involved and quite bitter against the abuse that is meted out to 
Nigerian girls, children and women” (NAPTIP interview 19). This personal 
involvement and ‘passion’ for their job explain the strong commitment of 
the civil servants. It was even reported that in the case of NAPTIP private 
funds or resources such as cars were used for undertaking official assign-
ments if other means were not available. While these may have been 
exceptional cases, they demonstrate that, by and large, the members of 
staff across the hierarchy saw their jobs with both organisations as both a 
personal and professional contribution to the provision of essential public 
services for their country.
Before continuing to discuss what these findings teach us about the 
nature of the state in developing countries, we shall return to the PoE 
research framework and some of the analytical foci outlined therein. With 
regard to internal variety or different degrees of effectiveness of the units 
of the respective organisations neither organisation showed significant 
variety in terms of performance. While NAPTIP was newly established 
and therefore did not have a ‘turning point’, NAFDAC’s period of change 
began with the appointment of Dora Akunyili as the new head and the 
granting of more autonomous institutional status to the organisation. We 
were sceptical about the explanatory value of ‘leadership’, but inclusive, 
professional and dedicated leadership turned out to be a crucial factor for 
the emergence of a PoE, although far from sufficient on its own. While the 
leaders credited with transforming the two organisations into PoE have 
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been replaced, their successors had not been in office long enough for us 
to detect any significant changes in the course of our research. Since the 
other case studies in our sample differ from the two organisations pre-
sented here, their inclusion may modify these results.
What Do PoE Teach Us About Stateness  
in Developing Countries?
Thomas Bierschenk’s call for an “anthropology of statehood (or stateness)” 
(Bierschenk, this volume) is strongly supported by our research project 
and findings. Some studies which would fall into this category already 
exist.13 We prefer the concept ‘stateness’ (Staatlichkeit in German) over 
‘statehood’. While the latter is used to refer to sovereign states as distinct 
from other states, and has an external perspective on the state, the former 
has an internal perspective and looks at the nature, capability and quality 
of state institutions. What do the findings from the PoE case studies teach 
us about this stateness in developing countries and weak governance 
states more generally? We identified five important lessons that should 
be taken into consideration for future research and policy.  
1. Civil Servants Respond to the Same Management Techniques  
and Incentives—but Institutional Context Makes the Difference
It may seem obvious to state that civil servants in developing countries 
respond to the same management techniques and incentives like their 
colleagues in the OECD world. However, a number of studies appear to 
suggest, implicitly at least, that civil servants in Africa and other parts 
of the developing world have a special and somehow culturally shaped 
‘mentality’ and work ethic. According to these studies, the key problem 
lies, therefore, on the individual, group or even cultural level. Our study 
shows that this is not true. In both of the case studies from Nigeria staff 
responded positively to inclusive, collaborative, transparent and moti-
vating management and to material as well as immaterial incentives. 
13 Some of these sociological and anthropological studies that engage in a non-nor-
mative analysis of the empirical reality of stateness and public authority in developing 
countries include Anders (2010) on Malawi; Bierschenk and Olivier de Sardan (2003) on 
Benin; Christophe (2005) on Georgia; Gupta (1995) on India; Roll (2004) on Sri Lanka and 
on Africa in general Blundo and Olivier de Sardan (2006), Blundo and Le Meur (2009) and 
the “Africa Power and Politics” research programme (www.institutions-africa.org). More 
generally, Hansen and Stepputat (2001) are instructive.
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They did so because they operated in a context that allowed them to do 
so. The legal provisions were adequate, the staff was qualified and the 
necessary equipment and resources were available. The reason why the 
performance of public organisations is often low in developing coun-
tries is predominantly the institutional context and not ‘mentality’ or 
work ethic. Imagine what a German bureaucrat would achieve if he had 
to work under the same conditions as an average Nigerian civil servant 
in the rural north of the country: without reliable and punctual payment 
of the salary, being the only person with a more or less regular salary 
in his extended family, without funds for buying petrol for the official 
motorbike (if it works at all), without the forms and data that were sup-
posed to have been sent by headquarters in the state capital months 
ago, without information about the latest changes in the departmental 
regulations etc. This diagnosis is key for de-essentialising the debate. 
Cultural explanations alone are of limited value while rigorous socio-
logical, anthropological and political analyses that fulfil universal social 
science quality standards are needed.
Given an adequate institutional context, management techniques and 
incentives appear to have a degree of universal applicability. However, 
as Judith Tendler has shown in her landmark study Good Government in 
the Tropics (1997), they go far beyond material incentives or managerial 
approaches based on simplistic principle-agent models. The reverse con-
clusion is that without a relatively advanced institutional context for pub-
lic organisations, even the use of modern management techniques and 
sophisticated incentive systems will not be able to improve public sec-
tor performance significantly—except for a few organisations as our case 
studies suggest. Hence, both external interventions and internal reform 
efforts must be simultaneously more selective and comprehensive than 
they usually are. Simply focussing on capacity building, internal monitor-
ing and control or incentive systems is very unlikely to improve adminis-
trative performance in developing countries.14
14 The World Bank’s scorecard on capacity building supports this conclusion. A 2005 
evaluation report found that “[t]he Bank’s traditional tools—technical assistance and 
 training—have often proved ineffective in helping to build sustained public sector capac-
ity” (World Bank 2005: viii) and concluded that despite “recent improvements, the Bank’s 
support for capacity building in Africa remains less effective than it could be” (World Bank 
2005: viii). 
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2. Effectiveness is Unlikely in the Existing Public Administration System
By definition, PoE are unlikely to emerge. According to our findings, how-
ever, for PoE to emerge, a certain degree of autonomy from the public 
administration system is indispensable. This implies that, in principle, it is 
possible to avoid the usual practices which undermine effectiveness such 
as the hiring of political clients instead of qualified professionals. Hence, 
such organisations are ‘pockets’ or ‘islands’ in which other conditions exist 
and different rules apply from the rest of the public sector.
Bierschenk has pointed out that, due to the highly disintegrated 
bureaucratic system and inadequate resources available in developing 
countries, normative double-binds are developed and informal norms 
produced which do at best “enable the minimal functioning of the appa-
ratus” (Bierschenk, this volume). In non-PoE organisations such informal 
rules have largely replaced official rules and norms that might exist but 
are not regarded as realistic and legitimate. One of the consequences of 
the autonomy of PoE from the existing public administration system is 
that such response strategies to inadequate conditions are no longer nec-
essary. Under a function-oriented management, the more autonomy and 
powers the organisation gains, the less informal rules are required to com-
pensate inadequate regulations. PoE organisations often have a detailed 
and integrated set of internal rules, norms and expectations. These are 
usually explicitly communicated, compliance is monitored and non-com-
pliance sanctioned. However, effectiveness-enhancing informal rules such 
as working long hours also exist in PoE and are often established through 
‘leading by example’.
Apart from these largely positive aspects with regard to organisational 
performance, two more negative implications of the high degree of auton-
omy of PoE from the public administration system need to be mentioned. 
Bierschenk and Olivier de Sardan describe the sedimentation process in 
administrative systems in developing countries (Bierschenk and Olivier 
de Sardan 2003). Since PoE are often established as or become semi-
autonomous organisations, from a systemic point of view, they complicate 
the already disintegrated administrative systems even more. This leads us 
to the second negative or at least disappointing implication of PoE. Due 
to their isolation from the larger administrative system, their autonomy 
and the better remuneration and benefits, the average civil servant rather 
regards these ‘alien’ institutions which receive special treatment with 
envy and resentment. This rivalry and negative attitude make it unlikely 
that PoE will have a trigger effect and inspire the transformation of other 
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public organisations into PoE, not to mention the administrative system 
at large. If PoE were to remain “small islands of functionality” (Olivier 
de Sardan 2009: 67) and isolated “enclaves” (Anders 2010: 60–69) without 
the potential to trigger broader change in the public sector of developing 
countries, their attractiveness for reformers would suffer. Research find-
ings on non-donor initiated PoE as in the case of Nigeria are scarce to 
date. A discussion of their broader reform potential will be provided in 
Roll (forthcoming).
3. The Command Mode of Governance Prevails: Personalisation  
and Top-Down Orientation
Based in part on Georg Elwert’s concept of the “command state” (2001), 
‘command mode of governance’ refers to two characteristics of gover-
nance and stateness in developing countries which are confirmed by our 
case studies.15 These are a strong personalisation of political and admin-
istrative procedures and decisions and the corresponding dominance of 
these procedures by top leadership. The command of the person in power 
can overrule existing legal rules and regulations. He or she is, therefore, 
the final authority, a ‘command authority’.
Due to the disintegrated bureaucratic system and the multitude of 
informal norms and rules, bureaucratic procedures in developing coun-
tries are not as strongly institutionalised as in most OECD countries. That 
is why uncertainties are not effectively absorbed in the administrations 
of developing countries and procedural predictability is limited. This lack 
of institutionalisation of law-based bureaucratic procedures is often sub-
stituted with the functional equivalent of personalisation: if I cannot get 
my public services based on my rights as a citizen, which are routinely 
recognised, I will try to get them by referring to my social status through 
my personal networks. This alternative mode of obtaining access to pub-
lic services usually involves the capacity to offer something in return or 
the potential to threaten the official in question. Niklas Luhmann has 
argued that in social systems which are strongly personalised, people have 
15 Georg Elwert defines the “command state” as “a system of politics and administration 
characterised by the primacy of present authority in daily life interaction and an ambigu-
ous relation with legal norms, which however define the overall power sharing within the 
apparatus” (2001: 420). While we are not sure whether present authority in daily life inter-
action is always necessary, we agree that in a “command state” official laws and regulations 
can be overruled by powerful individuals at any time. The history of colonial rule in Africa 
explains how these modes of governance emerged (Young 1994). 
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learned to attribute causality—understood as the social construction of 
cause-effect relationships—to personal networks and relationships and 
not to abstract institutions and procedures (1995: 7). According to him 
this may only change if other modes of delivery are established that are 
equally accessible, reliable and effective.
While personalisation does not mean that all procedures are necessar-
ily personalised, it implies that in order to achieve something, the per-
sonal relationship mode is of overriding importance. That holds true for 
all kinds of transactions, irrespective of whether they aim at undermin-
ing or supporting the establishment of an abstract bureaucratic system. 
Some of our findings in the two PoE case studies support the latter aspect. 
To be able to provide public services effectively both leaders used their 
personal status and networks. They used their access to the president, 
which was strongly based on personal trust and appreciation, to create 
favourable working conditions for their respective organisations through 
political management. However, the need to use personal relations 
within these organisations and for their ‘clients’ was significantly reduced. 
This is due to the internal establishment and enforcement of rules and 
norms that differed from the rest of the public sector and offered more 
universal access.
The second point is even more evident in our findings: political ini-
tiatives usually originate from the top. It was then President Obasanjo’s 
sensitivity to Nigeria‘s negative international reputation which, together 
with domestic and international pressure, led him to initiate reforms 
in the public sector during his second term in office (Olaopa 2008: 
chapter 5). In the PoE organisations themselves, the position of the 
leaders were exceptionally strong and they steered the organisations. In 
Nigeria, the strong position of the president in a presidential system, a 
de-facto one-party system with no need for coalitions or compromise and 
a strong material and symbolic social hierarchy (‘oga culture’),16 further 
reinforce a top-down mode of governance. If we take this finding about 
the dominance of leaders at all levels a step further, it appears to imply 
that we should expect reforms towards more public sector effectiveness 
not as a result of media reports or civil society lobbying but the leader’s 
16 ‘Oga’ is a Nigerian pidgin word for ‘boss’ and is frequently used for addressing a per-
son, thereby acknowledging his higher social status and accepting his authority. Some ele-
ments of this ‘oga culture’ are reflected in the phenomenon of ‘godfatherism’ in Nigerian 
politics (see Albert 2005). 
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own  decisions. However, this would be taking things too far. Even pow-
erful presidents in presidential systems do not operate and decide in a 
vacuum. As Obasanjo’s special attention to Nigeria’s international repu-
tation shows, they are more likely to respond to some kinds of pressure 
and demands than others. Leaders of organisations are also influenced by 
personal experiences or strong civil society organisations that can sup-
port them in pushing for more powers or funds from the government, for 
example. Ultimately, however, those higher up in the respective hierar-
chies have to be at least favourably disposed towards the task or decision 
at hand to make it work. These principles apply at all levels of the political 
and administrative system.
While both characteristics of the command mode of governance usually 
undermine the access to and predictability of administrative procedures 
and decisions, our case studies provide evidence of the fact that they can 
also be used for strengthening them in exceptional cases. In weak gover-
nance contexts, therefore, personalisation and top-down orientation can 
facilitate more effective state performance if they are combined with an 
interest in a particular service being delivered and a minimum of merito-
cratic considerations.
4. Public Service Ethos Does Exist in Developing Countries
It is often argued that the public service concept is alien to many develop-
ing countries (for Africa, see Ekeh 1975). The very existence of a national 
‘public’ is being questioned and hence also whether a public service ethos 
actually exists among politicians and civil servants. This ethos would mor-
ally oblige them to work for the benefit of the general public and do so 
with integrity and discipline. Authors often explain this lack of a national 
public with reference to colonialism. In most cases, colonial borders did 
not reflect existing social and political structures. It is argued, therefore, 
that they did not allow for a national public to emerge. The former prime 
minister of Nigeria’s western region Chief Obafemi Awolowo expressed 
this concern as far back as 1947: “Nigeria is not a nation. It is a mere geo-
graphical expression.” (Awolowo 1947: 47) he said referring to the amal-
gamation of three geo-political regions with different but also internally 
diverse ethnic, religious and social characteristics.
With regard to the lack of public service orientation and ethos, it is 
often argued that this is partly a legacy of the colonial past in which the 
state primarily served as an instrument of social control, political oppres-
sion and economic exploitation. The gap between state and society is said 
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to have remained under African rule with the state as an alien appara-
tus that was used as a source of private enrichment by those who had 
access to it. Due to the superior loyalty to primordial groups and the lack 
of historical formation of a public sector including the corresponding 
norms, the argument continues, this could be done without running into 
moral contradictions. However, the public service concept is well known, 
is referred to in public debates and is instrumentalised as a motivating 
factor in exceptional cases. Our case studies show that the senior staff 
of both organisations were also selected on the basis of some degree of 
public sector commitment and motivation, whether task-specific or more 
general. They are apparently receptive to further motivation along these 
lines by the leaders of the organisation who themselves have been found 
to exemplify the public service concept in their day-to-day management. 
Bierschenk and others agree that “African officials see themselves as hav-
ing a moral contractual relationship with the state” (Bierschenk, Lentz, 
this volume).
While the statement that public sector orientation does exist in devel-
oping countries where governance is weak is true, it requires further 
qualification. Due to a number of factors—the legacy of colonial rule 
certainly being one of them—the average civil servant probably feels 
less obliged to fulfil his public service mandate than his colleague in an 
OECD country.17 However, this difference is not one of substance but of 
degree. Furthermore, the enormous variety of public service orientation 
that exists in both developing and OECD countries is of great significance. 
There are those civil servants who practice and defend the public ser-
vice ethos despite the odds, and despite often experiencing difficulties in 
these hostile environments. Others are not as strict with themselves but 
do not ignore the ethos altogether and hence do not damage the system 
as severely as others. These different categories call for serious attention 
to empirical detail instead of premature generalisation when researching 
these issues. Public service orientation is often limited, temporary and 
fragile in developing countries. However, if civil servants, who share this 
ethos or are susceptible to it, work together and can do so under some 
of the supporting structural conditions outlined above, these ‘pockets of 
public service ethos’ may eventually grow into PoE.
17 This might vary, depending on the level in the administrative hierarchy. Thomas 
Bierschenk (in this volume) argues that civil servants in the lower ranks tend to be more 
disappointed from the state than those further up. 
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5. Effectiveness in Developing Countries is Fragile but Real
The governance and development debate is dominated by a deficiency-
focused perspective.18 Explanations for such ‘bad’ and ineffective gover-
nance are then often close at hand: indiscipline and corruption are two 
of the ‘usual suspects’. While these factors have a role to play, it is grossly 
inadequate and irresponsible for academic studies not to go beyond them. 
Most problems of public administration in Africa can be explained by 
political interference, a lack of resources or their non-functional distribu-
tion, and a lack of adequately trained staff. Moreover, all of the other prob-
lems, with which OECD public administrations are also familiar, also exist: 
communication gaps, coordination problems and work overload. While 
the historical processes of state and civil service formation in developing 
countries are highly distinctive, they share the common features of mas-
sive institutional sedimentation, heavy fragmentation and, in response, 
normative double-binds (Bierschenk, this volume). The degrees of effec-
tiveness may vary but public organisations exist in all of these countries 
which provide public services much more effectively than others. PoE 
are the result of a temporary and often precarious dynamic process of 
competing political powers, in which the interests of some political actors 
that favour the effective delivery of a particular service dominate. This is 
the essential precondition for the emergence of a PoE. As outlined above, 
once this is fulfilled, many other factors and their interaction are then 
necessary for its emergence.
These findings teach us that stateness in developing countries is much 
less well understood than it ought to be. Organisations, including but not 
exclusively public organisations, should no longer be treated as ‘black’ or 
even ‘stuffed boxes’. The term ‘stuffed boxes’ refers to researchers opening 
the black box that the organisation represents and then instead of look-
ing into it, stuffing it with his or her assumptions about how the internal 
structures look and how actors think and act. The researcher then closes 
the box again, paints it in a colour of his or her liking and presents the 
findings which are surprisingly often in line with what the assumptions 
have prompted the reader to expect. Such boxes must be discarded and 
assumptions, half-knowledge and stereotypes replaced with empirical data 
and analysis. These studies must observe social science research standards 
18 However, a ‘development success’ literature is beginning to emerge, including the 
classic Tendler (1997), Bebbington and McCourt (2007), Manor (2007), Robinson (2007) 
and Grant et al. (2009), amongst others.
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and apply the same analytical rigorousness that would be applied for 
organisational research in the OECD world.
While the challenges involved in finding out more about the inner 
workings of state-related organisations are enormous, it is simply indis-
pensable. Treating them as political micro-arenas and putting the organi-
sations themselves into the political context in which they operate are 
two more lessons. Given the often limited understanding of the everyday 
life worlds and meaning systems of civil servants in developing countries, 
quantitative research has its limits. Anthropological and sociological stud-
ies of these varieties of stateness and their respective modes of reproduc-
tion and change promise to make us understand better what is already 
working in the developing world and why. PoE are a particularly interest-
ing although, as this chapter shows, by no means exhaustive empirical 
and analytical perspective on stateness in this context. They enable us to 
gain a better understanding as to why, in light of the highly contingent 
and diverse historical processes of state formation, effective states or at 
least pockets of them actually do exist and will continue to emerge.
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THE DELIVERY STATE IN AFRICA.  
INTERFACE BUREAUCRATS, PROFESSIONAL CULTURES  
AND THE BUREAUCRATIC MODE OF GOVERNANCE
Jean-Pierre Olivier de Sardan1
In this chapter, we attempt to draw various comparative and theoretical 
conclusions from the empirical studies on state apparatuses and the pub-
lic service professions in West Africa which are presented in this volume, 
but also from research which has been conducted in other contexts over 
the last ten years or so.2
To this end, we shall elaborate certain conceptualizations. Some of 
these concern the nature of the object itself: the Delivery state, the Local 
state, and Interface bureaucracies are all central to the topic of research in 
question. Other conceptualizations relate to the practices of state actors: 
they include the professional cultures and the practical norms on which 
these practices are largely based. Finally, to address issues of a more insti-
tutional and structural nature, we shall be looking at the bureaucratic 
mode of governance and at configurations of delivery, especially pallia-
tive delivery, in which this particular mode of governance is implicated 
alongside other modes of governance.
The Delivery State, Interface Bureaucracies  
and the Local State
The Delivery of Public or Collective Goods and Services
By ‘delivery state’, we mean the function of the delivery of public or collec-
tive goods and services as performed by the state. The expression ‘public 
1   Researcher at LASDEL, Niamey, Niger.
2 In particular by LASDEL scholars. LASDEL (Laboratoire d’Etudes et de Recherche sur les 
Dynamiques Sociales et le Développement Local), a social science research institute located 
in Niger and Benin, carries out research on the delivery of public or collective goods and serv-
ices. For research results, see the series Etudes et Travaux du LASDEL, www.lasdel.net. Some 
of the analysis presented here was developed within the States at Work programme funded 
by the Volkswagen Foundation (www.ifeas.uni-mainz.de/277.php). It also has benefited from 
our involvement in the African Power and Politics programme, funded by the DFID and Irish 
Aid (www.institutions-africa.org/). On occasion, we have also drawn on previously published 
material (Olivier de Sardan 2001, 2003, 2009a, 2009b, 2010a, 2010b, 2011a, 2011a, 2011b).
© Jean-Pierre Olivier de Sardan, 2014 | doi: 10.1163/9789004264960_017
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or collective goods and services’ is deliberately wider than ‘public goods’ 
as used by economists and which corresponds to very specific criteria: it is 
applied to goods that have a double property, i.e. they are ‘non- excludable’ 
and ‘non-rivalrous’. This definition is too deductive and restrictive, it paves 
the way for normative uses, and we do not subscribe to it.
Instead, we opt for a wider and empirical use of the concept. For 
us, public or collective goods and services are first and foremost goods 
and services that are perceived by the vast majority of users as a social 
necessity, and, either directly or indirectly, as coming under the state’s 
duties towards these users. In other words, by general consensus, they 
are linked to the public interest, and are therefore matters of public 
concern, and thus public debate: for instance, access to drinking water, 
education and health, the fight against crime, an equitable legal system 
or an effective transport system are seen, in the African countries where 
we have conducted our research, as ‘entitlements’ or aspirations that 
are shared, whether they are articulated or not, by all users/citizens. It 
is, therefore, a concept: a concept which refers to emic, tied to specific 
historical and spatial contexts, and potentially including goods and ser-
vices at an international, national or local level. Such a definition allows 
for the consideration of contingent factors that cause a good or service 
to be counted sometimes as public and sometimes not. The concept 
of a public good will therefore vary from place to place and over time. 
In other words, what constitutes a public good is an object of politi-
cal struggle and public debate, depending on specific state trajectories 
which are different in, say, France from those in the United States, and 
different for, say, the 19th century to today (see Bierschenk and Olivier 
de Sardan, introduction to this volume).
It must be emphasized, however, that the conditions under which these 
goods are delivered are very largely local, even though they may involve 
non-local, national or international actors (the state, private companies, 
international organizations, development agencies etc.). It is, after all, at 
the local level that people drink, are protected from thieves, go to school 
and are medically cared for.
The delivery of some public or collective goods and services is a spe-
cific state function, which is performed regardless of the regime and 
the kind of power it wields. The state can never be reduced to either 
its purely repressive functions (which have already been roundly con-
demned by a whole body of literature inspired by Michel Foucault and 
James Scott) or the type of regime in charge (democratic/dictatorial/
patrimonial/populist, etc.). The state is also a complex organizational 
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machine, whose actors/officials/bureaucrats provide clients/citizens 
with a variety of goods and services. Both representative democracies and 
military dictatorships construct, maintain and operate—with greater or 
lesser degrees of  efficiency—collective infrastructures, water and elec-
tricity supplies, schools and dispensaries. Both communist regimes and 
oil emirates deliver—with varying degrees of success—day-to-day secu-
rity, aid when a disaster strikes, settling of justice, or economic regula-
tions. The delivery state, therefore, is in no way synonymous with the 
welfare state: the latter is a special version of the delivery state, and is 
characterized by a greater range and volume of the goods and services 
delivered by the state. The neo-liberal state, too, is, in its own way, a 
delivery state because at least it delivers regulation (which is a vital 
component of public or collective goods and services) and also because 
it delivers a basic level of particular services (for instance, in the areas 
of security, law and education).
Admittedly, the state is never the sole deliverer of public or collective 
goods and services. Other actors and institutions may assume this role, 
sometimes in tandem with the state, sometimes in opposition to it, some-
times in its absence, and sometimes simultaneously and independently. 
Even under regimes in which the state uses force to exercise its monopoly 
of delivering certain public goods, as was the case in the former Soviet 
Union, various informal or clandestine procedures present a de facto 
challenge to this monopoly (Ledeneva 1998). The current prevalence of 
neo-liberal ideology has obviously meant a scaling down of the goods 
and services delivered by the state and made it easier for more non-state 
organizations to assume a delivery role (private operators in particular). 
In Africa, the importance of a community-based ideology within develop-
ment organizations is, paradoxically, another factor contributing to this 
trend. Nevertheless, the delivery of goods and services by the state is still 
common in all parts of Africa, whatever imperfect or fractional, and the 
state is regarded everywhere as ultimately responsible for this delivery, 
in one form or another: i.e. as the main operator, a joint actor, regulator 
or guarantor.
Inasmuch as the delivery of goods and services is at the heart of what 
administrations routinely do on an everyday basis and of their relations 
with citizens/clients, to concern oneself with the delivery state is obvi-
ously to concern oneself with the state as a ‘concrete entity’ (“Etat au 
 concret”: cf. Padiolau 1982) or with “the governance of daily life” (Blundo 
and Le Meur 2009). It is also an opportunity to approach the state via some 
of its ‘practices’ rather than through the abstracting lens of discursive 
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or symbolic representations, an approach taken by some anthropologists 
of the state.3
That being said, it is quite obviously the case that practices relating to 
delivery are also the object of representations, and that they too give rise 
to certain ‘images of the state’, certain ‘conceptions of the state’ and cer-
tain expectations of the state.4 Even in contexts in which the state is inca-
pable of delivering by itself and in the proper manner the least onerous of 
services, it is still there in the background, an ever-present but shadowy 
figure, and its ineptitude is deplored (cf. Titeca and De Herdt 2011).
This kaleidoscope of popular expectations regarding the delivery 
state has been largely underestimated from a theoretical point of view, 
although the empirical results of much recent research give some indica-
tion of how they show up in real situations. When the delivery function 
is taken in account theoretically, it is mainly in terms of legitimization 
process (cf. Hibou 2011). Of course, analyzing the delivery state does not at 
all mean reducing it to this single function: there is no question of forget-
ting its despotic aspects, of circumventing the legitimization/domination 
processes that express themselves in it or of ignoring the methods used 
by political or economic elites in monopolizing power. But our perspec-
tive includes a further, often neglected dimension of the state, one that 
could be described as a semi-autonomous field, to borrow an often quoted 
phrase of Sally Falk Moore’s (1973).
To produce a body of knowledge about state delivery of public goods 
and services through fieldwork is also to study the forms of bureaucracy 
connected with this delivery (which is the topic of this book). States deliver 
services through bureaucracies. Ethnographic investigation on bureaucra-
cies implies ethnographic investigations on bureaucratic management: 
how bureaucracies manage the delivery as well as how this bureaucracy 
is managed. Here, too, contemporary anthropological research has too 
often considered that management is not a subject worthy of interest, 
or else that it is a disguised way of ignoring politics. But the analysis of 
management can perfectly well be combined with the analysis of power 
relationships, as work on New Public Management has shown (McCourt 
3 Cf. the introduction to this volume and Bierschenk’s (2009) review of the book by 
Sharma and Gupta (2006).
4 Not only do ‘ideas of the state’ find more favour with social scientists than do prac-
tices, but, what is more, it is the images the state itself wishes to project or those expressed 
in public discourse that are studied, while ordinary people’s perceptions of the state or 
those of public servants themselves (both types often being ambivalent and contradictory) 
are rarely investigated empirically.
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and Minogue 2001; see also Giovalucci and Olivier de Sardan 2009). In fact, 
management, like delivery, is also a semi-autonomous field, which social 
anthropology should investigate as such.
The same could be said of public policies. These are indeed largely 
devoted to the delivery of public or collective goods and services. In the 
case of Africa, however, there is an acute lack of such information. And 
yet, the lack of proper planning and the contradictions and inconsisten-
cies of public policies are especially noteworthy in Africa and take on a 
distinct form. Empirical investigations into public policies are particularly 
interesting and allow us both “to study up” (Nader 1974) (looking at the 
decisions of those who promote and are responsible for those policies) 
and to ‘study down’ (looking at the ways in which they are implemented 
on the ground and at relations with clients), but also to study ‘in the mid-
dle’ (looking at the daily functioning of civil services).5
The latter level, to which socio-anthropological type fieldwork is par-
ticularly suited, is crucial to our understanding of delivery processes. It 
concerns a specific category of state actors who interact with clients/
users/citizen.6 For this reason, we have called them “interface bureau-
crats” (Olivier de Sardan 2004). In ‘northern’ countries, the sociology of 
organizations and that of professions has yielded numerous studies on 
these public servants in their dealings with the general public, but, in the 
case of Africa, and, despite the recent spate referred to above, publica-
tions reporting results of empirical research on interface bureaucrats are 
still all too rare (cf. introduction).
The Local State
Among interface bureaucrats in Africa, those who work outside the capital 
and who make up what we might call the ‘local state’ or the ‘state at local 
level’ are even more of an unknown quantity. They are the state agents 
installed in the local arenas,7 scattered throughout the country’s inland 
areas, in the secondary towns, the small towns and sometimes the villages, 
5 In relation to education, cf. Chabi Imorou and Charton, in this volume, and Bierschenk 
2007, Fichtner 2012; on the justice sector cf. Hamani, in this volume, and Bierschenk 2008; 
concerning policies on free healthcare in the Sahel, cf. Olivier de Sardan and Ridde 2013.
6 Lipsky (1980) uses the term “street level bureaucracy” in the American context. 
7 In a local arena, institutions and actors, bound by “multiplex” relationships 
(Gluckman 1955), confront one another almost ‘physically’. On the notion of local arena, 
cf. Bierschenk 1988; Bierschenk and Olivier de Sardan 1997a. Cf., more generally, Swartz 
1968, Bailey, 1969.
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and hence in contact with users. They fall into two broad categories. On 
one hand, there are the actors of the so-called ‘command’ administration 
(prefectures or governorates), which took over from the colonial adminis-
trators (to this day, prefects and governors are called ‘commanders’ by the 
local people). On the other, a vast array of technical services represents 
the decentralized administration, far from the ministries. These are the 
main providers of goods and services on the state’s behalf.
This ‘local state’ is subject to specific constraints. In local arenas, the 
delivery of public or collective goods and services by state actors follows 
particular patterns. Later on, we shall be using the concepts of the ‘bureau-
cratic mode of local governance’ and ‘palliative delivery’ in this context.
For hundreds of millions of farmers, livestock breeders, tradesmen and 
shopkeepers, interface bureaucrats are simply ‘the’ state. Whatever their 
‘ideas’ of the state, for them the reality of the state is teachers, health-
care workers, police officers, livestock agents, water-supply technicians, 
registrars, customs officials, prefects, etc. Even development projects 
funded by international aid which play a central role nationwide hire 
former state actors as managers, and they routinely deal with current 
state actors, whom they consult locally or who serve as their ‘points of 
contact (point focal)’.
It is true that, in many outlying areas, the state has only a token 
presence and in some areas virtually none at all. A statement like ‘the 
state stops at PK 12’ (in other words, 12 km from the capital; quoted in 
Bierschenk and Olivier de Sardan 1997b: 441) does not merely apply to the 
Central African Republic but is applicable to most of Congo, for instance. 
We do not, however, subscribe to the concept of a ‘failed state’, which is 
a hasty overgeneralization made about certain extreme local situations.8 
There is no denying, however, that significant areas of ‘failed delivery’ do 
exist in African States, varying in degree from country to country, but 
more numerous and acute as one moves further away from the centre 
of power.
8 “Even in the context of a so-called ‘failed state’, public services are still being organ-
ized and provided”, write Titeca and De Herdt (2011: 2), who demonstrate their point with 
the example of education in the DRC. Cf. also Thomas Bierschenk’s review (2010) of the 
book by Englebert (2009), whom he criticizes for generalizing the situation in eastern 
Congo to the whole of Africa. On the notion of a ‘failed state’ being a ‘failed paradigm’, 
cf. Hameiri 2007. 
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The State’s Presence in Francophone West Africa: The Reality,  
the Weakness and the Paradoxes 
In most African countries, for example Niger, Benin, Burkina Faso, Mali 
and Senegal which we shall take as our points of reference, the state is 
in any case visible from one end of the country to the other, and there 
are many ‘external signs of state’. Its coverage of the whole country is an 
irrefutable fact. The state is officially represented everywhere, in its sov-
ereign powers, by its appointed officials, the governors, prefects and sub-
prefects, who are in charge of all the decentralized services (and who also 
have oversight of the communes); its presence is symbolically expressed 
through distinctive public buildings, each with its flag and vast square.
However, as soon as we focus on the delivery of public goods and ser-
vices, the state’s presence is actually seen to be very uneven:
Let us take the case of Niger. Health and education are two ‘high density’ 
sectors, in which the state’s presence in rural areas is strongest and most 
visible by far. Both are public services characterized by a high degree of 
organization and hierarchy, and are relatively functional, manned by a large 
‘army’ of public servants, forming a countrywide network and subjected to 
a host of complex and formal bureaucratic procedures. We could add to 
them the forces of law and order (the gendarmerie, the National Guard and 
the police), which also cover the whole of the country, albeit more sparsely 
and in smaller numbers. In contradiction to widely held beliefs about the 
‘retreat of the state’, these three professional bodies have grown in size in 
recent years.
Other state sectors, on the other hand, are in decline or are seeing their 
activities scaled down or revamped. They are more or less ‘disabled’. In 
some cases, their actors in the field are completely lacking resources and 
are therefore discouraged and unmotivated. In technical services such as 
sanitation, community development, livestock farming, agriculture or adult 
literacy, at both municipal and department level, there is generally only one 
actor (sometimes with a back-up, usually a civic service worker), who lacks 
the necessary means to carry out his mission (having neither a vehicle, nor 
petrol, nor professional expenses), and who hence has nothing to do except 
wait for the miraculous arrival of a possible ‘project’ (funded by a develop-
ment agency) that will come to his aid.
The justice system falls somewhere in between. Coverage is still mod-
est, although there has been considerable progress in the last 20 years 
(cf. Hamani in this volume) and its resources are very limited. However, 
through their rituals and organization, the magistrates’ courts, which are 
concentrated in a few medium-sized cities, reproduce a measure of state 
solemnity, and the (admittedly unsatisfied) demand for impartial state 
justice remains strong.
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The local state does not only present these quite different faces, it is also a 
complex organisation that has undergone profound changes in recent times. 
Decentralization (and the deconcentration that came with it) is the latest 
of these in tandem with a policy encouraging privatization, which is driven 
by the development agencies. A typical example is afforded by the water 
supply services in Niger, which are supported by Swiss cooperation: they 
increasingly assume the role of service providers for local authorities, that 
they charge for their services.
The ‘high density’ sectors of the state (in which the state has a high pro-
file) and the ‘disabled’ sectors (in which the state has a low profile) have, 
however, a few things in common.
First, the quality of the services they deliver is roundly condemned by 
clients, as is the behaviour of state actors, who are often criticized (with a 
few notable exceptions) for being arrogant, contemptuous, incompetent 
or corrupt.
Second, state services are often unable to deliver the services for which 
they are responsible through their own efforts alone. This gives rise to 
forms of co-delivery (involving both state and non-state actors) or non-
state delivery (outside the bureaucratic mode of governance) as a ‘pallia-
tive’ measure (cf. below).
Third, the management of human resources is haphazard in most areas, 
at both local and national levels. There is no guiding principle and count-
less problems repeatedly arise which are deplored by the workers them-
selves: e.g. absenteeism, patronage and clientelism, frequent interference, 
an absence of sanctions, chronic staff turnover, a lack of transparency, 
excessive centralization, a refusal to delegate, the failure of bonuses, inef-
ficiency, the bending of rules, etc. Despite odd instances of things work-
ing as they should, there appear to be no permanent solutions to these 
problems (cf. Roll in this volume, Crook 2010, Tama 2012).
Fourth, development organizations are courted by state actors, who 
see in them bottomless resources (although to benefit from them, there 
are conditionalities to bear) in the face of which they devise a multitude 
of strategies: development brokering, financial handouts, brain drain, 
doublespeak, quests for daily expense allowances through the creation 
of ever more training courses and workshops, opportunities for local 
reform etc.
These four characteristics are the product of the professional cultures 
of state actors, which are of a very specific kind. They also are grounded 
in practical norms which differ from the official ones.
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Professional Cultures and Practical Norms
One of the most significant conclusions to emerge from the research con-
ducted over the last 15 years or so by LASDEL—in Niger and Benin, in 
particular, but also in some other countries in French-speaking Africa—is 
the considerable disparity, which is in evidence everywhere regardless of 
the sectors of activity, between public norms that are supposed to regu-
late the professional conduct of state actors and the actual conduct of 
these actors. This is the level at which we shall introduce the concepts of 
practical norms and professional culture.
Practical Norms: The Gap Between Official Norms or Procedures  
and the Practices of State Actors
How are the professional behaviours of state actors regulated, despite the 
fact that they often fail to conform to public norms and procedures? What 
are the forms that give a structure to the informal practices of the state 
actors in question? Although the behaviour of interface bureaucrats is 
frequently at odds with professional norms, nonetheless it is not entirely 
random or anarchical. Significant regularities can be identified. Of course, 
every social organization, in every country and in every period, experi-
ences disparities between norms and practices. However, the extent and 
nature of these disparities vary considerably from sector to sector and 
from context to context. So how can we grasp the regulated informality 
that appear within African bureaucracies?
We shall call these informal regulations ‘practical norms’. This is an 
exploratory concept. It is not analytical, it does not give a particular sub-
stantive content to the phenomena it describes and it does not define 
a specific interpretive model. It simply serves to bring to light, provided 
appropriate investigation is undertaken, a variety of methods of social 
regulation and of patterns of behaviour, without incorporating them 
prematurely into a single model (of the neo-‘patrimonialism kind’)9 and 
organizing them into a priori types. It serves a purely pragmatic purpose, 
i.e. that of investigating aspects of reality that would otherwise have 
remained ‘invisible’ because they are discreetly distanced from prescribed 
9 For a critical account of the concept of neo-patrimonialism, cf. Therkildsen, in this 
volume.
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behaviour. On the theoretical level, it can be used as a tool in an anthro-
pology of practices, or an anthropology of ‘gaps’, in the sense of deviations 
from the official rules (cf. Bierschenk and Olivier de Sardan, Research par-
adigm, this volume).
The practical norms are the various informal rules, tacit or latent, that 
underpin those practices of public actors which do not conform to formal 
professional and bureaucratic norms. They describe the extent to which 
these practices converge, and they allow us to understand the divergences 
or ‘play’ (the ‘slack’, as it were) between formal norms and practices.
Such practical norms are not necessarily expressed as such by social 
actors; more often than not, they are automatic and routine, and exist at 
an unconscious rather than conscious level. To give a slightly different 
twist to Bourdieu’s expression, one might say that they are incorporated 
into a ‘habitus’.10 They are not directly ‘observable’. Hence it falls to the 
researcher to uncover, identify and analyse them based on how actors act 
and how they speak.
Let us look at an example. In all the state services we have researched into in 
West Africa, the official regulations provide an entire battery of penalties for 
professional misconduct, ranging from a verbal warning to dismissal or to 
appearing before a disciplinary board. These official norms mostly replicate 
the French management practices and employment laws of the 1960s. All 
public servants know they exist. Yet they are virtually never applied. All ser-
vice heads complain about this, but most of the time none of them manage 
to discipline an offending subordinate. Colleagues argue that a sanction is 
cruel, would lead to too many complications, would be counter-productive 
or ineffective, would serve no useful purpose etc. Such a situation is only 
comprehensible when a widely operating practical norm exists: sanction-
ing is inappropriate! From hospitals to water and woodland services, from 
town halls to regional schools inspectorates, the practice is not hard to spot. 
Various arguments are invoked to justify this practical norm: compassion 
(‘you can’t discipline someone with a large family’, or ‘this worker is com-
ing up to retirement’ etc.), reputation (it will be seen as nasty or heartless 
to discipline someone . . .), pragmatism (a potential replacement wouldn’t 
do any better), politics (the offender is a member of the party in power, 
he will be reinstated and the sanction overturned) etc. One can also try to 
interpret this practical norm using various sociological or anthropological 
lines of argument: pressure from the immediate social environment (mak-
ing the case for leniency), the clientelist system (which means numerous 
10 The concept of ‘habitus’ in Bourdieu’s work suffers from two major weaknesses: (a) it 
has no real empirical foundation and remains a black box; (b) it is very domino-centric 
(Grignon and Passeron 1989); in other words, it is almost exclusively centred on the inter-
nalization of the process of domination. We believe that the concept of practical norms 
avoids these pitfalls.
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pressures on the punisher on behalf of the punished by the latter’s ‘pro-
tectors’), the moral values of charity and pity, a morality of ‘shame’, the 
corruption of public services by the system of sinecures and appointments 
through political patronage, and more general forms of corruption (so that 
everyone has a hold over everyone else), the absence of a managerial culture 
etc. Highlighting a practical norm does not mean abandoning interpretation 
altogether but constructing it on more solid, empirical foundations.
However, in concerning oneself with practical norms, it is important not 
go to the other extreme and neglect public norms. Certain disciplines in 
the social sciences could be criticized for having focussed exclusively and 
for too long on official or formal norms (law, for instance, in relation to 
legal and administrative norms, but also ethnology, in relation to social 
norms: kinship, power and rites). Hence, we must not fall into the oppo-
site by forgetting about formal norms (something that interactionist soci-
ologists or the new sociology of science have sometimes done). Our own 
aim is to explore the space that is opened up for state actors between the 
professional, bureaucratic norms they are always supposed to follow and 
the practical norms they often do follow. Formal bureaucratic norms and 
informal practical norms form the two end points of a continuum, within 
which social actors’ strategies are played out.
One aspect of professional bureaucratic norms in African countries in 
which we have conducted our research must be underlined at this point: 
these public norms are particularly heterogeneous, often contradictory 
and sometimes outmoded (inherited from colonization) or incomplete 
(leaving important sectors outside official regulation) (cf. Bierschenk in 
this volume). The fact that they are frequently ill adapted to the local 
context obviously leaves more room for practical norms.
Within the public services, five main types of relationship between pro-
fessional bureaucratic norms and practical norms can be distinguished. 
They are ‘ideal types’ and are hence frequently intertwined in the real 
world, and, in some cases, merge completely. Practical norms could be 
adaptative, semi-tolerated, transgressive, palliative or rebel.
(1) Sometimes, the practical norms remain close to professional ones 
and are no more than variations in the way they are applied or small 
‘adjustments’ in the interests of the service or the client. Any ‘application’ 
of an official norm implies some room for manoeuvre and evaluation, 
and thus opens the door to practical norms.11 It may be a case of adding 
11 We are thus reminded that “the meaning of a legal rule is never determinate and 
always remains subject to interpretation” (Nuijten and Anders 2008: 14). For Lipsky (1980), 
the tensions between institutional objectives, on the one hand, and the constraints in the 
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a human touch to bureaucratic relationships, adapting to staff shortages 
or excessive workloads, taking account of certain requests by clients or 
certain constraints on public servants etc. These practical norms could 
therefore be described as adaptive.
(2) Sometimes, practical norms do not respect the rules, they are cheat-
ing with them. They evade official standards but in an innocuous register, 
with neither sanction nor stigmatization: in fact they are more or less tol-
erated. These are the “pragmatic rules” coined by Bailey (2001: 119): “how 
to break a normative rule without being penalized for it”. They may be 
called semi-tolerated practical norms.
(3) Practical norms sometimes mark a radical departure from the for-
mal norms, blatantly flouting them, as in cases in which the law condemns 
them as corruption: “The notion of corruption is theoretically inseparable 
from the transgression of a set of norms ( juridical or ethical)” (Blundo 
2008: 28). These practical norms are transgressive.
(4) Since the aim is to deliver the planned services, practical norms 
may sometimes actually transgress the letter of the public norms but 
obey their spirit. When funds have dried up, a disregard of certain regula-
tory requirements appears to be a coping strategy and a way of ensuring 
that the administration continues to function in spite of everything: in 
Senegal as in Niger, judges get shopkeepers to deliver official summonses 
and make defendants pay their own travel costs for attending court (cf. 
Hamani, this volume; Blundo 2006). In such cases, the practical norms 
are palliative.
(5) Finally, practical norms can sometimes be directly opposed to 
professional norms, as ‘counter-norms’, and express a refusal—which 
can even be coordinated, though disguised—of the legitimacy of official 
norms, such as disruptions in industry. In this case, the practical norms 
are rebellious.
Empirical research alone will acquaint us with the subtle intercon-
nections between official norms and practical norms, and allows us to 
describe actors’ strategies in switching between these two levels. Social 
actors do not adhere to practical norms any more ‘mechanically’ than 
they do to public norms. One can also posit the existence of ‘practical 
meta-norms’, which would provide criteria for choosing between cases in 
which public norms need to be applied and those in which such or such 
work environment and relations with clients, on the other, are the main explanatory factor 
of the “patterns of practices” of “street level bureaucrats”. 
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a practical norm would have to be followed. Contrary to the unifying and 
prescriptive interpretation of social norms that has pervaded much of the 
social sciences since Durkheim and Parsons, practical norms are not, any 
more than public norms, unavoidable, ‘one-size-fits-all’ rules. ‘Practical 
norms’ is therefore an ‘agency-friendly’ concept, which allows agency to 
be given a more empirical, more operational, more interactive and more 
collective content than the bald assertion that a margin for manoeuvre 
exists for every social actor.
Professional Cultures
The approach via practical norms provides an alternative solution to the 
explanation of the divergences between the public and practical norms 
of state actors via ‘culture’, or more exactly ‘societal culture’. The fact 
is that a culturalist-traditionalist argument is often invoked, and it runs 
something like this: state agents depart from official professional norms 
because they are conforming to social norms in their traditional culture. 
The norms of ‘African societies’ are hence more or less smuggled into the 
delivery of public goods. The scant respect for formal, bureaucratic rules 
in Africa is due to the weight of ‘community’ pressures, local customs and 
traditional values. An entire set of stereotypes and preconceived ideas 
(Courade 2006), prevalent among scholars and the general public alike, is 
brought into play: i.e. ideas on ‘African culture’, ‘socio-cultural traditions’, 
‘the pre-colonial heritage’, ‘African conceptions of the world’, ‘cultural 
determinants’, ‘community values’, ‘the weight of magico-religious beliefs’ 
and ‘the precedence of the family over the individual’.12
There is no shortage of empirical facts that should prevent one from 
systematically attributing to ‘African cultures’ customary practices of pub-
lic actors that do not conform to professional norms, and from confusing 
practical norms with traditional social norms (even though there are occa-
sions when social norms are transformed into practical norms, or at least 
legitimize them). For example, an entire range of practical norms within 
the public service were highlighted by our earlier investigations, such as 
the ‘every man for himself ’ attitude, the ‘perks’, the ‘widespread exchange’ 
of favours, the principle of impunity, the use of doublespeak, contempt for 
the anonymous user, a systematic use of mediators and various forms of 
obligations resulting from clientelist practices. An analysis of the origin of 
12 For a critical analysis of this ‘Africanist traditionalist culturalism’ cf. Olivier de Sardan 
(2010b).
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these norms shows that, far from stemming from a distant, pre-colonial 
past, they all point to a relatively recent past, colonial and post-colonial 
(cf. Cohen 1980; Olivier de Sardan, 2009a). The ‘colonial situation’, on the 
one hand, and development policies, on the other, have been decisive 
(but not exclusive) factors in the current pluralism of norms, and offer a 
reasonably comprehensive explanation of the origin of the considerable 
divergences between the professional and practical norms in evidence in 
interface bureaucracies in Africa. Many scholars have been emphasizing 
for a long time the extent to which laws introduced by the colonial state 
in Africa were ‘adapted’ or circumvented by local actors (Balandier 1963; 
Trotha 1994; Spittler 1981; Mamdani 1996; Bayart 1989).
However, the problem is to move to a higher level of generality, given 
the enormous diversity of practical norms, and produce theoretical inter-
pretations that, while avoiding the convenient traditionalist-culturalist 
argument, will allow the theorization of both the shared aspects and 
the internal differences characterizing the complex world of the practi-
cal norms of state actors. Another use of the concept of culture, and one 
that is much more concrete and empirical, will allow us to do exactly 
that: the concept in question is that of the professional culture of state 
actors. It can be divided into two basic distinct components: on the one 
hand, a ‘common bureaucratic culture’, which cuts across the differ-
ent state professions, and, on the other, ‘specific professional cultures’, 
peculiar to each one of them.13 A third component may be added, ‘site-
specific culture’, insofar as the common bureaucratic culture as well as 
specific professional cultures are always localized, and partly regulated 
by context- specific practical norms. In any case, professional culture is 
a space regulated by widely shared practices and representations, which 
straddle a body of official norms and a body of practical norms. But it 
always allows room for strategies, rejections or conflicts.
The Common Bureaucratic Culture
A historical development of a special kind occurred in Africa that affected 
the very basis of classic interface bureaucracy, which posits a clean break 
between public and private. This was a legacy of colonization, a legacy that 
grew stronger in the post-colonial period. A ‘colonial and post-colonial 
13 The role played by the ‘plurality of norms’ in Africa has already been demonstrated 
(cf. Berry 1993; Lund 1998; Chauveau, Le Pape and Olivier de Sardan 2001). But the exam-
ples analyzed tend to come from specific domains, like land ownership, where different 
kinds of legitimacy and redress—clearly identified and ‘visible’—clash. 
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construction of contempt and privilege’, was superimposed on the “social 
production of indifference” (Herzfeld 1992) typical of all modern bureau-
cracies. It encompassed the administration sector as well as the educa-
tion sector or the health sector, inasmuch as nurses and midwives adopt 
towards their clients the same attitudes as customs officials, teachers, 
police officers and registry workers.
In fact, the bureaucracy that was imported wholesale into Africa by 
the colonial regime had a very specific character. The gulf between the 
administrators and the public, which is an integral part of the construction 
of any bureaucracy, widened another, deeper and more radical gulf, that 
between Europeans and the ‘natives’. The highly exceptional and (even by 
the French administration’s own standards) illegitimate indigénat regime, 
which granted inordinate powers to district officers (‘commandants de 
cercle’) and deprived those they commanded of their basic rights, did 
indeed produce a bureaucracy that was undeniably ‘modern’, but in a 
‘colonial’ format that was something of a monster, mixing as it did a set of 
features deriving from the European classical model (organization charts, 
official procedures, written records, reports, etc. . .) and another set of fea-
tures spawned by the colonial/despotic situation and often contradicting 
the first set (resulting in a kind of schizophrenia, traces of which still lin-
ger today) (for a fuller analysis, cf. Olivier de Sardan, 2009a).
Admittedly, not everything goes back to colonization, far from it, and 
various practical norms, such as the general absence of sanctions, the 
systematic ‘every-man-for-himself ’ ethic, which undermines any team-
work, chronic absenteeism among staff and endemic corruption, are 
undoubtedly post-colonial. Others, however, which are just as recurrent 
in the behaviour of present-day African bureaucrats, can be traced back 
to the colonial administration (having been subsequently developed and 
incorporated). Contempt for the anonymous client, the role of media-
tors and the practice of conferring privileges are cases in point. Let us 
consider them.
Indeed, the enormity of the gulf between bureaucrats and their ‘native’ 
clients, embodied by the various provisions of the Code de l’indigénat and 
the prevailing colonial way of being (racism and paternalism, in varying 
proportions) introduced plenty of scope for arbitrariness, arrogance and 
even violence into the procedural rationality of traditional metropolitan 
bureaucracy, which was officially imported into the colonies for immediate 
application (cf. Bat and Courtin 2012). The long-term consequences have 
been significant: over and above the contempt many European public ser-
vants often expressed quite openly for those they governed, generations 
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of African auxiliary and clerical staff learned from their colonizers how to 
erect barriers between themselves and the local population, signal their 
privileged status in as many ways as possible, construct their superiority 
by asserting the inferiority of others, maltreat ‘natives’, and behave arbi-
trarily. Hence the gulf was perpetuated in post-colonial administrations 
and at times became even wider.
Mediators were indispensable to the functioning of colonial bureau-
cracy, which was blighted by chronic under-government. Lacking human 
resources and a mastery of local codes and customs, colonial bureaucrats 
not only tolerated but even systematically exploited various forms of out-
sourcing—another marked departure from metropolitan rules—, relying 
on auxiliary workers, chiefs, brokers, interpreters, etc. and giving them 
room for manoeuvre (cf. Alexandre 1970; Lawrance, Osborn and Roberts 
2006) After independence, the role of the intermediaries became more 
important to the point of now being one of the structural features of 
African administrations.
As for the system of privilege, it points straight to the innumerable ‘perks’ 
of colonial bureaucracy. The disparity was that much greater compared 
to public servants in mainland France because colonial managers were 
far less well educated. The mere fact of having a position in the colonial 
administration gave access to these privileges, regardless of competence 
or merit. Independence allowed former ‘clerks’ of the colonial regime to 
be promoted at lightning speed, catapulted overnight into all the senior 
‘colonial’ posts of the new state, and hence to acquire the ‘right’ to operate 
a system of privilege in their turn. After that, the system reproduced itself 
automatically via the classic route of ‘path dependency’.
More recently, the proliferation of enclaves constituted by development 
‘projects’ have replaced the state in a number of its functions. A striking 
contrast has developed between the official public sector and the sector 
of international institutions or ‘projects’, with derisory national rates of 
pay and third-class privileges, in the case of the former, and rates in line 
with international standards and first-class privileges, in that of the latter. 
The upshot is that, today, after devastating structural adjustment policies 
and the new forms of development aid, the public service has seen many 
of its old privileges disappear and has lost out to development agencies. 
Privilege has been displaced at every level in the ‘developmentalist config-
uration’, from northern countries’ experts to NGO outreach workers, and 
this goes a long way towards explaining the internal ‘brain drain’ inside 
Africa (the poaching of the best managers in the public service by the 
development agencies and international organizations).
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It should not be concluded from all this, however, that state mecha-
nisms are governed wholly by rationales based on privilege, clientelism 
or corruption. Rationales based on competence or merit have not disap-
peared from administrations. Far from it, they, too, feature as components 
of bureaucratic culture, as part of a complex mix, or have a place within 
the practical norms (cf. Willott, Therkildsen, Lentz in this volume). The 
same is true of the finicky respect for bureaucratic procedures.
Furthermore, the switching between official and practical norms that 
characterizes the generic bureaucratic culture is obviously not enough on 
its own to account for the professional practices of the entire body of pub-
lic service actors. These practices also vary, depending on the occupations 
and professions under consideration.
The Profession-Specific Cultures of Public Actors 
Each type of job has its own officially recognized technical skills and pro-
fessional norms, and a particular training system (a professional course, 
consisting of pre-service and in-service training). But jobs are also carried 
out in the real world, in a particular place, in ways that differ slightly from 
the official model, incorporating many of its elements, but mixed with 
habits, routines and ‘tricks of the trade’ that together correspond to the 
specific ‘know how’ of the job, to the requirements of a particular location, 
the way a particular department works, local management methods, the 
kind of hierarchy in place, relations between colleagues, contextual, mate-
rial and financial constraints and so on. It is this patchwork of different 
elements, of which practical norms are a core feature, that makes up the 
‘specific professional culture’.
It serves our purpose here to take the example of health workers. One would 
be on fairly safe ground in arguing that there is a profession-specific culture 
among midwives in West Africa, given the number of empirical studies that 
have been undertaken,14 which have highlighted an entire range of conver-
gent practical norms. These include the following: a sense of belonging to a 
social and professional elite, a certain contempt for the ‘ignorance’ of their 
patients, the opening up of the profession and the disappearance of the 
idea of a ‘vocation’ with its implied ethics, a feeling that the experience and 
instinct of midwives is more valuable than the knowledge of doctors, the 
appropriation of space and time in maternity hospitals for their own ends, a 
sense of impunity, the hunt for extra income at the expense of patients, the 
14 Cf. Jaffré and Prual 1993; Moumouni and Souley 2004; Koné 2003; Vasseur 2004; Jaffré 
and Olivier de Sardan 2003; Jaffré 2009; Olivier de Sardan and Bako Arifari 2011; Diarra 2012.
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frequent delegation of tasks to birth attendants, cleaners or trainee nurses, 
the primacy of forms of female sociability over professional requirements, 
the search for per-diems attached to professional training sessions, regard-
less of their content etc. . .
This professional culture is often far removed from the official norms, 
but the latter are known nonetheless (and some of them are respected), 
and knowing them (and knowing when to apply them) is also a part of the 
professional culture. Midwifery practices are also different from the expec-
tations of the local population, and have nothing to do with ‘traditionalist-
culturalist’ clichés: ethnic factors, witchcraft and kinship are not usually 
elements that have an explanatory relevance for the behaviour of midwives 
today (even though the latter, of course, in their private lives, have commu-
nity ties, consult soothsayers and belong to family networks, just like anyone 
else). Pre-colonial traditions relating to childbirth (at home) are in complete 
contrast to this professional culture: in pre-colonial times, birth attendants, 
whose main task was to cut the umbilical cord, were old women socially 
close to the parturient, who were present chiefly to give support, encourage-
ment and post-partum care (washing the baby and his mother and burying 
the placenta, as ritual required).
The professional culture of midwives is not, therefore, simply the product 
of formal training, where the official norms are taught. This formal training 
prepares them very insufficiently to the realities of their future professional 
life. Much more than that, the professional culture of midwives is made up by 
practical norms learned on the job. During their practical training, at the end 
of their formal education, trainees discover the ‘real’ job of being a midwife 
in a situation, in which there is a serious shortage of drugs and materials, a 
world away from the antiseptic and timeless depictions given in the lecture 
theatre, and without any guidance from their teachers: they suddenly have 
to do the bulk of the work themselves under the often lax supervision of 
the midwives on duty, who sometimes insult them if they are woken up ‘for 
nothing’. These placements and their first two or three years in post are the 
main locus of their professional socialization, the privileged space for learn-
ing this professional culture (cf. Vasseur 2009). They discover how to cope 
when they have run out of a particular drug, how to fill in partograms at the 
end of a care session and not during labour, how to do one’s job when there 
are no finger cots available, the blood pressure monitor doesn’t work and 
the ambulance has been commandeered for the head of unit’s shopping. 
They learn the tricks of the trade and the—more or less tolerated—‘dodges’ 
that bring in a bit of extra cash. They sort the tasks that really have to be 
performed from those they get used to neglecting. They gradually learn to 
inure themselves to suffering and death, to better resist the unreasonable 
demands of patients and their companions, to distinguish between ‘good’ 
and ‘bad’ patients and to live with hardship and injustice. They get over 
their initial (dis-)illusions and they begin to make ends meet.
Taken as a whole, the professional culture of midwives, no doubt like any 
other profession-specific culture, is a combination of at least three sets of 
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elements: (a) direct ‘traces’ of the respective official norms and skills the 
midwives have assimilated during their initial training; (b) more indirect 
traces, in that they have been modified and ‘tweaked’, the various ‘cop-
ing strategies’ serving as a filter, in other words adaptive, semi-tolerated 
or palliative practical norms; and (c) a set of behaviour patterns external 
to the professional norms and learnt on the job, in other words a further 
set of practical norms that have a ‘technical’, ‘relational’15 and economic’ 
dimension, including corruption, and are frequently transgressive.
Furthermore, every professional culture includes various other bodies 
of workers on the fringes of the space it occupies, with a range of sta-
tuses, both formal and informal. For a professional culture ‘localized’, it is 
always associated with a typical space, which in the case of midwives, for 
instance, is a particular maternity unit.
Hence, the ‘in-house’ professional culture of a maternity groups revolves 
around the midwives, carers, cleaners, birth attendants and first-aid work-
ers, with each of these ‘bodies’ being able, in certain respects, to perform the 
same therapeutic duties, establish similar relationships with clients, devise 
the same ‘dodges’, act in accordance with the same practical norms, but 
also, in other respects, to accept the distribution of roles and so maintain 
the hierarchy of relationships.
Paradoxically, it is these lower-grade workers—often volunteer workers, 
usually with a low turnover as they cannot be posted elsewhere—who 
ensure the stability of the localized professional culture (that is to say, a 
memory bank of the local habits, routines and ‘dodges’), whereas, under 
the present system, administrations change at the drop of a hat, depart-
ment heads rarely stay more than a year and the merry-go-round of trans-
fers of doctors hardly ever stops (see Hamani in this volume, for the role 
of volunteers in the running of courts).
This localized professional culture, whether at service or clinic level, 
can be seen as one of the elements of an organizational culture peculiar 
to that department. An organizational culture, as well as a professional 
culture, is always a mix of formal and informal patterns, of official and 
practical norms.16
15 It should be remembered that midwives are usually the wives of—sometimes high-
ranking—public servants and they exploit the protection they enjoy to avoid being posted 
in the provinces (cf. the pioneering article by Jaffré and Prual 1993; cf. also Diarra 2012).
16 ‘Deal and Kennedy (1982: 15) define organizational culture as the “system of informal 
rules that spell out how people are to behave most of the time” ’ (quoted in Grindle 1997: 
note 12).
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Similar processes can be observed in the legal system and education, 
as in all the profession-specific cultures involving jobs in the state sector.
Combinations of a Common Bureaucratic Culture, a Profession-Specific 
Culture and a Site-Specific Culture
It is obviously for analytical convenience that we have tried to distinguish 
between what belongs to a profession-specific culture, to a site-specific 
culture¸ and to a common bureaucratic culture. In real terms, they over-
lap, intermingle and even merge into each other.
For example, this triple influence could be read into the absence of com-
passion and patient care which can be observed on the part of healthcare 
personnel. On the one hand, a profession-specific culture has incorporated 
a range of ‘defences’ against unreasonable demands by patients, against 
the risks of patient management quickly becoming an all- consuming task 
and against helplessness in the face of suffering and death.17 On the other 
hand, a common bureaucratic culture has constructed the anonymous cli-
ent as a nuisance, an inferior and a victim all rolled into one. Finally, the 
personality of the senior midwive and the degradation of the maternity 
house will add other site specific factors.
Similarly, it can be argued that the very special relationship to time that 
one finds among midwives is the product of the intertwining of three dif-
ferent times. The ‘technical’ time, on the one hand, is a form of time linked 
to the profession-specific culture (the rhythm of night duty, the deceptive 
time of false labour pains, the more experimentally standardized time of 
cervical dilation, the normalized time of partograms etc.). It frequently 
contrasts with the time that is ‘lived through’ by the parturients. The 
‘bureaucratic’ time, on the other hand, is the time related to the common 
bureaucratic culture (where the illegitimate time of the client is always a 
disruption of the legitimate time of the bureaucratic actor). The local time 
of the health team is embedded in the precedent ones.
If we now extend the perspective beyond the example of the profession-
specific culture of midwives, we can conclude that the delivery of goods and 
services by state actors is carried out according to modalities that always 
combine a common bureaucratic culture and a set of profession-specific 
cultures and site-specific cultures, or, to put it another way, combine 
related sets of practical norms in part shared by state actors irrespective 
17 More generally, Lipsky (1980) had already noted that street level bureaucrats needed 
to “protect” themselves from clients.
 the delivery state in africa 419
of their professions, and specific in part to the profession and to the local 
context. It can also be argued that it is this combination that constitutes 
‘the bureaucratic mode of governance’, which is peculiar to state services 
when they deliver goods and services, compared to other suppliers.
Local Modes of Governance
The concept of ‘mode of governance’ should always be used in the plural 
and almost automatically implies a comparative perspective. The state 
is not the only provider of public or collective goods and services, other 
organizations also perform this role, in a way that is specific to them and, 
therefore, different from that of interface bureaucrats.
Development agencies, for instance, are not only providers of funding; 
they also deliver public services, sometimes in the same areas as the state 
as health or education (for example, through innumerable northern NGOs 
running or supporting clinics and schools)18 and sometimes in areas aban-
doned by the state (such as micro-credit or sanitation). In some cases they 
do this directly, but increasingly they do it through outsourcing to local 
NGOs, or even through the mediation of village cooperatives or various 
local voluntary associations that they have fostered. Municipalities also 
deliver public services, such as the management of drinking water, the 
registry and community schools. And other actors also exist, both indi-
vidual and collective, that perform a ‘delivery’ function, like ‘big men’ and 
sponsors originating from the locality (who finance a mosque, school or 
well), churches and brotherhoods (which open healthcare centres, distrib-
ute humanitarian aid or give help to the needy), and the ‘neo-traditional’ 
chiefs (who arbitrate in land disputes, ensure a degree of safety and wel-
come visitors). Most of these organizations have some involvement in 
education, the justice system (its arbitration function, at least), health, 
water supply and social welfare.
Furthermore, the approach adopted by these multiple social actors 
and organizations cuts across traditional boundaries. It blurs standard 
traditional distinctions like ‘private/public’, ‘state/civil society’, ‘formal/
informal’ and ‘endogenous/exogenous’. The state’s technical services 
now deliver commercial private expertise to communes and to individu-
als, NGOs and foreign aid agencies are staffed by the nation’s former 
18 Cf. Fichtner (2012) on the “NGOisation of education”.
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best public servants, the transfer of public sector habits into the pri-
vate sector is now just as rife as the better known converse (so that one 
now hears of forms of corruption internal to the private sector and the 
existence of ‘private bureaucracies’), associations are mushrooming in 
the hope of benefiting from ‘projects’, and many organizations exist in 
unclassifiable grey areas, in which they perform state functions without 
actually belonging to the state. These organisations are “twilight institu-
tions” (Lund 2006).
Each organization has its own forms of legitimacy and authority, its 
own actors, its own well-publicized operational rules (i.e. its system of 
official norms), its own way of applying these rules ‘on the ground’ (i.e. its 
configuration of practical norms). The coordination between these vari-
ous types of actors and the degree of manoeuvrability regarding the rules 
thus become important issues.
We shall refer to these different modalities, each with its distinctive 
character, through which organizations deliver public or collective goods 
or services, as ‘modes of governance’. In doing this, we use the concept 
of governance in a non-normative way, stripped of both the ideological 
visions peculiar to some development organizations and the oversimpli-
fied, reductive critiques typical of certain academic deconstructions. This 
perspective simultaneously takes into account the delivery dimensions 
and the political dimensions of public or collective actions, and allows 
us see the state and development organizations in Africa in a new light 
(cf. Blundo and Le Meur 2009).
To be more specific, a mode of governance is an institutional mecha-
nism (‘dispositif ’) for the delivery of public or collective goods and ser-
vices, in accordance with specific official norms and specific practical 
norms, incorporated into specific professional cultures and bringing into 
play specific forms of authority.
The notion of local governance is one variant of this definition, which 
seems to us particularly fruitful at the empirical level. The local level is 
certainly the level at which the best insight is gained not only into how 
a particular mode of delivery works (at the interface with clients/users), 
but also into how different modes of governance can co-exist; it is at this 
level, too, that the concrete forms of action by the various powers that 
occupy the same local arena can be simultaneously observed. Each mode 
of local governance has its own particular forms of authority and legiti-
macy, which are accepted or contested to a greater or lesser extent and 
which are more or less effective in delivering goods and services.
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Our research in Niger identified, ideal-typically, eight modes of 
governance.19 Among them, four are public ones. They are omnipresent 
and are also found in other African countries: the bureaucratic mode of 
governance (state services), the development project-based mode of gov-
ernance (development projects and aid interventions), the associational 
mode of governance (associations, cooperatives, farmers’ groups, etc.) and 
the municipal mode of governance (arising from recent decentralization, 
and the implementation of elected local governments). These four modes 
can be defined as ‘public’ modes of governance, in that they all are sup-
posed to serve the public interest (or the general interest), they all con-
cern the public domain, and they are all related to public spaces. Four 
other modes of governance, that are sometimes less prominent, often less 
central, more individualized, but also more disparate, could be added to 
them, inasmuch as they, too, deliver public or collective goods and ser-
vices, either on an occasional or a permanent basis: the chiefly mode 
of governance (exercised either by administrative—i.e. colonial-style—
chiefs, or by ‘customary’, ‘traditional’ chiefs, or else by neo-traditional 
chiefs), the sponsorship-based mode of governance (involving sponsors 
and big men), the merchant mode of governance (private operators some-
times deliver public services), and the religious mode of governance (simi-
lar in some ways to the associational mode, but with its own specificity 
nonetheless).
Each of these modes is officially regulated by specific normative and 
formal rules. But each of them also has its own informal regulation 
mechanisms. Each has its own forms of accountabilities, including for-
mal ones, linked to public norms, and informal ones, linked to practi-
cal norms (cf. Blundo in this volume). And each calls on a panoply of 
specific practical norms.
Each mode of governance is first of all describable and analysable at the 
local level, the level of its interface. This does not mean, however, that it 
is confined to a locality, or that it is idiosyncratic. Quite remarkably, the 
same forms of local delivery are replicated throughout French-speaking 
West Africa, even crossing national borders.
The common bureaucratic culture is, therefore, largely the same in 
Niger, Mali, Burkina Faso, Benin and Senegal, and the profession-specific 
19 For a more detailed description of these eight modes, cf. Olivier de Sardan 2009c, 
2011a.
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cultures of state actors also extend beyond borders (which is not to say 
that significant differences do not exist, despite this common identity, 
depending on the sectors, countries and regimes—differences that can 
only be unearthed by empirical research).
The same applies to the other modes of governance. Development proj-
ects are uncannily similar everywhere in West Africa, village associations 
and farmers’ groups operate along the same lines everywhere in West 
Africa, patrons make the same investments and introduce the same kind 
of patronage everywhere in West Africa, and municipalities are faced with 
more or less the same difficulties everywhere in West Africa.
Although these various modes of local governance exist side by side, 
it does not follow that each of them always delivers goods and services 
promoting the general interest in parallel, independently and on a more 
or less specialized basis.
Configurations of Delivery and Palliative Delivery
What actually happens is quite the opposite. The delivery of these goods 
is often effected through complex forms of coordination between differ-
ent modes of local governance, in other words between various sections 
of local authorities or other legitimate bodies, each with its own operating 
methods that have a presence in the local arena: state services, admin-
istrative chieftaincies, communes, associations, development projects 
etc. In other words, state bureaucracies, more often than not, do have to 
cooperate volens nolens with actors and organizations belonging to other 
modes of governance.
Let us take the example of personal safety in Niger (see also Bierschenk in 
this volume). Disputes between farmers and nomadic herders are common 
in the country’s interior, and sometimes lead to fatalities. It is the job of 
the police (gendarmerie) to prevent these (by patrolling) or to settle them 
(through written reports or arrests). To do either of these, a 4×4 vehicle is 
needed to get around. However, the car is often out of order, and the fuel 
allowance is woefully inadequate, hence patrols are few and far between. It 
is, in fact, the chief ’s ‘knights’ who alert the police whenever there is trouble. 
The car is fixed or the fuel is bought with dues paid by the local popula-
tion and collected by the village chiefs and a contribution from the mayor. 
As for the ‘livestock routes’ (‘couloirs de passage’) created especially for the 
herders, which should allow conflicts to be avoided, these are defined and 
mapped out by NGOs and funded by aid agencies.
This situation is one of co-production of the public good ‘safety’, which, 
in addition to the bureaucratic mode of governance (represented by the 
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police), also brings into play the chiefly mode of governance, the munici-
pal mode of governance and the developmental mode of governance. 
It also includes the clients themselves since they contribute to delivery 
through the dues they pay. This is a specific ‘configuration of delivery’. 
By this term—‘configuration of delivery’—I understand the various combi-
nations of actors, organizations and means—both state and non-state—
which enable a good to be delivered.
In the above-cited example, co-delivery is a consequence of the state’s 
inability, in one of its statutory functions, which is also a delivery func-
tion, to ensure this delivery by itself. It is therefore ‘rescued’ locally by 
other actors and organizations. Sometimes, when faced with the inability 
of their own administrations to fulfil their obligations, the state actors 
themselves ‘cobble together’ local solutions (bricolage or inventive prac-
tices, see Blundo and Hamani in this volume, and Cleaver 2002).
We refer to these practices as ‘palliative’ delivery or co-delivery. This 
has become widespread, and it allows goods and services that serve the 
general interest to be delivered even when the state is found wanting.
Palliative delivery relies very much on ‘arrangements’, which frequently 
take a monetary form, involving a payment by the client. He is the one 
who must somehow ‘dig deep into his pocket’ to fund expenditure that 
used to be undertaken the state, or which came under the state’s official 
responsibilities.
These practices are sometimes quasi-official, and even institutionalized, 
in other words they obey public (or quasi-public) regulations recently laid 
down by the state (or its appendages and partners) for dealing with its own 
inadequacies: the clearest case is education in the Democratic Republic 
of the Congo where the education system is funded largely by parents, 
whose contributions sustain the entire system, from the bottom up and 
in accordance with formal criteria, and where the Churches are the main 
providers of public education (cf. Titeca and De Herdt 2011). However, one 
could also argue that the introduction of health costs recovery in West 
Africa as a result of the Bamako Initiative is a form of palliative delivery: 
faced with the state’s inability to supply healthcare centres with drugs, 
patients have to pay a fixed sum for treatment and the money collected 
in this way is used by the centres to buy more drugs. In this case, the 
institutional form of palliative delivery remains internal to the bureau-
cratic mode of governance. The generalized practice of selling water by 
the bucket in areas that have boreholes or pumps, to guarantee repairs 
that the state can no longer ensure, is the same kind of process. Hence, 
it emerges that when palliative delivery relies on the client and is also 
institutionalized, it is close to being a form of privatization.
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However, palliative delivery can also take place in an informal con-
text while remaining within the bureaucratic mode de governance, and 
require palliative norms. Various unofficial charges levied on clients by 
public actors (in other words, various forms of petty corruption) serve not 
only to line the pockets of these actors but also to keep the service afloat 
so that it can continue its work: the actors of the Water and Woodlands 
Service (Eaux et Forêts) pay for their petrol and office equipment out of the 
‘income’ generated by the ‘racketeering’ to which the farmers are subjected 
(Blundo 2011). This amounts to a kind of informal privatization, which is 
internal to the public services (Blundo and Olivier de Sardan 2006).
However, very often palliative delivery takes a co-delivery form that is 
sometimes institutional in nature but, generally, informal. In fact, the kind 
of ‘informal tinkering’ that occurs at the local level is the most common 
response. It brings into play personal relationships between actors from 
different modes of governance. It depends on the goodwill of individuals 
and a commitment to reform on the part of local actors. It is therefore 
vulnerable and an easy prey for critics.
Conclusion: Reforms and Reformers
Generally speaking, clients/users/citizens everywhere are deeply dis-
satisfied with the bureaucratic mode of governance, as our, and others’, 
research has shown in various fields. The general feeling is that public 
services in Africa are blighted by inadequate delivery and poor quality. 
Although all four public modes of governance habitually appear as inca-
pable of translating their professed aims into realities, it is the bureau-
cratic mode of governance that most often comes under fire. The need for 
reform is stressed everywhere: and so the demand for reform is not just 
a demand from the outside world, from international organizations, but 
also (no doubt for other reasons and, obviously, in other forms) a demand 
from the grassroots level—the people themselves—for better-quality 
goods and services. The opportunistic behaviour of state actors, which 
shows up in a number of practical norms, reflects a widespread malaise 
among themselves, made up of discouragement, bitterness and cynicism.
Nevertheless, we met, in the course of our researches, state actors from 
all sectors who stood out as exceptions and who departed, to a degree, 
from the practical norms prevalent in their professional milieu, by follow-
ing certain alternative practical norms (often closer to the official norms, 
but without merging with them), in order to deliver better-quality services 
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(see Lentz and Roll in this volume). One can describe these exceptions as 
‘admirable’ in the sense that an actor’s nonconformist attitude often has a 
high personal cost, since it subjects him to the criticisms of family, friends 
and colleagues.
These reformers ‘from the inside’ (actors in the bureaucratic mode of 
governance) are, of course, in a very different position vis-à-vis the reforms 
proposed and implemented by the reformers ‘from the outside’ (actors in 
the developmental mode of governance). They operate within local pro-
fessional cultures (even if they do not adhere to them in every respect), 
they have a command of the practical norms (even if they modify or criti-
cize some of them) and they organize delivery or palliative co-delivery. 
In contrast, ‘outside’ reformers focus on official norms, either by perma-
nently producing new official norms—hence the endless reform of public 
policies (cf. Chabi Imorou, Charton and Muñoz in this volume). Or they 
try to improve the compliance to norms in place by introducing planning, 
control or management systems (as with the ‘new public management’ 
techniques). Or else they propose more training. As things stand at pres-
ent, these various measures appear to have little effect. At best they may 
serve as ‘windows of opportunity’ for ‘inside’ reformers, who sometimes 
exploit them to act in their own way in the specific area of practical norms 
and professional cultures.
Let us take the example of multiple accountabilities to illustrate the 
gap between reformers from the inside and reformers from the outside. 
While the latter work with a ready-made definition of accountability as a 
unique principle, the everyday reality we have studied is one where each 
mode of governance has its own forms of accountability, not only formal 
but also informal. Bureaucrats are submitted to an officially hierarchical-
bureaucratic accountability. But most of them are also de facto accountable 
to a ‘boss’ or an ‘elder’ somewhere in the public service, who intervenes 
for them in order for them to get their position, and/or to a patron or 
sponsor outside the public service, with whom they do deals and have 
“arrangements”. Moreover, when bureaucrats co-deliver a public service, 
they interact with actors belonging to other modes of governance, and are 
submitted to other types of formal and informal accountability. Any local 
reformer must take in account such constraints, most of them unknown 
or not taken in account by international experts.
Here is another example. In the face of the difficulties of public admin-
istration in Africa, development agencies have always been switching des-
perately from one mode of governance to another, in search of the key 
that will open all doors. It is tempting to believe that such and such a 
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mode of governance will provide, in and of itself, a miracle solution. After 
the great defeat of the bureaucratic mode of governance in post-inde-
pendence Africa, which occurred under both dictatorial and democratic 
regimes, and whose effects have persisted to this day, the preference was 
for the associational mode of governance, espoused in the name of com-
munity participation. Then it was the municipal mode of governance and 
democratic decentralization that embodied everyone’s hopes. The ‘mer-
chant’ mode of governance also has had its fierce supporters since the 
advent of the era of neo-liberalism and is still en vogue. Finally, disap-
pointed by all of the foregoing, some people have even turned to chiefly 
governance as the alternative.
But contrary to the expectations of many development experts, no 
mode of governance has intrinsic virtues that guarantee better perfor-
mance in public goods provision. ‘Within’ each mode of governance, there 
exist ‘reformers’ who are concerned to improve delivery performance and 
‘conservatives’ who are content with the current situation and the rents 
they derive from it. We use the opposition between ‘reformers’ and ‘con-
servatives’ here not in its usual ideological or macro-political sense, but 
only in relation to the issue of better access to public services and goods 
and improvement of their quality.
In other words, the different concepts we have used in this paper— delivery 
state, mode of governance, practical norms, delivery  configuration—are all 
linked one to each other. And they all belong to the grounded theory type: 
they are issued from empirical research ‘on the ground’. Maybe for this 
reason, they may not only help to better grasp complex situations without 
falling in ready-made theories, simplistic dichotomies, or ideological judg-
ments, but they may also open fresh perspective on reform issues.
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